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HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS TO FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, OPERATIONS, 1929.

MAJOR H. G. EADY, M.C., p.s.c.

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HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS TO FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS, "OPERATIONS," 1929,

BY

MAJOR H. G. EADY, M.C., R.E., P.S.C.

WITH A FOREWORD BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR GEORGE MILNE,

G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.S.O., D.C.L., LL.D.

Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

LONDON :

SIFTON PRAED & CO., LTD.

THE MAP HOUSE, 67, ST. JAMES'S STREET, S.W.1

1930

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FOREWORD.

I SHOULD have liked to have had this book by me when I first started my profession; as an introduction to the study of Field Service Regulations and Military History it could hardly be bettered. Books of principles are invaluable for the purposes of reference or for maintaining doctrines on sound lines, but they are not of much value to the young officer until he has learnt how to use them. To the uninitiated there is a grave danger that the premature study of such books may tend to the substitution of half-digested principles for the ordinary dictates of common sense, with of course disastrous results.

In order to derive full value from this book it is not necessary to agree with all the deductions made and it will be a most instructive exercise to turn to fuller accounts of the campaigns quoted to see why and on what grounds principles were broken, and whether there was any reasonable alternative. In the same way it is interesting to isolate the element of luck which plays so large a part in military operations and which is so impossible to define.

The book should be very useful to those who are studying for examination or the Staff College provided that it is used as an "apéritif" to further study rather than as a meal in itself.

G. F. MILNE,
F.M.

January, 1930.

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PREFACE.

A BOOK similar to this, but based on the *F.S.R.*, volume II, 1924, was originally published in 1926, and a second edition in 1927. In the meantime, the new *F.S.R.*, 1929, has been produced, and also many more authoritative works on the Great War.

It would appear as if the original book had been found of sufficient value to warrant a new publication, based on the new *F.S.R.*, and with more examples taken from the Great War. As a preface to this new effort, the author can do little but almost to repeat what he wrote in the first edition.

The study of military history often appears to be a stumbling block to officers, who get little instruction in it, although the importance of reading it and of applying it to the various official manuals is always being emphasised. The main difficulties for most people seem to be to know what to read, where to look for a particular type of campaign, battle, or incident, and how to apply the illustration to the manual concerned. Books are continually being written giving illustrations of strategy and of the handling of large formations, but few have direct bearing on these manuals, with which the average officer has to deal. This book is an attempt to help officers over this difficulty, and is not intended merely as a crammer's "potted history" for the purpose of passing examinations. Although the campaign index can be used for the study of one particular campaign, it is hoped that, by seeing illustrations from all periods of history, the reader may become interested in the study of war as a whole rather than in that of a single campaign for examination purposes, and that on this study he may be able to evolve a process of logical thinking as to the future.

If the book should afford assistance in this respect, it will have achieved its purpose.

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NOTES.

1. This book is based entirely on *Field Service Regulations,* volume II, 1929, the Controller of H.M. Stationery Office having kindly given permission for the use of the quotations.

2. The numbering of chapters and sections corresponds with that of *F.S.R.,* volume II, 1929.

3. As almost all the lessons for the consideration of protracted defence are to be found in the history of the campaign on the western front in the last war, little reference to them is made here.

4. Chapter X, "Warfare in undeveloped and semi-civilised countries," has been omitted for lack of space. The historical aspect of this warfare has already been dealt with in Callwell's *Small Wars,* and in *North-West Frontier Fighting,* by Col. Villiers Stuart; while further examples can be obtained from a study of the official *Operations in Waziristan,* 1919-1920, and of the campaigns in the Cameroons and in German East Africa.

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LIST OF REFERENCE BOOKS.

The following list of books on the various battles and campaigns is composed of books easy to read and to obtain.

GENERAL :

British Strategy. Maurice.
The Direction of War. Bird.
Operations of War. Hamley.
Principles of War. Foch.
The Science of War. Henderson.
The Study of War. Aston.
The Indecisiveness of Modern War. Holland Rose.
The Decisive Wars of History. Liddell Hart.
The Army and Sea Power. Pargiter and Eady.
History of the British Army. Fortescue.

ANCIENT HISTORY :

History of Polybius.
"Great Captains" series. *Lives of Alexander, Hanibal, etc.*
A Review of Infantry. Colonel Lloyd.

WARS OF THE MONGOLS :

Genghis Khan. Lamb.
Great Captains Unveiled. Liddell Hart.

WARS OF GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS :

"Great Captains" series. *Life of Gustavus.* Dodge.
Great Captains Unveiled. Liddell Hart.

CROMWELL :

Life of Cromwell. Morley.
Cromwell the Soldier. Baldock.
Cromwell's Army. Firth.
History of the British Army. Fortescue.
Cromwell's Letters and Speeches. Carlyle.
Cromwell's Scotch Campaigns. Douglas.
Six British Soldiers. Fortescue.

MARLBOROUGH :

The Wars of Marlborough. Taylor.
Coxe's *Memoirs of Marlborough.*
Six British Soldiers. Fortescue.
Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army. Atkinson.

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CHARLES XII OF SWEDEN :

Life of Charles XII. Votaire.

FREDERICK THE GREAT :

Frederick the Great. Carlyle.
Frederick the Great. Reddaway. "Heroes of the Nations" series.
The Wars of Frederick the Great. Maude.
Frederick the Great and his Seven Years' War. Hall.

WARS OF SAXE :

Great Captains Unveiled. Liddell Hart.
Campaigners Grave and Gay. Thornton.

QUEBEC :

Montcalm and Wolfe. Parkman.
History of the British Army. Fortescue.
Campaigners Grave and Gay. Thornton.

NAPOLEONIC WARS :

(A) *General*

Life of Napoleon I. Holland Rose.
Memoirs of de Bourienne.
Memoirs of de Marbot.
A Short History of Napoleon. Seeley.
Napoleon. Ludwig.

(B) *Detailed Campaigns*

"Special Campaign" series. *Campaign in Italy, Ulm, Jena, Leipzig, Waterloo.*
Austerlitz. A Hundred Years Ago. Furse.
Campaign of Marengo. Hamley

WELLINGTON AND THE PENINSULAR WAR :

Wellington's Campaigns. Robinson.
Napier's *Peninsular War.*
Oman's *Peninsular War.*
History of the British Army. Fortescue.
Wellington. Brett.
Six British Soldiers. Fortescue.
Warriors in Undress. Hudleston.

MOORE :

Six British Soldiers. Fortescue.

SIKH WARS :

The 1st and 2nd Sikh Wars. G.S., India, 1911.
The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars. Gough.

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AUSTRO-SARDINIAN CAMPAIGN OF 1848 :

The Chief Campaigns in Europe since 1792. Horsetzky.
A Century of Continental History. Holland Rose.
Guerre de l'indépendence Italienne. General Ulloa, 1859.

GARIBALDI :

Garibaldi and the Thousand. Trevelyan.

CRIMEA :

Kingslake's *Invasion of the Crimea.*
The War in the Crimea. Hamley.

FRANCO-AUSTRIAN WAR OF 1859 :

The Chief Campaigns in Europe since 1792. Horsetzky
A Century of Continental History. Holland Rose.
La Campagne d'Italie en 1859. Prussian General Staff, 1862.
The Campaign of Magenta and Solferino. "Special Campaign" series.

AMERICAN CIVIL WAR :

Stonewall Jackson. Henderson.
The Science of War. Henderson.
Grant's *Campaign in Virginia.* "Special Campaign" series.
The War of Secession: Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. "Special Campaign" series.
Maurice's *Life of Lee.*
The Civil War in the United States, 1861-65. Woods and Edmond.
The Generalship of Ulysses S. Grant. Fuller.

DANISH WAR, 1864 :

The Chief Campaigns in Europe since 1792. Horsetzky.

AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866 :

The Campaign in Bohemia. "Special Campaign" series.
The Prussian War in Bohemia. Anderson.
The Campaign of Koniggratz. Wagner.
Nachod. Principles of War. *Foch.*
The Seven Weeks' War. Hozier.

FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1870 :

The Development of European Nations. Holland Rose.
The German Official History.
Moltke's *Franco-German War.*
The Strategy of the Franco-German War. Bird.
Saarbruck to Paris. "Special Campaign" series.
A Short Tactical Study of the Battle of Worth. Henderson.
Account of the Battles of Gravelotte and Mars-la-Tour. Bigelow, U.S.A.

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RUSSO-TURKISH WAR OF 1877-8 :

The Russo-Turkish War, 1877. Major F. Maurice.
The Russian Army and its Campaign in Turkey, 1877-78. Greene.
General Gourko's Advanced Guard. Epauchin.

TEL-EL KEBIR :

The Military History of the Campaign of 1882 *in Egypt.* Maurice.

THE FRENCH CAMPAIGN IN MADAGASCAR, 1895 :

Rapport sur l'expédition de Madagascar, 1895. General Duchesne.

ITALIAN CAMPAIGN IN ABYSSINIA, 1896 :

The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik. Berkeley.

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR :

The Official History.

RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR :

British General Staff History.
German General Staff History.
The Russo-Japanese War. "Special Campaign" series.
A Staff Officer's Scrap Book. Ian Hamilton.

BALKAN WAR OF 1912 :

The Campaign in Thrace. Howell.
La Guerre des Balkans en 1912. Penrennun.

THE GREAT WAR :

(A) *Western Front*

Official History and Despatches
The First Thirty Days. Maurice.
The Last Four Months. Maurice.
1914. French.
German Strategy in the Great War. Neame.
Sir Douglas Haig's Command.
Story of the 4th Army.
Divisional Histories.
Tanks in the Great War. Fuller.
The March on Paris and the Battle of the Marne. Von Kluck.
General Headquarters and its Critical Decisions. Falkenhayn.
My War Memories. Ludendorff.
Out of My Life. Hindenburg.
The World Crisis. Churchill.
Britain and the War. Huguet.
Politicians and the War. Beaverbrook.

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The Great War. Carey and Scott.
From Private to Field Marshal. Robertson.
La Guerre en Action—Ethe. Grasset.
The Two Battles of the Marne. Foch, Joffre, Ludendorff, Crown Prince.
The Battle of Cambrai. De Prée.

(B) *East Prussian Campaign*

Tannenberg. Major-General Ironside.
My War Memories. Ludendorff.
German Strategy in the Great War. Neame.
With the Russian Army, 1914–1917. Knox.

MESOPOTAMIAN CAMPAIGN:
Official History and Despatches.
My Campaign in Mesopotamia. Townshend.
Callwell's *Life of Maude.*
A Brief Outline of the Campaign in Mesopotamia. Evans.

PALESTINE AND EGYPT:
Official Despatches and History.
Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914–1918. Major-General Bowman Manifold.
Five Years in Turkey. Von Sanders.

GALLIPOLI:
Report of the Dardanelles Commission.
Official Despatches and History.
Campaigns and Their Lessons: The Dardanelles. Callwell.
The Dardanelles Campaign. Nevinson.
Five Years in Turkey. Von Sanders.
The Campaign in Gallipoli. Hans Kannengiesser.

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CHAPTER I.

ARMED FORCES: THEIR COMMAND AND THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR.

1. INTRODUCTION.

Necessity for a Doctrine for Peace and War.

(i) *The Prussian Army at the Time of the Jena Campaign of* 1806.

After the period of the Seven Years War, 1756 to 1763, the Prussians, thanks to the reforming genius of Frederick the Great, were the supreme military power in Europe. For many years, it was sufficient for them to threaten to intervene in any quarrel to ensure a settlement favourable to themselves. As a result of this, they remained imbued with the ideas of Frederick the Great, and made no attempt to bring his doctrines into line with more modern conditions. "The military rulers failed to interpret the signs of the times." The Prussian military system became a soulless machine; barracks became practically prisons; the standard of physique and intelligence progressively decreased; evasion of service became frequent, with the consequent necessity of recruiting foreigners; in fact, everything possible was done to alienate the army from the nation, and this at a time when many of the advanced ideas of the French revolution were spreading through Europe.

The army was controlled by the Ober-Kriegs Collegium, a semi-political collection of old men, steeped in the ideas of the Seven Years War, and the only alterations they made in the organization of the army were carried out just before Jena, and were of such a disastrous nature that they must be considered partly responsible for the ensuing defeat. Forgetting the true lessons of Rossbach (Seven Years War—Frederick defeated Soubise), cavalry and guns were dispersed and handed over to the infantry commanders, who did not know how to use them; the "fusiliers" were taken away from battalions and made into separate units, with disastrous results at Vierzehnheiligen (Jena Campaign); and finally, the artillery, which Napoleon had constituted as a *Corps d'élite*, was considered of inferior social standing to the other arms, could therefore get few officers, and was of low moral. The supply system scarcely existed, and, as requisitioning was forbidden, the soldiers remained half-starving most of the campaign, while

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horses, clothing, and boots were all deficient and inferior. This state of affairs was entirely due to the lack of any doctrine in the country; there was no clarity of policy, and no cohesion between the politicians, the nation, and the army. The result of all this can be seen at once in the campaign. There was no definite scheme, and no co-ordination. "The Duke of Brunswick accepted the command," says Muffling, "in order to avert war." In fact, lack of doctrine was the true cause of Prussia's fall. "Prussia now suffered," says Seeley, in his *Short History of Napoleon I*, "from an incapacity diffused through the higher ranks both of the military and the civil service. Generals too old, a military system corrupted by long peace, a policy without clearness, diplomacy without honour, had converted the great power founded by Frederick the Great into a body without a soul."

(ii) *The Situation on Outbreak of Peninsular War.*

Extracts from works of Major-General Mitchell.

". . . every exertion was made to metamorphose Englishmen into soldiers—a task which the Whigs assured us was altogether hopeless.

As pipe-clay and drill were, in those days, looked upon as the best specifics for teaching Britons—the boldest and most athletic men in Europe—how to fight, an officer had then a fair chance of being promoted, provided he could strut up and down a parade in a commanding manner, give his orders in a loud voice, and above all make a battalion perform, in a cloud of pipe-clay, some of the so-called 'Eighteen Manœuvres.' A good deal of abuse heaped upon all ranks of subordinates was passed over, and became almost fashionable, whilst the foolish pedantry with which a number of high officials watched over the details of dress made an officer almost dependent on his tailor and hatter for the tenure of his commission.

As to military talents, they were—by universal consent—never spoken of; they were deemed far beyond our grasp and accessible only to our enemies. All military knowledge open to Englishmen was supposed to be confined to the book of the regulations."

". . . the British army took the field at the commencement of the Peninsular war totally destitute of all confidence except what was derived from the undisputed courage of the individuals of which it was composed. It was weighed down by the belief in some mighty phantom of military science that, at the command of our enemies, was to descend upon us in thunder, and crush our puny efforts."

". . . The minds of all officers were literally fettered, no one was supposed even capable of thinking on military matters; there was no professional assimilation of feeling; no amalgamation of sentiment, beyond what honour, patriotism, or private friendship

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inspired, ever took place. We were kept together by the iron bonds of a stern and rigid discipline, tempered only by the zeal and goodwill that avowedly pervaded all ranks. The injurious consequences of this estrangement extended themselves like a damp chilling mist over the whole profession, affecting more particularly the cavalry, who are more dependent on the daring and spirit of enterprise of individuals."

(iii) *The State of the British Army at the Outbreak of the South African War,* 1899—1902.

The British army had fought no war of any size since the Crimea. Parts of it had gained experience in many minor campaigns, but its organization and power of expansion for a larger war had not been tested. It is difficult to see quite what was the doctrine underlying the military ideas and organization at the end of the nineteenth century. " In all schemes for possible offensive war by Great Britain, it had been contemplated that the utmost strength which it would be necessary for us to embark from our shores, would be that of two army corps, with a cavalry division " (*Official History*). Yet Mr. Stanhope, the Minister of War, laid down in a memorandum in 1888 that " it will be distinctly understood that the probability of employment of an army corps in the field is sufficiently improbable to make it the primary duty of the military authorities to organize our forces efficiently for the defence of their country." This " improbable probability " had had its effect. In respect of numbers it imposed a limit on the powers of preparation; and the condition of affairs was precisely expressed by the following sentence :—" The war conclusively proved that Mr. Stanhope's memorandum did not make sufficient allowance for the general needs of the Empire " (*Official History*). That is to say— the doctrine was faulty.

The results were fairly easy to see. The two army corps had never existed, and were intended to be prepared while shipping to transport them was being collected; but the necessary ships for the movement of the troops with all their animals and transport were not easily obtainable. In addition, there was scarcely any organization for the administrative services, remounts, veterinary, clothing, equipment, etc., and there was no scheme for their expansion. As the result of inquiry on December, 1899, it was stated that " the war has now disclosed a situation as regards armaments, and reserves of guns, ammunition, stores, and clothing, and as regards the power of output of material of war in emergency which is, in my opinion, full of peril to the Empire "; while Lord Lansdowne, the Secretary of State, summed up the matter thus :—" It is, I think, abundantly clear that we were not sufficiently prepared even for the equipment of the comparatively small force which we had always contemplated might be

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employed beyond the limits of this country in the initial stages of a campaign. For the much larger force which we have actually found it necessary to employ, our resources were absolutely and miserably inadequate."

Possibly the worst feature was that staffs of many formations did not exist, while units had never been trained together. Staffs had to be created suddenly by borrowing from other units, which were thus depleted. The staffs throughout the army had never worked together, and many individuals had to take up appointments about which they were entirely ignorant. The result of this can be seen in the staff work in the various formations in the early stages of the war, and the lack of co-operation between units and arms.

As a result, then, of the lack of any real doctrine as to the army, its organization and equipment, and training in peace time, the army in South Africa in the early stages was in no sense capable of competing with the situation.

2. THE NATURE OF WAR.

Note the growing influence of the economic blockade. In the Napoleonic wars, both France and England attempted to enforce it; it played a great part in the American Civil War, and an almost decisive one in the Great War.

(See Chapter I.: "British Strategy." Maurice.)

3. THE ARMED FORCES.

A. The Moral of Armed Forces.

In all military history, it has been the moral of the commanders and of the forces which has been the deciding factor in success or failure. "Notwithstanding the power and effectiveness of modern weapons," says von Freytag Loringhoven in *Deductions from the World War,* "it is the moral element that is decisive in war.

(i) *The New Model Army.*

Consider the state of the Parliamentary army before Cromwell's re-organization. "Decayed serving men and tapsters" were unable to compete with the brilliant but undisciplined cavaliers. Cromwell therefore set to work to create a higher standard of moral, firstly by re-organization of the military system, and secondly by fostering the religious element of the war. "Being well armed within by the satisfaction of their own consciences," wrote a contemporary, "and without by good iron arms, they would as one man stand firm and charge desperately."

One has only to read the account of the campaign of Dunbar (see Sec. 76 (b)) to realize the standard of moral and discipline to which Cromwell had succeeded in bringing his army. "It had been observed," wrote one of his own soldiers, "that

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God was with him, and that affairs were blessed under his hand." From the time that he had got this feeling in his army, it was inevitable that the Royalist forces would be crushed.

(ii) *French Revolutionary Wars.*

The history of the French revolutionary wars is astounding from the point of view of moral. Troops unfed, unpaid, half-armed, and almost untrained, were continually driving back the fully equipped Coalition armies, and this was due almost entirely to the moral created by the series of amazing leaders France then produced. To take an example—the army of the Sambre-et-Meuse was supposed to be completely disorganised and demoralized in 1797, and was considered by the Coalition out of action. "Cette armée de Sambre-et-Meuse est désorganisée," wrote Hoche, on taking over its command; "mais j'en connais les éléments divers; j'y saurai rétablir l'harmonie : je vais réorganiser, créer." Within a very short time he again wrote : "il est impossible d'avoir une armée plus belle, plus brave, et mieux disciplinée. Avec elle, un général est sûr de vaincre bientôt les ennemis." He proceeded at once to put his words into practice by advancing over the Rhine, and winning the big victory of Neuwied (Map A, F 5).

(iii) *Army of Italy,* 1796.

Also note the condition of the army of Italy when Napoleon took over its command in 1796. They were badly equipped, worse clad, half starved, and not paid at all. On his arrival at Nice, in fact, at the close of March, he had to disband one battalion for mutiny. Yet by his personal powers, with this same army he was very shortly master of Northern Italy, having overcome the successive armies sent against him by the Piedmontese and the Austrians.

(iv) When Moral has Triumphed over Numbers.

Arbela, October, 331 B.C.

At the battle of Arbela, in Alexander's campaign against Darius, Alexander was probably outnumbered by nearly ten to one. Yet his moral and discipline gave him a complete and sweeping victory (see also Sec. 63 (f) (i)).

(v) *Charles XII of Sweden.*

In October, 1700, Peter the Great of Russia laid siege to Narva, and Charles XII of Sweden moved to its relief. Having landed at Pernau, Charles moved rapidly forward with some 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, leaving the rest of the army, about 12,000 infantry, to follow. The Russian advanced guard of 5,000 men was precipitately charged, and put to flight. In its flight, it carried away also the main body of the Russian forces, 20,000 strong. As a result, after two days very fatiguing pursuit, Charles

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arrived with his 8,000 men somewhat exhausted in front of the Russian fortified camp, containing 80,000 Russians and 150 guns. He immediately gave the order to attack. On someone pointing out to him the danger, Charles said :—" Why, do you imagine that with my 8,000 Swedes I shall not be able to march over 80,000 Muscovites?" The Swedish moral was too much for the Russians; their mere presence seemed to strike terror into their opponents. The attack was everywhere successful, and Charles, with his 8,000 men succeeded in capturing alone over 30,000 Russians.

(vi) See *Clive's famous Battle of Plassey,* 1757.

(vii) *Garibaldi and the " Thousand,"* 1860.

In his campaign for the unification of Italy, Garibaldi landed at Marsala in Sicily with his thousand men on May 11th, 1860, and within a month he had forced the withdrawal from the island of the Neapolitan garrison of 20,000 troops. He then crossed the Straits of Messina, and invaded Naples, forcing the evacuation of the Bourbon King, and was on the point of attacking the French forces in Rome as well, when Cavour stepped in, and declared the unification of Italy under the House of Savoy.

(viii) *The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

This war was a striking example of the effect of a high moral on one side, and a low moral on the other.

General Kuropatkin, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, gives an interesting view of this in his book *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*—a book which was banned in Russia :—

" Though our information as to the material points of the enemy's strength can hardly be described as good, we very much under-estimated—if we did not entirely overlook—its moral side. We paid no attention to the fact that for many years the education of the Japanese people had been carried out in a martial spirit and on patriotic lines. We saw nothing in the educational methods of a country where the children in the Elementary Schools are taught to love their nation and to be heroes. The nation's belief in, and deep respect for, the army, the individual's willingness and pride in serving, the iron discipline maintained among all ranks, and the influence of the *Samurai* spirit, escaped our notice; while we attached no importance to the intense feeling of resentment that we aroused when we deprived the Japanese of the fruits of their victories in China. . . . True, when hostilities began we did see all these things, but it was too late. And at that time, when the war was neither popular with, nor understood by, our nation, the whole manhood of Japan was responding with unanimous enthusiasm to the call to arms. There were

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instances of mothers committing suicide when their sons were rejected for the army on medical grounds. A call for volunteers for a forlorn hope produced hundreds ready to face certain death. While many officers and men had their funeral rites performed before leaving for the front, to show their intention of dying for their country; those who were taken prisoners at the commencement of operations committed suicide. The one idea of the youth of Japan was to serve in the army, and all the great families tried to do something for their country, either by giving their children to it, or by providing money. This spirit produced regiments which hurled themselves upon our obstacles with a shout of "Banzai!" broke through them, and, throwing the corpses of their comrades into the *trous de loup,* climbed over them on to our works. The nation, as well as the soldiers, felt the vital importance of the war, appreciated the reasons for which it was being fought, and spared no sacrifices to obtain victory. In this, and in the co-operation of the nation with the army and the government lay the strength which brought Japan victory. And it was with an army weakened by the feeling of opposition in its own country that we had to face the armed might of such a nation."

B. National Moral.

(i) Note the remarkable maintenance of national moral in Prussia during the Napoleonic Wars, which enabled her again and again to rise after defeat.

(ii) In the Great War note the effect on national moral of the failure of the French offensive under General Nivelle: and the collapse of national moral in Russia, and, later, in Germany.

C. The Necessity for a Suitable Organization of the Armed Forces.

(i) *The Success of Gustavus Adolphus.*

At the end of the sixteenth century, war had sunk to a very low level. There were few regular standing armies, and those only of a very limited size. Mercenaries were used just for the campaign, and then dismissed. The evolution of weapons from the bow and pike to the musket and gun had not advanced rapidly.

Gustavus ascended the throne of Sweden at the age of seventeen in 1611, and quickly changed the state of affairs. He started a national militia, which did away with mercenaries, and allowed him to introduce a strict discipline; he uniformed his army, and reorganized them definitely into companies and regiments, with definite ranks and commands; he gradually replaced

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the pikemen with musketeers; he produced a musket light enough to dispense with the crutch rest, paper cartridges, and finally the bayonet. He reduced the file to six, which deployed to three to fire, and altogether made the footmen more mobile. He trained the cavalry to charge at a gallop, instead of relying on their fire arms, as in other armies. Finally he produced the best artillery in Europe; he had light and handy guns, which could keep up with the troops and fire with rapidity; he invented fixed ammunition; and he made the handling of guns a science. In addition, he was a very keen observer of terrain, made full use of it, and attained complete co-operation between his arms.

The discipline enforced was rigid, and there was practically no crime in his army. The pay was regular (an astounding thing in those times), and the food ample, being obtained from magazines, carefully sited and stocked. Promotion went by seniority and service, rewards and punishments were justly meted out, and religious duties were strictly observed.

With this organization and discipline, both far in advance of those of other nations, backed by the moral influence of a religious cause, it is not difficult to see why Gustavus was so successful.

In addition, a study of Breitenfeld (Sec. 7 (iii) B (iii)), and of the crossing of the Lech (Sec. 16 (a)) shows that he was capable of making full use of the perfect machine he had created. In fact, he was not only the founder of modern continental military organization, but also the founder of modern tactical ideas.

(ii) *The Success of Cromwell.* (See "Moral.")

Cromwell's actual success was largely due to the careful organization of the New Model Army, and to the strict discipline which he instilled in all ranks. His methods are very clearly shown in C. H. Firth's *Cromwell's Army.*

(iii) *The Success of Frederick the Great.* (See "Surprise.") Sec. 7 (iii) B (iv).

Frederick's methods were almost a repetition of those of Gustavus Adolphus. He developed a very careful organization, which largely increased the mobility and fire power of his troops. Hence, he was enabled to put his tactical ideas of the oblique attack into practice.

(iv) *The Prussian Success in* 1866 *and* 1870. (See "Surprise.") Sec. 7 (iii) C (ii).

The campaigns of 1866 and 1870 were triumphs of organization and discipline. While Bismarck had been consolidating the political position of Prussia, Moltke and Von Roon had been perfecting the military machine. Von Roon was probably one of the greatest military organizers the world has seen.

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(v) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904–1905.

There is a very interesting comparison between the organizations and discipline of the Russian and Japanese armies in General Kuropatkin's book *The Russian Army and the Japanese War.*

(vi) *Tannenberg,* 1914.

Note that the Russian disasters in East Prussia in 1914 were largely due to their faulty organization. They advanced before their rear services were mobilized, and their supply system completely broke down.

(vii) *Gallipoli.*

" The situation was, moreover, complicated by the fact that two divisions (29th and Royal Naval), so soon to fight side by side, were armed with rifles of a different mark and that though the 29th Division, with Mark VII rifles, could use the Naval Division's Mark VI ammunition, their Mark VII ammunition was useless for the rifles of the Royal Naval Division." (Off: Hist: page 121.)

(viii) As a matter of contemporary historic interest, one might add a quotation from the modern Mr. Pepys, in a " Diary of the Great War." Speaking of one belligerent, he says :—" He hears that they do now send out their soldiers armed with stout clubs, but no guns, having none for them, and do bid them, each man, to knock down a German and take his gun from him. Hearing of which did make me the more admire them of their bravery, albeit their manner of fitting an army I do admire less."

D. Necessity for Unity of Direction and Control.

(i)

In early days, this was more easy to ensure, as a commander of a force was controller of policy as well. It is interesting, in this respect, to compare the campaigns of Marlborough and Napoleon.

(ii) 1799.

During the campaign of 1799 against the French, there was no unity of direction or control.

" Never before in any war," said Suvoroff, " has diplomacy held such unbridled and full control. Neither the broad object of the war nor the general direction and course of operations has been explained to the generals. The people in Vienna, 500 miles away, presume to direct operations, unaware of the fact that every minute produces some change or other. How can this court official, even though he were girded with the sword of

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Skanderberg, command an army from his office chair, and give orders to meet conditions that change on the field every single moment? "

(iii) 1812.

In 1812, when Barclay de Tolly had eventually obtained the sole command of the Russian forces, and was carrying out the correct policy of withdrawal and evasion of battle, the plan of campaign was nearly upset by interference of the Tsar, urged on by subordinates such as Bennigsen, who forced him to stand and fight at Smolensk, which was exactly what Napoleon wanted.

(iv) 1854.

In the Crimean War, Napoleon III was always trying to direct operations from Paris. General Pelissier, the French commander, finally telegraphed to him :—". . . prayed that by His Majesty's orders, he might be set free from the narrow limits assigned to him, or allowed to resign his command "—a command which he described as one " impossible to exercise . . . at the sometimes paralysing extremity of an electric wire." (Bird.)

(v) *Paardeburg, February,* 1900.

Note the difficulties which occurred here owing to the interference with the normal channel of command. Lord Roberts was ill, and gave the command to Lord Kitchener, his chief of staff, thinking that he knew better than any one else his intentions. But Kitchener was junior to several of the divisional commanders, who were not aware that Roberts had given him the command. Hence, many never knew who was in command at all at the battle, and the result was chaos. See " Co-operation," Sec. 7 (vi); also Sec. 28 (f).

(vi) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904–1905.

Note that there were two people issuing orders to the Russians in Manchuria and Korea—Alexieff, the Viceroy, and Kuropatkin, the Commander-in-Chief. The result was that Zassulich, on the Yalu, received conflicting orders, and failed to achieve anything. See Sec. 5 C (i) (c).

(vii) 1914.

Note the disastrous results to Germany of the lack of control of the 1st and 2nd Armies in the advance on Paris.

(viii) *Mesopotamia.*

(a) Note the extraordinary situation between Generals Nixon and Townshend, the lack of defined object of the campaign, and the complete lack of any central control in the early parts of this fighting. Sir William Robertson, in an appre-

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ciation, stated :—" anything is better than continuing our present difficult, costly and objectiveless plan."

(b) In the later periods of this campaign General Maude centralised control to a remarkable degree and allowed little initiative to his subordinates. This was particularly noticeable in his handling of his Cavalry Division, especially on the 25th and 26th February, in the advance towards Aziziyeh.

(ix) *Foch.*

Appointment of Marshal Foch to co-ordinate the whole of the allied forces.

(x) *Gallipoli.*

Note the interesting lack of central control on the Turkish side, as explained in the Official History Vol. I, p.37. There were three Commanders, each independent of the others.

(xi) *General.*

Note the serious effect on unity of control of the withdrawal of the General Staff from the War Office at the outbreak of war.

In Gallipoli, " where at the last moment, the army was suddenly called upon to make plans for a landing in face of a now thoroughly awakened enemy, the absence of initial staff preparations had already resulted in the violation of most of the principles the observation of which is essential to the success of an amphibious campaign." Official History.

The General Staff were not informed that any large military operations in the Dardanelles were contemplated until 11th March.

Similar troubles arose over the fight for possession of the 29th Division. (See Official History, Vol. I, p. 72.)

5. THE COMMAND OF THE MILITARY FORCES.

A. Importance of the First Appreciation of the Situation.

(i) *First Burmese War,* 1824.

" The British plan of campaign was to approach from the sea, capture Rangoon, and send an armed flotilla up the Irrawaddy to the capital, but the appreciation of climatic conditions, etc., was hopelessly wrong, and the wrong season was selected for such strategy. Rangoon was occupied in May, and then the rains, which transformed the Irrawaddy from a navigable channel into a rushing torrent, prevented for six months the advance up country. The Burmese had abandoned the town at the first appearance of the enemy and driven off all their flocks and herds into the jungles of Pegu. The British forces had thus to depend

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on rotting provisions provided by fradulent Calcutta contractors, and amidst the fever-laden mists of the drenched country round Rangoon were soon decimated by disease." (Robert's *Historical Geography of India.*)

(ii) *French Campaign in Madagascar,* 1895.

Faulty knowledge of the country and appreciation of the campaign led to the provision of a useless type of transport. General Duchesne had to abandon the transport, and, instead of advancing methodically with a considerable force, was only able to employ a small flying column.

(iii) *Mesopotamia.*

Note that in this campaign nearly all the rules here laid down were broken. The General Staff at home was not in charge; there was no co-operation between the General Staff, Intelligence, and the Government of India; there was no plan co-ordinated between the General Staff and the Government; and the plan evolved was based on purely political considerations, without really considering military opinion.

(iv) *Gallipoli.*

According to the evidence of the Commission, this is another striking example of a plan adopted without or against the advice of the heads of the fighting services.

In addition there was no reliable information about the country. " The Intelligence Section of the General Staff, who had not been informed that military operations in that area were ever contemplated, were unable to say whether the roads in the Peninsula at that season were fit for mechanical transport, or whether there were any roads at all." Official History.

All Sir Ian Hamilton was given were Lord Kitchener's instructions, a handbook of the Turkish Army, 1912, a pre-war report on the Dardanelles defences, and a map which subsequently proved inaccurate.

The French, who were to co-operate, appear to have been given no idea of the future plan.

B. Moral of a Commander.

See also Sec. 3.

(i) *Cromwell,* 1650.

Note his amazing resolution at Dunbar, when he appeared in an almost hopeless situation. He was surrounded in Dunbar by the Scots, his communications with the sea were interrupted by weather, and his troops were all but starving. Yet he indomitably maintained his position, until the enemy was led to make a

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mistake, of which he at once took advantage practically to annihilate the Scottish force. See also Sec. 76 (b).

(ii) *Battle of Eylau,* 1807. Map A.

In 1807, after Prussia's crushing defeat at Jena, the English and Russians renewed the coalition against Napoleon. Bennigsen, with the Russian forces, had moved westward to try to seize Danzig and Graudenz (L 3), from the French. They had been held up by Bernadotte at the river Passarge, and then Napoleon moved north to drive them into the sea. Bennigsen retreated towards Konigsberg, " but at Eylau turned on his pursuers and fought the bloodiest battle fought in Europe since Malplaquet." (Rose.) There were about 75,000 on each side, and the fighting was terrific, and apparently, at the end of the day, without result. " Thus darkness closed over some 100,000 men, who wearily clung to their posts, and over snowy wastes where half that number lay dead, dying or disabled. Well might Ney exclaim: ' What a massacre, and without any issue.' Each side claimed the victory . . . but, as Bennigsen lacked . . . above all the dauntless courage of Napoleon, he speedily fell back and thus enabled the Emperor to claim a decisive victory." (Rose.)

This battle was simply a duel between the will-power of the respective commanders.

(iii) *American Civil War.*

Much of Jackson's success was achieved by his personality. " His own soldiers," says Henderson, " and with them the whole population of the South, believed him capable of any task, invincible except by fate."

(iv) *Russo-Turkish War,* 1877–78.

One of the most interesting figures in history in this respect was the Russian, Skobeleff. " A dandified, debauched fire-eater," as he was described, his troops worshipped him and he could do whatever he wished with them.

See "A Sense of Proportion " in *The Green Curve,* by Ole Luk-Oie; " Some Aspects of Moral and Command," *Army Quarterly,* April, 1925.

C. Allotment of Tasks to Subordinates, and Responsibility and Initiative of the Soldier.

(See " Co-operation," Sec. 7 (vi).)

(1) Understanding Orders.

(*a*) *Bernadotte at Jena,* 1806.

Bernadotte's corps was linking up Napoleon's force on the Landgrafenberg with that of Davoust at Auerstadt. There is

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considerable divergence of opinion as to what orders were actually sent to Bernadotte, but there is no doubt that he entirely failed, whether wilfully or not is not known, to understand what was required of him, and he remained inactive, without taking any part in the two battles raging to the north and south of him.

(*b*) *Waterloo,* 1815. Map A.

Cf. Blucher and Grouchy before Waterloo. Blucher knew exactly what was required of him, that he should join Wellington in time to defeat Napoleon. Grouchy had apparently little idea of his rôle, and was wandering about achieving nothing, while the fate of the campaign was being decided at Waterloo.

(*c*) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904–1905. Map D.

See Sec. 3 D (vi). There were three courses open to Zassulich on the Yalu, but he apparently did not realize which was required of him :—

1. To stand on the Yalu and fight a decisive action against the Japanese 12th Division before further troops could be landed;
2. To fight a delaying action on the Yalu to give Kuropatkin time to mobolize the rest of the Russian forces;
3. To act as an observation force.

Actually he did no one of these, and merely was well beaten without achieving any real result.

(*d*) *Adowa, March,* 1896. *Italian Abyssinian-Campaign.*

Note the disaster in this battle due to misunderstanding of orders. See Sec. 23 (a) (vii).

(*e*) 1914. Map A.

The encounter battle of Ethe-Virton (E 5) between the Fifth German Army and the French Third Army. See Sec. 64 (i). There was a very interesting case of a misunderstanding of an order, which brings out the danger of a verbal order, unconfirmed in writing. The right of the French Sixth Corps was completely uncovered by a misunderstanding. This flank was covered by the 40th French Division, which, after very severe fighting, had to withdraw. General Hache, in command, ordered verbally its elements to withdraw to "*l'Othain,*" where they still covered the right of the Corps. The liaison officers, who took the order, thought he said "*Etain,*" also close by, where the elements of the division consequently moved, and uncovered the right of the VI Corps.

(*f*) *Mesopotamia.*

In General Aylmer's attack on Shirkh Saad, 6th January, there was considerable misunderstanding. General Younghusband with the 7th Division was intended merely to pin the enemy at

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Shirkh Saad, while General Aylmer could bring up the remainder of the Tigris Corps: but on the 6th, the 7th Division attacked with very insufficient artillery, and by early morning on the 7th found itself irrevocably committed to a serious battle.

(ii) Interference. (See Sec. 3 D.)

(iii) Fear of Responsibility. (See also Sec. 5 B.)

(*a*) *Jena.*

Cf. Napoleon and the Duke of Brunswick at Jena. Brunswick had accepted the command "in order to avert war." He was overwhelmed by his responsibilities, and never took decisive action.

(*b*) 1870.

See again von Alvensleben's decisive action before Mars la Tour. See Sec. 7 (v) (g).

Also note the French indecision after Gravelotte. Map A, Sketch I. MacMahon had decided to retire to Chalons. Then, owing to pressure from Paris, he decided not to. Then he decided to advance on Metz to relieve Bazaine. Finding this very difficult, he wandered, almost without object, and led himself to the final disaster of Sedan.

(*c*) 1877–78—*Russo-Turkish War.* Map A.

Note the inaction of Suleiman Pasha. After the Russian forces had crossed the Balkan Mountains and held the Schipka Pass, Osman had flung himself and his army into Plevna, from which he threatened the flank and communications of the Russian forces, across the Balkans. Suleiman had a force of about 50,000 south of the mountains, yet he remained practically inactive, bought by the Russians, according to some authorities, while the Russians laboriously and at great cost captured Plevna, thanks chiefly to Skobeleff. Throughout the period of the siege, the Russians were undoubtedly in a very dangerous position, as they were dependent on a narrow defile across the mountains, and had their flank threatened from Plevna. Any move by Suleiman would probably have forced a Russian withdrawal to the Danube.

(*d*) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904–1905.

Note the continued inaction, vacillation, and fear of responsibility of Kuropatkin and of his subordinates throughout the war.

(*e*) *Le Cateau.*

The decision to stand and fight at Le Cateau had to be taken on the responsibility of a subordinate—General Smith Dorrien.

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(*f*) *Gallipoli.*

Note the initiative and quick decision of Mustapha Kemal in throwing in a big counter attack on his own responsibility during the Anzac landing. (Off. Hist. pp. 185 and 186.)

6. THE COMMANDER'S PLAN.

" Must be conceived within the possibilities of available resources."

Napoleon in Russia, the Austrians in 1866, the French in 1870, the French in 1914, and the British forces in Mesopotamia—all initiated plans which were outside the possibilities of their available resources, with serious results.

7. THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR.

(I) Concentration.

(*a*) *Rupert and Albermarle* v. *the Dutch,* 1666.

In 1666, there was a very interesting naval case of lack of concentration, when de Ruyter with the Dutch fleet met the English fleet divided, part being under the Duke of Albermarle and part under Prince Rupert. See the very interesting contemporary comments on this in *Pepys' Diary* from May 31st, 1666, onwards, especially June 24th.

(*b*) *Napoleon's Campaign in Italy,* 1796. Map F.

See " Surprise "—Sec. 7 (iii) A (ii).

Beaulieu and Colli had widely divided their forces, which were only linked together by a weak detachment. Napoleon, on the contrary, concentrated every available man and struck at the weak spot in the enemy's line.

Note, that in the later stages of the campaign, the Piedmontese and the Austrians emphasized their error. Instead of withdrawing their forces and trying to re-unite again, Beaulieu and Colli further separated to cover their respective capitals—Beaulieu withdrawing to Milan and Colli to Turin, so that Napoleon was able to complete their destruction in detail.

(*c*) 1796–1797. *The Fighting for Mantua.* Map F.

In July, 1796, as a result of his earlier campaign, Napoleon was master of Lombardy. He was holding the line of the Adige, up to Rivoli, and was besieging Mantua, a place of considerable strategic importance. He only had some 45,000 men, however, who were scattered along a front of fifty miles from Legnano to Brescia and to Milan, and 10,000 of these were engaged in the siege of Mantua.

The Austrians determined to regain Lombardy and Mantua at all costs. Beaulieu was replaced by Wurmser, a veteran of the

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Seven Years War, and 47,000 men were concentrated in the Tyrol.

Unfortunately for the success of their plans, they had not learned anything from the lessons of Montenotte and Millesimo. "Success," says Holland Rose, "might have been attained had the Austrian Emperor and Staff understood the absolute need of concentration in attacking a commander who had already demonstrated its supreme importance in war." Yet the plan devised was for an advance by three columns.

Quasdanovich, with 17,600 men, was to move down the western side of the Lake Garda, to seize Brescia, and cut Napoleon's communications with Milan; the main body, under Wurmser, 24,300 strong, was to march in two columns on either side of the River Adige, drive the French from Rivoli, and push on to Mantua; and a third division, under Davidovich, from the Friuli area, was to march on Vicenza and Legnano, distract the French attention on that side, and possibly relieve Mantua, if the other two onsets failed.

On August 7th, Wurmser and Quasdanovich were timed to reunite south of the Lake Garda. It is of particular importance to notice that Wurmser and Quasdanovich were divided by very severe obstacles—Lake Garda and the mountains above the Adige.

Napoleon was considerably disconcerted, when he heard, on July 29th, that the Austrians had occupied Brescia, thus cutting his communications with Milan, and that Massena's Advanced Guard had been driven in from Rivoli; his force was considerably scattered, but he at once realized the danger and saw how he could take advantage of the enemy's dispersion. He immediately drew in all his forces towards the southern end of the Lake Garda, abandoning the line of the Adige. So thorough was he in concentrating every available man that he abandoned the siege of Mantua, and destroyed his siege train. Thus he was concentrated with his full force between the divided Austrian forces, and at the point where the Austrians were due to reunite themselves.

The subsequent fighting was very involved, but, though the Austrians appeared successful at first, they never could recover from their faulty strategic plan. Wurmser did get to Mantua, and revictualled it, but Quasdanovich was held up south of Brescia, and Wurmser, still adhering to the time table which obviously could not be maintained, advanced to try to unite the whole of the Austrian army.

Napoleon, concentrated and centrally placed, succeeded in dealing with Quasdanovich and Wurmser in detail at Lonato and Castiglione respectively, and the whole Austrian attempt to retake Lombardy was shattered.

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(*d*) *Second, Third and Fourth Attempts to retake Mantua,* 1796–1797. Map F.

The Austrians never seemed to learn from their previous mistakes. In the second attempt, September 4th to 15th, Wurmser again split his forces. Davidovich, with 20,000 men, took up a position at Rovereto to cover the road to Trient, while Wurmser himself was to move *via* Bassano, down the valley of the Brenta to Vicenza, and thence to Verona. Napoleon was again concentrated centrally, and struck at Davidovich, who, on the 4th was overpowered, and fell back upon Trient. Napoleon then turned back, and struck at Wurmser.

As a result, Davidovich's army was destroyed, and Wurmser eventually forced into Mantua, which town thus had shut up in it 30,000 men.

Third Attempt.

Again the Austrians divided their forces. Davidovich with 20,000 was once more to come down the valley of the Adige, while Alvinczy, with 30,000, was to advance through Bassano against Verona. Napoleon was, as usual, concentrated centrally. He watched both the Austrian forces, withdrawing slowly in front of them, and waiting for his opportunity. When Alvinczy was just in front of Verona, and only some twenty-five miles from Davidovich, Napoleon struck. At Arcola, he defeated and drove back Alvinczy, and then turned on Davidovich at Rivoli.

Fourth Attempt, January 9th to 16th, 1797.

The last attempt, with the same mistakes. Alvinczy, with 28,000, was to advance from Rovereto to force the position of Rivoli; Provera, with 9,000, to advance from the Brenta on Legnano, to withdraw the attention of the French from the real attack on the Adige; 10,000 at Bassano and elsewhere to assail the French at different points, and hinder their concentration.

Note that 19,000 *men were being employed on feint attacks, leaving only* 28,000 *for the main attack.* Napoleon soon saw that Provera's attack was only a feint, and concentrated at Rivoli, where, after a terrific struggle, with fluctuating fortunes, he shattered Alvinczy's army, and the power of Austria.

(*e*) *The Campaign of Jena,* 1806. Map A (H 5).

This campaign illustrates perfectly Napoleon's principle of concentration. From the moment he issued the first orders for the provisional concentration before the advance, he had no doubts as to his action. He did not know what were the enemy's plans or dispositions, and they were almost immaterial to him. He was going to move on Leipzig and Berlin fully concentrated; the Prussians were certain to give him battle somewhere; and in

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his concentrated formation he felt sure of success. In order to achieve this formation, he devised the "battalion square of 200,000 men." The outer lines of his advance were some thirty-five to forty miles apart, so that his army could concentrate upon its centre in one day, or on either flank in two.

The Prussians did exactly the reverse. The policy was vacillating from the beginning, and they had no plan. Russia had joined them, but no diplomatic or military efforts were made to arrange a Russian and Prussian junction of forces before Napoleon could strike the latter alone. The French advance had begun on October 6th, at which time the 130,000 Prussians were spread out over a front of eighty-five miles, "the Saxons being near Gera, the chief army, under Brunswick, at Erfurth, while Ruchel was so far distant on the west that he could only come up at Jena just one hour too late to avert disaster." (Rose.) Scharnhorst, referring to the need of concentrating their forces, wrote on October 7th—"What we ought to do, I know quite well; what we shall do, only the gods know." This lack of concentration was further emphasized by pushing out isolated Prussian detachments to the front, and by sending off 12,500 men to raid the French communications, *via* Fulda.

The result of all this dispersion was inevitable. The raiding detachment affected nothing, and was lost to the battle; Tauentzein, with one of the advanced detachments, was completely defeated by Bernadotte about Schleiz; Prince Louis, with another of the detachments, was killed and his force completely defeated by Lannes at Saalfeld; while, as already stated, Ruchel was too far off to affect the battle at all.

The Prussians, in fact, were defeated by their lack of concentration before a shot was fired. "Had he (the Duke of Brunswick, commanding the Prussians) massed all his forces so as to command the valleys of the Saale and Elster near Jena and Gera, the campaign might possibly have been prolonged until the Russians came up." (Rose.)

(*f*) *Federals in the American Civil War*, 1861–1865. Map B.

Note how, until the arrival of Grant in the Virginian theatre of war and the growth of the overwhelming superiority in numbers of the Federals over the Confederates, the Northerners were never properly concentrated. Jackson, in the Valley of the Shenandoah, was always able to play upon their fears of an attack upon Washington, and, as a result, large Federal forces were maintained protecting the capital, which should have been employed at the decisive point. The Confederate successes in the first two years of the war were almost entirely due to the way in which they forced this dispersion on the enemy. See also, "Economy of force," Lee's concentration for 1st Manassas (see 7 (ii) (c) (i).)

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(*g*) *The German Campaign*, 1914. (See Sec. 7 (ii) (e).)

Von Moltke at the outset of the campaign, weakened von Schlieffen's plan by lack of concentration of the striking force. He later weakened it further, probably to breaking point, in his fear first for Alsace-Lorraine, secondly for East Prussia, by detaching more corps from the striking wings. Two corps were detached from the Second and Third Armies to mask and besiege Namur, and when they were freed by its fall on August 23rd, they were at once despatched to Russia, where they arrived after the crisis of invasion had passed; two corps were detached from the First Army to mask Antwerp; and one division from the Third Army to capture Givet. On August 25th, Moltke decided, in the words of his D.M.O., "that the great decisive battle in the West had been fought, and decided in Germany's favour, and that the moment had arrived when forces might be sent to the eastern front." As a result, in the end two more corps were sent from the striking wing, and Schlieffen's plan really ceased to exist.

"Moltke presumably intended to avoid all risk of invasion of Alsace-Lorraine, but in doing so, he violated some of the principles of war—concentration at the decisive point—in that he had not the strength in his offensive wing to envelop the French armies without allowing gaps to arise in his own armies—and economy of force—in that his detachments south of Metz failed to hold the French forces there." (Neame.)

(*h*) *Tannenberg Campaign*, 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

See also "Surprise," Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

"The German dispositions appear excellent. The Lake position is lightly held, while two strong groups are thrown out in the direction of probable danger. The excellent East Prussian Railway system admits of reinforcement of either group, quickly and without enemy interruption. The remaining forces are disposed centrally on the railway, ready to move either north or south of the Lakes. These dispositions are a good example of a concentration for a Strategic Defensive." (*Tannenberg*, Ironside.)

Note the effect of Ludendorff's concentration of every available man to strike Samsonov.

Compare the situation of Rennenkampff and Samsonov, with the Masurian Lakes between them, with that of the Prussian forces in 1796 and 1797 separated by the Lake Garda and the mountain ranges. See Sec. 7 (i) (c).

(*i*) *Great War.*

Was the principle of concentration at the decisive point broken by the allied forces operating in the Dardanelles, in Egypt and Palestine, in Mesopotamia, in Salonika, etc.? See also "Economy of Force."

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(*k*) GUERILLA WAR.

Note the difference in this principle for guerilla forces. So long as guerilla forces do not concentrate to give decisive battle, so long will their suppression be very difficult. See the guerilla war of the Spaniards against the French in the Peninsular War; the pacification of the Vendée by Hoche in 1795; our difficulties in South Africa after the capture of Pretoria; the Italian troubles in Tripoli.

(ii) Economy of Force.

Read in conjunction with "Concentration."

(*a*) *Napoleon.*

(i) For an example of this principle, consider the campaigns in Spain. The Spanish theatre of war could never be more than a subsidiary one. The main issue would be decided in Central Europe, where the main forces were being employed. The French forces in Spain were not maintained for any really military object, but for a material and political one. Yet Napoleon maintained there forces about three times as numerous as those arrayed against him—"The Spanish ulcer" simply became a ceaseless drain upon the man-power of France without offering any ultimate military gain. It was a force detached from the main theatre without true military objective and only containing a force of the enemy less than itself.

This detachment in Spain affords an excellent example of the evils caused by breaking this fundamental principle.

(ii) *Marengo,* 1800.

See "Strategical Surprise," 7 (iii) A (iii).

Note the true economy of force shown by Napoleon in his use of Massena's force. The latter was deliberately sacrificed in Genoa, because Napoleon saw that, by doing so, a force of Austrians much larger than Massena's would be contained by him sufficiently long for Napoleon to complete his own movements.

(*b*) *Walcheren Expedition,* 1809. Map A (E 4).

Throughout the Napoleonic wars, England was continually breaking this principle of war, and despatching strategic detachments, which achieved and could achieve nothing. The worst case was the expedition known as the Walcheren Expedition.

Early in 1809, it was known that Austria was preparing to fight Napoleon, and was building her hopes of success, partly on the Peninsular War, and partly on a British descent on Hanover, which was supposed to be ripe for revolution against Napoleon. We were actually at war with Hanover at the time, and we delayed the conclusion of peace with them so long that it was the end of July before we were ready for this expedition.

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Forty thousand men were placed under the orders of Chatham, and they spent their time trying to batter down the walls of Flushing. The real military objective, if there could be said to be one at all, was Antwerp, which might have been seized by a sudden attack, but was ready for siege by the time that Chatham moved on to it. He therefore withdrew from the citadel, and took his army into the Isle of Walcheren, a fever-ridden swamp, where Napoleon had refused to send a single French soldier. Fever destroyed nearly the whole force, and only a small, diseased remnant eventually returned to England.

Thus 40,000 men were detached from the main theatre without any real military objective, and were lost without having any effect whatsoever on the enemy.

(c) *Jackson's Campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley,* 1861–62. Map B.

The campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley afford a perfect illustration of the correct use of a detached force. In studying the whole campaign, to get a true picture, one must realize how sensitive were the Northerners to any threat on their capital, Washington, and it was on this fear that Lee and Jackson continually played.

To illustrate the principle, two phases of the campaign will be analyzed.

(1) *The Campaign leading to the First Battle of Manassas. July,* 1861.

In the opening period of the campaign, in 1861, the Federal plans were based on the invasion of Virginia. McDowell, with 50,000, was at Washington and south of the Potomac, threatening Manassas Junction; 20,000 were in West Virginia, moving on Stanton; and 14,000 under Patterson were moving from Harpers Ferry down the Shenandoah Valley.

To oppose these 80,000 men, converging in three columns, the Confederates only had some 31,000: 20,000 under Beauregard, protecting Manassas Junction, and 11,000 under Johnston and Jackson watching Patterson. There was, however, one important factor in favour of the Confederates. By means of the Manassas Gap Railway a force in the Shenandoah Valley could be rapidly transferred to Manassas Junction.

Johnston's and Jackson's rôle was a difficult one. They were to contain Patterson's force, which was considerably larger than their own, without getting themselves involved, and without letting Patterson get to Winchester; and then to slip away, unperceived, by the railway to join Beauregard at Manassas Junction so as to be in force against McDowell.

Patterson's task was also difficult. It was equally easy for the Confederates to transfer Beauregard's force to the Valley,

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and Patterson had to be ready to protect Harper's Ferry, and at the same time to prevent Johnston joining Beauregard. Actually, all his actions were so indecisive that he achieved nothing. Up to July 16th, Johnston and Jackson succeeded in containing Patterson's larger force in front of them. Then, on that date, McDowell advanced against Beauregard.

Johnston and Jackson successfully gave Patterson the slip, leaving him to be amused and held by a few hundred troopers under Stuart, while they joined Beauregard in sufficient time to gain a decisive victory over McDowell.

Cf. this with Ludendorff's similar manœuvre before Tannenberg, Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(2) *Jackson's Campaign in the Valley leading up to Kernstown, March 23rd,* 1862. Map B.

In the early part of 1862, the Northerners had been collecting an enormous force for the invasion of Virginia.

At the beginning of February, Banks, with 38,000 men, was in the Shenandoah Valley threatening Winchester, where there was only Jackson with some 3,600 to hold him; but, in order to protect the passages of the Potomac, McClellan, the Federal Commander-in-Chief, had been compelled to disseminate his army, and there was a gap of fifty miles between his right wing under Banks and his main body south of Washington.

In this illustration, it must again be emphasised how sensitive were the Federals to any threat to Washington.

On March 7th, the main Confederate forces were moved to Orange Court House, where they had the protection of the Rapidan, and were also well placed to anticipate any force transferred by sea and landed close to Richmond. This left Jackson with his small detachment isolated in the Valley, but he was sure that he could be of value there and asked to be allowed to remain.

On March 12th, Banks was instructed to move on Winchester, and Jackson had to abandon it; and by March 18th, the Federal advance had become rapid. The Federals then learned, for the first time, the truth as to Jackson's strength. Hence, Shields' division only was left to look after Jackson, while the rest were to be concentrated with the main forces by Manassas.

After a great deal of argument and discussion, McClellan had persuaded Lincoln to allow him to transfer 150,000 men by sea to land on the peninsular south of Richmond, and to strike for that town from the south. Accordingly, on March 17th, the embarkation of this force was begun. Jackson in the Valley was considered negligible; Shields' division was left to hold him, while Banks was to move to Manassas to assist in covering Washington. To carry out his rôle, Shields was ordered to Winchester.

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Jackson, realizing to the full this principle of Economy of Force, decided to take advantage of the Federal dispositions. He at once followed up Shields, and eventually attacked him on March 23rd, at Kernstown, believing he was only up against a rear guard. Shields had, however, concealed his men very skilfully, and had his whole division in position. As a result, Jackson was sharply defeated, losing a quarter of his whole force. Yet his action had exactly the effect he desired. It was considered by the political generals among the Federals that he could not have attacked unless he had had reinforcements coming to him, and there was consternation at Washington. Some 17,000 Federals were at once despatched from Manassas to the Valley to hold Jackson in check; this considerably weakened the force directly covering Washington, and Lincoln at once ordered McDowell's corps, 37,000 strong, to remain at Washington instead of embarking for Richmond, which meant that McClellan's striking wing was reduced by some 46,000 men.

In the two armies, one can see perfect illustrations of faulty dispersion on the one side, and of the correct application of the principle of economy of force on the other. The effect of the correct use of this small detachment of 3,000 bayonets, wonderfully skilfully and boldly handled by Jackson, was practically to pin down to the ground 80,000 troops, and completely to disorganize the enemy's plan of campaign.

(*d*) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904–1905. Map D.

There is a very interesting point in this war in connection with this principle. After the battle of Nanshan, the Japanese invested Port Arthur. It was evident that the capture of the fortress would be a lengthy business, and Nogi was left with the Third Army to carry on the siege. Meanwhile, Oyama moved the rest of the Japanese forces towards Mukden.

Now at the battle of Liao Yang, the Russians actually outnumbered the Japanese by some 20,000 men, though they were ultimately defeated. It is an interesting point for discussion whether this use of Nogi's army was a true application of economy of force, or whether it would have been better for Oyama merely to have masked Port Arthur and to have concentrated all available troops against the Russian field armies, so as to be in maximum strength at the decisive point. This is discussed fully in Hamley's *Operations of War* in the chapter on the Russo-Japanese War.

(*e*) *Von Moltke*, 1914.

See " Concentration," Sec. 7 (i) (g).

It has been shown how Moltke was continually weakening his striking wing to reinforce his defensive wing in the south; and

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this defensive wing was not even carrying out its true rôle, as it did not contain the French forces opposite it. Throughout the campaign, up to the Marne and the Aisne, Joffre was always able to form reserves, with which to reinforce his heavily pressed left wing and finally to take the offensive, by withdrawing troops from his right.

(*f*) *Mesopotamia.* Map E.

Was the principle of economy of force being correctly applied with regard to British commitments in Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Salonika, etc.? One must consider the matter not only from the point of man power, but also from that of shipping, material, etc. It must be realized, too, that under no circumstances could any of these theatres be considered the decisive one. The forces involved were strategic detachments, and their value can only be estimated by the acid test of applying to them the principles of economy of force.

In February, 1916, there were 400,000 men in Egypt; at the end of 1916, there were 64,800 British and 156,300 Indians in Mesopotamia, *where the Turkish forces never exceeded six divisions.* These figures of British and Indian troops do not include the enormous numbers already lost by previous battles, by sickness, etc. These 200,000 men were detained there, practically without military objective, at a time when the man power on the main front was being heavily strained. In addition, the troops of all these detachments had to be supplied almost entirely from home, thus diverting valuable shipping from the main theatre.

Sir William Robertson summed up the situation in his book *From Private to Field Marshal* as follows :—" It is no exaggeration to say that every mistake we made in our wars with France more than a hundred years ago had been repeated. We had committed ourselves to expeditions on a large scale and in remote theatres, which were strategically unsound, and had never been properly thought out. The false direction thus given to our strategy imperilled the chances of ultimate success, and at least was bound to hang round our necks like a millstone for the remainder of the war—as it did."

Note also the interesting situation from the Turkish point of view.

" By the end of May he (Khatil, the Turkish Commander) had established himself master of the strategical situation. He was containing General Gorringe by a force considerably smaller than the Tigris Corps, and had succeeded in concentrating in Persia about 20,000 rifles, 1,700 sabres and 50 guns against General Baratof's 9,000 rifles, 9,000 sabres and 37 guns. Moreover, he had superiority in the air." (Evans.)

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(iii) Surprise.

(See also Chap. VI.)

A. GENERAL.

(i) *Cyrus at Thymbra,* B.C. 554. Map E.

This is really the first more or less authentic case both of strategical and tactical surprise. Cyrus was the founder of the great Persian Empire (558–529 B.C.)

"Persia had been subject to the Medes, and was grievously oppressed. Cyrus deposed Astyages, the Median King, and united Persia and Media under his own sceptre. Alarmed for his safety, Crœsus, King of Lydia, which then comprised almost all Asia Minor west of Halys, entered the lists against Cyrus, and advanced across the Halys into Cappadocia, the most westerly of the Persian-Median provinces, and devastated the rich lands and cities of Pteria. Crœsus was preparing to advance still further into Persia, when Cyrus, by a rapid march, anticipated him, and met him on the scene of his devastations. An indecisive, wild and bloody battle was fought here, and ended only by night, after which Crœsus retired to his capital, Sardis, not expecting that Cyrus would undertake a winter campaign. Here he endeavoured to strengthen for the succeeding year his bonds with his allies, and procure material assistance.

"But Cyrus, full of the ardour which brooks not delay, and acting on that oldest and soundest of military principles, to do that which your enemy least expects, gave his adversary no breathing spell. Winter was at hand. Crœsus, anticipating no further present activity on the part of Cyrus, had unwisely allowed his army to disperse on reaching Sardis. Taking advantage of this error, Cyrus, by forced and difficult marches, came upon him unawares at Thymbra, on the plains not far from Sardis, and utterly defeated him." Dodge, *Alexander.*

The battle itself, described in this book, also affords an excellent illustration of surprise in tactical methods.

(ii) *Napoleon's Campaign in* 1796. Map F.

When Napoleon had more or less reorganized the army of Italy, in the spring of 1796, the French with some 47,000 men occupied a line on the Apennines and Ligurian Alps from Voltri to the Col di Tenda, with 18,000 men in reserve on the coast. The allied Austrians and Piedmontese, 57,000, held a line from the Bochetta Pass, north of Genoa, Ceva, Mondovi, Coni. Genoa was supposed to be neutral, but in reality strongly favoured the allies. Colli, with 25,000 Piedmontese, was on the allied right, with Headquarters at Ceva, watching the Col di

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Tenda; Argenteau was in the centre with 9,000 men about Dego and Sasello; Beaulieu, the Commander-in-Chief, was about the road from Alessandria to Genoa above the Bochetta Pass. Thus the Allies were very dispersed.

Napoleon's lines of communications ran westwards along the coast road, but he got many of his supplies from Genoa, which was more or less dominated by a French force on the heights about Voltri. The allied plan of attack was for Beaulieu to advance from the Bochetta, and attack the French at Voltri, while Argenteau moved on Savona. This manœuvre would cut the French in two at Savona, would allow their right to be destroyed and their left to be rolled up on Nice.

Napoleon obtained from his intelligence service complete details of this plan, and made full use of this advantage. He intended to encourage this attack by Beaulieu, as it split the allied army nearly into two, and left a very weak force in the centre to connect the main wings, which were separated by a range of almost impassable mountains. When Beaulieu's attack was well launched, Napoleon intended to overwhelm the weak centre of the allied army, cut the army into two, and destroy each portion in detail. With this end in view, he reduced the force in Voltri to 3,000 men, so as to have the maximum striking power possible; and he asked the Genoese Government for permission to march through Genoese territory so as to attack the Austrian left through Bochetta, correctly realizing that this information would be sent on to the Austrians, and would probably make them weaken their centre even more. All went as he intended. Directly Beaulieu and Argenteau were really involved, he and his marshals crossed the mountains by the difficult and little-known tracks and passes by Cadiboni and Altare, and overwhelmed the weak centre. This was a complete strategical surprise. It was too late for the allies to alter their defective strategic dispositions, and the succession of battles—Montenotte, Dego, Millesimo—rapidly caused the complete destruction in detail of the allied forces in the theatre.

(iii) *The Campaign of Marengo*, 1800. Map F and Map A.

In the spring of 1800, Napoleon had for some time been completely occupied with carrying through the *coup d'état* in Paris, which had made him first Consul; and the situation in Italy had become serious. Russia had withdrawn from the coalition, but the Austrians had been very successful in Italy. In April, 1800, they severed the French forces near Savona, drove Suchet's corps back towards Nice, and hemmed in Massena's in Genoa. Here, by the heroic efforts of Massena, Oudinot, and Soult, their further advance was stayed. The Austrian scheme was to compel Massena to surrender in Genoa, to advance with a large force

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into Nice, Provence, and possibly Savoy, in conjunction with a landing by a British force, and to rouse the French Royalists in the south into a general insurrection. If all went well, this plan appeared likely to cripple France.

Meanwhile, in Germany, Moreau was steadily forcing back Kray on to the fortified camp of Ulm. (Map A. G 6.) It is said that Napoleon saw at once the weakness of the allied plan :— " it exposed a large force to a blow from the rear, from Switzerland." (Rose.) According to Bourrienne, in his *Memoirs*, Napoleon called Bourrienne on March 17th; he stretched himself upon a map of Italy, and told Bourrienne to do the same; " he then stuck into it pins," says Bourrienne, " whose heads were tipped with red and black sealing wax. I observed him in silence, and waited the result of a campaign so inoffensive. When he had stationed the enemy's corps, and had drawn up the pins with red heads on the points where he intended to conduct his own troops, he said to me ' Do you think I shall beat Melas?' ' Why, how can I tell?' ' You are a simpleton,' said he; ' look you here— Melas is at Alessandria, where he has his Headquarters; he will remain there till Genoa surrenders. He has in Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, his reserves. Passing the Alps here ' (pointing to the Great St. Bernard) ' I fall upon Melas, I cut off his communications with Austria, and I meet him here in the Plains of Scrivia ' (sticking a pin at San Juliano)."

To carry out this plan, it was essential that the Austrians should get no idea of this march across the Alps. " The better to hide his purpose, he chose as his first base of operations the city of Dijon (E. 7), whence he seemed to threaten either the Swabian or the Italian army of his foes. But this was not enough. At the old Burgundian capital, he assembled his staff and a few regiments of conscripts in order to mislead the English and Austrian spies; while the fighting battalions were drafted by diverse routes to Geneva and Lausanne. So skilful were these preparations, that in the early days of May, the greater part of his men and stores were near the lake of Geneva, whence they were easily transferred to the upper valley of the Rhone." (Rose.)

On May 20th, Napoleon himself started the ascent of the pass. His army complete numbered 41,000 men. Moncey, with 15,000 was meanwhile crossing the St. Gothard, and driving back the Austrian outposts in the upper valley of the Ticino, and 5,000 men, marching over the Mont Cenis pass, threatened Turin from the West.

On the 19th, Melas was still at Nice, entirely unconscious of this force marching to get astride his communications. On the 21st, he learnt some parts of the truth, and attempted to extricate himself; but he had been completely surprised strategically, and it was too late to alter his dispositions.

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On June 4th, Genoa fell, but by this time Massena had achieved Napoleon's object of maintaining around Genoa a large force of the enemy, and the doom of the Austrians was sealed.

The resultant battle of Marengo was disappointing in a way, as the tactical ability displayed by Napoleon in this case was not on the same level as his strategical; but the results of the campaign were the complete subjection to France of Northern Italy up to the Mincio, except Peschiera and Mantua, and the vindication of the supremacy of France.

(iv) *The Advance of Lord Roberts Against Cronje in* 1900. Map C.

When Lord Roberts arrived at Cape Town on January 10th, 1900, the situation was approximately as follows:—Ladysmith was still besieged, and a force of Boers was holding back Buller along the line of the Tugela River. Mafeking and Kimberley were also besieged, and in the latter town the hardships of the siege were telling on the spirits of the civil population.

Gatacre was at Molteno, watching a main body of commandos about Stormberg 4,000 strong; while French, by unceasing activity, had forced Boer commandos 5,000 strong back to Colesberg. Methuen, who had been moving up the Kimberley railway to attempt the relief of that town, was held about Jacobsdal by Cronje, who was covering the siege.

In a War Office memorandum issued at the beginning of the war, it was considered that there were only two practical routes for the invasion of the Transvaal—one, by the Natal route; the other, by the line through the middle of the Orange Free State. It was considered that the route by Kimberley was impractical owing to the lack of railway facilities from Fourteen Streams eastwards. At the time of the arrival of Lord Roberts, however, the only bridge over the Orange River still in our hands was on the Kimberley line; Lord Roberts therefore decided to advance on that line and strike the central line about Springfontein Junction, so as to force the evacuation of the Boer positions about Stormberg and Colesberg, which evacuation would open up other bridges over the Orange River. On January 27th, anxiety as to Kimberley made him decide that this town must be relieved. He therefore decided to follow the original plan, but, as soon as Cronje's flank had been effectively passed by the eastwards march, to wheel north astride the Boer line of communications, and thus open the road to Kimberley. Then, if possible, he determined to make straight for Bloemfontein.

Secrecy was essential, if Cronje was to be caught, and this eventuality was only possible, if the Boers were made to believe that the advance was to be made by the central line.

During October, 1899, the Boers had captured at Dundee intelligence papers which showed that the advance would be by the

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central line. Then, at the end of 1899, French's activity and the fighting around Colesberg further led them to believe that this was all to secure the passage of the Orange River at Norval's Point to open up the Colesberg-Bloemfontein route. Then the concentration of troops was arranged to hoodwink them further. A newly arrived division was sent to the neighbourhood of French, and the whole force could be kept in this area up to the last minute, as there was a cross railway from Naauwport Junction to the Kimberley line. French was instructed to be very active in the Colesberg area so as to distract the attention of the Boers from the movement of troops towards Methuen.

Cronje disregarded all the signs of accumulation of forces against him; his lines of communication ran to the north, and he considered that any movement against him, so long as Norval's Point bridge was in Boer hands, must be made direct against his trenches, which was exactly what he wanted.

Finally, fictitious orders, cancelled by cypher telegrams, were successfully used by Roberts.

The whole scheme depended on the skill with which French, in the Colesberg area, could impose on the enemy, and on the efficiency of the railway working.

Everything went according to plan. The Boers remained passive in their positions, convinced up to the last that the advance would be by the central line. Roberts successfully carried out his secret concentration on the west, outflanked Cronje, after a wonderful move by French's cavalry, relieved Kimberley, finally rounded up Cronje at Paardeburg, and then struck at Bloemfontein. The whole operations afford an almost classic example of the complete strategic surprise of an enemy.

(v) 1914. Map A. Sketch II.

Note the effect of the German strategic surprise on the outbreak of the war. Von Schlieffen's plan had always been for the main striking wing to sweep round through Belgium; but, owing to the German signature to the treaty guaranteeing the integrity of Belgium, the French arrangments had all been made for countering a German concentration south of this. The result of this was the strategic surprise of the French, the effect of which was further increased by the inability of their strategic cavalry or aircraft to gain any information of this main striking wing, until it was too late to alter their strategic dispositions. The Germans obtained the initiative, and retained it until there was a similar failure on their part when they were strategically surprised at the Marne.

(vi) *Tannenberg*, 1914. Map A. Sketch III.

When Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the command of the Eighth Army in East Prussia on August 23rd, the situation

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was very serious. The north-west group of Russian armies, under Jalinsky, was advancing on both sides of the Masurian Lakes, Rennenkampff's Niemen army of eleven divisions and five cavalry divisions, on a forty-mile front about Goldap, Gumbinnen, Pilkallen, and Samsonov's Narev army of nine divisions and three cavalry divisions about Usdau-Waplitz. Jalinsky's plan was to unite these two armies about Allenstien, and to clear East Prussia.

On the German side, the Eighth Army in front of Rennenkampff was retreating towards the outer defences of Konigsberg; the area of the Masurian lakes was well fortified, and held by German troops; while Samsonov was opposed by the 20th Corps, with some Landwehr and fortress troops, all of whom had had very severe fighting.

The Prussian strategic railway system on the front was admirable for the the lateral movement of German troops, while that of the Russians was poor. In addition, when the Russians had crossed the frontier, the break in gauge from the Russian six foot to the Prussian standard, had rendered the Russian communications even more difficult than usual.

The Germans had originally intended to withdraw behind the Vistula; this idea was later replaced by the idea of a withdrawal behind the Passarge; but, owing to the feelings roused by the picture of East Prussia being invaded, this defensive idea was abandoned, and Ludendorff decided to attack Samsonov's army with all the forces at his disposal, while he merely observed Rennenkampff with a small force. The success of this scheme would depend entirely on the secrecy with which it could be carried out, and on the successful " bluffing " of Rennenkampff.

Thanks to the apathy of Rennenkampff, and to the railway facilities available, the scheme was successful, and Samsonov and Jalinsky were entirely surprised. From August 24th to the 26th, Ludendorff gradually moved the bulk of the Eighth Army, and of his other reserves, to the area behind the 20th Corps, and from 27th to 30th, the period during which the battle of Tannenberg was raging, Rennenkampff allowed his army to be out of touch with the enemy, and his force of eleven divisions and five cavalry divisions was actually being contained during those days by weak detachments in the area of the Masurian lakes, two cavalry brigades from Lake Mauer to River Pregal, and the Konigsberg garrison. He had no touch with Samsonov, and was completely ignorant of the situation; while, further to help Ludendorff's surprise, all Samsonov's orders for the 26th were issued by wireless, in clear, on the 25th.

Ludendorff began his attack on the 27th, and by the 29th the overwhelming success of the German strategic surprise was certain.

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(vii) *Palestine.* Map E.

Allenby's Surprise of the Turks at Beersheba, 1917.

General Allenby had assumed command in Palestine on June 28th, 1917, after the abortive attempts to take Gaza. His general plan of operations was " to deliver the main blow, in overwhelming force, against the left of the enemy's principal line of defences at Hareira-Sheria. The infantry would then roll up the Turkish line, while the mounted corps pressed through into Philistia on the enemy's communications. The first step must be the capture of Beersheba; and to confuse the enemy, Gaza itself was to be subjected to prolonged intensive bombardment, and attacked simultaneously, but with limited objectives in view. The plan for the capture of Beersheba was to envelop the place. Two mounted divisions were to attack from north-east, east and south-east, and two infantry divisions simultaneously were to assault the works in the west and south-west, while a third infantry division covered the left of the main infantry attack. The Turk was to be kept fully occupied, and yet uncertain as to where the main blow would fall. The measures taken to mislead the enemy were very carefully elaborated. It must be remembered that the bulk of the troops out of the trench line were kept opposite Gaza, in well marked camps between Tel el Jemmi, Deir el Belah, and Rafa. In June, as the force spread out towards Shellal, the detachments on the Wadi Ghazzee had formed similar camps to which the Turkish airmen were well accustomed. The Desert Mounted Corps always had a division in rest on the coast, near Khan Yunus. When the assembly marches began, in the last week of October, all moves took place at night. The brigades departing always left tents standing, and stepped up to an existing camping ground. Camps which were finally vacated were kept going, and arrangements were made to water horses and to create dust at the normal hours and in the usual places. Thus, the enemy's airmen—who got over only at a great height—saw merely the camps to which they were accustomed and no marked changes in them.

" The French contingent had their camps and stores at Khan Yunus. Great camel lines existed near Deir el Belah. Extensive light railways had been built, primarily for ammunition supply, conveniently in front of Gaza. A dummy main line station was constructed at the Wadi-Ghazzee crossing, near the Belah-Gaza road. The enemy was also misled by our indiscreet use of wireless-doctored messages in indifferent cypher—and by other information which he prized, but which was not as good as it seemed.

" Finally, Gaza was subjected to eight days continuous bombardment, as has never been before in all Asia. The evidence to the enemy that Gaza was the enemy's main objective was reason-

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ably conclusive, and when the move on Beersheba became obvious, he considered it to be merely a bluff." (*An Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns* 1914 *to* 1918. Major-General Sir M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold.)

The result was the complete surprise of the Turks and the collapse of the Gaza position. Compare the methods adopted in this case with the similar ones in concealing the presence of the cavalry on the coastal plain in Allenby's final break through.

(viii) *Gallipoli.*

Note how all concealment was abandoned and the attack on the Dardanelles publicly heralded. Official Hist. : Vol. I, p. 109.

B. Surprise by Tactical Methods.

(i) *Marathon* 490 B.C. Map A (N. 14).

Darius with the Persians was defeated by Militiades with the Greeks.

Militiades had only 11,000 men, while Darius is reported to have had over 100,000.

Instead of drawing his army up on the usual parallel lines, Militiades thinned out his centre, made his wings very strong, and advanced with his flanks resting on two brooks, which prevented action against his flanks by the Persian cavalry. In the battle, the fighting on the flanks was very severe, but in the centre, after a stout resistance, the thin Greek lines were pressed back. Just when matters seemed critical for them, Militiades was successful with his strengthened flanks, which routed the enemy. Seeing his chance, he then hurried his flank troops in on the Persian centre, which was then assailed on three sides. Demoralization set in, and the Greek victory became complete. The Persians lost over 6,000 while the Greeks but 192.

(ii) *Leuctra,* 371 B.C. Map A (N. 13).

Epaminondas with about 6,000 Thebans defeated 11,000 Spartans by a surprise tactical method—the oblique order of battle, which was the method adopted and perfected by Frederick the Great.

" When the armies came into presence of each other, Cleomhotus, the Spartan King, drew up the Lacedæmonians in the usual phalanxial shape prescribed by generations of usage and success, of twelve men in depth, and with the cavalry in front. He expected, as usual, to fight in parallel order and all along the line. Cleomhotus was not a man of force or originality. His own position, with his chief officers, was at the post of honour, the right. The Spartan idea was to swing round its wings into concave order when the battle should have been engaged, and thus

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enclose the Theban flanks. The fact that Cleomhotus was on the Spartan right Epaminondas well knew, and he determined to make up for his numerical weakness by a daring innovation." (Dodge, *Alexander.*)

He advanced in an oblique order, instead of parallel order. The great part of the weight of the attack was in his advanced left, while he refused his centre and right.



His horse proved superior to the Spartan horse, and drove them back in confusion on the line of battle. "Under cover of this wavering in the Spartan line, Epaminondas pushed forward his column towards the Spartan right, ordering the horse to keep up a hearty skirmishing along their front. The column he led in person, and we can imagine the tremendous momentum with which this compact body of fifty men deep, with their long spears and heavy shields and armour, struck the Spartan line. The fighting was desperate. The Lacedæmonians, surprised at the unusual Theban formation, instead of completing their concave manœuvre, extended their right to receive Epaminondas' column. This, if anything, weakened their line at the key-point.

Epaminondas, after heroic efforts, proved too strong for even Spartans. Cleomhotus was killed, together with a number of his lieutenants. The Sacred Band took the confused mass of the Spartan right in flank, and completed its destruction. Meanwhile, on the Spartan centre and left there had been little or no fighting. Not ordered forward, because the right could not advance, and not being attacked by the Theban centre and right, which, thus refused, was practically in reserve, this portion of

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the Spartan army was at a loss what to do. Finally when the right had been entirely annihilated, and the Theban column, elate with victory, wheeled and opened an attack upon its flank, it melted away in its uncertainty, and the whole Lacedæmonian army sought safety in flight to its camp." (Dodge, *Alexander.*)

Compare this with Frederick the Great's tactics at the batle of Leuthen.

See also Sections 7 (iii) B (iv) and 25 (m) (i).

(iii) *The Methods Created by Gustavus Adolphus. Seventeenth Century.* (See Sec. 3 c.)

In the middle of the seventeenth century, the tactics of the continental armies were rather the tactics of weight. Troops were drawn up and organized in such masses that their mere advance should be irresistible, and that they should easily break up a cavalry charge. The infantry " battalia " was usually in fifty files, ten deep, of which mass the bulk was mere pushing, not fighting force, as it was obvious that few of the men could use their pikes; the musketeers were in groups at the corners of the " battalia," and were still armed with a musket that required ninety-nine " times and motions " to handle, and a crutch to rest on; the artillery was very slow firing, immobile, and inefficient; and the cavalry had ceased to rely on shock action, and relied instead on repeated salvoes of its carbines and pistols.

Gustavus Adolphus set out to alter all this. See Sec. 3 c.

In his campaigns against the Imperialists, he and his enemy had completely different systems. " The two armies, (*i.e.* those of Gustavus Adolphus and of Tilly at Breitenfeld) differed as a rigid cast iron bar differs from an elastic steel sword blade. The latter has life which the other lacks." (Dodge.)

At Breitenfeld, Map A (H 4), September 17th, 1631, Gustavus Adolphus was face to face with Tilly, who had never been conquered in battle. Gustavus with the Saxons probably outnumbered Tilly, but little reliance could be placed on the Saxons. In the ensuing battle, not only Tilly, but the whole military world were surprised by the effect of the re-organization of the Swedish army, which gave a mobility astounding to the soldiers of that time, and which won the battle. Though Tilly drove the Saxons, who formed the left of the Swedish line, completely off the field, and then tried to throw the whole weight of his force against the open left flank of Gustavus, his every manœuvre was checked by his being surprised by Gustavus Adolphus's mobility. The latter was able to swing his left flank to meet the impending attack long before the Imperialists had completed their preliminary moves, and then drove in a cavalry counter attack with all his reserves on to Tilly's immobile artillery, and then on the cumbrous battalia while they were still manœuvring.

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Though outnumbered by three to two during the decisive part of the battle, Gustavus, owing to his surprise tactics, based on his mobility, gained a very decisive victory, and drove the Imperialists headlong from the field.

(iv) *Frederick the Great. Eighteenth Century.*

Frederick the Great surprised the military commanders of his time in almost the same way as Gustavus Adolphus and by almost similar means. Armies at the time of the Seven Years War on the continent had again become cumbrous, immobile masses, without co-operation between arms and without any tactical doctrine. Frederick copied Gustavus. He set about rendering his army thoroughly mobile, with all arms in it trained to co-operate; he again reduced the file, and produced a wonderful machine-like fire drill, which very greatly increased the fire-power of the infantry, and he re-animated his cavalry with the offensive spirit of shock action. He then evolved the tactical idea of the attack in oblique formation, a formation almost identical with that of Epaminondas at Leuctra, and which was based on the same ideas. The basic idea of this was to choose the point in the enemy's position (usually on the flank) to be attacked; to attack this point in strength; and to keep the rest of the force echelonned back on the flank ready to check any hostile attempt at envelopment, or ready to be used as a reserve to be thrown into the decisive attack. Its mere position on the flank, also, made it appear an offensive threat, and often contained a large portion of the enemy's reserves.

These new tactical methods and organizations completely surprised the continental commanders. See in particular Rossbach and Leuthen. See 43 (a).

(v) *The German Attack at Riga, September,* 1917.

In all attacks on trench systems, the tactical method adopted had been that of material destruction: but in September, 1917, General von Hutier carried out a surprise attack at Riga on methods which formed the basis of the German attack in 1918. He "selected a small sector of the Russian line, some 5,600 yards in width, he massed against it a strong force of guns, one to every eight yards of front, and on September 3rd, inundated it with gas shells and then attacked. The whole operation was over in a few hours, and the success was complete, the reason being that he based his tactics not on the destruction of wire and trenches, but on the destruction of the Russian troops—infantry and gunners, opposed to him. This seems a very simple and common-sense idea, yet it was one which, on the western front, had been in the main lost sight of for three years." (Colonel J. F. C. Fuller.)

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(vi) *The Battle of Cambrai, November,* 1917. Map A. Sketch II.

This battle may be considered the originator of modern tactical methods in the Great War. It must be remembered that tanks had first been used in small numbers in September, 1916, and had then been used in several small encounters, over very difficult country, for local enterprises. They had never, before November, 1917, been used in mass over good country.

The situation in the latter part of 1917 was serious. Russia had collapsed, and then the Italian disaster at Caporetto occurred. These two facts meant that the Germans would be getting many reinforcements on the western front, and that the British and French troops were wanted to help Italy; while the French had not really recovered from the effects of Nivelle's offensive. The British had had a succession of limited successes at Arras, Messines, and Paschendaele, which had been won by the old methods of heavy preliminary bombardments of enemy positions, with correspondingly heavy casualties. The Paschendaele battle was still being waged, but the weather conditions were appalling, and the condition of the ground precluded the use of tanks. This constant hammering at the German positions, however, had caused a considerable strain on their resources, and their line in most places had been thinned out to provide fresh formations for Paschendaele. It was then decided to take advantage of this thinning out, and to try a new method of tactical surprise. On a front of two corps, about Cambrai, against the formidable lines of the Hindenburg position, it was proposed to launch a sudden surprise attack. The attacking troops were to be brought up by rail only at the last possible moment, and there was to be no preliminary bombardment by the artillery. The reinforced artillery on the front, which was to be very numerous, was to remain silent till zero hour, but the guns were to be calibrated carefully before taking up positions. The main surprise feature, however, was to be the use of tanks in mass. The whole of the tanks available were collected for this battle. They were to go forward at zero hour, just in front of the infantry, under cover of a certain amount of smoke from the guns; to crush down the opposing wire entanglements, to enable the infantry—who were to follow closely behind—to get into the enemy's positions; and then to continue assisting the infantry in their advance. Directly a sufficiently large gap had been made in the enemy's position, the cavalry corps was to pass through.

There were, then, two completely new ideas in this attack :—

(*a*) The artillery were not to be registered, but to trust to accuracy of calibration.

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(*b*) The surprise use of tanks in large numbers to get the infantry into the enemy's positions.

It must be realized that the Hindenburg line was covered by immense wire entanglements, the destruction of which, under normal circumstances, would take days of preliminary bombardment, and which gave a great feeling of security to the Germans.

The scheme of the attack was originally carried out successfully, and the enemy was completely surprised and demoralized. The effect of a sudden extremely heavy bombardment, followed almost at once by innumerable tanks looming out of the mist was very great on the moral of the enemy.

In all the future battles of the war, these ideas, first produced at Cambrai, were the basic principles of the attacks made both by the Allies and the Germans. See also Sec. 26 (a) (iv).

(vii) *The German Attack in March*, 1918. Map A. Sketch II.

This was a repetition on a large scale of the methods adopted by von Hutier at Riga, who was brought over specially to command the attack. Ludendorff " decided to have no long preliminary bombardment, which would have given us a definite indication of his plans, and, as we had found to our cost, would so destroy the surface of the ground and break up the roads and the railways, as to make it a matter of great difficulty to get the reserves forward when they were needed. He also decided to bring up his attacking divisions at the last moment by train and by rapid marches under cover of darkness. This was the essence of his plan and the feature in which it differed most from other attacks which had been tried in the West " (except that of Cambrai). " In the details of its execution there was also much that was new. Ludendorff and his Staff had studied very carefully all the previous attacks which had been carried through both by us and by the French, and he found that opportunities had often been missed because parts of the attacking line had been checked at strong points, held resolutely by the defenders, and the remainder had waited for these to be reduced; he also maintained that the progress of the Allied infantry had been delayed by too frequent reliefs. He therefore determined that as a principle he would follow up success wherever it was won, driving in at such weak points as he discovered, and that he would not delay his advance in order to overcome centres of resistance against which his progress was checked." (*The Last Four Months*, Major-General Sir F. Maurice.)

As a result of the adoption of these methods, the whole scheme came as a tactical and strategical surprise, and was very successful in its early stages.

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(c) Surprise by Organization.

(i) 1806—1813. *Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.*

Napoleon had completely crushed the military power of Prussia at Jena, and believed he had done so for all time; but Prussia began early to revive. Under the influence of Stein, the beginnings of a new civil life were being laid in Prussia. Feudalism and serfdom were falling before a spirit of nationalism, " and the principle that the army ought to be the union of all the moral and physical energies of the nation was carried out by the military organizer Scharnhorst, who conceived and partly realized the idea that all able-bodied men should serve their time with the colours and then be drafted into a reserve." (Holland Rose.) Napoleon was disturbed by this, and in September, 1808, forced the King of Prussia to agree by treaty that the army should never exceed 42,000 men. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, by maintaining the system of short colour service and long reserve, kept to the letter of this treaty, but succeeded in building up a large reserve under the very nose of Napoleon and his agents.

In 1813, the result was seen, and Napoleon was completely surprised. " Do not forget," he wrote to Eugene on March 14th, when the latter was getting anxious as to the state of Prussia, " that Prussia has only four millions of people, she never in her most prosperous times had more than 150,000 troops. She will not have more than 40,000 now," which was the figure to which he had limited the King of Prussia. " He was unable to conceive," says Holland Rose, " that Scharnhorst's plan of passing men into a reserve would send triple that force into the field." Hence he was completely surprised and his original plans upset.

(ii) *Austro-Prussian War,* 1866.

In this war, Austria was completely surprised and her plan of campaign upset by the rapidity and efficiency of the Prussian mobilization. Roon and von Moltke had been steadily reorganizing the Prussian army, with Bismarck to support them, after the humiliating debacle of the Convention of Olmutz, November, 1850, when Prussia had had to submit to every demand of Austria, owing to the obvious inefficiency of the Prussian army. Actually this reorganization did not begin until 1861. Austria, France, and indeed the whole of Europe, would not believe in 1866 that very much could have been done in the time to remake the Prussian army, and were therefore completely surprised by the efficiency of mobilization and organization, and by the production of the needle gun. As a result, the Austrians, instead of being able to advance through Bohemia, joining up with the Saxons, to invade Prussia, were forced to act on the defensive, and lost the initiative to the Prussians. Their plan was based on

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a faulty appreciation of the efficiency of the enemy, and the surprise Moltke thus gained enabled him to win the war in six weeks. *Cf.* this with the surprise effected by Scharnhorst.

(iii) 1914.

Note the similar mistake made by the Germans about the Russians. In 1914, the Russians, though only partially mobilized, moved ten days before the date on which the Germans had calculated. Hence the Russian invasion of East Prussia.

Also, the surprise effected by the Germans by their organization and mobilization of reserve corps additional to those that were appreciated by the French General Staff.

(D) SURPRISE BY MATERIAL.

Note the effect of the surprise production of :—

(*a*) the super-heavy German howitzer, especially on the Belgian fortresses;

(*b*) the production of gas;

(*c*) the production of tanks.

Note the great difficulties in handling any new weapon or material. To be really successful, a new weapon or material should be used on a large scale and by troops well trained in its use, but to obtain this, secrecy is nearly certain to be lost. In addition, the correct use of the weapon and material can often only be learnt by experience.

Note the very limited success of the first surprise production of gas and of the tank. In 1870, the French produced the Mitrailleuse as a complete surprise, but it was of little value, as, in order to conserve secrecy, none of their soldiers had been properly trained in its use.

(iv) Mobility.

(See also Chap. XI.)

Note that in reading the history of any of the great commanders, or military reformers, Gustavus, Cromwell, Marlborough, Frederick, Napoleon, etc.—the keynote of all their reforms was "increase of mobility."

See "Surprise." Gustavus and Frederick. Sec. 7 (iii) B (iii) and (iv).

See "Offensive Action." Marlborough, and his mobility as exemplified by his march across Europe to the battle of Blenheim. Sec. 7 (v) (b).

(*a*) *Napoleon's Mobility.*

Both Napoleon and Wellington realized to the full the value of the time factor in war. "In all military operations," said

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Wellington, " time is everything," and all their reforms were based on this increase of mobility. Napoleon achieved it, in the early campaigns, by breaking away from the large depôts of stores, which were the basis of the recognized method of supplying an army at the period, and was one which greatly limited its power of movement. Instead, he made the troops live on the country as far as possible, thus making them independent of depôts and also of the huge train of transport which slowed down movement.

" The Little Corporal has discovered a new method of carrying on war," was remarked in 1805, " he makes more use of our legs than our bayonets."

(*b*) *Salamanca*, 1812. Maps G and H.

The campaign leading to the battle of Salamanca affords an interesting example of the value of mobility, as Wellington's army was placed in a very dangerous position, owing to its having been outmarched by Marmont and the French. The campaign is being given in full as it affords an almost classic example of mobility and manœuvre, leading up to a decisive engagement.

In the first period of the 1812 campaign, Wellington had captured Ciudad-Rodrigo and Badajoz, and passed the Agueda on June 13th. He moved to the river Tormes and crossed it on June 17th by fords above and below Salamanca, while Marmont threw a strong garrison into the forts of Salamanca, and fell back to collect his scattered forces on the Douro. Wellington then invested the forts and entered the town of Salamanca. On the 27th he captured the forts, and Marmont took up a position behind the River Douro. Wellington blew up the forts and followed him.

By July 8th, the situation was as follows :—" Marmont's right was at Toro; his centre at Tordesillas; his left at Simancas on the Pisverga River. On the River Douro there was but one bridge—viz. that at Tordesillas—left standing; but at Pollos and some other points there were fords. The River Pisverga was not fordable, but bridges over it existed at Simancas and Valladolid which were commanded by field works.

" One hundred cannon guarded the line. Wellington had drawn up his army facing the French. His left was on the Guarena River; his centre on the Trabancos River; and his right at Rueda. He had posts also near Tordesillas and opposite Pollos." (Robinson.)

The situation remained uncertain for some days, but Marmont was eventually further reinforced and he assumed the offensive in a most masterly fashion.

" On July 15th and 16th he suddenly moved his army towards

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Toro, and with part of it crossed the Douro at that point intending apparently to turn Wellington's left and march up on Salamanca.

"Wellington became aware of this on the 16th, and united his centre and left at Canizal during the night, but only brought his right in as far as the Trabancos River, in order that it might still watch the country on the right bank of the Trabancos.

"This movement of Marmont towards Toro was merely a blind, in order to draw away the Allies from the points of Tordesillas and Pollos, so that those passages over the Douro might be left open.

"On July 17th the French General made a forced march back again along the right bank of the river, crossed it at Pollos and Tordesillas, and by nightfall had concentrated his whole army at Nava del Rey, *some of his troops having marched forty and others fifty miles without a halt.* He had thus succeeded in his design of passing the Douro unopposed."

Wellington only knew of his danger late at night on the 17th, and concentrated his army behind the Guarena. On the 19th, both armies faced each other along the banks of this river, opposite to, and a little below Canizal.

"It was Wellington's object to cover the town of Salamanca, and also the road to Ciudad-Rodrigo. To reach this road, Marmont had to pass the Tormes River, over which fords existed at the points of Santa Marta, Aldea Lengua, Huerta and Alba."

The ford at Alba was, Wellington thought, secured by the Allies, as there was a fort commanding it which was entrusted to a Spanish garrison. He hoped also to be able to reach Huerta, or the other fords, with equal or greater speed than his adversary. He was therefore under no apprehension regarding any attempt on Marmont's part to turn his right and out-march him to these forts upon the Tormes.

In this instance he under-rated the skill *and rapidity* with which Marmont could move, and his knowledge of the country; also, unknown to him but known to Marmont, the Spaniards had evacuated the fort at Alba.

"On the evening of the 19th, Marmont concentrated his troops towards his own left; then, on the morning of the 20th, marching rapidly up the right bank of the Guarena, he passed that river unopposed, and moved across Wellington's right flank towards the forts of Huerta and Alba on the Tormes. Wellington, as soon as he saw that Marmont's design was to turn his right flank, made a corresponding movement up the left bank of the Guarena, and endeavoured, in the first instance, to cross the French line of march at Cantalpina. In this he failed, for on approaching this place it was evident that Marmont had outmarched the Allies; so now turning and moving in a direction

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parallel to the French columns, he made for some high ground North of the ford of Aldea Lengua.

" The whole country between the Trabancos and the Tormes is undulating and open, and *during some hours of July 20th, the hostile armies had marched for a long time upon parallel hilly ridges, within half-musket range of each other, yet without coming to battle. Each army was straining every nerve to outstrip its enemy, and there was no time for more than an occasional cannon-shot upon either side;* but yet the ranks had to be kept closed up, ready to form at once in order of battle, for both generals watched keenly for any error which would warrant an attack. In this way the two armies both pressed towards the Tormes, the officers, Napier tells us, exchanging salutes and waving their caps at one another, and the cavalry moving about seeking an opening for a charge.

" By nightfall on the 20th, Marmont's leading column had reached Hüerta and secured the ford; while Wellington was upon some high ground close to Cabera Velosa, with a division pushed on towards Aldea Lengua.

" On the 21st Marmont crossed the Tormes by the fords at Huerta and Alba (placing a French garrison in the fort at Alba), and Wellington also passed the river by the fords of Santa Marta and Aldea Lengua. The French that evening encamped near Calvariza de Ariba, and occupied the wooded ground to its South, but had still some troops on the right bank of the Tormes. The Allies had their right near the village of Arapiles, and their left about Santa Marta on both banks of the Tormes."

Wellington now realized the strength of the force attempting to encircle him, and decided to withdraw to Portugal, if possible. Marmont intercepted a letter intimating this intention, and in an attempt to prevent it, brought on the battle of Salamanca (see Sec. 82 (a) ii). Marmont's design was to strike at the Ciudad-Rodrigo Road, the Allied line of retreat towards Portugal, and, as a result, there was, on the 22nd, practically a race between the two armies as to which should gain possession of some hills—the Arapiles—which dominated this road. In the race, the prize was divided, each army getting half. Wellington considered this secured his line of retreat, and started a withdrawal. Marmont attempted to stop this withdrawal, and in his efforts to do so gave Wellington the chance for a wonderful sudden counter-stroke, which completely crushed the French attack, and entirely altered the situation. " In this battle Wellington—to use the expression of a French officer—practically defeated 40,000 men in forty minutes."

Wellington, by his wonderful coolness and eye for tactical opportunity, had won, by this counter-stroke, a great victory over an army which, up to that moment in the campaign, had

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undoubtedly completely outmarched and outmanœuvred him. (*Wellington's Campaigns*, Major-General Robinson.)

(*c*) *South African War.*

Until the arrival of Lord Roberts, and the subsequent reorganisation of the transport services, the British forces in South Africa were singularly immobile owing to the wrong type of transport and general organization of units having been provided.

(*d*) *Palestine*, 1918.

Note the distance covered by the cavalry in Allenby's final break through the Turks, in spite of the difficulties of water for horses.

(*e*) 1914.

It is very interesting to compare the mobility and the results obtained of Allenby's cavalry with those of General Sordet in 1914.

See "British Strategy," Maurice, p. 188.

INFLUENCE OF ROADS, ETC., ON MOBILITY.

(*f*) *The Expedition up the Nile*, 1884-85.

Note the dependence of the mobility of the force on the state of the river and of the river transport. Further examples: 1st Burmese War, Sec. 5 A (i); Crimea; Madagascar, Sec. 5 A (ii) (*b*); North Persian expedition.

(*g*) *South Africa*, 1899-1902.

Note the changes which had to be made in our organization there. The greater part of the British force was at first infantry, but it was very soon discovered that they were not sufficiently mobile to deal with the Boers, who were nearly all mounted. Hence numerous bodies of mounted infantry had to be formed.

(*h*) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904-1905. Map D.

At the beginning of this year, there was only one very bad road for the advance of the 12th Japanese Division up to the Yalu, and the weather conditions were very bad as well. Hence the advance of this division was very slow, and opportunities, which were not taken, were offered to the Russians. See Sec. 23 (c) (i).

(*j*) *Mesopotamia.*

Note that this campaign depended very largely upon communications; the mobility of the force depended on the river, which was often in flood.

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EFFECT OF RAILWAYS AND M.T.

(*k*) As a result of the advent of railways, the mobility of troops was much increased. Note the effect on the mobilizations in 1866 and 1870.

(*l*) *Gallieni's Division,* 1914. Map A, Sketch II.

Note the effect of M.T. This division was moved rapidly a distance of thirty-five miles in buses and taxis from Paris to the Ourcq to reinforce the French Sixth Army at a critical period of the battle of the Marne, and had a great influence on the ultimate issue. In previous days, there being no really suitable railway, this move would have taken a long time by march route.

Note also how the mobility of the Germans was increased by the railways which enabled them to transfer troops rapidly from the East to the West, and *vice versa.* Compare this situation with that of Napoleon when he was fighting the enormous struggle of Leipzig.

Note the effect of the break in gauge between the German and Russian railways. Purely for strategic purposes, the Russians maintained their railways at the large gauge, while those of the Germans were standard. Hence the supply problem, once either side crossed the frontier, became very difficult.

(v) Offensive Action.

(*a*) Note the early ideas about this.

Marshal Saxe, in his *Rêveries,* wrote :—

"I am not in favour of battles, especially at the beginning of a war; and I am convinced that a skilful general may wage war all his life without being driven to them. There is no method like this for reducing the enemy to an absurdity, and furthering your own interests. You must have frequent engagements, and so to say, melt the enemy away: after which, he will have to go into hiding."

It was because these ideas were so prevalent that wars continued indecisively for such long periods, without either side gaining any real military advantage.

There is another excellent illustration of the same idea in a contemporary account of the action of General Wade's operations against Marshal Saxe quoted in Thornton's *Campaigners Grave and Gay* :—"On July 30th they (Wade's troops) encamped within four or five miles of Lille; on the 31st they lost a Scotch volunteer before it. They looked also for a field of battle, but by great Providence no enemy was nigh; on the 1st instant they were put in fear, but as it happened danger was at a distance; on the 2nd they slept sound; on the 3rd the right wing foraged; on the 4th the whole army was reviewed; on the 5th they rested; on the 6th

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the right wing foraged; on the 7th did nothing; on the 8th received a trumpet from Count Saxe about the exchange of prisoners; on the 9th sent him back again; on the 10th the Hanoverians foraged and had a gun fired at them from Lille; on the 11th the Britons foraged and had no gun fired at 'em, and the captain that was taken at Lille being exchanged, returned."

(b) *Marlborough's Campaign with the Dutch, 1703 Onwards.* Map A.

In these campaigns, on the one side were arrayed the forces of France, Spain and Bavaria, who were in possession of the Netherlands, with their numerous fortresses; and on the other, the Emperor, England, Holland, and later Denmark and Prussia. There were two main theatres of war—the Netherlands and the Danube. The sole objective of the Dutch was to gain a line of fortresses in the Netherlands, which would act as a barrier against the French. All their ideas of the war were based on this. Their idea of war was one of an endless series of sieges, and of an entire avoidance of any battle with hostile field armies. They could see no connection between this war in the Netherlands and the campaign of the Imperialists against the French and Spaniards, etc., on the Danube and in Italy.

In August, 1703, the Allies were in superior strength in the Netherlands, and the French and Spaniards on the Danube and in Italy. Marlborough at once wished to take advantage of this superiority by attacking the French in their fortified lines between the Mehaigne and Leuwe, but the Dutch refused permission. They did not consider that the French forces were their objectives. Instead, they only permitted the siege of Limbourg (E 5), which would give them another defensive fortress against the French. Meanwhile, the French under Tallard and Villars were making full use of their superiority to follow a true objective, Landau (F 6) being captured by Tallard, and Villars heavily defeating the Imperialists in Bavaria.

In 1704 the French had decided, in accordance with this principle, to disengage most of their forces from the Netherlands, and to concentrate on the Danube for a decisive stroke. Still the Dutch would not realize that the field forces were the sole means of a country to wage war, and that a stroke on the Danube would affect the Netherlands. Marlborough, with a clear vision of the objective, decided to anticipate the French, with Eugene on the Danube, and strike at the French and Bavarian field armies. To get permission from the Dutch for this was impossible, so, at the beginning of his great march across Europe, which was to lead to the battle of Blenheim (G 6), and at one stroke shatter the power of France, he had not only to deceive the enemy, but also his own allies, by giving out that it was his intention to move

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to Coblentz (F 5) to start a campaign towards Paris *via* the River Moselle. For the first time in the war, he became free from the Dutch, and, as a result, for the first time the Allies won a success which definitely influenced the whole campaign, while the Dutch remained endlessly besieging their fortresses.

(*c*) *Napoleon.* Map A.

All of the campaigns of Napoleon up to 1812 illustrate this principle, but perhaps Jena does it best. It has been seen from the account under "Doctrine" what a state the Prussian army was in at the time. Its mobilization, and its strategy were of a similar type. There was no strategical scheme which lasted more than about twenty-four hours at a time.

In 1806, the French were cantoned in South-West Germany, and could be concentrated approximately in eight days. Napoleon was at Paris. Berthier, and then apparently Murat, was in command, and there was considerable confusion in the concentration owing to Napoleon, Berthier and Murat all issuing orders at the same time. However, Napoleon's ultimate plan was simple, and was entirely based on offensive action against the enemy's forces. He devised the "bataillons carrés" of 200,000 men, which meant that his corps were all moving concentrated, and all within supporting distance of each other. He was ignorant of the moves of the Prussians up to and including the battle of Jena (H 5) itself, but his formation and his determination simply to seek out the enemy forces made it almost immaterial to him what the enemy might do. He continually held the true objective in front of him. After the battle, in which he had actually misjudged the situation, and in which his complete success was really due to the heroic fighting of the Corps of Davoust, he still maintained this objective, and gave the enemy no rest, chasing them vigorously in a classic pursuit which did not end till the Prussian force had practically ceased to exist (see Sec. 76 (c)).

Napoleon's aim was always to strike at the forces of the enemy in the field, and go on striking them till they ceased to exist.

See also his continuous blows at Beaulieu and Colli in 1796; his Marengo campaign, in which his keenness to close with his enemy nearly led him to destruction; Ulm, or even Austerlitz, which was practically his only really defensive battle. Sec 7 (ii) A (ii) and (iii).

(*d*) *Campaign of* 1812.

This campaign is an interesting example. "The Russians intended originally to keep the initiative, and to base an offensive campaign on some almost mediæval theories of von Phull. This nearly led to disaster. Their true rôle was the adoption of the

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strategic defensive allowing the actual offensive to be carried out by the climatic conditions, which were all against Napoleon; and then the change to the offensive, when Napoleon's troops had been entirely exhausted by the attacks of the climate. Once they adopted this true rôle, the campaign affords a perfect example of a correct offensive spirit—strategic defensive to lure on an enemy, and a change to the offensive at exactly the correct moment, with relentless pressure until the enemy is destroyed.

(*e*) *Wellington.*

In reading the Peninsular campaigns, it must always be realized that Wellington's force was really only a strategic detachment from the main theatre of war in Central Europe. His object was not only the liberation of the country, but also the retention in Spain of as large a French force as possible. This did not alter his objective, which was always the French forces themselves. This can be seen in his successive offensive campaigns. He came into Spain whenever the chance was afforded, struck the French forces heavily, and thus forced large forces to be sent against him, which had to be obtained from the main theatre. It was this continual drain of troops from other theatres for Spain that undermined Napoleon's strength. Even his withdrawal to the lines of Torres Vedras was for the same ultimate offensive purpose. While he remained there, he constituted a continual threat of offensive action, which pinned French forces to the ground, while the devastation of the country afforded other chances of furthering his ultimate objective.

(*f*) *The American Civil War,* 1861-1865. Map B.

At the outbreak of the war, the South were really in a better position than the North, especially in the Virginia area. Its population was more accustomed to an outdoor, strenuous life, and was more easily trained as soldiers; and most of the depôts of arms were in their area. At the same time, their man-power was very much smaller than that of the North, and they depended for all manufactured goods on importation from abroad. This importation was bound to be prevented in time, as the North was certain to obtain superiority at sea. The only chance, then, for the South was to take immediate offensive action, using their temporary military superiority to gain a quick decision.

Instead of doing this, they took up an attitude of strategic defensive, apparently relying on the fact that Europe, especially England, depended on the South for its cotton supply, and that Europe would therefore intervene on her behalf. Small tactical offensives were undertaken, but that was all, until Lee's abortive invasion of Maryland, which was made too late, when the superiority of the South had waned. Had he followed up his success of Bull Run, and struck for Washington, he would at

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any rate have had some chance of obtaining strategic victory. The North made many blunders in the early stages of the war, for which they suffered severely, but they persevered in their strategic offensives, until Lee's troops were very much reduced, and could be overwhelmed by the masses of Northerners under Grant.

(*g*) *The Campaign of* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

Throughout this campaign, all ranks of the Prussians were imbued with the one idea—" to march to the sound of the guns." This is well illustrated by the action of von Alvensleben with the 3rd Corps, which brought on the battle of Mars-la-Tour, August 15th and 16th. After Worth and Spicheren, Frossard and Bazaine had hurriedly retired towards Metz, and MacMahon and Failly were driven south, and seemed unlikely to be able to stop their headlong flight at Nancy or even Toul. Meanwhile the German First Army made for Colombey, east of Metz, and the Second prepared to cross the Moselle south of Metz, and circle round the fortress on the west.

The remaining French forces, after many marches and counter marches, and much confusion, had taken up a position at Colombey under Bazaine, and were eventually ordered to retire towards Verdun. Bazaine delayed east of Metz, and this enabled Moltke to engage him at Colombey, further delaying him, and giving the Second Army more time to encircle the town.

On August 14th, General von Alvensleben was commanding the 3rd Corps of the Second Army, and had received direct orders from the Army commander, Prince Frederick Charles, forbidding any advance until the situation in front was more fully known. He became convinced, however, that by a rapid advance southwards to and over the Moselle, he might be able to intercept the French retreat on Verdun, which might now be looked on as certain. He realized Moltke's true objective, and regardless of orders, he pushed straight on, notifying his Army Headquarters that he had done so. He crossed the river about midnight, and when he had got to Gorze, he knew that the other Corps of the Second Army, and the VII and VIII of the First were coming up to support him. He found the French in force between him and Metz and, though he had only the one Corps, he decided to attack, so as to delay the French retreat, and enable Moltke to strike with the whole of his force. In the ensuing battle, variously called Vionville, Rezonville, and Mars-la-Tour, his Corps withstood the attacks of two French Corps for a considerable time, till his supporting Corps came up.

As a result of this action, against the letter of his orders, but very much in the spirit of them, the whole of Bazaine's force was shut up in Metz and ultimately captured.

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(*h*) *South African War,* 1899-1902. Map C.

Before the arrival of Lord Roberts, with his reinforcements, the Boers, if they had made a co-ordinated offensive, could probably have penetrated deep into Cape Colony; but they had not got the offensive spirit, and let the chance slip. It is interesting to read the orders issued by Joubert at this time as an indication of the incorrect strategic attitude of the leaders. See *Official History,* Vol. I, page 425. Compare also the difference in the situation from our point of view when we were able to abandon the defensive and advance to invade the enemy's country. Note also, that strategic offensive against the main forces of the enemy did not finish the war. Further offensive action had to be taken unceasingly against the guerillas to sweep them up against the lines of blockhouses.

(*j*) *The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

At the outbreak of the Russo-Jap War in 1904, the Russians were obsessed with the idea of "Positions." The one thing necessary in war was to find a position, and then sit down in it to defend it. All their training was based on this, and the idea of the offensive seems almost to have been forgotten.

At the beginning of the campaign, Russia was necessarily on the defensive. There could be no question of her invading Japan. The theatre of war was to be Korea. Japan had superiority at sea, her armies were ready, and she invaded Korea. Russia was not prepared, her mobilization was certain to be slow, and she depended for reinforcements, supplies, etc., on an immense length of railway, which was broken at Lake Baikal. She therefore had to adopt the strategic defensive at the beginning of the war. The Japanese thus were able to cross the Yalu, and, after Nanshan, on May 26th, to invest Port Arthur.

By this time, however, Russian reinforcements had begun to arrive, and Russia had altogether nearly 200,000 field troops in the area. They were somewhat scattered, but could be concentrated in time. The Japanese had about 135,000, but they were also divided, as the 1st Army under Kuroki was moving northwest on Liao Yang through the mountains, divided by mountains with few and difficult passes from the Second Army, under Oku, which was moving on Liao Yang due north from Port Arthur along the Mukden Railway; while the Third Army, under Nogi, was besieging Port Arthur. Yet Kuropatkin, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, made no real efforts to take the offensive and strike these forces in detail. He sent isolated bodies with no real objectives against Kuroki, and sent a force of about 27,000 under Stakelberg to attempt the relief of Port Arthur. All these minor isolated efforts were foredoomed to

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failure. The Japanese armies, in July, continued their advance, and were by then nearly in touch with one another. It seems probable that Kuropatkin did decide at this point to attack Kuroki about the Motienling Pass, but he was not quick enough in his decision, and was forestalled by Kuroki.

Once again, Kuropatkin was given a chance, as the Japanese at this juncture halted for some three weeks, apparently in the hopes that Port Arthur would fall and release Nogi's army. Kuropatkin had had time to collect reinforcements. At Liao Yang, his force outnumbered the Japanese by about 20,000 men. Once again, however, he took up a defensive attitude, left the initiative to the enemy, and was forced to retire.

He finally made one last effort, though he had left it so late that he was again in numerical inferiority: and in order that the Japanese should have every advantage, he published abroad his intentions to attack. In the ensuing battle of the Sha Ho, his attacks were hopelessly unco-ordinated, and he was decisively defeated. Throughout the campaign, then, one can see that he adopted the strategic defensive, and that no success of any real value could be obtained until he abandoned this attitude. Even had he obtained a success from his tactical offensive at the Sha Ho, his whole attitude and outlook would probably have stopped him from reaping full strategical advantage from it.

(*k*) *The Change in Plan and Objective of the Germans in* 1914. Map A, Sketch II.

In von Schlieffen's plan of 1905 for the invasion of France, on which von Moltke's was based, nine divisions and three cavalry divisions were detailed for the defence of Alsace-Lorraine, while no less than seventy-eight divisions and eight cavalry divisions were to be in the armies north of Metz-Thionville. Moltke originally ordered twenty-seven divisions and three cavalry divisions to the south, and sixty-one divisions and seven cavalry divisions to the north. He already thus had weakened the striking wing, which was to seek the main objective—the French forces. Then, on mobilization, he further weakened Schlieffen's plan by sending the Ersatz divisions, originally intended to join Kluck for the investment of Paris, to the Lorraine front. Moltke, throughout, could not keep to one plan. On August 30th came Kluck's wheel, originally to help Bulow's army, but ultimately to become permanent, and to necessitate fresh objectives being given to the wheeling armies. On the 30th, the whole original plan of offensive was really given up, and was replaced by the idea of a great coup against the Verdun-Nancy defences. There was no singleness of plan and of objective throughout the whole campaign. Large gaps began to appear between the various

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armies, and control by German Headquarters really ceased. As a result the whole advance and attack lost impetus, became piecemeal, and ended in the disastrous battles of the Marne and the Aisne.

(*l*) *Frontier Wars.*

N.B.—In uncivilized war, the offensive is the only possible attitude.

The campaign will be punitive, and an unceasing, relentless offence will be the only means of bringing the enemy to his senses. Compare the campaign in Afghanistan in 1841 and that of Roberts in 1880.

(vi) Co-operation.

(*a*) *The Wars of Marlborough,* 1703-1710.

These wars afford many interesting examples of lack of co-operation and of close co-operation.

In his campaigns in the Netherlands, Marlborough was almost completely fettered by the lack of co-operation and direct obstruction of the Dutch.

"The War of the Spanish Succession is a perfect example of the vices and defects of a coalition. If the forces at the disposal of the Allies had been placed under the unfettered control of a military genius of the first order, in these campaigns he would have made an end of the exorbitant power of France. If Marlborough or Eugene had been fortunate enough to wield the political authority of a Frederick or a Napoleon, the war would have been conducted with a single eye to the destruction of the enemy. But under the conditions which in fact prevailed, the opinions of third-rate generals were treated with respect, while unity of purpose and harmony of action were entirely sacrificed to the selfish and short-sighted ambitions of the various members of the vast confederency." (Taylor, *The Wars of Marlborough.*)

Chance after chance of decisive military success was snatched from Marlborough by the refusal of the Dutch Field-Deputies to allow an attack to be made.

Even when Marlborough left the Dutch, and completed his amazing march to the Danube before Blenheim (see Sec. 7 (v) (b)), his troubles were not over. On the Danube, there were three allied commanders involved—Marlborough, Eugene, and the Margrave Louis of Baden. Of these, the first two form the most classic examples of close, loyal co-operation of history; but there were many difficulties with the Margrave. The last, "conscious of the progressive decadence of his powers, was anxious only to conserve a reputation which he had little hope of increasing. Such a man, jealous, suspicious to the last degree, deficient in

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nerve and fearful of fresh responsibility, was little better than an embarrassment to Marlborough and Eugene at this critical juncture. . . . An Imperialist General claimed precedence of all others within the Empire, but, as Commander-in-Chief of the forces of the Queen of England and of the States-General of Holland, Marlborough declined to become the Margrave's subordinate. It was therefore agreed that the old unsatisfactory compromise of a dual *command upon alternate days* should come into operation as soon as a junction had been effected between the allied armies." (Taylor.)

With these fetters on him, and with the realization that he never had more than twenty-four hours in which to carry out his designs, it is even still more amazing that Marlborough achieved the decisive success at Blenheim.

The comparison between the difficulties encountered with the Dutch and the Margrave and the close co-operation always afforded by Eugene is extremely interesting.

(*b*) *Napoleon's Marshals.*

Successful co-operation between Napoleon's various Corps and Marshals was only achieved when Napoleon was present himself, and not always then. When away from the Emperor, they were all too jealous of their positions and reputations to afford each other real support. " Each of the officers commanding these Corps d'Armée," wrote Wellington on the war in Russia in 1812, " exercised over the movements of his own Corps a command independent of all except of Napoleon himself. Not only they declined to obey each other, but would not attend to suggestions or advice in respect of the operations of their several Corps in critical moments; and from the great caution with which it appears that Napoleon proceeded in placing one of these authorities in command over others, and the paucity of the instances in which he adopted such a measure, it may almost be believed that he was apprehensive of a refusal to obey the order. This organization of Corps d'Armée gave great efficiency to a French army when under Napoleon, and was very convenient in all great movements and operations; but it rendered it necessary for Napoleon himself to be present on all occasions in which it was necessary to employ more than one Corps d'Armée in an operation."

Even when Napoleon was present, note that, at Jena, Bernadotte with his Corps remained entirely inactive, in spite of Davoust's requests, while the latter was fighting desperately at Auerstadt against great odds. Compare this with the decisive independent action of Kellerman at Marengo. When the latter battle was apparently all but lost to Napoleon, Kellerman, on his own initiative, carried out one of the most famous cavalry charges of history, and completely altered the situation.

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In the Peninsular, the only occasion when the French Corps were co-ordinated and acting decisively was when Napoleon himself was directing the pursuit of Sir John Moore. At other times, there was unceasing bickering between the Marshals. Napier paints a remarkable picture of the lack of co-operation in Massena's Army at the battle of Fuentes d'Onore, May, 1811. "Massena himself was disgusted, as he knew that he was about to be superseded by Marmont; that the Imperial Guards (under Bessières) would not charge at his order; Junot did not second him cordially, Loison neglected his instructions; Drouet sought to spare his own divisions in the fight, and Reynier remained perfectly inactive. Thus the machinery of battle, being shaken, would not work."

(c) *Wellington.*

In the Peninsular, Wellington was in a similar position. He had endless difficulties in attempting co-operation with Cuesta and the Spaniards. Full reliance could never be placed on them, while at Talavera (see Sec. 43 (b)) they endangered the whole British army by their failure to carry out their promise of holding the Baños Pass.

In July, 1809, "Frere (the British Minister in Spain) was possessed with the notion that the time had now arrived at which it would be possible to press for the appointment of a single commander-in-chief of all the Spanish armies. The obvious person to fill this post was the victor of Vimiero and Oporto, if only Spanish pride would consent to the appointment of a foreigner. Frere had sufficient sense to refrain from openly publishing his idea. But he was continually ventilating it to his private friends in the Junta, in season and out of season. There can be no doubt that both from the military and the political point of view the results of Wellesley's exaltation to the position of Generalissimo would have been excellent. If he had controlled the whole of the Spanish armies in the Summer of 1909, the course of affairs in the Peninsular would have taken a very different turn, and the campaign of Talavera would not have been wrecked by the hopeless want of co-operation between the allied armies." (*Oman.*)

Later, Oman gives a very interesting picture of the attempts to arrange definite co-operation:—"The all-important plan of campaign was settled at a long conference—it lasted for four hours—on the morning of the following day. According to all accounts the scene at the interview must have been curious. Cuesta could not, or would not, speak French! Wellesley was not yet able to express himself fluently in Spanish. Accordingly, O'Donoju, the Chief of the Staff of the Army of Estramadura, acted as interpreter between them, rendering Wellesley's views

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into Spanish and Cuesta's into English. The greater part of the discussion consisted in the bringing forward of plans by the British Commander and their rejection by the Captain-General. Cuesta was full of suspicion and saw a trap in every proposal that was made to him; he imagined that Wellesley's main object was to edge him out of the supreme command. He was almost silent throughout the interview, only opening his lips to give emphatic negatives, for which O'Donoju proceeded to find ingenious and elaborate explanations."

It is very interesting to compare this interview with that between General French and General Lanrezac, commanding the French Fifth Army, in the early part of the 1914 campaign. Neither could speak the other's language, and, apparently, they refused permission for a third person to be present.

Wellington had also difficulties at times with his own Generals. When Craufurd had become heavily involved on the Coa in July, 1810 (see Sec. 25 (j) (ii)), General Picton rode up to the bridge of the Coa; there he met Craufurd, who was just preparing to resist Ney's attempt to cross the river. Picton was asked to bring up the Third Division in support, which could have been done in less than three hours, but roughly refused, saying, apparently, that Craufurd might get out of his own scrape. The Generals parted after an exchange of some hard words, and Picton rode back to order his Division to get ready to retreat, " having committed one of the greatest military sins, that of refusing to support a comrade in the moment of danger, because he did not choose to compromise his own troops." (*Oman.*)

(*d*) *American Civil War,* 1861-1865.

Note the wonderful co-operation between Lee and Jackson, which enabled them to carry out the somewhat dangerous manœuvres of the first Manassas, second Manassas, and the turning movement at Chancellorsville. After Jackson's death, Lee never again attempted any of these involved plans. Longstreet was the only Confederate General who at times failed to co-operate fully. (See " Gettysburg," *American Civil War.*)

Compare this with the jealousies, bickering, and lack of co-operation between the various Generals in the Federal armies. Until Grant took over supreme command, there was no co-ordination or co-operation.

(*e*) 1866.

Compare the Prussians and Austrians. The former were thoroughly imbued with the doctrine of co-operation. They " marched to the sound of the guns," and were always prepared to go, on their own initiative, to the help of their other formations, while their commanders and staffs had been trained in the

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co-ordination of the various arms. The reverse was the case with the Austrians. "The infantry jeered at all new-fangled inventions, including the needle gun, revived Suvoroff's old sayings, and went over bodily to the cult of the bayonet. Still, the cause of their defeat is not accounted for, because they possessed an admirable artillery, and, as events proved in Italy, an excellent cavalry, and *had the three arms combined their powers, all might yet have gone well;* but the fatal defects in their system of staff selection and training led to a paralysis of their mounted men, and an entire failure to ensure that timely co-operation of the three arms which can alone guarantee great results." (*Maude.*)

(*f*) 1870.

There is the same picture. The German commanders were extremely thorough and loyal in their co-operation between themselves, and were becoming skilful in the handling of all arms together. The French were, throughout, in a chaotic state.

(*g*) *The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

This is a very interesting war to study as it is really the first one in which definite ideas on the co-operation of all arms were being evolved. The Japanese artillery co-operation with their infantry was at times very successful.

The Russians were always unco-ordinated. Kuropatkin himself is very candid about it:—

"The most pronounced weak points amongst our senior commanders, especially in the first period of the campaign, were their lack of initiative, their ignorance of the method in which an attack should be conducted, and their want of determination. There was never any co-ordination in the operations of large units, which were really quite remarkable for their absolute disconnection. Even our best commanders preferred their neighbour to be told off for the attack, while they themselves remained in support."

(*h*) *The Great War.*

1914.

(i) There was complete lack of co-operation between the various French Armies, especially in the area of the French offensive in the Ardennes. Joffre wished to keep his plans secret, but he was so reticent that the Army Commanders did not know sufficient of each other's rôle to co-operate at all.

(ii) Note the lack of co-operation between the British Army and the French Fifth Army under Lanrezac during the retreat to the Marne. The respective commanders, apparently, mistrusted one another, and there was little co-ordination.

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(iii) Note the lack of co-operation, due apparently to the lack of control from G.H.Q., between the I and II Corps of the B.E.F. just before Le Cateau.

(iv) It is of the greatest interest to study the successive offensives on the Western Front and to see the different methods adopted to try to obtain full co-operation of all arms. The fullest co-operation of infantry, artillery, tanks, smoke, cavalry, etc., was really first achieved in the early part of the first battle of Cambrai. Up till then, one arm or other had always failed, and the methods of employment had been wrong.

It is also interesting to note the complete misuse of the cavalry arm on the Western Front after 1914.

Note the excellent co-operation of all arms achieved by General Allenby in Palestine.

(j) *Gallipoli.*

In the initiation of this campaign, there was no co-operation at all.

In the actual details, co-operation was very difficult owing to lack of intercommunication. This was particularly the case between the naval guns and attacking infantry. "It is noticeable that throughout the landing operations at Y Beach and elsewhere, the navy's unavoidable difficulties in picking up shore targets were seriously increased both by inadequate signal arrangements ashore and by an omission to provide the supporting ships, before the landing began, with full information regarding the composition and location of the various portions of the force." (*Official History*: Vol. I, page 206.)

(vii) Security.

See Surprise Sec. 7 (iii) and chapter VI.

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CHAPTER II.

FIGHTING TROOPS, THEIR CHARACTERISTICS AND ARMAMENT.

AN OUTLINE OF THEIR HISTORY.

10.—INFANTRY.

The history of Infantry is the history of War, and it is impossible to give a brief outline of this.

There is a very interesting book dealing with this subject—*A Review of the History of Infantry*, by Colonel E. M. Lloyd. Longmans Green and Co.

11.—CAVALRY AND MOUNTED RIFLES.

The history of Cavalry may be divided up into a series of periods. Cavalry in some shape or other has always existed, since a horse big enough to carry a man has been bred.

Period I.

The Scythians were probably the first known cavalrymen but normally they appear to have been of little tactical use. Alexander was the first to organize and employ them with definite tactical ideas. He successfully used armoured cavalry to break down enemy resistance (demoralization) and light cavalry to pursue (annihilation).

Hannibal and Scipio Africanus employed similar methods, but chiefly against his enemy's flanks or rear. The cavalry influence had become so strong that Julius Caesar trained his infantry specially to resist cavalry attacks, and employed his cavalry only as an arm of annihilation.

During the main part of this period, the cavalry was the predominant arm on the battlefield.

Period II.—The Period of the Middle Ages.

The improvement in missile-throwing weapons had produced an increase in the armouring of the cavalryman, with the result that he became immobile and incapable of manœuvre, and incapable

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of demoralizing well-trained pikemen and archers. Then the introduction of gunpowder accentuated his difficulties, and the development of portable firearms and the " wagenburg " (see " Artillery," Sec. 12) ensured his doom in his present form.

Period III.—The Period of the Thirty Years War.

Gustavus Adolphus and Cromwell, the greatest cavalrymen of history, restored mobility and added fire-power to their cavalry. It became again the predominant arm on the battlefield, and, owing to its increased mobility and to the inaccuracy and slow loading of fire-arms, it could still be employed as an arm of demoralization.

See " Breitenfeld, 1631," Sec. 7 (iii) B (iii); " Marston Moor, 1664 "; " Naseby, 1645."

Period IV.—1650-1740.

Cavalry tactics again deteriorated. Owing to the type of fortress-fighting and to the mud of the Flanders battlefields, speed and power of manœuvre were lost sight of. It is true that Marlborough cut the French army in two by his cavalry charge at Blenheim, but there was no use of speed or manœuvre in this. It was a charge at the trot, at the middle of the French line, over marshy country, and was successful owing to the ground having been considered by the French impossible for cavalry. Charles XII, however, was evolving improved mobile methods, which were further exploited by Marshal Saxe.

Period V.—The Period of Frederick the Great.

After his cavalry debâcle at Mollwitz (see Sec. 28 (a)), Frederick set out to restore mobility and discipline to his cavalry. He employed it generally as an arm of annihilation and seldom of demoralization. He realized, too, that though speed and good drill still made his cavalry superior to the fire-arms of the day, fire support for cavalry was necessary; and he therefore added horse artillery. Cavalry again became the predominant arm in battle, as exemplified by the actions of Seydlitz at Rossbach in 1757 (Sec. 43 (*a*)) and Zorndorff in 1768. The rôle of reconnaissance, however, was still completely ignored.

Period VI.—Napoleonic Wars.

Fire-arms were now continually improving, and shock action against unbroken infantry becoming more and more impossible. Napoleon employed his cavalry to reconnoitre, to screen, and to annihilate, rarely to demoralize. Note his cavalry screen up to Austerlitz—his use of Murat at Jena and in 1812 to cover him—his annihilating use of Murat in his pursuit after Jena (see Sec. 76 (c))—Kellerman's "demoralizing" use of his cavalry at Marengo.

It was only when he had lost the best of his infantry personnel

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that Napoleon began to turn to his cavalry to obtain demoralization of the enemy.

Period VII.—1815-1870.

The introduction of the breach-loading rifle finally abolished the power of cavalry to demoralize an unshaken, well-armed opponent, but the situation was not fully realized, and shock action for large bodies of cavalry was still considered possible without previous preparation by other arms. The American Civil War taught little, except the use of mounted rifles, and the value of cavalry reconnaissances, as exemplified by Stuart's rides at Richmond and 2nd Manassas. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

In the 1866 campaign, there was little cavalry activity, and its handling was very poor.

In 1870, the great value of cavalry reconnaissance was shown, in which the Germans proved very successful, and the French very poor (see Secs. 23 (a) (vi) and 36 (b) (v)). It also proved the futility of shock action against modern fire-arms, especially as exemplified by Bredow's actions about Mars-la-Tour.

Period VIII.—1870-1914.

It was at last generally recognized that security—*i.e.* reconnaissance and protection, would be the primary rôle of cavalry in war, but this was only fully realized in England. The continent still believed in the possibility of shock action. The exceptional conditions of both the South African War and the Russo-Japanese wars seem to have clouded the minds of most cavalry tacticians. *Period IX.*

The Great War showed the divergence of views held, and that the correct employment of cavalry was not yet understood. Cavalry were called upon to carry out the double duty of intelligence and security, with the result that they achieved neither and were worn out. The French and Germans both attempted shock action, but only once each, where they learnt their lesson.

When once the war had stabilized into trench conditions, the rôle of cavalry on the Western Front ceased. Attempts were made on many occasions to create a gap large enough for the cavalry to pass through into the rear of the enemy, but, with the possible exception of the first battle of Cambrai, no real opportunity was ever provided for them. Their rôle was again forgotten, and, in the retreat in March, 1918, when their mobility would have been invaluable, they were dismounted and used as infantry.

In Palestine, however, in the final break through against the Turks, they obtained their chance, and this campaign affords an excellent example of the use of cavalry as an arm of annihilation.

(Chiefly from notes by Lieutenant-Colonel Charrington, M.C.)

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SEC. 12.—ARTILLERY.

From the earliest known times, artillery in some form or other has always appeared in wars. In the Old Testament there are mentioned: "engines invented by cunning men to shoot arrows and great stones." Every period had its own type of "catapulta," "balista," etc. Alexander actually produced a type of field artillery which could accompany his infantry.

The first known historical use of cannon was by the Germans in Italy in 1331. They are said to have appeared also at Crecy, and at Harfleur, in 1415; but, at this time they were only employed, as a general rule, for battering down walls.

The real father of field artillery is said to be John Ziska, who, in the Hussite wars of 1419-1424, invented the "Wagenburg," a vehicle containing several small guns. These were still found in use as late as the battle of Cropredy Bridge in 1644. The great artillery event of the fifteenth century, however, was the siege of Constantinople, where the Turks used a large force of artillery, with some very big pieces, some of which survived to fire stone shot with effect at Admiral Duckworth's fleet in 1807, when he went through the Dardanelles.

Sixteenth Century.

Artillery made considerable strides in the Italian wars of Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I of France. At the battle of Marignan, 1515, "the French artillery played a new and distinguished part, not only by protecting the centre of the army from the charges of the Swiss phalanxes, and causing them excessive losses, but also by rapidly taking up such positions from time to time . . . as enabled the guns to play upon the flanks of the attacking columns." (Chesney.)

About 1525 the arquebus began to become efficient, and the very light forms of artillery therefore began to die out, the smallest remaining being the two-pounder; and artillery gradually evolved into cumbrous and immobile guns of position. Manœuvring of the pieces disappeared; they came into action in advance of the troops, and were generally captured and recaptured with every changing phase of the attack. Considerable progress, however, was made in siege artillery, and the mortar was introduced.

Thirty Years War.

Artillery remained in the immobile state until the arrival of a genius of war—Gustavus Adolphus. The French had already invented the limber, and Gustavus set out to make his artillery thoroughly mobile, so as to enable it to accompany his troops in the field. His field pieces were iron four-pounders; and they were

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distributed among the infantry units, and thus began the system of " battalion guns." He was the first to classify the artillery into mobile and non-mobile guns, the first class of which comprised guns up to twelve-pounders. The best field gun of the period, however, was the nine-pounder, or demi-culverin. No attempt was yet made to organize the ammunition trains or the drivers as military units; they were all civilians.

English Civil War.

Little use was made of artillery in the field, as English artillery had not progressed in mobility. Movements of forces were, as a rule, too rapid to be accompanied by guns, and there were few fortresses to be reduced. The New Model Army usually sent for any guns when there was a particular task for them.

1660-1740.

In the wars of Turenne and Marlborough, so much time and energy were spent on the sieges of fortresses that the progress of heavy artillery was considerable, but that of field very slight. At Blenheim, the allied armies only brought into the field one piece per 1,000 men. At Oudenarde, " from the rapidity of the march, the battle was fought with little aid from artillery on either side." Still, the armies as a whole were getting more accustomed to the use of artillery, and, in 1716, the " Royal Regiment of Artillery " came into existence in England; but the drivers were not soldiers in England until 1793, at the earliest.

Wars of Frederick the Great.

After 1700, the pike had entirely disappeared and infantry fire-power had become the decisive factor in battle. Guns had been divided into those moving with the army, and the wholly stationary, or siege pieces. So far as the latter were concerned, they began to be employed on the system elaborated by Vauban for the capture or defence of fortresses. In the field it was the infantry and cavalry who forced the decision. In the early Silesian wars, heavy guns did try to prepare the way for the infantry, which were accompanied by the battalion guns, and they did have, at any rate, a considerable moral effect: and as battles became more and more entrenched, like those of Frederick's later campaigns in the Seven Years War, the heavier weapons regained their former supremacy. At this period, the Austrians, the greatest experts in artillery, always placed their guns in long lines of field works, heavily protected by abattis, etc.

In 1759, Frederick introduced horse artillery to keep pace with the movement of his cavalry, and he employed the field artillery in " batteries " of from ten to twenty pieces.

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In England at this time, the guns in use were twenty-four-pounders, twelve-pounders, and six-pounders. They were divided into " brigades " of four, five and six guns respectively, and began to be separated into " heavy " and " light " brigades. The field gun was drawn by four horses, and had 100 rounds of shot, and thirty of grape.

Reforms of Gribeauval.

Artillery in France at the beginning of the eighteenth century was bad, but in 1765 Gribeauval started to build up a system of personnel and material, creating a distinct material for field, siege, garrison, and coast artillery respectively. He dismissed to branches other than field artillery all pieces of greater calibre than twelve-pounders, and reduced the weight of those that remained. These included a four-pounder regimental gun, and eight and twelve-pounders for the reserve, with six-inch howitzers. For siege and garrison, he adopted the sixteen-pounder and twelve-pounder guns, eight-inch howitzer, and ten-inch mortar. He improved the carriage and adopted a uniform construction for all material, making parts inter-changeable as far as possible. The corps, or reserve, artillery was organized in divisions of eight guns, which made a unit, with guns, munitions, and gunners complete; and horses and drivers were also made part of the unit towards the end of the century. This was all a great step forward, and paved the way for Napoleon's successful artillery tactics.

Artillery in England had not progressed so rapidly, but in 1793 horse artillery was introduced, and in 1797 the driver corps was established. It was not till 1802, however, that battalion guns were done away with, and field " brigades of six guns " were formed.

From the period of the French revolutionary wars dates the real progress of modern artillery methods and tactics. Artillery became really mobile; it was properly organized; and definite tactics of employment began to be evolved. Artillery not only was used to prepare the advance of the infantry, but also, in mass, for the actual destruction of enemy personnel and material, as an offensive weapon. From the time of Napoleon, then, dates the art of combining the action of all three arms, especially those of the infantry and the artillery.

From now onwards, the history of artillery becomes a history of the technical improvement of the gun and howitzer, influenced very considerably by the corresponding improvement of small arms. In the American Civil War, the infantry kept the gun at long range as a rule, and there was, in consequence, little preparation of attacks by artillery. Infantry assaulted unbroken infantry and artillery, while artillery in the attack took fleeting

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chances of coming into action at very short ranges, and then withdrawing, as exemplified by Pelham's guns at Fredericksburg.

In 1866, guns were present in large numbers on both sides, but actually had little effect, as the training of personnel and the equipment were poor. By 1870, however, the Prussians had improved this, and their artillery was skilfully employed, until, at Sedan, the French army was disposed of, at the cost of only five per cent. German casualties, by the enveloping fire of nearly 600 guns.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the quick-firing gun began to appear in European armies, and shrapnel began to be developed.

The South African War demonstrated the value and necessity of having long range guns in the field, and the Russo-Japanese war emphasized this and also showed the effect of modern heavy howitzers on fortresses.

It was left to the Great War to show the supreme importance of artillery support, and of accuracy and density of fire; the value and possibility of employment of guns and howitzers of the biggest calibre in the field; the effect of modern super-heavy howitzers on permanent fortification; and, finally, the possibility of producing the extremely long range gun—"Big Bertha"—which fired on Paris at a range of about seventy-six miles.

SEC. 13.—ARMOURED UNITS.

See Colonel Fuller's *Tanks in the Great War.*

The tank may be said to date at any rate from 3500 B.C., when they existed in Assyria in the form of chariots. All war cars, chariots, battering rams on wheels, elephants, etc., were forms of tanks. (See *R.U.S.I. Journal.* Vol. lxxi. No. 481, Feb., 1926.)

The next stage in its evolution may be said to be that of the knight in armour, who possessed most of the attributes of the early types of tank, and especially the very regrettable one of extreme vulnerability when the motive power had gone. "The knight," says Colonel Fuller, "to all intents and purposes was a living tank—a combination of muscular energy, protective armour, and offensive weapons."

During the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the idea of an actual battle car was always cropping up, and various types were designed, without any apparent success. Leonardo da Vinci, in 1482, wrote almost a prophecy of the modern tank: "I am building," he said, "secure and covered chariots, which are invulnerable, and when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe, even the largest enemy masses must retreat; and behind them the infantry can follow in safety and without opposition." The lot of the designers of some of the early

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machines was, like that of many pioneers, a hard one. As early as 1769 Cugnot in France set a steam boiler upon the frame of a wagon and succeeded in making the wagon go. His idea was that this invention could be used in war, and on this presumption he was, the next year, assisted by the government to construct an improvement. The speed, however, was scarcely more than two-and-a-half miles an hour, and the machine would only run for twenty minutes before it had to stop for fifteen minutes to get up more steam. In this first public trial, he had the ill-luck to run into and knock down part of a stone wall. This led to him being cast into gaol and his experiments were abandoned." (H. H. Manchester, *The Forerunner of the Tank.*)

In 1855, James Cowan, in England, took out a provisional patent for " a locomotive battery fitted with scythes to mow down infantry " and endeavoured to persuade Lord Palmerston to take up this adaptation of the chariot; while in 1900, armoured steam traction-engines were produced for South Africa.

The other requirement to make the tank a possibility was the " track " system of propulsion. The principle of this appears to have originated in 1770 in a device by which a portable railway could be attached to a wheeled carriage. From this time continual experiments were made with caterpillar traction, and steam locomotives with caterpillar tracks had for years before the Great War been applied to haulage in lumber camps in America. In 1907, a Rochet-Schneider car fitted with a chain track was tried for military traction purposes, and in 1908, a 70 H.P. Hornsby-Ackroyd chain-track tractor took part in a review at Aldershot. Finally in 1912, de Mole, an Australian, placed before the War Office a design for a climbing, fighting track-driven machine, which, though no action about it was taken at the time, is now considered to have been a better design than the first one actually produced during the war.

Great War.

In October, 1914, the idea of the tank was first officially put forward and looked into, with the result that the first tanks appeared on the Western Front on the Somme in 1916, where, owing to the difficulties of the ground and to unforeseen mechanical faults, they were not very successful. From the experiences gained here, however, the construction was gradually improved, but their tactical handling remained poor until the first battle of Cambrai see under " Tactical Surprise," Sec. 7 (iii), B (vi)), where modern tank, and really combined, tactics may be said to have originated. From this period onwards, they became almost the dominating factor in success. The " whippet," or small, fast tank to exploit success, soon arrived, and the successful counter-offensive made by Foch and by Sir Douglas Haig in 1918 was

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based on the tank, and on the tactics learned at the first battle of Cambrai.

It is interesting to see, in *My War Memories,* how Ludendorff gradually changed his opinion as to the value of tanks. In the early stages he undoubtedly thought them of little value, but, obviously against his will, he was gradually and overwhelmingly convinced of their very great importance before the end of the war.

Armoured Cars.

On the outbreak of war in 1914, several types of armoured cars appeared, but there were not sufficient anywhere to do effective work at the beginning of the war. A few naval cars, and some small units, did useful work, but, directly position warfare set in, the use of armoured cars became impossible. They were collected and sent East and later to Rumania and Russia.

There were very few opportunities during the war of effective use of these cars. There was one very interesting action in the desert in Egypt, carried out by the Duke of Westminster, against the Senussi, to liberate the imprisoned crew of H.M.S. *Tara.* (See *The Campaign in Palestine* by Maj.-Gen. Bowman Manifold.)

Armoured cars also played a considerable part in the fighting in Ireland after the war.

A very interesting historical parallel can be drawn between the tactics of armoured cars and those of the Mongol cavalry in the times of Jenghis Kahn.

See " Jenghis Kahn " by Harold Lamb and, " Great Captains Unveiled " by Liddell Hart.

Sec. 14.—ENGINEERS.

In the early history of wars in Europe, there was no line to be drawn between civil and military engineers. They worked indiscriminately on the fortifications, etc., of the period. By the middle of the thirteenth century, however, there was one organized body of skilled workmen in England employed under a " chief engineer." At the siege of Calais in 1347, this corps consisted of masons, carpenters, smith, tentmakers, miners, armourers, gunners, and artillerymen. At the siege of Harfleur, in 1415, the chief engineer was designated " master of the King's works, guns and ordnance," and the corps under him numbered 500 men. Headquarters of engineers existed in the Tower of London before 1350, and a century later developed into the Office of Ordnance, whose duty was to administer all matters connected with fortification, artillery, and ordnance stores. For a very long time, as is seen, the artillery was part of the engineer services of the army.

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Henry VIII added to this organization a body of pioneers under trench-masters and a master trench-master. Charles II increased the peace establishment and formed a separate one for Ireland: but the peace establishment was very small, ordnance trains being specially enrolled for the period of any war. In 1716, however, the artillery and the engineers were definitey divided, and an engineer corps was formed consisting of 1 chief engineer, 3 directors, 6 engineers-in-ordinary, 6 engineers extraordinary, 6 sub-engineers, and 6 practitioner-engineers.

In 1782 this establishment was largely increased and in 1787 the designation of " Royal " was conferred on the corps.

As war has become more and more complex, and more and more scientific instruments have been introduced, so the work of the Engineers has become more and more involved. Up to the end of the Napoleonic period, when sieges were as a rule the most important part of war, the work of the Engineers lay chiefly in the siege and assault of fortresses, in which they led the " forlorn hope " at the head of assaulting columns.

It is of considerable interest to see the enormous growth of the work, both in amount and variety, that fell to the lot of the " sappers " in the Great War.

In France, the evolution of the Engineers was very similar to that in England, the French Corps du Génie being formed by the famous Vauban in 1690.

15. AIRCRAFT.

A. GENERAL.

The Air Force owes its beginning to three Army Officers, flying in 1910, and, as an outcome, the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers was created in February, 1911. This in turn was re-constituted as the Royal Flying Corps in April, 1912. Previously, in 1890, a balloon section of the Royal Engineers had been formed, and these balloons did good service in the South African War, particularly in Ladysmith and at Magersfontein.

The R.F.C. took the field at the outbreak of the Great War with H.Q., four aeroplane squadrons, and an aircraft Park, and the first aerial reconnaissance of the war was carried out on the 19th August over Nivelles-Genappe and Gembloux. Continuous reconnaissances were made from then onwards, and their work in this respect during the retreat is summed up as follows in The War in the Air, Vol. I:—" The main work of the R.F.C. throughout the days of the retreat was reconnaissance, and . . . . Sir John French was well served by his airmen. He had been warned before the battle of Mons, not only of the heavy movement on his front, but of the enveloping attempt on his flank, and throughout the retreat he was punctually informed

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of Von Kluck's enveloping efforts. The change of direction made on the 31st August was immediately seen and reported. Von Kluck's renewed pursuit of the British on the two following days did not escape observation. Finally, the German swerve to the left on the 3rd of September was clearly followed from the air."

Battles in the air soon started, and, on August 25th, the first German machine was brought down in aerial combat. On 15th September, a pilot took a few photographs of enemy positions, a method of reconnaissance which was to be the forerunner of the immense photographic activity of later periods: whilst ranging with artillery was gradually being improved and enlarged in scope.

The battle of Neuve Chapelle saw the first organised bombing of enemy headquarters and important centres, and the next battles, Aubers Ridge and Festubert, inaugurated the attempts to arrange co-operation between the attacking infantry and the air by the use of ground strips.

In 1918, the R.F.C. was made an independent service under an Air Ministry.

B. ATTAINMENT OF AIR SUPERIORITY.

(i) On the western front, the fight for this superiority was continuous. Note the temporarily decisive effect of the appearance of the Fokker machine on the German side. Note, too, the particularly heavy aerial fighting just prior to any of the main offensives.

(ii) In Palestine, General Allenby was greatly assisted by his superiority in the air, both in concealing his concentration before the battle of Megiddo, and in the final pursuit.

C. DISTANT RECONNAISANCE.

(*i*) *Western Front.*

Note the continuous reconnaisance carried out during the early fighting in 1914, particularly those round the Charleroi area on August 22nd, which gave the first real indication of the seriousness of the situation: also the very complete reconnaissance of the German moves on September 4th between Chateau Thierry and La Ferté sous Jouarre.

At the same time, it is interesting to see the false impression given to the German 1st Army on August 24th and 25th, 1914, that the British forces were retreating on Maubeuge.

See also Sec. 31.

(*ii*) *Mesopotamia.*

Note the conflicting reports as to Turkish reinforcements before the battle of Ctesiphon.

See Sec. 29 (d) (ii).

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D. CLOSE CO-OPERATION.

(*i*) *With Artillery.*

This consisted mainly of ranging and spotting. It began early in 1914 (see *Official History*, Vol. I, and *The War in the Air*, Vol. I, page 350, etc.).

(*ii*) *With Infantry.*

(*a*) Notification of positions reached. This was inaugurated at Aubers Ridge by the use of the ground strip. Then flares, and the flaps of respirators were used for the purpose.
(*b*) By low-flying attacks. (See F.).

(*iii*) *With Cavalry.*

To assist in reconnaissance, as in 1914, and for low-flying attacks in pursuit, as in Palestine after the battle of Megiddo.

E. AIR BOMBARDMENT OF VITAL CENTRES.

(i) The first organised attacks were made at the battle of Neuve Chapelle.
(ii) Note the influence of these attacks during the early stages of the battle of the Somme: and of the enemy attacks on H.Q's., dumps, etc., before the battle of Passchendaele.
(iii) The very great effect of the attack by air on the Turkish General Headquarters in the early stages of the battle of Megiddo (September 19th).
(iv) The influence of the air raids on England, and the actions of the Independent Air Force.

F. LOW-FLYING ATTACKS.

(i) More and more use was made of such attacks on the Western Front, particularly in the German March, 1918 offensive, and the counter offensive from August 8th.
(ii) Note the results achieved in the low-flying attacks on the Turks retreating from Nablus through a gorge, after the battle of Megiddo.
(iii) The effect of the pursuing aircraft upon the Austrian forces in the final stage of the battle of Vittoria Venito on the Italian front, October 27th, 1918.

G. TRANSPORT.

(i) Two companies of 14th Sikhs were flown to Kirkuk on February 20th, 1923, in the operations undertaken against Shaikh Mahmoud by the forces in Iraq.

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(ii) Stores for these columns were also provided. (See the interesting account in the Supplement to "The London Gazette," June 10th, 1924. These operations provide many interesting examples of co-operation.)

(iii) The evacuation of the Kabul Legations, 1929.

(iv) The movement of small bodies of troops to Palestine to cope with the Arab-Jew troubles, 1929.

Sec. 16.—SMOKE.

Smoke has been used throughout all time as a means of concealing military movement, as the Israelites were concealed in their escape from Egypt.

(*a*) *The Crossing of the Lech, April 15th,* 1632. Map A (G 6).

In this remarkable example of a crossing of a river in face of an enemy, Gustavus Adolphus employed smoke on part of the front. The Imperialists, under Tilly and the Elector, had withdrawn before Gustavus and taken up a position behind the River Lech, with their right flank on the Danube and their left on the town of Rain. "Redoubts had been built along the low-lying river-front and joined by entrenchments; and heavy guns in suitable batteries stood at intervals. The fords of the Lech, up to Augsburg, and this city also, were held by Tilly; the bridges had been destroyed and the towns occupied." (Dodge.) Gustavus could turn Tilly's position by crossing the Lech above him, and might be able to coop him up in a corner and starve him out: but he wanted a decisive action. He decided to do the unexpected, and cross the river frontally in Tilly's teeth, before Wallenstein could reinforce him. Having made a close reconnaissance, he threw up a 72-gun battery on the left bank, where it could dominate part of the right bank; and "under cover of a constant fire, directed by the King in person, a bridge was thrown in such a way that the artillery and musketeers on the banks could protect; and when it was nearly done, there was sent over a party of 300 Finns, who were concealed by burning damp straw to produce thick smoke. These, with this concealment, got across successfully, and formed a bridgehead of earthworks, and eventually the whole force was passed across by means of this bridge."

(*b*) *Charles XII: Crossing of the Duna,* 1700. Map A (N 1).

Poland and Russia, under Peter the Great, had just formed an alliance against Charles XII, who, after having passed the winter at Narva, appeared in Livonia, in the neighbourhood of Riga. "The Saxon troops, hired by the King of Poland, were posted along the River Duna, which is very broad at that place. Charles,

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who was on the other side of the river, was obliged to dispute the passage. The King of Sweden had caused some large boats to be built on a new plan, the sides of which were much higher than ordinary, and could be raised or let down like a draw-bridge. When raised, they covered the troops on board; and when let down, they served as bridges to land them." (Compare these with Admiral Bacon's pontoons for the protected landing on the Belgian coast in the Great War.) "He made use also of another artifice. Having remarked that the wind blew from the north, where he lay, to the south, where the enemy's camps were, he ordered that they should set fire to a quantity of wet straw. From this a thick smoke arose, and so spread itself over the river, that the Saxons were prevented from seeing his troops, and observing what he was about. Under the cover of this cloud, he ordered several boats to put off full of the like wet fuel; so that the cloud always increased, and was driven by the wind into the eyes of the enemy, making it impossible for them to know whether the King was passing the river or not. Meanwhile he conducted the execution of his stratagem alone." In a quarter of an hour, he had effected the crossing. "He immediately landed his cannon, and formed a line of battle, while the enemy, blinded with smoke, could not oppose him, except by a few random shot. The wind having dispersed the smoke, the Saxons saw the King of Sweden already advancing towards them." (Voltaire, *History of Charles XII.*)

(c) *The Great War.*

Smoke became more and more common as the war progressed, being used in bombs, containers, and shells. It was first employed by the Germans in small quantities at Ypres, on November 11th, 1914.

Its use was possibly best exemplified by the first battle of Cambrai, when the advance of the tanks was covered by smoke-shell, blinding all the enemy observation posts. The failures on subsequent days of the attack were partly due to the supply of smoke-shell in France having been exhausted.

Smoke was also considerably used, mixed with gas, in the German offensives in 1918.

17. GAS.

"The first recorded effort to overcome an enemy by the generation of poisonous and suffocating gases seems to have been in the wars of the Athenians and Spartans (431-404 B.C.) when, besieging the cities of Platia and Belieum, the Spartans saturated wood with pitch and sulphur and burned it under the walls of these cities in the hope of choking the defenders, render-

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ing the assault less difficult. Similar uses of poisonous gases were recorded during the Middle Ages. In effect, they were like our modern stink balls, but were projected by squirts or in bottles after the manner of a hand grenade. The legend is told of Prester John (about the 11th century) that he stuffed copper figures with explosives and combustible materials which, emitted from the mouths and nostrils of the effigies, played great havoc." (*Chemical Warfare.* Fries and West.)

The first gas attack in the war was launched by the Germans, as a cloud, about Ypres, on 22nd of April, 1915, and met with a decided but very limited success: further efforts were made without much success in the same year. The British forces first employed gas at the battle of Loos, released from cylinders: but the wind was wrong, and the gas attack did more harm than good to the attackers.

Other forms of projecting the gas were devised—shells, Stokes mortars, and lastly the Livens projector, first used in July, 1917, in which month, also, the Germans first employed mustard gas.

In all the main German offensives from March, 1918, gas played a very prominent part.

(see also *Calinicus,* by J. B. S. Haldane.)

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CHAPTER III.

STRATEGICAL PRELIMINARIES TO JOINING BATTLE.

18. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS.

MOBILISATION AND STRATEGIC CONCENTRATION.

(a) Necessity for Information as to Possible Theatres of Operations.

See Sec. 5 A.

(b) Speed of Concentration and Interference by the Enemy.

(i) *Sir John Moore in* 1808. Map G.

After the Convention of Cintra, Sir John Moore was in command at Lisbon, with some 32,000 men. Early in October, 1808, he was informed that 10,000 men were arriving at Corunna under Sir David Baird; that he was to take the field himself with 20,000 men; form a junction with Baird; and then act in co-operation with the Spaniards.

Moore directed Baird to march from Corunna through Galicia, as he intended originally to carry out the strategic concentration of all his forces at Valladolid or Burgos. Owing to appalling local difficulties of every kind, Moore was unable to quit Lisbon with his troops until October 26th.

Meanwhile, the whole of the Spanish peasantry had risen against the French, who had withdrawn, under Joseph Bonaparte, behind the Ebro; but then Napoleon entered the country, raised the army in Spain to 250,000 men, dispersed the Spaniards in November, and moved on Madrid, detaching a corps to watch the British forces on the flank.

Moore's troops had met further difficulties. He had been told that the roads north of the Tagus were impassable for artillery and heavy carriages, and he therefore felt forced to divide his army.

"The main body was to move—part by Coimbra, Viseu and Almeida (north of the Tagus) and part by Alcantara (south of the Tagus) and Coria—upon Ciudad-Rodrigo and thence to Salamanca. Only the light baggage and ammunition for immediate use were to be sent with this portion of the force.

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" The artillery, the cavalry, and a park of several hundred carriages, were to go round south of the Tagus by Elvas and Badajoz, across the river at Almaraz, and thence move by Talavera, Madrid and the Escurial Pass—a detour which added some miles to their march—and so unite with the main body at Valladolid or Salamanca." (Robinson.) This part of the force was put under Sir John Hope, and it was accompanied by the bulk of the ammunition.

The actual point of the strategic concentration had not been finally decided, and the lack of any adequate transport was greatly hindering movement. Moore was compelled to move his troops in small successive divisions; Baird could only get out of Corunna on November 9th, and had to march by half a battalion at a time, hiring carts day by day; and Hope had to move in six successive divisions, each one day's march behind the other.

Thus Moore's strategic concentration was becoming slower and slower, while Napoleon was already concentrated at Madrid. On November 15th, Sir John Moore reached Salamanca, and discovered, for the first time, that the French had entered Madrid. Then it became evident that he *would be unable to carry out his strategic concentration without interference by the enemy.*

On November 26th, the British forces, still not concentrated, and in dangerous proximity to the enemy, were situated as folows :—

Moore at Salamanca;
Baird at Astorga, with his rear far behind, beyond Lugo;
Hope approaching the Escurial Pass, with his rear at Talavera.

On November 28th, they were still more or less in the same position, waiting for the rear troops to close up, while Napoleon was at Aranda, with Lefebvre's corps at Palencia and Valladolid. Moore suddenly realized the situation and the danger, and decided to retreat, after first trying to surprise Soult's corps, which was moving on Benevente. Hope had succeeded in joining him on December 13th, and, on the 20th, Moore and Baird at last succeeded in forming a junction.

Thus, owing to lack of speed, the strategical concentration could not be carried out without interference by the enemy, and this resulted in the British army being placed in a very dangerous situation, which was only avoided by a somewhat disastrous retreat.

(ii) *Napoleon's Concentrations.*

He always concentrated quickly, and some distance from the enemy. Note in particular the campaign of Jena, and his instructions to Berthier for the strategic concentration. See *Orders,* Chapter XII. Compare this with the Austrians in

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1796 and 1797. They were moving on both sides of the Lake Garda, trying to concentrate about Peschiera, where Napoleon was actually situated. See " Concentration," Sec. 7 (i) (c).

(iii) 1866. Map A.

Ever since the humiliating Convention of Olmutz, von Roon and von Moltke had been reorganizing the Prussian army, and had evolved a very rapid mobilization and strategic concentration. The whole of the Austrian plans were upset by this rapidity. Yet the Prussian concentration was not really successful, as an attempt was made to effect it too close to the enemy. The Battle of Sadowa (K 5) was raging some time before the Prussian concentration was completed by the arrival of the army of the Crown Prince.

The Austrian strategic concentration was never really carried out at all, as all their movements were too slow.

(iv) *South African War,* 1899-1902.

Note how great were our difficulties at the outbreak of this war. Practically nothing could be sent out before the declaration of war, for fear of precipitating a crisis, which we hoped to avoid. The force at home was not ready for a big war (see under " Doctrine," Sec. 1), the whole concentration depended on the provision of adequate shipping, which was not immediately available, and the journey to the Cape took seventeen or eighteen days.

(v) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

Note how slow was the Russian strategic concentration at the beginning of the war. This was largely due to the inefficiency of communications. The only railway from Russia for mobilization stores, supplies and reserves had a complete gap in it at Lake Baikal. Mobilization and stragetic concentration will always largely depend on communications.

Note also the Russian attempt to concentrate their fleet. The Baltic fleet was brought round, but it arrived too late.

(vi) *Great War.*

(a) Note the amazing efficiency, secrecy, and rapidity of the German strategic concentration on a large scale. They had been perfecting this ever since 1866. In 1866, the whole time for mobilization and deployment into position took nearly five weeks; in 1870, it took eighteen days—eight to mobilize and ten to deploy.

Note, similarly, the move of the first British Expeditionary Force to France, and the controversy that arose as to the correct place for it to concentrate.

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(b) The importance of keeping marches short until troops have become hardened was also well illustrated in the concentration and forward move of the B.E.F. The heat and distances covered in the early stages had a severe effect on the many reservists in the ranks. "The number of reservists in the ranks," says the official history, "was on an average over one half of the full strength, and the units were, owing to force of circumstances, hurried away to the area of concentration before all ranks could resume acquaintance with their officers and comrades and relearn their business as soldiers. Arrived there, they were hastened forward by forced marches to the battle, confronted with greatly superior numbers of the most renowned army in Europe and condemned at the very outset to undergo the severest ordeal which can be imposed upon an Army."

(c) Note the importance of the initial concentration as exemplified by the Gallipoli campaign:

"The well-known axiom," says the *Official History*, Vol. I, page 108, "that it is hardly possible during the course of a campaign to repair errors committed in the original concentration—has seldom been better illustrated." . . . "The orders issued to the Q.M.G's. branch at the War Office were to embark the troops for Mudros. In the absence of any knowledge as to their probable employment they had been embarked as if for landing at a friendly port, irrespective of any tactical requirements, and with regard only to economizing tonnage."

(c) Organisation of Line of Supply.

(i) *South African War.*

On arrival in South Africa, Lord Roberts decided to alter the line of advance from that along the central railway to one on Kimberley.

The consequent re-concentration of troops and alteration of line of supply form an interesting illustration of the difficulties involved when a wrong initial direction has been given to an advance.

(ii) 1914.

(*a*) Note the failure of the German supply organization in the advance to the Marne, and the necessity to change the British line of supply to St. Nazaire.

(*b*) Note the influence on the Mesopotamia campaign of the difficulties of the line of supply, and the delays in the Palestine campaign caused by the necessity to construct the railway and the pipe line across the desert.

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(iii) *General.*

It is of interest to compare the difficulties of modern armies, dependent on their line of supply, with those of early days. In this connection, Fortescue gives an interesting sidelight on the difficulties involved in the supply system in the Marlborough Wars in an article in the *Morning Post*:—

"The Quarter-Master-General was concerned, among other things, with the business of transport and supply, which at the best of times, and in Marlborough's day particularly, was a terrible difficulty. Wagons and teams had to be gathered together by requisition, sometimes as many as 800 in a body, and forage had to be collected for the horses at different points in the route; and, above all, commanding officers had to be kept to the route appointed to them, lest they should stray out of the way to spare the meadows of one friend or to visit the wife of another. Further, officers of all grades and nations were given to the 'intolerable practice' of seizing for their own use every masterless or isolated wagon that they could lay their hands on."

The difficulty must have been increased by the kit to be carried for the use of officers. Fortescue gives a list of things carried by the equivalent in those days of C.O. of a battalion:—

"A neu black coate, wastecoat and britches.
Blue surtoot.
Six new laced fine shirts.
Twelve new fine holland shirts with musslin.
Five new fine musslin cravats.
A silver handled sword.
A new scarlett cloake laced with gold lace.
A pr. of gould buttons for sleeves.
A guilt knife, forke, and spoon.
A pr. of sillver spurs.
Six perewigs.
Eight pd. of wax candle.
About six or eight pd. of chocolet.
Two canisters with tea.
About five or six dosin of clerett."

20. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CASE OF AN OVERSEAS CAMPAIGN.

(a) Disembarkation not liable to interference.

(i) The disembarkation in South Africa.

(ii) The B.E.F. in France. Note the different port of disembarkation for the 7th Division, and the later changes of base of the B.E.F.

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(iii) The preliminary concentration of the Gallipoli Force. See Sec. 18 (b) (vi) (c).

The importance of loading the stores in ships in the correct order is well illustrated here. Ships had to be returned to Alexandria for stores to be resorted owing to faulty original loading. Note also the difficulties in deciding on the best base. *Official History*, Vol. I, p. 95.

(b) Disembarkation liable to interference.

(i) The Gallipoli Landings.
See the Official Histories.

(ii) The Zeebrugge landing.

(iii) See also the examples quoted in "*The Army and Sea Power*" (Ernest Benn, Ltd.).

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CHAPTER IV.

BATTLE.

21. GENERAL.

(a) Opportunities for Forcing an Action without loss of time.

(i) *Superiority in moral.*
See Sec. 3 (Moral).

(ii) *Superiority in Armament.*

This has always been one of the main factors in native warfare, or in conquests by civilised or semi-civilised countries.

In 1866, the existence of the needle gun strongly influenced the Prussians in their decision to force a decisive action as early as possible.

Similarly, in 1914, the possession of the super-heavy siege howitzers, with their power to reduce rapidly the obsolescent Belgian fortresses, was a very influential factor in the German plan of seeking a rapid decision on the Western Front.

(iii) *Superiority in Training and Readiness for War.*

This was the main reason for so many of Napoleon's rapid successes and for the Prussian successes in 1866 and 1870.

In South Africa, the decision was long delayed owing to faulty British training and unreadiness for war. (See Sec. 1 (iii).)

In 1914, it was the belief of the Germans in their superiority in readiness for war which gave them assurance of early victory.

(b) Further Examples of Reasons for Seeking "Quick Decision."

(i) 1866.

For the best example of a quick decision, see the 1866 campaign. Moltke's position was difficult. He knew that Napoleon III was vacillating, and might come in on the side of the Austrians at any moment, so he had to gain his successful decision and also make peace before Napoleon had time to make up his mind to interfere. Hence, the campaign was settled really with one battle—Sadowa.

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(ii) 1870.

Again quick decision was of supreme importance. The French must be beaten before they could have time to find out the defects in their military organization and equipment; before Southern France could be really roused to enthusiasm for the war; and before the separate German states, which Bismarck was trying to weld into one Empire, began to tire of war, to have grievances, and to fight among themselves.

(iii) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904—1905.

Note the difficulties of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war. They wanted to gain and hold the initiative, yet they had to fight with one eye on the financial markets of Europe all the time. They had to rely on external loans for the means of carrying out their war, and they knew that any slight set-back early in the war would greatly restrict their markets for borrowing money.

(iv) *The Balkan War*, 1912.

For one of the few times in the history of the Balkans a solid alliance of Balkan states against Turkey had been organized. It was realized that this Alliance could only last a very short time, therefore a quick decision against Turkey was essential. The Bulgarians declared war against the Turks on September 30th, they crossed the frontier on October 18th; decisively defeated the Turkish armies at Kirk Kilisse, Map A (P11), on the 22nd; defeated them again on the 29th at Lule Bergas; and by November 17th had driven them into the Chatalja lines, defending Constantinople. Here, the Turks were able to hold up their advance long enough for the inevitable break up of the alliance.

(v) 1914.

Note the German attempt to gain a quick decision in the West, so that they could then turn against the slower mobilizing Russians.

(c) Deliberately Delaying Decisive Action.

(i) *Campaigns of Fabius Maximus against Hannibal.* 217-216 B.C. Map A.

Hannibal had invaded Italy, had gained the decisive battle of the Trebia in 218, and advanced through Tuscany, laying waste the country and causing consternation in Rome. Flaminus was Consul at the time, and, in spite of the advice of Fabius Maximus to retire slowly in front of Hannibal, evading his blows and letting him wear his army out, he decided to give battle. He drew up the Roman army near Lake Thrasymene (G 10), and was there almost annihilated by Hannibal. Fabius was then

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given command, and in spite of the contempt and the insults levied at him, carried out his own scheme, always evading Hannibal's blows, but always remaining close enough to him to cause him alarm. So long as he was in command himself, and this policy was carried out, the campaign was successful, and Hannibal's army began to disappear, but first Minucius, and then Varro, at the disastrous battle of Cannæ (J 11), abandoned this plan, and nearly brought Rome to ruin. When once Fabius was again placed in command, as the " shield," with Marcellus as the " sword," the campaign of delay was universally successful.

(ii) Views of Marshal de Saxe.
(See Sec. 7 (v) (a).)

(iii) *Austerlitz*, 1805. Map A (K 6).

This was a case of the adoption of the tactical defensive after an offensive strategic campaign. Napoleon knew the psychology of his opponents, and deliberately took up a defensive position, where he knew his enemy would attack him. Then, at the correct moment, he turned from the tactical defensive to the offensive, and almost destroyed the Russian and Austrian armies. See Sec. 25 (e) (ii).

(iv) 1812.

Once the Russians had abandoned the ridiculous scheme of von Phull, they adopted the correct strategy. They maintained a defensive attitude, withdrawing in the face of Napoleon, until the country and weather had exhausted the troops and organization. Then they turned on their enemy, and started a vigorous offensive.

Napoleon's success had always been largely due to his unceasing concentration of mind on his final objective—the forces of the enemy. In 1812, when he began his invasion of Russia, he still had the same idea, and the Russians somewhat played into his hands. Led astray by a pure theorist—General von Phull—the Tsar Alexander had divided his army into two, one led by himself and Barclay de Tolly, 125,000 strong north of Vilna (N 2); the other by Bagration, 45,000 strong in the province of Volhynia (O 5). Napoleon, intent on his true objective, decided to strike at these two armies while they were separated, and defeat them in detail. Bagration's force, however, escaped Napoleon's clutches, and the two Russian armies withdrew to try to form a junction under the orders of Tolly. Napoleon pushed on, and did all he could to force on a general engagement, but the Russians always withdrew in time, until, on August 17th, Bar-

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clay drew off his forces after a sharp fight at Smolensk (Q 2) to join Bagration on the road to Moscow (S 1). It was at this moment that Napoleon seems to have faltered. He became obsessed with the idea of the value of Moscow. "I am going to Moscow," he said; "one or two battles will settle the business. I will burn Tula, and Russia will be at my feet. Moscow is the heart of the Empire." He had lost sight of his true objective. The "heart of the Empire" was really its armies. It was only after the capture of Moscow that it slowly dawned on him that this was the case, and that the capture and destruction of a city would not bring a determined country to its knees. "But he had now merged the thinker in the conqueror, and—sure sign of coming disaster—his mind no longer accurately gauged facts; it recast them in its own mould." The disastrous retreat from Russia was the direct outcome of this abandonment of the true objective and the soundness of the Russian scheme of delay became apparent.

(v) *Austria* v. *Piedmont*, 1848. Map F.

Note Radetzky's withdrawal before the Piedmontese, from Milan, falling back with the view of leading King Albert Victor on, while he was concentrating forces in rear ready to strike back, and assume the offensive. See Sec. 25 (h) (vi).

(vi) *South Africa*, 1899-1902.

The British forces were greatly outnumbered, and had to remain on the strategic defensive, holding on to important places such as Ladysmith, Kimberley, Mafeking, etc., and attempting to keep the Boers out of Cape Colony until the arrival of reinforcements would allow them to assume the offensive.

(vii) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904-1905. Map D.

Note the complete failure of the Russians. They adopted a defensive attitude, but without any apparent intention of resuming the offensive. They were obsessed with the idea of "tactical positions," a series of which they took up, and on which they remained on the passive defence till they were either beaten or till they voluntarily abandoned the position, and took up another further in rear.

A defensive attitude at the beginning of the war was probably necessary, but it could have been conducted with a view to taking the strategic offensive later. See Sec. 7 (v) (j).

It would be interesting to speculate what would have been the result if the Russians had definitely taken up the strategic defensive, had garrisoned Port Arthur, and had then slowly withdrawn up the railway, even beyond Mukden. Every day would have increased the strength of the Russians, especially as the gap in

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their railway communications over Lake Baikal was being completed; and every day would have lengthened the communications and increased the difficulties of the Japanese.

(viii) 1914.

In the allied retreat in 1914, Joffre was always creating new reserves in immediate readiness to resume the offensive if a chance appeared. Then, when von Kluck's oblique move to the east of Paris gave him his opportunity, he at once took the offensive with Gallieni's troops on the German flank.

(d) Note also the many successful deliberately defensive-offensive battles that have been fought.

(i) Most of Wellington's battles.

(ii) In the American Civil War :—
1st Mannassas, 1861.
2nd Mannassas, 1862. Jackson's action while waiting for Lee. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).
Sharpsburg, 1862.
Fredericksburg, 1862.

(e) Co-operation of Component Parts of the Army.

Throughout the Great War, one of the main difficulties was to get effective co-operation between the infantry and the artillery. This was chiefly a matter of discovering the exact position of the infantry at any time. Among many others, there were two interesting examples of this in the retreat from Mons, in the attack by the Lincolnshire Regt. on the German guns west of Bezu on the 9th September (*Official History,* Vol. I, page 290) and the attack of the Sussex and Northamptonshire Regts. through Priez on September 10th (*Official History*, Vol. I, page 309).

It was this difficulty mainly which led to the elaboration of the somewhat rigid artillery barrages of the trench warfare period.

Note how particularly difficult this co-operation between artillery and infantry proved for naval guns at Gallipoli.

22. THE FORWARD MOVEMENT FROM THE AREA OF CONCENTRATION.

See *also Mobility Sec.* 7 (iv).

(*a*) *Jena.*

As examples of correct and incorrect forward moves from concentration areas, compare those of Napoleon and the Prussians.

(See Sec. 7 (i) (e).)

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(b) *Sir John Moore in* 1808.

Note the influence on this forward move of the lack of roads. (See Sec. 18 (b) (i).)

(c) 1914.

(i) Movement by night to ensure secrecy became more and more common in the Great War.

In the German attack at Riga, the battle of Cambrai, the German offensive in March, 1918, and in the series of British offensives from August the 8th, 1918, concentrations and forward moves to the battle areas were all made by night.

(ii) Note the interesting example of the movement of the six corps of the German First Army, all marching through Aix-la-Chapelle in the forward movement from the area of concentration. In "The March on Paris" von Kluck writes:—"The march formations of the First Army consisted of a deep column of two corps on each of the three roads, passing close to one another, through Aix-la-Chapelle and which did not greatly diverge between them and the Meuse, north of Liége, or even for some way beyond the river. A general was appointed to look after each of these three roads, and to issue all the necessary routine orders for the march. Billeting and supply columns were hurriedly sent forward from the railway base, as the Army Commander had ordered that every man was to be fully rationed by the time the Meuse was reached. Howitzer batteries were put into position near Aix-la-Chapelle by order of the Army Commander to guard against air attacks, and all the roads along the Dutch frontier on the right flank of the advance were blocked. The Army Commander also ordered that the roads of advance should be thoroughly inspected and fully repaired, and all bridges and other constructions guarded."

23. THE APPROACH MARCH.

(a) Action of Mobile Troops and Advanced Guards.

(i) 1746. Map A.

In the allied campaign against the French in the Netherlands, Marshall Saxe was with the main French force East of Antwerp, which had just been captured by him; and Conti, with another French force, was besieging Charleroi, after taking Mons. Prince Charles of Lorraine, in command of the Allies, with a force considerably larger than that of Saxe alone, decided to advance through Liége, along the watershed separating the valley of the Meuse and the tributaries of the Scheldt, to turn Saxe's right, and interpose between him and Conti. In order to screen

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this movement, the *advance was covered by a complete screen of the Austrian Light Horse,* which was so effective that Saxe could get no information at all of the movements of the enemy. Had the advance of the allied main body been really vigorous, the French Army under Saxe would have been placed in a very dangerous position; but the Allies let the chance slip.

(ii) 1805.

In the advance to Austerlitz, note the amazingly effective cavalry screen, which swept the country in front of Napoleon, and hid all his movements from the enemy,

(iii) 1806.

In the advance to Jena, Napoleon was covered by Murat with the cavalry, supported by the corps of Bernadotte.

(iv) 1812.

In this campaign into Russia, Murat, with the cavalry screen, was often fifty miles ahead of the advanced guard of the main columns.

(v) 1866.

In the Prussian approach march into Bohemia, their armies were widely separated, and the cavalry screen was really impossible. Each army moved with its own advanced guard, and actually little use was made of the cavalry in the approach march, except for scouting.

(vi) 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

Note the difference in the approach marches of the Germans and the French. With the latter, their mobilization arrangments were so faulty that a general advance to the frontier to take the offensive, which had previously been intended, was found impossible. They were completely undecided as to what to do, and were really inadequately protected, while their cavalry were ineffective in reconnaissance. They finally sent out a reconnaissance in force as a sort of advanced guard. This consisted of the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Corps, which, after driving in a very weak German detachment at Saarbruck, achieved nothing and obtained no information.

Von Moltke paints a clear picture of the difference in the approach marches in his account of the war. "The French military chiefs now hesitated for a long while between conflicting resolutions. Orders were given and recalled on the strength of mere rumours. The left wing was reinforced because 40,000 Prussians were supposed to have marched through Treves, the Guards received contradictory orders, and the bare apparition of

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a small German force about Lorrach in the Black Forest occasioned the order that the 7th Corps must remain in Alsace. Thus the French were straggled over the wide area between the Nied and the Upper Rhine, while the Germans were advancing in compact masses towards the Saar."

With regard to the German approach march, it is interesting to note that they made little use of any big cavalry screen, but advanced with A.G.'s so strong that they often involved the army commanders in a serious attack when this was not intended. See "A.G.'s Worth, Spicheren," etc.

(vii) *Campaign of Adowa*, 1896; *Italian Abyssinian Campaign.* Sketch IX.

This campaign affords an excellent example of the danger of lack of co-ordination of A.G.'s of separate columns in an approach march. The battle took place in the Italian-Abyssinian War.

Both the Italian army, encamped under Baratieri at Sauria, and the Abyssinian under Menelik about Adowa, were in a bad way for lack of provisions and stores at the beginning of 1896, and each wanted the other to attack. Finally, Baratieri, driven on by pinpricks from Rome and from his subordinates, decided to advance and offer battle.

The Italians, whose strength was about 11,000 white men, with some 8,000 natives, 56 guns and no cavalry—in all about 14,500 rifles—were encamped at Sauria. Menelik, about Adowa, had some 80,000 rifles, 8,600 horse, and 42 guns. The distance from Sauria to Adowa was nearly sixteen miles, and between, nine miles from Sauria, was a strong barrier of hills across the paths from Sauria to Adowa. There were three hills in this barrier—Spur of Belah, Hill of Belah, and Mount Belah. Baratieri determined to occupy this line of hills, and offer battle there. To do this with safety, it was essential to occupy another hill on his left flank, which, *in his orders,* Baratieri called Kidane Meret, and which was shown as such on a sketch which he himself drew. Unfortunately, there was another hill of this name some four miles further on, and it was owing to this mistaken nomenclature that Baratieri's troubles started.

Baratieri decided to advance by night in three columns, as there were three fair tracks. Each column was to provide its own A.G. His right column, under Dabormida, was to occupy the Spur of Belah and the Hill of Belah; his centre, under Arimondi, was to occupy Mount Belah; and his left, under Albertone, was to occupy the hill which *he* called Kidane Meret. He did not issue any orders for the co-ordination of the various columns during the approach march, but ended his orders by saying:—"the commanders of the various columns will send fre-

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quent advices to the Headquarters and to the neighbouring columns."

On the evening of the 29th February, 1896, the approach march started, apparently under satisfactory conditions; but trouble soon began, owing to the lack of co-ordination. As he was riding with the reserve column, Baratieri received the following note :—

"Gundapta, March 1st, 1896. Hour: 3.30.

"The advanced guard, having reached the height where the valley opens on to the plain of Gundapta, has been compelled to halt in order to allow Albertone's brigade, which is following the same path, to defile past them. I suppose that the cause of this unforeseen crossing is due to the fact that the two roads assigned to the brigade have a stretch of ground, which is common to both.

"I will follow in rear of them; but I shall not be able to start from this point before 4 a.m.

"I have not been able, as yet, to get connection with Dabormida's brigade.

ARIMONDI,
Major-General."

It was evident that Albertone had taken a wrong route. Having delayed the other two brigades for almost an hour and a half, Albertone reached the hill, which, according to the sketch given to him by Baratieri, was Kidane Meret, at a little after 3 a.m. He halted here to await the arrival of the other columns; but, after waiting half an hour, when there were still no signs of the others, he began to think there must be a mistake, and consulted his native guides, who told him that the Kidane Meret, that they knew, was still some four miles on. Eventually, without gaining touch with anyone else, or asking Baratieri, he decided to move on to the true Kidane Meret, and thus began the move which was to end in the greatest disaster ever experienced by a European nation at the hands of natives. He became isolated and surrounded, and left the rest of the force, with its left flank inadequately guarded, compelled to make futile efforts to relieve him; and the battle ended in disaster to the whole force.

In *The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik* Berkeley writes :—

"Baratieri urges strongly that the fault was not attributable to him, because :—Albertone, like all the other generals, *had special orders to keep in touch* with the column on his right; having lost it, he never sent any messages to say where he was; hence, he never could be supported. That he knew the position which was to be held by the army, and that he was to guard the left flank. . . . That even if Kidane Meret was a mistake, he could

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not fail to know where he was to go, as it was carefully marked on the map."

Albertone, in spite of the difficulty of deciding his exact whereabouts in the dark, was undoubtedly to blame for not attempting to keep in touch with other columns and for not notifying Baratieri as to his position; but the whole disaster really seems to have been caused by a lack of efficient staff work to co-ordinate the movements of the columns during the approach march.

(viii) 1914.

Note the method in which the B.E.F. advanced from its first concentration area, with separate A.G.'s and a cavalry-screen of the 1st Cavalry Division and of the 5th Cavalry Brigade.

In Operation Order No. 5, given in the *Official History*, Vol. I, the method of advance was laid down, all movement being co-ordinated by the march table issued with the order.

Note, also, that in the early stages of the German advance, the French were never really able to pierce the German screen of cavalry, supported by Jaegers in lorries, etc.

Note, also, the faulty co-ordination of the advance of the various German armies on their striking right wing, owing to the continuous changes of plan. Sec. 7 (v) (k).

(b) Struggle for Information.

See "Information and Reconnaissance." Secs. 29-35.

1914. Note the great difficulty experienced by the Germans in 1914, in learning anything about the B.E.F. See *Official History*, Vol. 1.

(c) Order of March.

See Secs. 38-40.

Engineers in the Approach March.

(i) *Russo-Japanese War.* Map D.

Note the importance of this in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905. The roads in Korea up to the Yalu scarcely existed, and the whole advance of the Japanese 12th Division and the 1st Army, depended on how fast the engineers could get the roads ready. In the landing at Ping-Yang, two engineer battalions were the first troops to be landed after the covering detachment.

It was intended to concentrate the 1st Japanese Army about Anju, but great difficulties were encountered owing to the lack of roads, etc. "Engineers who had been sent ahead," says the German official account of the Russo-Japanese War, "had meanwhile, after the greatest exertions, repaired and rendered passable for vehicles the three main lines of advance passing through Sun-tschon, Suk-tschon, and Tong-yu respectively. The coast

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

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road was found to be in such a deplorable state of repair that portions of it had to be completely reconstructed. When the engineers began these works, the cold was still intense. The soil resisted any work with the spade. These very extensive road improvements had, therefore, to be carried out with the pick-axe.

"When thaw set in on March 14th, the road, which had been improved with so much pains, became impassable, the vehicles sinking in the morass up to their axles, and the work having to be recommenced.

"Kuroki's army (*i.e.*, 1st Japanese Army) began its advance from Pyong-yang on An-tju on March 20th. Daily progress was very slow on account of the miserable condition of the roads, as well as owing to the difficulties of supply caused by these bad roads and the poverty of the country. Instead of covering daily 20 to 24 kilometres (12½ to 15 miles) as was intended, only 4 to 8 kilometres (2½ to 5 miles) were covered."

(ii) *Palestine.* Map E.

Note that in this campaign, the advance on Gaza was held up until a pipe-line for water could be laid across the desert to supply the force which was to operate east of it. Five thousand tons of water per day were required in the force. A twelve-inch pipe had to be laid from Kantara to El Arish, a distance of ninety miles, and had to be syphoned from the Sweet-Water Canal under the Suez Canal. This delivered 600,000 gallons per day. It necessitated the building of a special dock at Kantara to land the pipe sections.

24.—THE FIRST CONTACT WITH THE ENEMY.

(*a*) 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

See the very interesting first collisions in the Franco-Prussian War, which led to Saarbruck, Weissenburg, Worth and Spicheren.

In every case, the French were acting without any real plan, and hence obtained no knowledge of the movements of the enemy. On the German side, collisions, which were only intended for reconnaissances often developed into big engagements, in spite of the orders of the higher command.

The Battle of Worth is a very interesting case of a first collision. The 3rd German Army, under the Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia, was concentrated to the North of Alsace; and, on August 4th, a strong Bavarian division from it had advanced and surprised a weak French division under General Douay, the vanguard of MacMahon's Army, at Weissenburg. The French

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retreated, and MacMahon, who was very ignorant of the moves of his opponent, took up a strong position at Worth.

The Crown Prince advanced on MacMahon, but, realizing the strength of his position at Worth, gave orders to his advanced guard commanders that a general engagement was not to be brought on on the 6th, when they would first gain contact, as the whole striking power of the army would not be available. In spite of these orders, the early collisions on the 6th between the French outposts and the German vanguards rushed on a general engagement. Up to noon, this battle, being a series of unco-ordinated attacks by individual German divisions, went against them; but, then, the Crown Prince, who was well up with his advanced troops, galloped up, saw that he was thoroughly involved, and promptly co-ordinated a full attack of his whole available strength, which was ultimately successful.

(*b*) 1914.

The encounter battle of Ethe-Virton between the German 5th and the French 3rd Army. This is an excellent example of the type of action in the first contact with the enemy. See Sec. 64 (i). See also following sections.

25.—THE PLAN OF BATTLE.

(a) Unexpected Collisions.

(i) See " Battle of Worth," August 6th, 1870. Sec. 24 (a). Note also that at the beginning of the 1870 campaign, the French never decided definitely whether " *to attack, to await attack, or manœuvre, in order to gain time.*"

(ii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904—1905.

The Russians were the same as the French in 1870. They did not decide on a general plan, and Zassulich received contradictory orders as to his rôle on the Yalu.

(iii) *The Great War.*

As in 1870, the German advance in 1914 produced many unpremeditated encounters. They were in overwhelming strength on their right or striking wing, and could afford to strike straight at their enemy wherever they found him.

(iv) 1917.

Note later, the effect on the Allied plans of the German withdrawal on the Somme in 1917.

(b) Commanders Coming to a Decision.

This is well exemplified in the campaigns of Frederick the Great in the Seven Years War, 1756 to 1763. He was nearly

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always outnumbered and surrounded by the converging forces of the French, Austrians, Russians and Swedes; but he always came to a decision as to the course of action, gave effect to that decision without delay, and thus defeated the enemy in detail, forcing them to conform to his movements.

Napoleon was the same. Note, in any of his campaigns, how quickly his decisions were taken and put into effect.

(c) Plan before disposing troops.

(*a*) 1870.

Note again the opening French moves of the 1870 campaigns. The disposition of the troops was ordered before any general plan of action was decided.

See Secs. 5 C (iii); 25 (f) (i); 23 (a) (vi).

"Absence of any scheme was the only characteristic of the French leadership at this time." (*German Official History.*)

"From the beginning of affairs, the mental attitude of the French leaders was defensive, and they were ready to follow the German lead rather than impose on them their will." Bird, *Strategy of the Franco-German War.*

(d) Offensive Action.

See Sec. 7 (v).

Also note the assumption of the offensive by Napoleon in the Marengo and Ulm campaigns, by Von Moltke in 1866 and 1870, by the younger Von Moltke in 1914, enabled them to choose the points of attack and force their opponents to conform to their movements.

(e) Defensive Battles.

(i) Note the defensive battles of Wellington, and of Lee and Jackson. Talavera, Busaco, Fuentes d'Onore, Salamanca, Waterloo; Bull-run, Sharpsburg, Fredericksburg—were all defensive battles, but were all, except Salamanca, fought on ground of these commanders' choosing, and mostly won by counter attacks.

(ii) *Austerlitz, December 2nd,* 1805. Map A (K 6) and Sketch IV.

The greatest example of a defensive battle is that of Austerlitz.

After the devastating campaign of Ulm, Napoleon had moved on Vienna, and thence northwards to Brunn. The situation was difficult for him. The Prussians were vacillating, and at any moment might declare war; there were still large forces of Austrians under the Archduke Charles; and Alexander with the

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Russians, was also advancing from Olmutz on Brunn. Napoleon managed to keep Haugwitz, the Prussian envoy, quiet, by pretending to offer possible conditions of a settlement with Prussia, while he hoped to lure Alexander on to a decisive action quickly. "Yet the crisis was terrible. With a superior force in front, with the Archdukes Ferdinand and Charles threatening to raise Bohemia and Hungary on his flanks, while two Prussian armies were about to throw themselves on his rear, the position was fully as serious as that of Hannibal before Cannæ." (Rose.) Yet Napoleon was in no way daunted. He brought up every available man, so that he had 73,000 against the 80,000 Russians and Austrians with Alexander. He had made, also, a very careful study of the ground, and it is stated, indeed, that, on his previous advance northward, he had foretold that a great battle would be fought opposite Austerlitz, and had explained how he would fight it.

In order to entice Alexander to attack him, he withdrew his troops from the high ground of the Pratzen to the line of the River Goldbach from Telnitz to beyond Schlapanitz. With uncanny strategical and tactical insight, he had foreseen what Alexander and his rash Austrian adviser, Weyrother, would attempt to do, and they did not fail him. The Czar's right was resting on villages, and was strong in cavalry and artillery; and his centre was on the great central hill—the Pratzenberg—with the village covering it at its foot. Alexander, therefore, considered these impregnable, and decided to detach two-fifths of his force to attack Napoleon's right about Telnitz and Sokelnitz, and to roll up his line from the south. Napoleon decided to encourage this, and actually withdrew his right under Davoust further back so as to tempt the enemy to prolong his line on that side; and he ordered Davoust to remain on the defensive. On December 2nd, he allowed the Russians to make a heavy attack on Davoust, and not until the latter was being slowly driven back and the Russians were beginning to advance from the Pratzenberg, did he launch his great counter-attack at the weakened Russian centre on the Pratzenberg. After terrific fighting, he seized the hill, and thus had cut the Russo-Austrian army into two. Then the danger of Alexander's false tactics became evident. With a wedge deeply driven into his adversary, Napoleon turned on the force attacking Davoust, and almost annihilated it in the marshes of the Goldbach, and in the Menitz and Satschan Lakes. The Allies, as a result, lost 33,000 men and 186 guns.

(f) "Offensives contrary to dictates of sound reasoning."

Note how adversely the moral of the various armies was affected by abortive offensives:—

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Sketch IV.



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(i) *The futile French offensive at the beginning of the* 1870 *Campaign.* Map A, Sketch I.

Frossard's original scheme for the French had been based on a defensive attitude on Langres as a pivot of action. In May, 1870, this plan was set aside, and one was evolved to cross the Rhine into Southern Germany, to separate the northern and southern German States, which were believed to be antagonistic to each other, and then to advance upon Berlin, as Napoleon had done in 1806.

With cries of "à Berlin," the French tried to put this scheme into action, regardless of the fact that their lack of organization rendered such an advance entirely impracticable. They gained initially a small advanced-guard action at Saarbrucken, and the subsequent failure to complete their offensive was, therefore, all the more demoralizing.

(ii) *The Great War.*

Note the effect on moral of the following failures in offensives, all of which were really undertaken without sound reasoning :—

(*a*) The German offensive in 1914. Sound basically but not as developed.
(*b*) Neuve Chapelle, 1915.
(*c*) Loos, 1915.
(*d*) The German offensive at Verdun, 1916.
(*e*) Townshend's offensive to Baghdad.
(*f*) The main French offensive in 1917 under Nivelle. Seldom in history has a repulse had such sudden demoralizing effect on an army or a nation.
(*g*) The German failure at Rheims in 1918 against Gouraud.

(g) Examples of changes from defensive to offensive.

(i) Cromwell's offensive after being hemmed in at Dunbar. Sec. 76 (b).

(ii) 1812. Barclay de Tolly and the Russians after Moscow. Sec. 7 (v) (d).

(iii) Wellington's offensive against Massena after the withdrawal to Torres Vedras.

(iv) Radetzky's offensive in 1848 after withdrawing from Milan in the face of the Piedmontese. See Sec. 25 (h) (vi).

(v) The change from defensive to offensive of the Allies at the Marne and the Aisne; and later again in 1918.

(vi) The offensive of Tannenberg, after the Prussian withdrawal, 1914. Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(h) Influence of time factor on decision.

(i) See the action of Fabius Maximus against Hannibal. See Sec. 21 (c) (i).

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(ii) 1796.

Note the time factor for Napoleon in his fighting round Mantua in 1796 and 1797. On every occasion he had to complete the destruction of one of the divided Austrian forces before the other could seriously interfere. See "Concentration," Sec. 7 (i) (c).

(iii) 1805 *and* 1806.

Note the bad mistake in time factor of the Prussians in 1805 and 1806. They delayed their action against Napoleon until he had had time to crush the Austrians and Russians at Austerlitz, and was thus enabled to deal separately with them at Jena.

(iv) 1810.

See Wellington's withdrawal to the lines of Torres Vedras, 1810. See Sec. 77 A (i) (b).

(v) 1812.

See the action of Barclay de Tolly against Napoleon in 1812 in Russia. See Sec. 7 (v) (d).

(vi) 1848: *War between Austria and the Piedmontese.* Map F.

When the Piedmontese declared war against the Austrians, Radetzky, the Austrian commander, was in Milan with a small force of about 10,000 men. The city rose in revolt against him, and could not be held. He therefore withdrew all the Austrian forces to Verona, as "*the situation was temporarily unfavourable.*"

On hearing that Radetzky had evacuated Milan, King Charles Albert crossed the frontier east of Novara on March 25th to pursue the Austrians, who were believed to be in flight. He reached Cremona early in April with a mixed force of about 75,000 men full of enthusiasm, but incoherent and ill-disciplined. (Horsetzky.)

It should have been evident to any outside observer that the longer the decision was delayed, the more would this force be likely to grow disheartened and to disintegrate.

Meanwhile, Radetzky was quietly putting his army on to a war footing, and getting up reserves; and he maintained his attitude of avoiding a decisive battle.

The Papal States had joined the Piedmontese with some 25,000 men, and the generals in command—Durando and Ferrari—had arrived about Montebello, after having detached a portion of their forces to besiege Mantua. Still intent on avoiding a pitched battle, the Austrian Reserve Corps from Gorz sedulously avoided Durando, marched round him, and joined Radetzky at Verona on May 22nd.

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By this time, Radetzky had some 45,000 men concentrated, and he considered that the time had arrived when "*superiority in moral, armament, training or numbers has given a commander an advantage which he should turn to account by forcing a battle before the enemy has restored the balance.*" He consequently took the offensive, and the heavy fighting about Goito and Custozza followed. Though this was all rather indecisive, the Piedmontese troops were very much the worse for four days' fighting, and King Charles attempted to save the situation by asking for an armistice. Radetzky's appreciation of the situation had worked out correctly, and he refused this request, with the result that the Piedmontese had to retreat in ever-increasing disorder, and an armistice was eventually granted to them when they had withdrawn across the Ticino.

(vii) 1859.

The Austrians made a great mistake with regard to the time factor in 1859. The French, under Napoleon III, and the Piedcontese had declared war against the Austrians, and a French army of over 100,000 men was to join the Piedmontese about Turin; but, after the declaration of war, there was a delay of some days before the French arrived, during which period the Piedmontese force was heavily outnumbered by the Austrians and was within easy reach of them. If the Austrian commander, Gyulay, had been of a more decisive nature, and had realized the time factor, he might have defeated the Piedmontese before the French could have come to their assistance.

(viii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904.

Note the Japanese quick decision against Russia. They realized that it was essential to gain this before Russia could place her real power in the field.

(ix) 1914.

Note the attempt made by the Germans to gain a quick decision on the Western Front before Russia could be dangerous in 1914; and again in 1918, before the Americans could arrive in large numbers.

(j) Delaying Actions.

See Rearguards Secs. 44–47.

(i) *Busaco. September,* 1810.

Wellington occupied the position of Busaco during his withdrawal to Torres Vedras. He really gave battle there so as to increase the moral of his own troops and the Portuguese, and to raise the spirits of the countryside; but the position was also an excellent one. It is probable that he could have held it as long as he wished had his reconnaissances to the flank been efficiently

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carried out; but the existence of a small pass over the mountains far to a flank was not discovered, and Massena was able eventually to turn the position; but only by a movement far to a flank, and after Wellington had succeeded in his objects of delaying his enemy and of raising the moral of his troops.

(ii) *The dangerous situation of Craufurd's Light Division on the Coa in* 1810. Map G.

In June, 1810, the French were obviously about to invade Portugal, and Wellington had distributed his force with the bulk under his own command about Viseu, Celorico, Guarda, and Pinhel, while Craufurd with 2,000 of the Light Division was watching Ciudad-Rodrigo, between the Rivers Coa and Agueda. Craufurd was instructed to retire behind the Coa and not to risk a serious action on the right bank, if the French advanced in any strength.

Early in June, Ney crossed the Agueda to invest Ciudad-Rodrigo, and Craufurd fell back fighting rear-guard actions with great skill. Ney took Ciudad, and advanced, threatening Almeida. Craufurd, anxious to delay its fall, remained in position on the right bank of the Coa. He was then in the position of a small force "*accepting battle in a position which is liable to envelopment,*" as Ney's Corps was six times his strength. The result was that he was nearly surrounded, and was obliged to draw off his force hastily over the Coa on July 24th, by one narrow bridge, suffering very heavy casualties for very little object.

(iii) *Le Cateau.*

General Smith Dorrien was forced to accept battle at Le Cateau. It is of great interest to compare the arguments in the Official History and Dispatches with those produced by Lord French in his "1914" as to the correctness of this decision.

(k) Examples of change of plan and vacillation.

(i) Note the attitude of the Duke of Brunswick, commanding the Prussians at Jena, and Suvoroff's remark:—"what we ought to do, I know quite well; what we shall do, only the gods know." See Sec. 1 (*a*).

(ii) *American Civil War.*

Note the effect on the Federal Forces of the continual changes of plan, particularly when McClellan was in command. This was due more to interference by poiticians than to the commander himself, but the results were perhaps worse.

(iii) 1870. See Sec. 5 C (iii) (b).

(iv) Note the disastrous effect of the vacillation and change of plan of von Moltke in 1914. See Sec. 7 (v) (k).

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(l) Examples of pre-determined Blows.

(i) 1914.

The German invasion of 1914 was a case of a pre-determined blow, which was changed later owing to the vacillation of the Commander, von Moltke.

See Sec. 7 (v) (k). It was only possible owing to the great superiority in numbers of the Germans over the Allies.

Note that the French also decided on a pre-determined blow in Alsace; this determined the position of the bulk of the force, and its failure jeopardized the success of the whole campaign.

It is interesting to picture what would have been the result had the French adopted a temporary strategic defensive.

(ii) *Mesopotamia.*

In all the battles of Townshend, his attacks were, tactically, cases of pre-determined blows.

See *My Campaign in Mesopotamia.*

(m) Position of Reserves.

(i) *Leuthen, December 5th,* 1757. Map A (K 5).

This is an interesting example of the results of faulty tactical siting of reserves.

In the actual battle, Prince Charles of Lorraine, in command of the Austrians, had taken up a position really too extensive for the troops at his disposal, covering the road to Breslau, from Nippen to Sagschutz. Therefore, it was all the more important for him to have his reserve in the correct place. The right wing, under the Italian Luchesi, was defended in front and flank by hills, woods, and marshes, which rendered any attack by Frederick in that area unlikely. Yet Prince Charles did not seem to realize this. During Frederick's reconnaissance, most attention seemed to be paid to this wing, and his troops appeared to be in position to threaten it. Moreover, at Prague, Kolin, and in a way at Rossbach, it had been the right wing which Frederick had attacked. Luchesi insisted on being reinforced, and Prince Charles acquiesced. Daun, with the Austrian Cavalry, was actually moving over to the right wing in accordance with Charles' orders when Frederick was moving towards Leuthen to attack the Austrian left. Thanks to the rapidity of the Prussian movements, Frederick was enabled to overwhelm the Austrian left before Prince Charles could rectify the faulty siting of his reserve.

(ii) *Gravelotte, August 18th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

Note the extraordinary siting of Bazaine's reserves on his left flank. Instead of thinking of offensive action, or at any rate of breaking away so as to remain in existence as a field army,

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Bazaine's sole thought was to prevent himself from being cut off from Metz. Hence, he kept his reserves sited really for the object of securing his own extinction! Had these reserves been correctly sited, a great opportunity for a counter-stroke might have been given him, when the Germans made their attack with faulty knowledge of the French position, owing to their bad reconnaissance.

See "Reconnaissance," Sec. 30 (v).

(iii) 1914.

Again note the difficulties of the Allies as a result of the faulty dispositions of the French reserves at the outbreak of war.

(iv) *Battle of Loos, September,* 1915. Map A, Sketch II.

Even in a battle of this size, the siting of reserves was misjudged, and they were too far away to *"be brought into action at the right time and place."* "Unfortunately, as matters turned out, the troops of the 11th Corps (in reserve) were not near enough to the scene of action on September 25th, and the reserve divisions, consequently, were called upon to carry out long and exacting marches just before they were sent into action. There can be little doubt that Sir John French made a mistake in keeping the 11th Corps in general reserve. In view of the small scope of the operations, it was clear that the reserve troops could only be employed on the front of the 1st Army, and, had they been placed from the first at the disposal of Sir Douglas Haig, better arrangements could have been made for their concentration in the battle area." Instead of this, the Guards' Division only moved forward from Ferfay at 2 p.m., and the moves of these reserves show the difficulties caused by wrong siting in the original instance.

"This march, throughout the course of which rain fell almost incessantly, proved a terribly trying ordeal even for seasoned troops. The actual distance which had to be traversed varied from between fifteen and a half to seventeen and a half miles, but it was not so much the length of the march—although it should be remembered that the infantry had already been marching for about four hours in the morning—as the continuous stoppages on the roads, which proved so tiring for the troops. There was no kind of traffic control, and units and transport of the 21st and 24th Divisions, and transport of the 47th Division, blocked the entire line of route; while, to add to the general congestion, the tail of the column was cut off by the Cavalry Corps, orders having been received that the cavalry was to be allowed to pass through the infantry." (*The Guards' Division in the Great War.*)

Such are the results of faulty siting of reserves.

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(v) 1918.

Note the difficulty of deciding the position of the reserves before the German offensive in March, 1918, and during the series of their subsequent offensives. With the exception of the last attack on Gouraud about Rheims, the attacks all achieved surprise; the front was too big for one central reserve; reserves were very scanty; and it was, in consequence, extremely difficult to know where to place them.

26.—DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE.

(a) General.

(i) Note the failure in deployment in the night operations at Magersfontein in the South African War.

(ii) The deployment of the British force in the battle of Kut al Amara is of particular interest. See General Townshend's orders in *My Campaign in Mesopotamia.*

(iii) Note the very successful deployment by Hindenburg and Ludendorff of the German forces prior to the battle of Tannenburg.

(iv) The battle of Cambrai, in 1917, provides many excellent lessons in deployment, although for deliberate attacks:—

(Sec. 7 (iii) B (vi).)

(*a*) Attacking troops were kept a long way out of the battle area.

(*b*) All reconnaissances were made very carefully, badges of regiments carrying out the reconnaissance often being altered, especially those of the Tank Corps.

(*c*) All movement into the battle area was by night; but, by day, much movement by motor transport, rail, etc., was carried out in the opposite direction.

(*d*) Units moving by march-route were only given their destination for the current day's march.

(*e*) Tanks came in by rail, and were then carefully concealed in woods, etc.

(*f*) New artillery on the front all went into old positions, or into concealed positions where they remained silent.

(*g*) There was no registration of new batteries. They were all carefully calibrated, and then, in the attack, fired from the map.

(*h*) Wireless traffic was kept normal.

(*j*) At the moment of deployment, aeroplanes drowned the sound of the tanks; there was a considerable mist, which helped to conceal deployment; and smoke-screens were put down by the artillery to neutralize the enemy O.P.'s.

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(b) Concealment of Artillery.

Prior to the battle of Liao Yang in the Russo-Japanese War, by opening up with a few of their guns, the Japanese inveigled the Russians into disclosing all their artillery positions.

28.—POSITIONS OF COMMANDERS.

(*a*) *Frederick the Great's Flight. Mollwitz*, 1740. Map A (K 5).

At Frederick's first battle, Mollwitz, April 10th, 1740, he and his cavalry were completely crushed by the Austrians. He left the field of battle in headlong flight; the battle was then won by Schwerin and Dessauer, in spite of the commander's absence from the field of battle.

(*b*) *Suvoroff in* 1799 See Sec. 3 D (ii).

(*c*) *Pope at 2nd Manassas, August*, 1862. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

Note the difficulty in finding Pope's location, and the disastrous results ensuing.

(*d*) *Chancellorsville, May*, 1863. Map B.

At the Battle of Chancellorsville, in the later stages after Jackson's death, there was a complete collapse of the Confederate plan owing to the fact that no one but Jackson knew the plan, and that no one really knew the identity or location of the new commander, who had taken his place.

(*e*) *Crown Prince before Worth*, 1870, *August 6th.*

Thanks to his being well up at the head of his force, he was able to control the unexpected battle. See Secs. 24 (a) and 40 (d) (ii).

(*f*) *Paardeburg, February*, 1900. Map C.

After Roberts' successful outflanking movement against Cronje, he had encircled him at Paardeburg, where he proposed to attack him. Lord Roberts himself was ill, and he therefore delegated the command to his Chief of Staff, Kitchener, though he was not the senior officer in the field; but many of the other divisional commanders, etc., were not notified of this and they did not know where to find the commander in the field. The result was that all the attacks on the first day were unco-ordinated, and little was achieved. See Sec. 3 D (v).

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(*g*) *The Battles of Gaza.* Map E.

During the first two battles of Gaza, the Headquarters of the British Force was still at Cairo, some 250 miles away.

Directly General Allenby arrived, he moved Headquarters up to near Rafa.

(*h*) *Gallipoli.*

Note the difficulties that arose in Gallipoli. The Commander-in-Chief was continually separated from his administrative staffs, with almost disastrous results.

In the landing at W Beach, Brigadier-General Hare and his Brigade Major moved up with some of the foremost attacking troops. The General was wounded, no one knew where he was, and there was consequently a great deal of confusion.

Throughout all the initial operations of landing, lack of intercommunication and the delays in transmission of information played an almost decisive part.

e.g. Information as to possibilities of landing not sent to the landing Brigade on April 23rd, p. 142. Non-delivery of orders, as a result of heavy seas on the 20th (p. 149); non-receipt at 29th Division Headquarters, in time, of the all-important information as to the real situation at V Beach on April 25th (p. 241), etc. (References to the Official History. Vol. I.)

Later at the first battle of Krithia, General Hunter Weston "sent forward Brigadier-General Marshall with a more or less roving commission to superintend the advance. General Marshall took with him a few officers to act as a temporary staff; but having no fixed headquarters and a telephone, it was impossible for him to exercise adequate control over a two mile front, and this delegation of divisional authority led to some delay and confusion in the issue and despatch of messengers, orders and reports." (*Official History,* Vol. I., page 289.)

(*j*) 1914.

In the retreat from Mons, difficulty was often experienced in the issue of orders owing to the positions of the various subordinate Headquarters not being known.

See the difficulties before Le Cateau.

Page 137, *Official History,* Vol. I.

And again with the 19th Brigade on the 26th August, page 143.

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CHAPTER V.

INFORMATION.

29.—INFORMATION—GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

(a) Results of Lack of Timely Information.

(i) *Jena,* 1806.

Note that, up to the Battle of Jena itself, Napoleon was quite ignorant of the actual dispositions of the Prussians. The result might have been serious as, thinking that the bulk of the force of the Duke of Brunswick was at Jena, and only a detachment at Auerstadt, he only sent the corps of Davoust to the latter place. Actually, the Prussian dispositions were the reverse of what he thought and, but for very gallant fighting, Davoust might have been overwhelmed.

(ii) 1808. Map G.

Note the danger of Moore during his concentration owing to his lack of information.

(iii) *Talavera,* 1809. Map G.

In this campaign Wellington had no information of the junction of Soult, Ney, and Mortier, but thought that Soult was alone. Hence the very dangerous situation caused by the abandonment of the Baños Pass by Cuesta. (See Sec. 43 (b).)

(iv) *Torres Vedras,* 1810.

Although work on these lines had been proceeding for many months, Massena had not received any information that they had even been thought of, and therefore based his invasion of Portugal on a complete misconception, which proved fatal to him.

(v) 1859.

" In the war between Austria and the French and Piedmontese, the French army numbering 125,000 infantry, 11,000 cavalry, and 300 guns, met the Austrian army of 146,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, 700 guns, in full march at Solferino, neither army being aware of the vicinity of the other." (Hamley's *Operations of War.*)

This situation occurred, although these armies had been encamped within a few miles of each other.

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(vi) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862.

Throughout this campaign, Pope, in spite of a reconnaissance in force, was completely ignorant of the situation. Had he fully realized what had happened, he might have been able to deal with Lee and Jackson separately while they were still divided.

(vii) 1870.

The French were entirely without information of the German moves at the beginning of the war, and they remained in darkness throughout almost the whole of the war. There is a very interesting series of maps in Bird's *Strategy of the Franco-German War,* showing, at various times, the positions of the Germans as visualized by the French, and their actual positions.

(viii) 1914.

The Allies had incorrect information of the strength of the Germans at the outbreak of the war, and they were unable to obtain information after the advance began as to the German strength or plan. Hence the faulty strategic concentration of the allied forces.

(ix) *Gallipoli.*

Note the almost decisive effects resulting from lack of means of communication and of information generally in the landings at Gallipoli.

(b) Information to be supplied to the Commander-in-Chief on the outbreak of war.

See the campaigns in Burma, in Madagascar, in Mesopotamia and Gallipoli. (Secs. 5 A (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv).)

(c) Information from Subordinates.

(i) *Peninsular War.*

Note the difficulties Wellington had with the Spaniards. Cuesta seldom gave him any information as to his intentions or movements. At Talavera, he did not even inform him that he had abandoned the Baños Pass, which was vital to Wellington's safety.

See " Flank Guards," Sec. 43 (b).

Note the result of Grouchy's failure to give Napoleon information of his movements before Waterloo. Compare this with Blucher on the same occasion.

(ii) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862.

Note the failure of Ricketts, King and McDowell, to keep Pope or each other informed of the situation. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

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(iii) 1914.

According to Lord French, in his book, "1914," he had considerable difficulties with Lanrezac, commanding the French 5th Army, who, he says, seldom informed him of the rearward movements of his army during the retreat.

(iv) *Gallipoli.*

Throughout the landings, the utmost difficulty was found in getting the information from subordinates to higher authorities, and from the attacking troops to the supporting artillery.

(d) Confirmation of Information and Negative Information.

(i) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862.

Note Pope's failure to obtain any confirmation of information given to him before his last attack on the Confederates, who, he believed, were retreating. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

(ii) *Mesopotamia.*

There is an interesting example of negative information, and of the necessity for confirmation. Before moving on Ctesiphon, General Townshend had a reconnaissance of Ctesiphon carried out by a seaplane, the observer of which reported that the position was unoccupied. He said he could see no troops, lighters, or storehouses there, but he thought he saw a column about four miles south of the Diala River going northwards. General Townshend decided to have confirmation of this, and sent up another plane. The pilot of this reported "that the position was undoubtedly occupied; that he had seen four large paddle-steamers, lighters, mahelas, storehouses and at least 3,000 or 4,000 men . . . and he saw tents evidently covered over with leaves and straw."

This latter report proved correct. (*My Campaign in Mesopotamia.*)

30.—RECONNAISSANCE.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

Examples of lack of faulty reconnaissance.

(Note the remark of Frederick the Great—"If we all knew before a battle, as much as we know after its conclusion, every one of us would be a great general.")

(i) *Battle of Kunersdorff, August 12th,* 1759. Map

The allied Russian and Austrian forces had invaded Prussia from the east, and by August 12th were encamped on the right

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bank of the Oder, opposite Frankfurt. They comprised about 40,000 Russians, 13,000 Austrians, and some 16,000 Irregulars. "Their left wing was shielded by impassable morasses, and their right by forests. Behind them lay a fortress commanding a well-bridged river, before them a tangled mass of sandhills, woods, and lakes, which seemed to have been designed by nature to impede an attacking force, and which was now made still more formidable by art." (Reddaway, *Frederick the Great.*)

Frederick had moved north against the Austrians under Laudon and the Russians under Saltykoff with some 50,000 men, and he determined to cross the Oder below the Russian camp, to march round it, and then to strike. His reconnaissance, however, was very poor. He knew little of the ground and of its enormous difficulties, and made little attempt to improve his knowledge. Finally, during his cursory glance at the position, before completing his plan of attack, it appeared that Laudon's force was encumbered in an isolated peninsula in the marsh which protected his left. Further colour was lent to this belief by the information given to him that Laudon and Saltykoff could only communicate by a roundabout way. He took no steps to verify this, and based his plan on this report. Actually, a new causeway connecting Laudon and Saltykoff had been constructed and this fact proved fatal to Frederick's plan. His complete defeat in the ensuing action was due largely to his lack of adequate reconnaissance of the enemy's position.

(ii) *Battle of Vimiera, August 21st,* 1808. Map G.

Allies, 18,000 with eighteen guns; French, under Junot, 14,000, twenty-three guns, with greater strength in cavalry.

"The Allies held a good position. Hill and the bulk of the army occupied a height north-west of Vimiera, the left resting upon another to the north-east, overlooking an almost impassable ravine; while, in the centre, lay the village of Vimiera, masked from the French view by an isolated hill in front on which some infantry and guns were posted." (Robinson.)

Junot intended to attack, and hoped to effect a surprise. Therefore, as he thought that the appearance of any reconnoitring troops might endanger the surprise, he decided to attack without reconnaissance. He marched at night, intending to attack at dawn; but the difficult ground over which he had to go, and of which he knew little, delayed him so much that it was after eight o'clock when he launched his attack. Even then it came as a surprise to the Allies. "The high ground, behind which the allied left lay, appeared to him to be denuded of troops, and, imagining that the main body of the enemy rested behind the isolated central hill, his efforts in the battle which ensued were directed to force the allied centre and left . . ." "But,"

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Napier writes, "to act on conjectures is dangerous in war; Junot's were all false. . . . Soon that general discovered the mischief of over-haste." "The rocky and broken ground which his troops had to cross involved him in immediate difficulties, and he had to attack under every disadvantage." (Robinson.) His lack of reconnaissance everywhere caused his failure. Instead of the allied left being denuded, Wellington had there a strong British force, just on the reverse side of the slope, ready to deal with any enemy. Seeing his opponent's false and groping movements, Wellington moved four more brigades over to his left under cover of the hill in his centre, and was thus able to strike Junot heavily in the flank.

(iii) *Barrosa, March 5th,* 1811. Map G.

In January, 1811, Soult had left Victor to blockade Cadiz, and had moved on Badajoz. On January 21st, an expedition of 11,000 British, Portuguese, and Spaniards, of whom 5,000 were British, had sailed from Cadiz, landed at Algeciras, and marched to Tarifa. On January 27th they moved forward under the orders of La Pena, a Spaniard, to attack the French force near Cadiz in rear, while the blockaded garrison was to co-operate by making a sortie.

Victor prepared to bar the way against this force, and this led to the battle of Barrosa.

The Allies had moved forward and occupied an all-important ridge—that of Barrosa. In front of them lay a plain, and then another small ridge—Bermeja Hill. To their right front lay a large wood—the Chiclana Forest. In spite of all remonstrances, La Pena insisted on advancing from Barrosa Ridge on to Bermeja Hill, leaving Barrosa practically untenanted, and making *no reconnaissance of the country to his front and flanks.* Meanwhile, Victor had kept close contact with La Pena's movements by means of scouts, and had placed 9,000 men concealed in the Chiclana Forest. When the Allies had quitted Barossa and advanced without reconnaissance to Bermeja, the French, under Ruffin and Laval, debouched from the unreconnoitred forest on the flank, seized Barrosa Ridge, and struck the Allies in the flank and rear. Had it not been for the decisive action of the British Commander, Graham, and the amazing fighting powers of the British troops, the French would have won a very decisive victory, which would have been solely due to the lack of reconnaissance on the part of La Pena.

(iv) 1870.

Many of the German attacks were brought on by the impetuosity of advanced guard and subordinate commanders, and, as a result, the attacks were made without reconnaissance—Worth,

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Spicheren, Borny, Mars-la-Tour, etc. The German successes were only won, therefore, at the cost of heavy casualties, by the superior co-operation between German formations, and by the greater driving power of the German higher command.

(v) *Gravelotte, August 18th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

After the brilliant fighting around Mars-la-Tour, the German Armies had prevented the withdrawal of Bazaine's armies towards Chalons, if this commander had ever intended to move in that direction, and was forcing it back on Metz. The French finally took up a position west of Metz, where the Germans attacked them in the battle of Gravelotte.

Bazaine had taken up a strong position extending from Roncourt and St. Privat in the north to the Metz-Gravelotte road in the south. The German reconnaissance of this position was very faulty, and, as a result, they believed that the French right extended no further than Amanvillers. This was a very serious mistake, as their plan was to outflank the French right. The result was that their supposed outflanking attack about Amanvillers became a directly frontal attack, and their consequent losses were large. Had Bazaine been of a bolder type, had he not been so anxious as to the security of his retreat to Metz, and had he had his reserves correctly placed, he might have struck the Germans a heavy blow as a result of their faulty reconnaissance.

(vi) *Russo-Turkish War,* 1877-78. Map A (N. 10).

The Russian plan was to invade Turkey across the Balkan mountains; and, to ensure the safety of this move, General Krudener, with the 9th Russian Corps, was ordered on July 16th, to occupy Plevna, and thereby secure the flank of the main body. This only meant a move of some twenty miles for this corps.

On July 17th, Osman Pasha moved down with 40,000 troops from Widdin, and occupied Plevna, almost within striking distance of Krudener's headquarters. Although the latter had an ample cavalry force at his disposal, he remained entirely ignorant of this new situation, and on the 18th, ordered a force of a brigade of infantry, thirty-two guns, and a regiment of Cossacks to occupy Plevna. On the night of the 18/19th, this brigade bivouacked some ten miles from the town, still without having made any reconnaissance. On the 19th, the force advanced again, with the cavalry, not to the front, but to the flank. They halted that night on the heights north-east of Plevna, and, on the morning of the 20th, without any reconnaissance of the enemy's whereabouts, numbers, or position, an attack was launched against this unknown force, which was actually four times its strength, and was occupying a very strongly entrenched

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position. The Russian force was terribly defeated, and thus began the series of disastrous Russian assaults on Plevna.

SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899–1902.

(vii) *Stormberg and Magersfontein.* See "Night Operations."

(viii) *Colenso, December 15th,* 1899. Map C and Sketch V.

This battle affords one of the most interesting pictures of the troubles caused by faulty reconnaissance. The failure in this battle was due to a series of mistakes in reconnaissance, orders, tactics, and co-operation. The Boers under Botha were holding the line of high ground north of the River Tugela, barring the way to Ladysmith, which Buller was trying to relieve. To do this, Buller had decided to attack Botha. "The British commander's plan for the passage of the Tugela, however, was undoubtedly so hazardous that only the most exact sequence of the phases of its execution, as conceived by Sir Redvers Buller, could have brought it to a successful issue. *Imperfect knowledge of the topographical conditions of the problem and of the dispositions of the enemy, combined with misapprehension of orders, sufficed to wreck it at the outset.*" (*Official History.*)

There was a total lack of reconnaissance. Neither the strength nor the extent of the position of the enemy was known; the terrain over which troops would have to manœuvre was neglected; and, worst of all, no reconnaissance was made of the river, the maps of which were extremely inaccurate.

The result of this appeared most strongly in Buller's orders. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of his operation orders for the battle read:—

"3. The 5th brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30 a.m., and march towards the Bridle Drift, immediately west of the junction of Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The brigade will cross at this point, and after crossing move along the left bank of the river towards the kopjes north of the iron bridge.

"4. The 2nd brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4 a.m., and passing south of the present ground of No. 1 and No. 2 divisional troops, will march in the direction of the iron bridge at Colenso. The brigade will cross at this point and gain possession of the kopjes north of the iron bridge."

Now, as already stated, there had been no reconnaissance of the line of the river, and the order to the 5th brigade was, as a result, almost unintelligible. The *Official History* shows very clearly the result:—

"The 5th brigade moved off as ordered. Major-General Hart, the commander, had been provided with a tracing of a map, a Kaffir guide, and a colonist as interpreter to assist him in finding 'the Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of the

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Doornkop Spruit and the Tugela,' by which he was to cross the river. This map was a plane table sketch, prepared by an engineer officer shortly before the action. It was an attempt to fill into a farm survey, made for land registration, as many of the topographical features as could be seen from a distance. Unfortunately, it had not been verified by any close reconnaissance of the river, and thus both the sketch and the orders were misleading, A Bridle Drift, used by natives, in the dry season of the winter, but uncertain in the summer, did indeed exist, although on that particular day it was unfordable. But the sketch, on which the order relied, showed the Doornkop Spruit as running into the Tugela at the western bend of the remarkable loop which that river makes to the north-west, about one mile east of E. Robinson's farm; it showed, moreover, the Bridle Drift close to the junction of the Spruit, and placed, also, immediately to the west of the drift another loop of the river. On all three of these points the sketch was defective. Only a short but deep donga enters the river at this western end of the loop, near 2 on Sketch V. The Doornkop Spruit joins the river at the eastern, not the western, bend of the loop, but a mile to the westward. Finally, the Tugela makes no second loop for several miles to the westward. The effect of these topographical errors in the map and in the written orders was further enhanced by another serious misapprehension. Major-General Hart had been informed on the previous evening that the Kaffir guide lived close to the drift where he was to cross, and could be relied on not to make any mistake about it. Unfortunately the native misunderstood his instructions, or had been given wrong instructions, for he conceived that he was intended to lead the column, not to the Bridle Drift, but to a point (marked 4 on Sketch V) close to his own kraal, at the head of and inside the loop where, owing to the existence of rapids, the river was fordable, breast-high, by men on foot. The practicability of this drift had been personally verified by the native on the two previous nights, but *no staff officer had accompanied him.* Another similar foot ford might have been found at point 6 immediately below the junction of the Doornkop Spruit with the Tugela, but the existence of neither of these fords was known to Major-General Hart or to the headquarter staff."

. . . " Hart, following the directions of the Kaffir guide, led his brigade in a north-westerly direction to the first drift over the Doornkop Spruit, and thence northward. . . . The column, therefore, continued to move steadily on the point, near to the western bend on the loop, where the sketch had placed the Bridle Drift. But, as the brigade was crossing a newly-ploughed mealie field, within 300 yards of the entrance to the loop, the brigadier riding at its head perceived that the map was mis-

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leading, and on enquiry, the Kaffir guide pointed up the loop, and stated, through the interpreter, that it was in that direction that the ford lay." Almost at once Boer artillery opened up on them, and fire was brought to bear on them from all sides. The Kaffir guide disappeared, and the exact position of the ford was unknown.

Hence, owing to this series of mistakes in reconnaissance and staff work, the brigade plunged into the loop of the river, with its units hopelessly mixed up, and, after suffering severe casualities without achieving any result, had to be withdrawn with the help of other formations, by the orders of Buller.

A similar sort of drama was being enacted by the 2nd Brigade. It is noticeable that in his orders Buller continuously made mention of the " iron bridge." Now, as can be seen from the map, there were two iron bridges over the river, and it never became clear which was intended.

At any rate, the results of this entire lack of reconnaissance were almost disastrous to the force trying to relieve Ladysmith.

31.—RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE AIR BEFORE BATTLE.

(a) General.

(i) Note the difficulties encountered at the outbreak of war in 1914 in obtaining accurate knowledge of the German concentrations: but air reconnaissances became more and more detailed and valuable.

See, as an example, the almost vital importance of the air reports on the evening of August 22nd from the Charleroi area, which showed the withdrawal under severe pressure of several corps of the French 5th Army, leaving the British on the Mons Canal some nine miles ahead of the main French line. (*Official History,* Vol. I, page 57 et seq.).

(b) Photographic Reconnaissances.

Photographic reconnaissances usually discovered intended offensives on the Western Front by indications of increased gun positions, roads, tracks, dumps, etc.

Note particularly the Somme and Paschendaele offensives, and the German withdrawal on the Somme in 1917.

(c) Confirmation of Air Reports.

(i) Note how the German First Army was misled for some time on the 24th and 25th of August, 1914, by the air reports indicating " the impression of a general retreat on Maubeuge."

(*Official History,* Vol. I, pages 130 & 131.)

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Sketch V.



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(ii) The air reports on Turkish reserves at Ctesiphon. (See Sec. 29 (d) (ii).

(iii) In the retreat in March, 1918, considerable stir was caused by an air report that German armoured cars had broken through into the back areas. The reported cars were actually agricultural tractors.

32. RECONNAISSANCE FROM THE GROUND BEFORE BATTLE.

(See Secs. 23 and 24.)

Fighting for Information.

(i) *September,* 1811. *Marmont,* Map G.

This is an interesting example of the possible danger or futility of a reconnaissance in force.

Wellington was blockading Ciudad-Rodrigo, with the greater part of his forces on the heights of the left bank of the Agueda, his centre near El Bodon, and with the light division thrown across the river to the right bank, south of Ciudad. The allied forces, extended over some twenty miles, consisted of 35,000 men.

On September 23rd and 24th, Marmont, with 60,000, moved forward and introduced a convoy of provisions and ammunition into the fortress, an action with which Wellington was not sufficiently strong to interfere.

On the 25th Marmont decided to push forward a strong force as a reconnaissance in force against Wellington, to find out his position and strength. A large force under Montbrun, with a considerable body of cavalry, crossed the Agueda just south of Ciudad, turned the El Bodon heights, and forced the Allies back toward Fuente Guinaldo. As already seen, Wellington was very strung out, and was separated from the Light Division, while Marmont was concentrated about Cuidad within three to eight miles of Wellington's positions with 60,000 men. The British position was therefore distinctly dangerous, but, judging from the fact that Marmont had only used a part of his force, Wellington realized that the French Commander must be ignorant of the situation. He therefore maintained his position, until he could withdraw the Light Division, and retire, after fighting the two sharp engagements of El Bodon and Aldea de Ponte.

Marmont undoubtedly had an excellent opportunity of striking a severe blow at the allied forces, which he let slip by adopting the weak compromise of merely making a reconnaissance in force. When he heard afterwards what the true situation had been, " he is said to have exclaimed (alluding to Napoleon's star) ' and Wellington's star; it also is bright.' "

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The result was due, however, not to the brightness of Wellington's star, but to the weakness of Marmont's own decision. The reconnaissance in force merely gave away the situation; it could not effect a decisive result; and it could not gain information of Wellington's position in sufficient time to allow the main body of the French to intervene before the Allies could concentrate and withdraw to safety.

(ii) *Dresden and Leipzig, August to October,* 1813. Map A (H and J 5).

During the enormous struggles centring round Leipzig and Dresden in 1813, on August 21st and 22nd, one group of the allied forces was winding its way through the passes of the Erz, ignorant of the fact that, by his latest move eastwards in his desperate efforts to stay the ever-narrowing circle of his enemies, Napoleon had left Dresden almost within their grasp. On the 23rd, one of St. Cyr's dispatches was captured, and the position was at last realized. They at once turned on Dresden, but, owing to bad weather and roads, did not reach the heights south-west of the town till the 25th. Holland Rose gives a most vivid picture of the arguments among the Allies, which eventually culminated in a futile reconnaissance in force being sent out. "The daring spirits at Schwarzenberg's Headquarters, therefore, begged him to push on the advantage already gained, while Napoleon was still far away. Everything, they asserted, proved that the French were surprised; Dresden could not long hold out against an attack by superior numbers; its position in a river-valley dominated by the southern and western slopes, which the Allies strongly held, was fatal to a prolonged defence. . . .

"Against these many counsels the voice of prudence pleaded for delay. It was not known how strong were St. Cyr's forces in Dresden, and in the entrenched camp south of the city. Would it not, therefore, be better to await the development of events? Such was the advice of Toll and Moreau, the latter warning the Czar, with the earnestness which we may deem fraught with destiny for himself:—

"'Sire, if we attack, we shall lose 20,000 men and break our nose.' The multitude of counsellors did not tend to safety. Distracted by the strife of tongues, Schwarzenberg finally decided to wait until further corps reached the front, and at four o'clock of the following afternoon *to push forward five columns* for a general reconnaissance in force. As Jomini has pointed out, this plan rested on sheer confusion of thought. If the Commander meant merely to find out the strength of the defenders, that could be ascertained at once by sending forward light troops, screened by skirmishes, at the important points. If he wished to attack in force, his movement was timed too late in the day safely to

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effect a lodgment in a large city held by a resolute foe. Moreover, the postponement of the attack for thirty hours gave time for the French Emperor to appear on the scene with his guards."

The reconnaissance was a bloody failure; and the sole result of it was that time was given to Napoleon to add the corps of Marmont and Victor to his own. The ensuing victory, which was really the last of Napoleon's great victories, may be ascribed solely to the lack of decision of the Allied Commander, which resulted in the reconnaissance in force.

(iii) *2nd Manassas, American Civil War, August,* 1862.

See " Separation of Forces," Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

Pope's reconnaissance in force against Lee achieved nothing, and obtained information which was erroneous.

(iv) *Saarbrucken,* 1870, *August 2nd.*

See Sec. 23 (a) (vi).

The reconnaissance in force to Saarbrucken, which achieved no real military object, was really only a compromise—the outcome of the complete lack of plan or decision in the minds of the French higher command.

(v) *Russo-Turkish War,* 1877-78. Map A.

On June 30th, when the Russians had successfully crossed the Danube in their projected invasion of Turkey, the Grand Duke Nicholas ordered General Gourko to push a reconnaissance in force towards Tirnova and Selvi; then, in subsequent orders, to gain possession of a pass in the Balkans, by which the army could cross; and to send his cavalry south of the Balkans to cut the railways and telegraphs, and obtain as much information about the Turkish forces as possible. For this purpose, Gourko was given 10½ battalions of infantry, 32 squadrons of cavalry, and 32 guns—14,000 men in all.

His subsequent operations are a mixture of great success and nearly disastrous failure. Starting on July 12th, in spite of extraordinary obstacles, he gained possession of three passes over the mountains in eight days, captured the important Shipka Pass from the south, cut the railways, harried the countryside, creating panic in the inhabitants, and gained valuable information. His tactical dispositions, however, were faulty. He divided his forces, so that they could not really co-operate, and he nearly lost his infantry as a result.

Though, finally, events elsewhere forced his withdrawal again, the information he obtained and the capture of the Shipka, were of extreme value to the Russian Commander-in-Chief.

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(vi) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

After the Battle of the Yalu, the Japanese 1st Army had steadily advanced into the hilly country which lay to the east of the Port Arthur-Mukden Railway. Throughout the fighting about Nanshan, and the preparations for the Japanese advance along this railway, the Russians were anxious lest the Japanese 1st Army should attempt a direct move on Liao Yang or on to any spot on the Mukden Railway. On May 30th, therefore, Count Keller received permission from Kuropatkin to lead a reconnaissance in force towards Saimachi. This force consisted of six battalions and two batteries, while two other battalions were to reconnoitre towards Fenghuangcheng. They moved on June 1st, and reached Saimachi in terrible weather after a twenty-seven mile march, and without gaining any touch with the enemy. Here they received a telegram from Kuropatkin, recalling them to watch the passes. " The only result of this expedition was said by General Kashtalinski to be 8,000 pairs of boots ruined." This was only one of a series of similar reconnaissances in force made by Rennenkampff and others towards Aiyangcheng and Fenghuangcheng, all of which had the same results.

33.—RECONNAISSANCE DURING BATTLE.

(See Secs. 23 and 24.)

(*a*) 1914.

(i) Note the lack of touch with the enemy and the surprise attack on the 4th Guards' Brigade at Landrecies on the 25th August. (*Official History,* Vol. I., pages 124 et seq.)

(ii) Very severe losses were inflicted on the King's Own owing to the faulty reconnaissance by French cavalry patrols and the lack of cavalry or cyclists in the 4th Division to confirm reports. August 26th, 1914. (*Official History,* Vol. I., page 155.)

(iii) At the beginning of the battle of the Marne, Von Kluck was completely ignorant of the new French Army formed on his right flank.

(iv) Note the successful German withdrawal on the Somme in 1917, contact being completely broken off.

(b) Ground Reconnaissance by Cavalry.

(i) *Talavera, July 28th,* 1809. *Charge of Anson's Cavalry Brigade.* Map G.

In the second French attack on Wellington in this battle, they attempted to turn his left, which rested on a hill. Beyond this hill a wide valley led into this position. Realizing that the enemy would probably try to turn his flank, he had strengthened it, and had massed his cavalry in the valley; but no adequate reconnaissance was made by this cavalry of the ground over which they

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might have to manœuvre. When Ruffin and Villatte were attacking up this valley to turn his flank, Wellington counter-attacked them with Anson's Cavalry Brigade of the German Hussars and the 23rd Lancers. As already stated, however, the ground had not been properly reconnoitred, and when the brigade was at full gallop, it came unexpectedly on a small ravine. The Germans pulled up, but the 23rd scrambled through in twos and threes, and attempted to engage the French; but Victor, who had been watching, had at once despatched light cavalry to the scene, and the 23rd only got out of their difficulty with the loss of half their numbers.

(ii) *Sadowa,* 1866.

The 4th Prussian Hussars made a charge in this battle. They omitted to throw out ground-scouts or to make any reconnaissance, and, at full gallop, came unexpectedly on a deep gully, which had been hidden by the high corn. As a result, the greater part of the regiment fell into this ravine and was destroyed.

34.—INFORMATION FROM PRISONERS, ETC., AND FROM CAPTURED DOCUMENTS.

(a) Wireless.

(i) Note the effect on the Western Front of any alteration of the normal amount of wireless traffic on any sector. This at once gave away offensive plans.

(ii) *Tannenberg,* 1914.

Again note that Rennenkampff greatly aided Ludendorff before and during Tannenberg by issuing his orders twenty-four hours ahead, by wireless, in clear. Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(b) Documents.

(i) 1808.

Sir John Moore only discovered the real danger in which his force lay from an intercepted French dispatch, which fell into his hands on December 13th. From this he learnt the whole situation. See Sec. 18 (b) (i).

(ii) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862.

See the effects of the capture of all Pope's papers during Stuart's cavalry raid before the campaign began, and of the capture of his orders prior to Groveton. See "Separation of Forces," Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

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(c) Newspapers.

On March 16th, 1811, Wellington wrote as follows to the Earl of Liverpool :—

Louzao, March 16th, 1811.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

"In answer to your letter of February 16th, regarding publications in the newspapers, I assure you that I did not mean to say that the information to which I referred was received either from your Lordship's office or from that of the Commander-in-Chief; for aught I know that neither have the information, at least from me. But I wished to point out to you under what disadvantages we carried on our operations. Foy brought from Paris not only the paper containing that information, but copies of all my dispatches; from which Massena knew all that I had intended to do in November against his position, and he knew accurately every inch of mine, by how many guns defended, for what purpose, etc. It may be very right to give the British public this information; but if they choose to have it, they ought to know the price they pay for it, and the advantages it gives to the enemy in all their operations. I am sure your Lordship does not expect that I, or any other officer in command of a British army, can pretend to prevent the correspondence of the officers with their friends. It could not be done if attempted, and the attempt would be considered an endeavour to deprive the British public of intelligence, of which the Government and Parliament do not choose to deprive them. I have done everything in my power by way of remonstrance, and have been very handsomely abused for it; but I cannot think of preventing officers from writing to their friends. This intelligence must certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it was confidentially communicated to his friends in England; and I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with a plan."

and

Portalegre, April 25th, 1811.

To the Earl of Liverpool.

"It is very desirable that you should not publish the details of my dispatches to your Lordship. You cannot conceive how deficient the French are in information. All the dispatches from me which are published are sent to Massena from Paris, and they thus acquire the information of what is going on.

"When an army is engaged in defensive operations, or in sieges or blockades, or in any other in which it is long in the same position, the enemy acquire all the information they desire, if they obtain a knowledge of its position and numbers of the

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date of a month old. Information of this date Massena can and always does acquire, and it is a serious disadvantage to us."

It is interesting to compare these letters with the censorship arrangements of the last war, and the correspondence they aroused in the Press.

1914.

Note that the original movements of the British Expeditionary Force to France had been so well concealed that the first information obtained by the Germans was the announcement in the "Times" of August 20th that the Force had landed.

(d) Agents and Inhabitants.

(i) *American Civil War*, 1861-1865.

In the early part of the campaign, McClellan's intelligence department was in the hands, not of trained staff officers, but of detectives, whose estimates of enemy strengths, etc., were usually very poor.

"As a deputation from New England was one day leaving the White House, a delegate turned round and said: 'Mr. President, I should much like to know what you reckon to be the number the rebels have in arms against us?' Without a moment's hesitation Mr. Lincoln replied: 'Sir, I have the best possible reason for knowing the number to be one million of men, for whenever one of our general's engages a rebel army he reports that he has encountered a force twice his strength. Now I know we have half-a-million soldiers, so I am bound to believe that the rebels have twice that number." (Henderson.)

"The blacks, however, appear to have been as unreliable as regards numbers as McClellan's detectives. If a negro were asked how many Confederates he had seen at a certain point, his answer was very likely to be: 'I dunno, Massa, but I guess about a million.'" (Henderson.)

(ii) 1870.

During the early part of the campaign, the German 3rd Army, that of the Meuse, was advancing on Chalons, towards Paris, but was ignorant of the position of MacMahon's Army; but, on August 24th, they began to get information from the French newspapers. Next, a letter was captured from an officer shut up in Metz, saying that MacMahon was going to advance to the relief of the fortress. Then all the French newspapers made it evident that MacMahon would do, as they stated that an army was being organized at Rheims, and that Bazaine must not be left in the lurch. Lastly, a telegraphic dispatch was received on the 25th from London, stating definitely that, from newspaper information, MacMahon was about to try to effect a junction with Bazaine.

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35. SECRECY REGARDING INFORMATION.

See previous Secs. on "Information."

(a) *Jackson in the American Civil War*, 1861-1863.

He always succeeded in obtaining secrecy, but sometimes at the expense of co-operation. With Longstreet and with Hill, hitches were continually occurring because Jackson would not take anyone into his confidence, or let anyone know his real plans. Henderson exemplifies his powers of secrecy in the story he recounts that his men used to tell of him:—"Stonewall died, and two angels came down from Heaven to take him back with them. They went to his tent. He was not there. They went to the hospital. He was not there. They went to the outposts. He was not there. They went to the prayer-meeting. He was not there. So they had to return without him; but when they reported that he had disappeared, they found that he had made a flank march and reached heaven before them."

Undoubtedly, though, at times he was too reticent. On July 27th, 1862, Lee wrote a gentle hint about this to him, when he had sent Hill to join him to drive back Pope:—

"A. P. Hill, you will, I think, find a good officer with whom you can consult, and by advising with your division commanders as to your movements, much trouble will be saved you in arranging details, and they can act more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble from my increasing your command."

Unfortunately, Jackson took little notice of this hint, and the same troubles ensued, delays before Cedar Creek being caused by Hill not really understanding Jackson's intentions. "But that Jackson would have done better," says Henderson, "to have confided his intentions to his divisional commanders, and to have trusted something to their discretion, seems more than clear. In war, silence is not invariably a wise policy. It was not a case in which secrecy was all important (Cedar Creek). The movement had already been discovered by the Federal cavalry, and in such circumstances the more officers that understood the intention of the General-in-Chief, the better. Men who have been honoured with their leader's confidence, and who grasp the purpose of the efforts they are called upon to make, will co-operate, if not more cordially, at least more intelligently, than those who are impelled by the sense of duty alone."

Finally, at Chancellorsville, a great chance of a decisive victory was given to the Confederates by Jackson's wonderful counter-attack; but all hope was banished by his death, as no one else knew his plan or knew how to continue the attack.

(b) 1914.

In the French advance, in their attempted offensive into the

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Ardennes, Joffre only allowed each Army Commander to know his own objective and rôle. The complete plan was kept so secret that co-operation between armies was impossible.

(*c*) *Gallipoli.*

At the Suvla landing secrecy was deemed so essential that no one, except the highest commanders, was given any information as to the real plan. The subordinate commanders and the rank and file did not realize the supreme importance of pushing on rapidly the first day after the successful landing, and the whole operation failed. Had more information been given to the subordinate ranks, and had they been thoroughly imbued with their true rôle, there probably would have been very much more initiative and much greater success.

(*d*) *French Offensive in* 1917.

Details of the offensive organised under General Nivelle were openly discussed in Paris and other towns prior to the opening of the attack.

(*e*) *German Offensive,* 1918.

Compare the attack in March, 1918, and that in July. In the former, all details were kept strictly secret with successful results; in the latter, no secrecy was observed, while General Gourand was further assisted by the capture, on the eve of the attack, of German prisoners, from whom full details of the bombardments, etc., were obtained.

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CHAPTER VI.

PROTECTION.

36. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

(a) Commander's Responsibility for Security.

(i) One of the maxims of Frederick the Great was that it was pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised. Yet he, himself, through neglect of the ordinary precautions, was surprised and severely defeated at Hochkirch.

See " Outposts," Secs. 48-54.

(ii) *Liegnitz, August 15th,* 1760. See also Chap. X (*d*). Map A (K 5).

In this battle, Frederick the Great had only 30,000 men against Daun with 90,000. Daun intended making a surprise attack on Frederick's position, south-west of Liegnitz. Hearing of this, Frederick secretly moved his troops by night to a position north of Liegnitz, very much nearer to the Austrians. The right of Daun's attack was to be carried out by Laudon, who, like Daun, believed that Frederick was still south of Liegnitz. Considering, therefore, that he was quite safe, he advanced without any advanced guard or proper protection, and suddenly ran on to Frederick's new position, where he was completely surprised, and severely punished for his mistaken tactics.

(*iii*) *Rossbach, November 5th,* 1757.

See " Flank Guard," Sec. 43 A.

Notice how Soubise moved without taking any of the ordinary precautions for his own protection.

(iv) *2nd Manassas, American Civil War, August,* 1862.

See " Separation of Forces," Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

Note that King with his division on his move to Centreville, thinking that the Confederate forces were far away at Manassas, neglected all precautions for his security, and was marching with bands playing, etc., when he was struck in the flank by the brigades of Ewell and Taliaferro.

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(v) *Stormberg, December 10th,* 1899, *South African War.*

See "Night Operations," Chap. IX (o). and the lack of measures for security taken on the march.

(vi) See also Sec. 7. iii. Surprise.

(b) "If an enemy is so closely watched . . the chances of surprise will be reduced to a minimum."

(i) *Marlborough's Campaign of Blenheim,* 1704.

In this campaign the French took no steps to keep a careful watch on Marlborough. He was known to be on the Moselle, apparently preparing to invade France by that route; the next known of him was that he was on the Danube, preparing to effect an immediate junction with Eugene. See Sec. 7 (v) (b).

(ii) 1815.

Note the effect of the failure of Grouchy to keep in touch with Blucher before Waterloo.

(iii) *Jackson at the battle of Bull Run.*

He was able to slip away from the valley to join Beauregard for the first battle of Bull Run or 1st Manassas without anything being noticed by the Federals opposed to him in the valley. Sec. 7 (ii) (c) (i).

(iv) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862. "See Separation of Forces," 63 (e) (ii).

Had Pope kept a really close watch on the Confederate movements on the Rappahannock, the Confederate plan could never have matured. Lee made still more certain of his success by "*preventing*" Pope "*from obtaining information regarding his opponent's dispositions,*" while his own plan was based on the sure knowledge of Pope's dispositions gained by Stuart in his cavalry raid.

(v) 1870.

The following are accounts by French eye-witnesses of the campaign :—

"From that moment (mid-day, August 8th) until we reached Luneville, their scouts watched us unceasingly. Linked to their army by horsemen, they gave an exact account of our positions, our halts, our movements; and as they watched us from some little distance, incessantly appearing and disappearing, they spread uneasiness. In place of acting in a similar way, we kept our cavalry in masses, difficult to move, which did not protect the army, and rendered no service whatever.

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" For one moment, the Prussian staff lost our tracks in the plains of Champagne, because we suddenly changed our plans. But *they quickly found us again by means of their cavalry, which never lost the touch, and marched on our flank, spreading out a curtain behind which their army worked.* When he arrived at Chêne Populе, the enemy was thirty miles behind his cavalry; as we advanced, we met groups of five or six horsemen, who retired slowly, after examining our arrangements and informing those who followed them. If we wished to pursue, each fraction fell back on a support capable of resisting us and keeping us from penetrating the curtain. This service was so well performed by the Prussian cavalry, that we marched, so to speak, within a net which enclosed us in its meshes."

(vi) *German Advance,* 1914.

In the German advance in 1914, their cavalry and Jaeger screen was so effective that it completely prevented the French from obtaining information regarding their opponent's dispositions.

(vii) *Tannenberg,* 1914.

Rennenkampff failed to keep in close touch with the German movements in front of him. As a result, Hindenburg and Ludendorff were able to transfer the bulk of the forces opposite him to deliver a decisive blow against Samsonoff. See " Surprise," Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(viii) *German withdrawal on the Somme,* 1917.

Just before the opening of the allied offensive in 1917, the Germans in the Somme area withdrew to the prepared lines of the " Hindenburg " defences, thus seriously disturbing the allied plans. This withdrawal finally came as a considerable surprise, as sufficiently close contact with the enemy had not been maintained.

(ix) *Gallipoli.*

The Gallipoli Peninsula was evacuated by the Allied troops almost without any casualties, in spite of casualties up to fifty per cent. having been considered possible. This was due to the lack of contact maintained by the Turks, and to the very efficient organization of the withdrawal.

(x) *Palestine.*

The Turks failed to maintain close touch, and Allenby was able to transfer, unknown to his foe, the whole of the cavalry to the coast sector, before his final break through.

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(xi) 1914.

Note how the lack of mounted troops or cyclists to watch the enemy resulted in the surprise of the 12th Infantry Brigade about the Warnelle Ravine on August 26th.
(See *Official History*, Vol. I., page 158.)
See also Sec. 29.

(c) " The duties of protective troops are . . . to gain time and space for the Commander of the Force to put his plan into execution."

See Advanced Guards. Secs. 38–42.
(i) Nachod. (Foch's " Principles of War.")
See Sec. 38 (e).

(ii) *The Great War.*

Note the importance of this in France. The only offensives which were really successful, such as those of Germany in 1918 and the allied counter-offensive in July, August, and September, were those in which the outpost or forward zones were overwhelmed before the main bodies had time to prepare to meet the attack.

(d) Mobile troops in protection.

(i) Note the exceptional information and general protection provided by Ashby and Stuart with their mounted troops in the American Civil War.
(ii) In the South African War, when Lord Roberts was secretly concentrating for an advance against Cronje, and to relieve Kimberley, his whole intention was concealed and protected by French's activity round de Aaar. These operations are a perfect example of the active protection of a strategical move.
(iii) See, too, the protective influence of the British cavalry during the early fighting in 1914, and the rather wasted energy of Sordet's Cavalry Corps.

(e) " The actions (of protective troops) must be regulated solely in the interests of the main body which it is covering."

(i) In this respect, it is interesting to see how often the main German forces, particularly in the Franco-Prussian war, were involved by the precipitate action of their advanced guards.
(See in particular Secs. 40 (d) (i) (ii) and (iii).)

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(ii) In General Townshend's retreat from Ctesiphon, his rear guard became compulsorily pinned to the ground, involving the whole force in an action.

(iii) Note the action of the rear parties when the battle of Le Cateau was broken off.

(f) Composition and strength of protective troops.

See Advanced Guards, etc.
(Secs. 38–42.)

PROTECTION WHEN ON THE MOVE.

37.—MOBILE FORCES.

(*a*) *The Advance to Austerlitz,* 1805.

Napoleon's advance was covered by an impenetrable screen of practically the whole of his cavalry, sweeping the country in front of him.

(*b*) *Jena,* 1806.

For the advance in this campaign, he was protected by Murat with the cavalry, supported by the corps of Bernadotte.

(*c*) 1812.

In this advance, Murat with the cavalry was often fifty miles ahead of the advanced guards.

(*d*) *American Civil War,* 1861-1865.

Note the use Jackson always made of Ashby and later of Stuart to cover and screen his movements.

(*e*) 1870.

See " Accounts of eye-witnesses." in Sec. 36 (b) (v).

(*f*) 1914. *British Advance.*

Operation Order No. 5 of Sir John French of August 20th, 1914, runs :—

. . . . . .

" 3. The Cavalry Division and the 5th Cavalry Brigade will cover the movement (*i.e.*, the advance of the B.E.F.).

4. The R.F.C. will act in accordance with special instructions."

Separate instructions were also issued to this protective force of cavalry on the 21st.

See O. (A), 47. Appendix 12, *Official History* (Vol. I).

In all the General Headquarters' orders, all movements were covered by cavalry screens of one kind or another.

Note, too, how the German cavalry screen was strengthened by Jaegers in lorries, etc.

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"Task of Seizing and Holding Positions . . ."

(*g*) 1866.

Note the necessity for the advanced guard to seize and hold on to the Pass of Nachod. Sec. 38 (e).

(*h*) 1878.

Note action of the cavalry and advanced guard of the Russians after they had crossed the Danube in the war of 1878, when they seized the bridge over the Sereth and over the Danube by Galatz. See Sec. 40 (f).

(*j*) *South African War*, 1899-1902.

In Lord Roberts' advance against Cronje, French with the cavalry was first given the task of seizing the high ground to the north of Kimberley, so as to cut Cronje's communications with the north and to facilitate the relief of Kimberley; and later he was given the task of seizing the high ground by Koodoos Drift, to prevent Cronje from crossing there in his efforts to escape from Paardeburg. Sec. 7 (iii) A (iv).

ADVANCED GUARDS.

SEC. 38.—COMPOSITION OF AN ADVANCED GUARD.

It is interesting to see what has been the composition of advanced guards at various periods of history.

(*a*) *Gustavus Adolphus.* Map A.

In 1631, Tilly, under orders from the Emperor, had invaded Saxony to force that country to abandon its idea of a Lutheran alliance with the Swedes, and on September 16th had captured Leipsic.

On September 3rd, Gustavus Adolphus and the Swedish Army were at Coswig and Wittenberg (H 4), and at last an offensive and defensive alliance was made between the Swedes and the Saxons. The Swedes then crossed the Elbe at Wittenberg, heading for Duben, the rendezvous with the Saxons, and it is this crossing which is of interest here.

On September 9th, a cavalry detachment of 500 men crossed and formed a bridgehead; on September 12th, they were joined by a further 300 cavalry and a small wagon-train; an the 13th, the army itself, 20,000 foot and 7,500 horse, followed. They were preceded by an advanced guard of 2,000 foot, a detachment of cavalry, and 12 guns drawn by trains of 11 to 31 horses; then came ordnance and munition wagons, nine regimental pieces with their munition wagons; and then, escorted, Gustavus himself, who was evidently a believer in the commander being well up with the advanced guard. Behind him came four royal six-horsed coaches (the staff motor-car of the period); then followed

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the infantry regiments with their pieces, and munition carts; the baggage-wagons and pack-horses, and then the bulk of the cavalry with all its baggage. Last of all came the general wagon-column under escort of horse and foot.

This was the order of march on the move to the famous battle of Breitenfeld. Sec. 7 (iii) B (iii).

(*b*) *Jena*, 1806.

In Napoleon's advance against the Prussians, his whole force was covered by an advanced guard of Murat with the cavalry, supported by the corps of Bernadotte.

(*c*) *Passage of the Douro, May*, 1809. Map G.

During the advance of the British army to the Douro, the advanced guard, according to Wellington's dispatches of May 12th, consisted of the King's German Legion and Brigadier-General R. Stewart's brigade, with a brigade of six pounders and a brigade of three pounders. The French advanced guard, encountered on the 11th, was estimated at 4,000 infantry and some squadrons of cavalry.

The ensuing advanced guard action is an interesting example of vigorous, decisive action on the part of Lieut.-General Paget, commanding the British advanced guard.

(*d*) *Trautenau*, 1866. Map A.

During the Prussian advance against the Austrians, the 1st Prussian Army Corps was assigned the Pass of Trautenau through the Riesengenbirge (J and K 5). On June 26th, its main body was at Liebau, more than ten miles distant from Trautenau.

The corps started at 7 a.m. on the 27th in two columns, the right of which was to move from Liebau, on Trautenau. For this move, an advanced guard was detailed of 7½ squadrons of cavalry, 5 infantry battalions, and 16 guns. In spite of the comparative strength of the advanced guard, the ensuing fighting about the pass and village of Trautenau is an interesting example of feeble and half-hearted action of an advanced guard when held up by a small body of the enemy. See "Action of Advanced Guards," Sec. 40 (b).

(*e*) 1866, *Nachod*. Map A (K 5).

For a complete account and analysis of this engagement, see Foch's *Principles of War*.

In the advance of the Prussian armies in 1866, the 5th Corps of the army of the Crown Prince had to pass through the defile of Nachod. On June 26th the advanced guard occupied Nachod, and on the 27th pushed on to the junction of the roads to Neustadt and Kleny, and about 8 a.m., contact with the Austrians was made. The Prussians' advanced guard had to hold

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out for over three hours, with 6½ battalions infantry, 13 squadrons cavalry, and 3 batteries against 21 infantry battalions, 11 squadrons and 4 batteries, to allow the main Prussian force to pass the defile and deploy. For this advance the organization of the advanced guard had been :—

Van Guard—2½ Battalions Infantry.
2 Squadrons.
6 Guns.
Main Guard—4 Battalions.
3 Squadrons.
6 Guns.
1 Company Pioneers.

(*f*) 1870.

It is to be noted, with regard to the German advance in 1870, that their advanced guards were always so strong and consequently so independent, that they often involved the commander of the main forces in a decisive action against his will.

(*g*) *Spicheren, August 6th,* 1870.

See " Advanced Guard Action," Sec. 40 (d) (i).

In this case, the 14th Division complete, about 10,000 men, was the advanced guard to the 1st Prussian Army.

(*h*) *Weissenburg, August 6th,* 1870.

When the Crown Prince's army was moving forward prior to the Battle of Weissenburg, he stated in his general orders :—

" 1. Bothmer's Bavarian division will continue as advanced guard, move on Weissenburg, and endeavour to gain possession of the town. . . ."

Then he gave more detailed instructions, in which the advanced guard was to consist of :—

4th Regiment of Dragoons.
59th Regiment of Infantry.
1st Heavy, 1st Light } Batteries, Lower Silesian Regiment.
58th Regiment Infantry.
5th Rifle Battalion.
Pontoon Company with Light Brigade Train.
Half Sanitary Detachment.
Light baggage of Advanced Guard.
Munitions Column.

The advanced guard was given a starting point and time, and the order of march was to be fixed by the A.G. Commander. Further orders were to be issued to him later at a definite place. Finally, the last paragraph of his instructions read :—*" Connection must be kept up with detachments on the flanks."*

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(*i*) 1870, *Generally.*

The average strength of the advanced guard of a division in this campaign on the side of the Prussians was 2 to 4 Squadrons cavalry, 1 battery, 2 to 4 battalions of infantry, and 1 section pioneers—1/6th to 1/3rd of the infantry.

(*k*) 1914.

In the advance to Mons, the B.E.F. was covered by the cavalry division and the 5th cavalry brigade, while each corps found its own advanced guard.

In the change from the defensive to the offensive in September, the cavalry division advanced with an advanced guard of 2nd cavalry brigade, and the 4th brigade R.H.A. See "Cavalry Division Operation Order No. 11," of September 5th. At the same time the 3rd corps advanced with an advanced guard of "one infantry brigade and attached troops," to be supplied by the 4th division. See "3rd Corps, Orders No. 7," of September 5th, 1914. (*Official History,* Vol. I.)

(*l*) *Mesopotamia.* Map E.

On November 17th General Barrett, in command of Force "D," in camp about Sanniya, after a reconnaissance of the Turks about Saihan, decided to move his camp forward some eight miles, in order to safeguard the Sheikh of Mohammerah. He expected resistance from Turks holding positions about Sahil. At 5.15 a.m., on the 17th, the force moved out of camp, organized as follows:—

Advanced Guard under G.O.C. 18th Brigade.
1 Squadron 33rd Cavalry.
23rd Mountain Battery.
17th Company Sappers and Miners.
2 Battalions 18th Brigade.

Main body in order of march:
1 Squadron 33rd Cavalry.
Force Headquarters.
34th Signal Co. Headquarters.
22nd Sappers and Miners.
2 Battalions 18th Brigade.
48th Pioneers.
63rd Field Battery.
30th Mountain Battery.
2¾ Battalions, 16th Brigade.
Bearer Sub-Division, Field Ambulances.
Mule 2nd Line transport.

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Right Flank Guard.
Half-a-Battalion.

Left Flank Guard.
1 Company.

Rear Guard.
2 Companies.

Qurna.—Later, for the advance to Qurna, General Townshend had the following advanced guard to the 6th Division :—

17th Infantry Brigade of 4 Battalions.
½ Company Sappers and Miners.
1 Mountain Battery.
1 Section British Field Ambulance.
2 Sections Indian Field Ambulance.
1 Section Divisional Signal Company.

See Memorandum issued to all senior officers, Appendix, Part I, "*My Campaign in Mesopotamia.*"

Again, in Townshend's advance to Zeur, the division was to advance in three columns, one of which was to provide the advanced guard to the whole force. This advanced guard consisted of 2 battalions, 1 section R.F.A., and the divisional cavalry squadron.

Sec. 39.—ADVANCED GUARD COMMANDER.

Maintaining touch with Flanks.

Note the lack of this in the advance to Adowa. See Sec. 23 (a) (vii).

Sec. 40.—ACTION OF ADVANCED GUARD.

(a) Typical Advanced-Guard Actions.

(i) *Jena Campaign,* 1806. Map A.

Advanced guard action at Saalfeld, (H 5).

Prince Louis, with the main guard, was at Rudolstadt, when he received information of the approach of the French left column under Lannes from Grafenthal. He considered that he must prevent the French from debouching from the mountains so as to give time to Hohenlohe's force to file across his rear to join the Saxons at Neustadt. Actually, the French would have been too far off to interfere with this march; but the Prince at once moved off, with this end in view, with 10 battalions, 10 squadrons, and 2½ batteries, and met Lannes with the 5th Corps at Saalfeld, where the Prussian force was completely destroyed and Prince Louis killed.

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(ii) *The Passage of the Douro,* 1809.

There is a very interesting account, in Oman's *History of the Peninsular War,* of the advanced-guard fighting under Paget on the advance of the British force to the Douro.

(iii) *2nd Manassas, August,* 1862.

Note the very great importance of the advanced-guard fighting of Longstreet's force in Thoroughfare Gap. Delay in the advance of his and Lee's forces would have been fatal to the Confederate cause. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

(iv) *Vigorous Advanced-Guard Action in Prussian-Danish War,* 1864. Map A.

During the advance of the Prussian Guard Division from Kolding on Fredericia (H 2), the advanced guard consisted of 3 battalions, a detachment of hussars, and 6 guns, and arrived at the bridge behind Havreballegaard at about 8.30 a.m. "On the left crest of the valley of the Ransau stood only weak posts of the enemy, but on the farther side in the wood by the Nebelsee stronger detachments could be seen, which evidently had not observed the approach of the advanced guard. The fusilier battalion at once extended skirmishers on either side of the road, and rushed rapidly up to and over the bridge before the guns, which were to have supported the attack, had even got into position. The bridge was prepared for destruction, yet the artillery were able to pass by it." Waldersee.

(b) Advanced guard holding off a superior force to allow the main body to deploy.

1866.

Nachod, see Sec. 38 (e).

Trautenau, June 27th, 1866. See Sec. 38 (d); Map A (K 5).

The advanced guard of the right column of the 1st Prussian Corps, moving Austrian advanced guard from near Liebau, was held up for a long time by the Austrians about Trautenau, and the Prussian advanced guard attack was badly co-ordinated and feeble. "The 1st Corps was, during the whole day," runs the Prussian official account, "thus held in a disadvantageous position, because, at the commencement, Trautenau and the heights commanding it had not been immediately occupied, and the debouche of the main body thus secured. The infantry fought almost alone . . . the Austrians, with full freedom of movement, used all their arms against the Prussian infantry, and could bring the whole superiority of their fire to advantage."

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(c) Distance between advanced guard and main body, and necessity for advanced guard to reconnoitre.

(i) During the German advance to Mars-la-Tour (August 15th and 16th) the 5th Prussian division moved from Novéant to Flavigny with the divisional cavalry, one infantry brigade, and one battery as advanced guard, the main body consisting of the other infantry brigade and three batteries. The advanced guard encountered the enemy between Gorze and Flavigny, and at once attacked without reconnaissance. The French were in much superior strength, and pressed very severely on the advanced guard before the main body was able to assist. In fact the leading battalion of the main body had to be thrown into the fight without deploying, in an endeavour to check the French onslaught. The Prussian troops thus engaged, defeated for want of timely support, suffered "fearful losses." Had the French been more active, they might have defeated the Prussians in detail as they came up and were thrown piece-meal into the fight.

(ii) *Mars-la-Tour, August 15th and 16th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

Note the vigorous action of von Alvensleben, with the 3rd Corps, acting in a way as an advanced guard, when he rushed forward to attack and pin down Bazaine's force on the road to Chalons. See Sec. 7 (v) (g).

(d) Advanced-guard actions brought on by advanced-guard commanders against the wishes of the higher command.

Map A, Sketch I.

(i) *Spicheren, August 6th,* 1870.

This battle was brought on by the advanced guard of the 14th Prussian division, which for three hours was in action with eleven battalions against thirty-nine French, before the main body could come to its assistance. In the next three hours, only eight more battalions could be brought in, and at the end of the battle, the Germans had only been able to deploy 27 battalions and 10 batteries in action.

(ii) *Worth, August 6th,* 1870.

This action was brought on by the advanced guard of the 5th Corps. The Crown Prince, commanding the army, sent word to break off the action, and to "avoid everything that might induce a fresh one"; but the advanced-guard commander had already committed his troops too deeply to effect this. Luckily, the Crown Prince was close up to his advanced guard, and had

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closed up his main body. He took control of the battle almost at once, and co-ordinated a general attack; but, until he was able to do this, the action had been going much against the Germans, owing to the impetuosity of their advanced-guard commander.

(iii) *Colombey, August 14th,* 1870.

This was similarly started by the advanced guard of the 7th Prussian Corps, against the wishes of the higher command.

In all these 1870 battles, the advanced guards were used too independently, and were not *" regulated solely in the interests of the main body, which they were covering."*

(e) Ethe, 1914. Map A (E 5).

The encounter-battle and advanced-guard action of the 7th French division at Ethe, during the encounter between the 5th German and 3rd French armies in 1914, affords the most interesting example of a modern action yet written. It is very fully and interestingly dealt with in *La Guerre en Action-Ethe,* by Commandant A. Grasset, published by Berger-Levrault of Paris. See Sec. 64 (i). See also " Fighting Forces," Vol. VI, No. 3, October 1929.

(f) Mounted Troops undertaking a Detached Mission.

Map A.

1877-78.

When Russia declared war on April 27th, the corps concentrated near Kishineff (P 7), crossed the frontier in three columns, and the plan of campaign necessitated the seizure of the railway bridge at the mouth of the Sereth. That morning, General Radetsky crossed the frontier at the village of Bestomak, and by the same evening, his advanced guard of the 11th cavalry division, Caucasian brigade, and one regiment of Cossacks had reached the Sereth, after a ride of sixty-five miles, and had seized, by a *coup de main,* the railway bridge near Galatz (P 8) on the Danube.

Sec. 42.—PROTECTION WHEN DEPLOYED.

" Forward Movement in March Formation no longer practicable."

Note the danger of being caught in march formation, as exemplified by the Battle of Magersfontein.

See also " Rossbach " and the French disaster, Sec. 43 (a).

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SEC. 43.—FLANK GUARDS.

(*a*) *Campaign and Battle of Rossbach, November 5th,* 1757. Map A (H 4).

In 1757, Frederick the Great had, for some time, been confronted by the converging armies of Russia, Austria, France and Sweden. He had been heavily defeated at Kolin on the Elbe by Daun in June; before July was over, the French had seized East Frisia, and were striking east; the Swedes were sending 17,000 men into Pomerania; and the Russians were in East Prussia. Frederick, with his somewhat broken force, was at Leitmeritz on the Elbe, keeping his communications open with Saxony, when his brother, Augustus William, was completely outmanœuvred further to the west, and driven headlong into Saxony by Prince Charles, who thus opened up a way into Saxony. Frederick was forced to withdraw into Saxony, on which he had determined to maintain his hold at all costs.

Meanwhile, everything continued to go wrong. Frederick's English allies, under Cumberland, were completely defeated by the French at Hastenbeck; Hanover lay at the mercy of the French under Richelieu; and by August 25th, 1757, Soubise with a second French force, and the army of the Empire, was at Erfurt.

Frederick, as usual, decided on immediate action, and undertook a march of 200 miles to try to collect 20,000 men and lead them against Soubise. By the middle of September he was in touch with Soubise, and for a month he was held impotent, as the French were in a position too strong to attack and he could not induce them to move. On October 23rd, however, Soubise was reported to be leaving the hills he had occupied, and marching straight for Leipzig. Frederick concentrated all the troops available, and, by the end of October, he was in face of the enemy on the Saale at Weissenfels. On November 3rd, he crossed the river, as the French and Imperialists had withdrawn to a position further west. This position was found to be so strong that he could not attack it against odds of two to one, and he was forced to withdraw. He accordingly encamped with his left wing resting on Rossbach.

The French and Imperialists were now finding it difficult to remain in their position, as there was little food, and the Imperialists had been practically starving for some days; they also believed that Frederick's moral was very low. Soubise, as a result, was finally persuaded to take the offensive. He planned to move round Frederick's left flank, screened by some low hills, and to attack him in flank and rear. His sole fear was that Frederick would flee in time to prevent himself from being attacked.

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On November 5th, the force set out on its flank march, and, after some three hours, reached a point due south of Rossbach, where information was received that the Prussians were retreating. It was evident that they could delay no longer, without permitting Frederick to escape. If, however, they hastened round the eastern end of the long, low ridge which hid his army from view, they might still take it in flank as it fled along the road to Merseburg. With this plan in mind, Soubise and his colleagues cast prudence to the winds. From the first *they had omitted to name a place of retreat or a formation to be adopted in case they should be attacked.* Now their army hurried along, pell-mell, with three generals at the head of the cavalry, the infantry straggling after as best they might, the French reserves pressing between the marching columns and the artillery, *and the whole flank exposed on the left*, where the low ridge still screened the enemy from their sight." (*Frederick the Great,* Reddaway.)

No precautions were taken, and the force was marching with its flank exposed to the most decisive general of the period, without any form of flank guard.

Frederick was also marshalling his troops, but was ignorant of the situation for some time. Directly he knew it, he moved east and then south-east, hidden by the ridge, and converging on the enemy. Finally he formed line, and still unseen, awaited the advent of the unprotected enemy. Little more than an hour after the Prussians had struck their camp, they were launched in attack on the enemy. In this unprotected, panic-stricken mob, caught in march formation, the Prussians had wonderful targets; and Seydlitz, by his cavalry charge, completed the butchery. At the cost of about 500 men, Frederick destroyed an army of nearly 50,000, thanks to their neglect of the ordinary measures of protection when on the march.

(*b*) *Talavera Campaign,* 1809. Map G.

At the beginning of 1809, the position and strength of troops in the Peninsula were as follows :—

French :—10,000 at Madrid, under Joseph; 20,000 near Toledo, under Sebastiani; 25,000 near Talavera under Victor. In addition, there were three corps under Soult—his own at Zamora, Ney's at Astorga, and Mortier's at Valladolid—making about 50,000 under the command of Soult.

Allies :—Wellesley at Abrantes, 22,000; Beresford with some Portuguese and Spaniards about Ciudad Rodrigo, 20,000; Wilson with the Lusitanian Legion about Salamanca and Avila, 4,000; Cuesta with a Spanish army, near Mirabite, on the Tagus, 40,000; Venegas with Spaniards near Carolina, in Andalusia, 25,000.

The important point to note in studying this campaign is that Wellesley was completely ignorant of the situation of the corps

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of Ney and Mortier and that they had all been placed under Soult. He believed that Soult was alone, and based his plan of campaign on this supposition.

Between the Tagus and the area of Soult's Corps lay a range of mountains, with only two passes practicable for military purposes—those of Perales and Baños, through both of which roads descended on Plasencia. Wellesley therefore decided to join up with the main body of Cuesta's army, and march up the Tagus against Victor, while Venegas and Wilson were to co-operate so as to divert Sebastiani and Joseph. To safeguard this move, Cuesta, with Spanish troops, with Beresford to support him, was to provide a flank guard, by holding the Perales and Baños Passes. For this, two battalions were detailed, Cuesta looking after Baños, and Beresford Perales.

Wellesley and Cuesta accordingly moved off, and arrived on the Alberche on July 23rd. After many delays, caused by Cuesta's refusals to attack Victor, and after Cuesta had then suffered a severe check from Joseph and Victor, the allied force withdrew to Talavera, where, for two days, they were heavily attacked by Victor and Sebastiani, who were eventually completely repulsed.

Throughout this campaign, the Spaniards had been most irresolute, but there was worse to come. On August 2nd, Wellesley learnt that the flank guard protecting his northern flank did not exist. Cuesta had only sent a few men to occupy the Baños Pass; Soult had seized it; and the French were now concentrated at Plasencia in Wellesley's rear. The situation was extremely serious as the corps of Ney and Mortier, of whose proximity Wellesley was still ignorant, were fast concentrating with Soult in the valley of the Tagus.

Wellesley started to move against what he thought was Soult's single corps; but on August 3rd, at Oropesa, he discovered from a captured dispatch Soult's real strength and position. The only line of retreat left for him was *via* Arzobispo, where he crossed the river on August 4th, and eventually withdrew to Badajoz.

Owing to this lack of a proper flank guard, the value of the great tactical victory of Talavera was completely lost, and the allied army was placed in what was probably the most serious situation of the whole Peninsular War.

(*c*) *2nd Manassas*, 1862.

See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

Note the disastrous results of King's failure to have an advanced guard and flank guard in his advance to Centreville.

(*d*) *South African War*, 1899-1902. Map C.

Note the importance of guarding the left flank throughout Lord Roberts' move round Cronje's left flank, when the latter was in position south of Kimberley. See Sec. 7 (iii) A (iv).

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(e) *Retreat from Mons,* 1914.

Note, throughout the retreat, the action of Sordet's cavalry corps, guarding the outer flank of the allied armies.

Note, too, the action of the British cavalry covering the rear and flank of the British army. See " Operation Order No. 8," paragraph 8; Appendix 14 *Official History.* In the advance to the Marne, the 4th Division was ordered to throw out a left flank guard of two battalions and one battery. See " 3rd Corps' Operation Order No. 7," of September 5th, Appendix 38, *Official History.*

(f) *Mesopotamia.*

Note the flank guards detailed in General Barrett's order. See Sec. 38 (l).

44 & 45.—REAR GUARDS.

(a) Composition.

(i) *Xenophon,* 401 B.C. (See also chap. XI C. (ii).)

The greatest rear guard commander of history. After the defeat of Cyrus the Younger by Artaxerxes at Cunaxa, Xenophon commanded the rear guard of the Ten Thousand in their march to the Euxine. For fourteen months he carried out this retreat, marching upwards of 4,000 miles. He was the originator of all rear guard tactics.

See Dodge's *Life of Alexander.*

(ii) 1811.

Massena's retreat from in front of the lines of Torres Vedras was protected by Ney's Corps, consisting then of about 5,000 men, some cavalry and a few guns.

(iii) *El Bodon,* 1811. See Secs. 32 (i). Map G.

To cover his withdrawal, Wellington left three battalions, five squadrons cavalry, and two batteries to hold El Bodon heights, and three battalions to hold El Bodon village.

(iv) 1812.

During the French retreat from Moscow, the rear guards were very weak in cavalry. Thus the Cossacks were able to hang very close on to their rear, and were able to pound them with light guns brought up on sledges.

(v) *Sharpsburg, September 17th,* 1862.

When the Confederates retreated from Sharpsburg, Lee left a rear guard of two brigades and thirty pieces of artillery to cover his retreat. See Sec. 96 A (i).

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(vi) *Action at Munchengratz, June 27th,* 1866. Map A (J 5).
Secs. (44 and 45) (b) (vi).

The 1st Austrian Corps left a rear guard of seven battalions, four squadrons, one battery to cover its withdrawal.

(vii) *Retreat from Mons,* 1914.

Divisions of the 2nd Corps were ordered to detail rear guards of one infantry brigade, two brigades R.F.A., the cyclist companies, and divisional cavalry squadrons. See "2nd Corps' Operation Order No. 6," August 25.

(viii) *Mesopotamia.*

For the retreat from Ctesiphon, in his preliminary orders for retirement, General Townshend detailed a rear guard of 16th and 18th Infantry Brigades, divisional artillery and the cavalry brigade, under General Delamain. In his detailed orders, he detailed "one mixed brigade," and the cavalry brigade, the mixed brigade consisting of one battery R.F.A., half company Sappers and Miners, portion of field ambulance, and one infantry brigade.

(b) Action of Rear Guard to a Retreating Force.

(i) *Peninsular War,* 1811. Map G.

The French forces in front of Wellington at Torres Vedras were forced by exhaustion and lack of supplies to retreat. Massena's rear guard was commanded by Ney, probably the greatest rear guard commander of modern history. He took up successive positions at Pombal, Redinha, Condeixa, Cazal Novo, forcing Wellington to deploy and turn his position. Then he skilfully withdrew.

In his despatch of March 11th, Wellington wrote :—

"The whole country affords advantageous positions for a retreating army, of which the enemy has shown that he knows how to avail himself. They are leaving the country, as they entered it, in one solid mass, covering their rear on every march by one (or sometimes two) Corps d'armée, in the successive positions, which the country affords, which Corps d'armée are closely supported by the rest."

The action at Redinha was, perhaps, the most classical of this campaign :—"The day's work had been a very pretty bit of manœuvring on both sides. Ney hung on to his two successive positions just so long as was safe, and absconded on each occasion at the critical moment, when his flanks were turned. A quarter-of-an-hour's more delay would have been ruin, but the retreat was made just in time. The two stands had delayed

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Wellington for a day, and his army had only advanced ten miles in the twenty-four hours." Oman, *History of the Peninsular War,* Vol. IV.

RETREATS.

(ii) *Moore's Retreat to Corunna,* 1808-09. Map G.

Just as Le Cateau and Umm al Tubul were forced on Generals Smith Dorrien and Townshend respectively by the enemy's advance overtaking the retreat and forcing the retreating army to turn and strike to gain time to continue the retirement, so Moore had to turn and fight at Lugo and at Corunna to cover the withdrawal and finally the embarkation of his army.

(iii) *The Russian Retreat,* 1812.

During the Russian retreat on Moscow, the rear guards were very skilfully handled. Jomini writes:—

"Rosen's rear guard alone, supported by two corps of cavalry in echelon, made head against the whole of the forces of Murat and Davoust. . . . Our squadrons, always in masses along the high road, were checked at every stream, wood, bridge, and defile, and, battered by the enemy's well-posted guns, had to await the arrival of the infantry, which only came up to see the enemy depart; the latter, falling back on his supports echeloned in rear, was soon ready to recommence the action with fresh troops against the head of our extenuated columns."

(iv) *The French Retreat after Moscow.*

Here, again, Ney showed his wonderful skill as a rear-guard commander. He took over the command of the rear guard early in the retreat, and continued it throughout, with unbroken success, even when the Russians interposed between him and the main body at Krasnoe, and he had to cut his way through. There is a very vivid account of this retreat in the *Memoirs of Baron de Marbot,* though this prototype of 'Brigadier Gerard' was not there himself.

(v) *American Civil War,* 1864.

There was a very interesting series of rear-guard actions, when General Sherman was advancing from Chattanooga on Atlanta. General Johnston was commanding the Confederate forces, and he took up a series of rear-guard positions which were so strong that Sherman, after one attempt at a direct attack, was forced to move wide to a flank in order to turn them. Then Johnston withdrew. In succession, he forced Sherman to deploy at the pass of Buzzard's Roost Gap, in front of a position in rear of Camp Creek, in the forest of Resaca, on the plateau of Casseville, and at the Allatoona Pass. Johnston, on his part, was clever enough

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"not to remain too long in his strong position, and on each occasion fell back in good time. Thus he contrived at least to delay seriously the advance of the enemy, who, in consequence, took over seventy-two days to move a distance of 100 miles. Moreover, he invariably took precautions to secure his retreat; as, for example, when he threw up a strong *tête de pont* on the Chattahochee, in order to secure for himself an uninterrupted passage over that river." (Home.)

(vi) *Munchengratz, June 27th,* 1866. Map A (J 5).

There was a very interesting rear-guard action at Munchengratz, fought by an Austrian brigade, to hold the passage over the Iser, to cover the withdrawal of the Austrian 1st Corps, which was echeloned along the Iser, between Brezina and Munchengratz, and to burn the bridge on the approach of the enemy.

The brigade achieved its object. It held up the Prussian advance for three hours; it withdrew successfully across the bridge, which it destroyed; and then took up a further position on the other side of the river.

(vii) *Retreat from Mons,* 1914.

In this case, there were really no definite rear-guard actions of any importance; there was continuous patrol skirmishing between the opposing cavalries, but the withdrawal was sufficiently rapid to avoid rear-guard actions of any size until Le Cateau. Then, the 2nd Corps was so closely pressed that it found itself unable to continue the retreat, but had to turn and strike the pursuing enemy to get its troops re-assembled, and to gain time to organize the retreat again.

(viii) *Mesopotamia,* 1917.

Similarly, in Townshend's retreat from Ctesiphon, there were no rear-guard actions; but his retreat was insufficiently rapid, owing to difficulties of communications, and his force was pinned down by the enemy at Umm al Tubul. "I had been taken by the collar," wrote Townshend, "by having to guard the ships." In order to extricate his force, he decided to attack the Turks himself to gain time; but, on December 1st, the Turks made a vigorous attack upon his position. This attack was beaten off, and Townshend was enabled to renew his retreat.

(c) Counter-Attacks in Rear-Guard Actions.

(i) *Moreau's Action at Biberac,* 1796. Map A (G 7).

In October, 1796, Moreau, in command of a French army, was retreating through the Black Forest. The Austrians, under Archduke Charles, who had previously defeated Jourdan at

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Warzburg, was pursuing him relentlessly, but without full precautions. Moreau decided to strike back at the Austrian troops. He turned suddenly at Biberac; severely defeated the advanced Austrian forces; and then continued his retreat unmolested.

(ii) *Smolensko,* 1812. Map A (Q 2).

During the French retreat in Russia, the 4th French regiment, forming the rear part of one of the rear guards, was holding the entance to the suburbs of Smolensko on the enemy's bank. It was ordered to fall back and its retreat was closely pressed by the enemy. On arriving at the bridgehead to cross the river, it found that the bridge was so congested with carriages, baggage, etc., that the crossing was impossible, and it had to halt in the face of the enemy. The Russian advanced guard brought two guns into action, and chaos quickly ensued on the bridge. Ney then appeared on the scene, and, seeing the situation, at once ordered the regiment to attack the advanced Russian troops, but not to advance too far. The suburb was promptly cleared and the old position covering its entrance held until the bridge was freed. Then the regiment was safely withdrawn.

(iii) *Sharpsburg, September 17th,* 1862.

Note Jackson's action against the advanced Federal forces. See Sec. 96 A (i).

(iv) *Le Cateau,* 1914.

See Secs. (44 and 45) (b) (vii).

(v) *Umm al Tubul,* 1917.

See Secs. (44 and 45) (b) (viii).

(d) Co-ordination of Rear Guards.

(i) 1914.

Note the importance, yet lack, of this during the retreat from Mons when the 1st and 2nd Corps were divided by the forest of Mormal. In this respect compare the two following orders :—

OPERATION ORDER No. 7.
by
Field Marshal SIR JOHN FRENCH,
Commander-in-Chief
British Expeditionary Force.

BAVAI.
August 24th, 1914.

1. The Army will move to-morrow, 25th inst., to a position in the neighbourhood of Le Cateau, exact positions will be pointed out on the ground to-morrow.

2. Corps will march so that their rear guards are clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eth road by 5.30 a.m.

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3. Roads available :—
1st Corps with 5th Cavalry Brigade attached. All roads east of, but excluding, Bavai-Montay road.
2nd Corps Bavai-Montay road inclusive, up to but excluding the road Wargnies-Villers Pol-Rusenes-Capelle sur Ecaillon-Vertain-Romerie-Solesmes.
Cavalry Division, with 19*th Infantry Brigade* attached, the last named road inclusive and all roads to the westward.

4. Two brigades of the Cavalry Division with divisional cavalry of the 2nd Corps under command of a brigadier to be named by G.O.C. Cavalry Division will cover the movement of the 2nd Corps.

The remainder of the cavalry division with the 19th Infantry Brigade under command of the G.O.C. cavalry division, will cover the West flank.

. . . . . .

A. J. MURRAY, Major-General,
C.G.S. for F.M. C.-in-C.

Issued at 8.25 p.m.
9th Army Corps.

Q. G. LA NEUVILLE,
September 1st.
14 hours.

The Moroccan Division, leaving out a rear guard* till nightfall (19 hours) will withdraw its main body to Witry-les-Reims by Mesnil Lepinois and Warmeriville. The Rethel-Reims road, after Isle-sur-Suippe is allotted to the division. Its rear guard* will retire on Lavanne and Caurel-les-Lavannes, *joining up with the 17th Division on the old Roman road at Vaudrette.*

Similarly the 17th Division will withdraw its main body to the area Epoye-Berru-Nogent L'Abbesse. Its rear guard* will with draw at 19 hours to the line of the Suippe and will *hold it between Vaudrette and Pont Faverger* (exclusive).

The crossings must be held by companies of the main body until the rear guards are in position. Pont Faverger will be held by two battalions of the 52nd Division which are already in position there.

Touch with the 11th Army Corps will be gained at Betheniville.

The movement of the main bodies will begin as soon as possible. The 17th Division will regulate the movement of the 52nd Divisional artillery and will direct it to its bivouac by the Beine road.

GENERAL DUBOIS.

*Note.—Rear guards already ordered to be on the Retourne. (Order No. 3 for August 31st.)

Orders were issued after " entente " with 11th Corps and 42nd Division. (Dubois, Tome 1, page 150.)

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(e) Successive Movements of Troops in Rear Guards.

(i) *Retreat to Corunna,* 1809. Map G.

During Moore's retreat, his rear guard was being heavily pressed by the French, when it arrived at the defile of Constantino, where a crossing of the river had to be made, and there was only one bridge. This was dominated by a hill, which, if in the hands of the French, would render the crossing very costly. The infantry and artillery were placed in position on this hill and under this screen the rest of the rear guard crossed the bridge. Then the guns moved off at a trot, covered by the riflemen, and took up a position on the other side of the river. Finally, the infantry were successfully withdrawn under cover of the artillery fire from the new position.

(ii) *Retreat to Corunna, Calcavellos,* 1809. Map G.

The main guard was in a strong position behind the bridge of Calcavellos. The rear party of some 400 infantry and 400 cavalry were left beyond the stream, watching the two roads from Bembihe and Foncevadon, with orders that, on the approach of the French, the infantry were to retire, while the cavalry covered their retreat. On the French appearing the infantry withdrew as ordered; but the cavalry, believing that the French were in much greater strength than they actually were, instead of fighting their way slowly back, retired at full speed, and arrived at the bridge with the French on their heels, just as the British infantry were crossing. The result was chaos and heavy losses on the bridge, and the French advance was only stopped by the main guard in position on the river-bank.

In reading the Peninsular War, note how cavalry and infantry worked closely together in retirements, while the infantry square was seldom broken by cavalry attacks.

(f) Artillery in Rear Guard Action.

Le Cateau, 1914.

Note the position of the guns of the 5th Division. They were so sited that it was found impossible to withdraw them at all, and they were of little value in the battle either.

Compare this siting with that of the 4th Division, where guns were not in such forward positions, were of great use during the battle, and were withdrawn with perfect ease when it became necessary.

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(g) Distance between Rear Guard and Main Body.

(i) 1809. See Sec. 18 (b) (i). "Moore's Retreat." Map G. Note Moore's danger at the beginning of the retreat. Soult was trying to get to Astorga *via* Mancilla before Moore could arrive there *via* Benevento, and thus interpose between the portions of Moore's force retreating.

(ii) 1812.

In the French retreat from Moscow, the Russian advanced guard, by use of side roads, interposed between the French rear guard and main body near Wiasma. Map A (R 2).

(h) Passage of a Defile.

(i) *Mondego,* 1810. Map G.

During Wellington's retreat to Busaco and Torres Vedras, the allied cavalry had fallen back slowly from Fornos to a ford over the Mondego. Beyond this the road led through a long defile. The French cavalry were pressing relentlessly on the rear of the force, and made a vigorous attack as the head of the column was entering the defile beyond the river. The rear regiments of cavalry sent two squadrons back to hold the entrance to the defile, and with the other two prepared to hold back the French until the column could get clear of the defile. These two squadrons steadily fought their way back, the struggle actually being continued in the river itself, until the French infantry appeared. By this time, the British column had passed the defile, and the cavalry then withdrew.

(ii) *The Beresina,* 1812. Map A (P 3).

This is an instance of the appalling results arising from the inability to keep the enemy sufficiently far away from a defile as to make it impossible for them to interfere with the passage of the defile by the main body of the army.

The French losses at the passage of the Beresina were enormous.

(iii) 1*st Sikh War, Sobraon, February* 10*th,* 1846.

In this action the Sikhs fought with a defile of a bridge of boats over the Sutlej in their rear as the only means of retreat. When beaten by Gough, they were unable to hold the British troops up to prevent their interference with the passage of the bridge by the retreating troops. The resulting losses, in the attempts of the Sikhs to cross the river, were terrible.

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SEC. 46.—EXPEDIENTS FOR DELAYING AN ENEMY'S ADVANCE.

(a) Generally note—

(i) Cutting the dykes in the Netherlands in the wars against Philip of Spain (16th Century).

(ii) Soult's attempts to remove all the boats to prevent Wellington's crossing of the Douro, 1809.

(iii) 1810. The devastation of the country before Torres Vedras to make it uninhabitable for the French.

(iv) 1812. The Russian destruction of stores, etc.

(v) The inundations effected by the Belgians in Northern Belgium to prevent German movement in 1914.

(vi) The destruction of all stores, the cratering of roads, etc., before the German withdrawal in 1917, on the Somme.

(vii) The destruction of material, cratering of roads, installation of booby traps, etc., in the German withdrawal; 1918.

(b) "Responsibility laid down for Demolitions."

(i) 1914.

All main bridges in France and most in Belgium were prepared for demolition, but they were not destroyed, chiefly because the French plan was offensive, and it was thought that they would be required later for these plans.

It is of very great interest to consider what the effect would have been on the German movement if some of the main bridges and railway tunnels in Belgium had been destroyed before the Allies withdrew.

(ii) 1918.

Many of the bridges over the Somme in the German advance of 1918 were left standing by us, though orders had been issued for their destruction; but the responsibility for preparation and for actual demolition had not been sufficiently definitely laid down.

(iii) *April,* 1918.

During the German offensive on the Lys, the bridge over the Lys at Sailly was blown up prematurely (though the demolition was not complete), while many British troops were still on the far bank, and their withdrawal was only effected with great difficulty.

In another place, at Nouveau Monde, in the same battle, pontoon equipment was lying on the bank. According to instructions, if a hostile attack were started, this bridge was to be constructed at once, to facilitate communication and withdrawal; but, in the actual attack, nothing was done, as no definite orders had been given nor definite party detailed off to the task.

In neither case was the responsibility definitely laid down; in

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the former, neither the responsible authority for ordering the actual demolition nor the circumstances under which it should take place were clear; in the latter, neither the responsibility for the construction nor for demolition was laid down.

SECS. 48-54.—OUTPOSTS.

(a) Disasters due to lack of Outpost Precautions.

(i) *Siege of Lincoln,* 1216.

There is a very interesting case of lack of security precautions in early English history. Early in 1216, the majority of the barons of England, provoked beyond endurance by the misdeeds of John, offered the crown to Louis, son of King Philip of France. He landed in Kent, and became master of all eastern England, when John, after his disaster in the Wash, died on October 19th. William, the Marshal, Earl of Pembroke, at once had John's son, Henry, crowned King, and with a small army moved against Louis, who was besieging Lincoln. This siege was carried out with such lack of precautions that Pembroke was actually able to surprise his enemy in the very streets of the town, and to inflict, as a result, an almost decisive defeat on him.

(ii) *Hochkirch, October 14th,* 1758. Map A (J 5).

In August, 1758, Frederick the Great had defeated the Russians at the terrible struggle of Zorndorf. While he had been on the Oder, however, the Austrians and Imperialists had begun the reconquest of Saxony and Silesia, and he at once turned his attention to them. First, he snatched Dresden (J 5) from Daun, who took up a position to bar Frederick's road to Silesia, where the Austrians were besieging Neisse (K 5). This position was too strong to be assaulted, so Frederick secretly moved round Daun's army, a movement which was promptly repeated by Daun. At the beginning of October, then, Daun was encamped near Hochkirch with some 65,000 men. Frederick seemed then to lose all sense of proportion, and threw all precautions to the wind. He appears to have become almost obsessed with the certainty of his own complete superiority over his foes. Though he had less than half of Daun's numbers, he insisted on taking up an untenable position within immediate striking distance of the Austrians, and took no outpost precautions whatever. His generals, the young Dessauer, Seydlitz, and Zieten, remonstrated with him in vain; while Keith, who arrived later, said to him:—"If the Austrians leave us quiet in a position like this, they deserve to be hanged." "It is to be hoped," answered the King, "that they fear us more than the gallows," and he appeared so certain of this that he still maintained his army in position without any security precautions, and began to devise a plan for a flank attack on his

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enemy. The result was that before daybreak on October 14th, the Prussian camp was surprised, and many of the men were butchered in their tents. More than a quarter of his army, more than 100 guns, much war material, and five generals were lost by the Prussians, thanks to the lack of outpost precautions.

It was a maxim of Frederick that "it was pardonable to be defeated, but never to be surprised"; yet, after Hochkirch, he informed the Berlin public that "these disasters are sometimes inevitable in the great game of chance we call war."

(iii) *Surprise of Arroyo dos Molinos,* 1811. Map G.

Towards the middle of October, 1811, a French division under Ginard crossed the Guadiana at Merida and inflicted great annoyance in the northern parts of Estramadura. Wellington and Hill arranged that the latter, in conjunction with the Spaniards, should deal with this force.

While on the march towards the enemy, Hill discovered that Girard had moved to Arroyo dos Molinos, west of Truxillo, and he determined to attempt to surprise him there. The French took few precautions, and carried out no reconnaissances, with the result that by the evening of October 27th, Hill had reached a position within four miles of the French, without the latter having obtained any information as to his proximity. Throughout the night of the 27th/28th, there was a continuous storm of rain, wind, and hail, and the allied forces had to remain in the open fields. At dawn they moved off in silence to attack the French. The latter seem to have had little discipline. Outposts were apparently put out, but only at a very short distance from the main body; there were no patrols, few sentries, and no officer supervision. As a result, the sentries, piquets, etc., practically abandoned all their duties in efforts to escape the effects of the wind and rain. Consequently, Hill's force completely surprised them. They made a short resistance, and then fled in utter confusion, throwing away their arms and equipment, or surrendering themselves to the attackers.

In a letter written by Hill on November 5th, 1811, he says:— "I have time merely to inform you that on the morning of the 28th at daybreak, I succeeded in surprising, attacking, and annihilating the French Corps under General Girard at Arroyo dos Molinos. The enemy's force, when attacked, consisted of about 3,000 infantry, 1,600 cavalry, and artillery. The result is the capture of one general, one colonel, 35 lieutenant-colonels and inferior officers, 1,400 prisoners, and probably 500 killed. The others dispersed, having thrown away their arms; we have also got all the enemy's artillery, baggage, and magazines—in short, everything that belonged to the corps." This disaster to the French was solely due to faulty outpost precautions.

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(iv) *Beaumont, August 30th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

On the evening of August 29th, the Germans discovered that Beaumont was occupied by the French, and that part of their army had crossed the Meuse, north of that place. Actually, Beaumont was held by the 5th French Corps acting as flank guard to three other corps, which were making for Mouzon from the west.

The object of the Germans was to destroy this flank guard before it could cross the Meuse.

"The French 5th Corps," says Johnstone, in his *History of Tactics,* "committed the unpardonable sin of neglecting to watch the road between their camp and the enemy. They knew he was only a few miles distant, but they *assumed* he was marching on Stenay, in order to cross the river there. Accordingly, the commander, wishing to give his troops a rest, let them stay in camp, cooking, with the intention of moving on Mouzon after noon. A few sentries, stationed a short distance from the camps, formed the sole service of security."

A French officer, quoted by Johnstone, gives a very clear picture of the disastrous results of such lack of precautions. "During the night of August 29th and 30th," he wrote, "the French corps arrived at Beaumont, harassed by the fatigues of a series of painful marches and counter-marches, and by the engagement it had had the day before at Nouart with the hostile advanced guards which pressed it closely in its first (attempted) march on Stenay. Without any previous study of the ground, in this funnel of Beaumont, de Failly's staff fixed the camping positions of the corps. The 3rd division was established to the east of the road, a brigade in first line, the batteries and mitrailleuses behind, and a brigade behind that. . . . The reserve corps artillery, two heavy batteries, two light and two of mitrailleuses, with the park halted south of Beaumont, covered on the rear (*i.e.,* towards the enemy) only by the camp guard, massed at 200 yards distance, facing the great woods.

"The proper rear guard, Maussion's single brigade, with a battery and some mitrailleuses, arriving about 4 a.m., found the ground about Beaumont occupied, passed through the sleeping town, and went on to establish itself on the heights, situated to the east of La Harnoterie. On the 30th, about mid-day, the German advanced-guard batteries opened fire unexpectedly on the reposing camps, and threw them into an indescribable panic. The reserve batteries succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in harnessing and getting clear of the dangerous position where they were exposed to the view and the blows of the enemy, and in carrying themselves to the heights north-west of the town.

"Already reduced to five batteries on account of these first losses, they opened fire on the edge of the Dieulet Forest, from

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which at that moment were debouching in mass the German infantry and artillery. The 3rd division batteries, and still more those of the 1st division, more exposed as they were to the enemy's sight, only escaped from their bivouac with serious losses, and went off to take position astride of the Mouzon road, north of the town. This retirement, so harshly imposed on these guns, most clearly indicated the fighting position on which the batteries *should have bivouacked* the night before.

" I shall not enlarge any further on the senseless situation in which the reserve artillery and the park had been placed, fooling in the rear of the column, although the 5th corps was moving in retreat. As I have said before, *nothing had been arranged in time for the emplacing of the troops in bivouac, nor for the order of departure next day, nor for the ensuring of such a zone of manœuvre as would be necessary in order to sustain the fight which ought to have been expected from moment to moment,* since it was known that the Prussians were following."

(v) *Vionville* (or *Mars-la-Tour*), *August 15th and 16th,* 1870. Map A.

In *Les Méthodes de Guerre,* Pierron gives an interesting account of the lack of outpost precautions taken by the French, especially in the famous case of the bivouac at Vionville.

" On the night of August 15th, the cavalry division, Rheinbaben, bivouacked on the line Xonville-Habonville, its outposts facing east towards Mars-la-Tour, and thus barring the Verdun road, on which the French army was advancing. At eight o'clock the next morning the chief of the staff of the 10th corps brought an order to carry out a reconnaissance in force in the direction of the French troops that we had seen the previous evening near Vionville.

" Redern's brigade, with four batteries of horse artillery, formed the advanced guard of the division, and at once started in the direction of Vionville. The patrols and flankers which preceded the squadrons reported that the French cavalry was in bivouac near Vionville and had no intention of leaving it. We saw the squadrons going to be watered, and the men of the piquets preparing their breakfasts while their horses were unsaddled. To our astonishment nowhere did we see a sign of French patrols. The contrast was striking; on the one hand, the French in complete repose, were carrying on their daily work without taking any precautions for their safety; on the other, a mass of more than 4,000 cavalry was advancing towards them in compact order.

" The four batteries came quickly into action and opened fire. As soon as our shells fell into the French bivouac, the disorder was indescribable. Everyone ran to-and-fro in confusion, like

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bees whose nest had been disturbed. In order not to mask the fire of the guns, the Prussian cavalry did not charge, but, if it had, we are of opinion that it would have rendered the surprised regiments ineffective for the rest of the day. The cavalry piquets were not more than 500 metres from the bivouac, and were, therefore, no protection against the distant fire of artillery."

(vi) *Tel-el-Kebir, September 13th,* 1882.

In this action, the Egyptians under Arabi, had neglected their outpost service. What outposts there were had been posted too close to give adequate warning of an impending assault. As a result, Wolseley, after a night march, with some 17,000 men, across the desert, surprised the enemy and stormed the entrenchments. See Chap. IX (m).

(vii) *South African War,* 1899-1902.

In the guerilla period, towards the end of the war, there were many disasters to small bodies of British troops. In his *Small Wars,* Callwell says :—

" Isolated columns roamed about a theatre of war which generally presented few intricate topographical features. After being on the move all day they would often only reach the bivouac towards evening, or sometimes not till after dark. Then, having come to a halt, the force would gather itself into a comparatively speaking restricted space and would start the necessary cooking and camp duties. A dull roar audible afar off in the stillness denoted its presence. Its position was clearly defined and unmistakable, and its limits and any defences hastily constructed were easily detected in the bright starlight of a sub-tropical climate. The Boers turned this situation fully to account. . . . But, while giving them all credit for the skill with which the operations were conducted, and for the dash, resource and foresight with which they were carried out, it must be pointed out that their success was almost invariably the consequence of inefficiency in the service of security on our side. Sometimes the most ordinary precautions were neglected. Sometimes the outposts generally, or individuals forming part of them, failed to exercise vigilance which the conditions of the case imperatively demanded."

Compare this with the outpost work of French's force in the Colesberg district, before Lord Roberts' move against Cronje. During the period prior to the actual move, it was of the utmost importance that Cronje should be deceived as to the true plan. (See Sec. 7 (iii) A (iv).) The brunt of the work necessary to prevent the Boers discovering any information lay on the outposts

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of French's force, and the activities of this force afford a very interesting example of excellent handling of outpost formations.

(viii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

The situation before the Battle of the Yalu affords a very striking example both of good and bad outpost organization. The Russian outposts did nothing. They made no attempt to watch Japanese movements, to keep contact with their enemy, nor to prevent movements and dispositions of their own body from being discovered. The Russian commander, Zassulich, as a result, remained in complete ignorance of the strength, movements, and intentions of the enemy. On the other hand, the Japanese outposts discovered everything about the enemy, and completely screened the movements and dispositions of their own main body. This is very vividly described in the German General Staff history of the War in the volume on the Battle of the Yalu.

(ix) 1914.

Note the surprise attack on the 3rd Coldstream at Landrecies on August 25th, and the disaster to the King's Own on August 26th.
(*Official History,* Vol. 1.)

(b) Example of Excellent Handling of Outposts.

(i) *The Light Division on the Agueda,* 1810. Map G.

Probably the best example of good handling of outposts in history is to be found in that of Craufurd with the light division on the Agueda in 1810.

He " accomplished the extraordinary feat of guarding a front of forty miles against an active enemy of sixfold force, without suffering his line to be pierced, or allowing the French to gain any information whatever of the dispositions of the force in his rear. He was in constant and daily touch with Ney's corps, yet was never surprised, and never thrust back, save by absolutely overwhelming strength; he never lost a detachment, never failed to detect every move of the enemy, and never sent his commander false intelligence. This was the result of system and science, not merely vigilance and activity." (Oman.) There is a most interesting and detailed account of Craufurd's methods given by his A.D.C., and recorded in Oman's *Peninsular War,* Vol. III, p. 237, *et seq.*

" Seven minutes," says Napier, " sufficed in the division to get under arms in the middle of the night, and a quarter of an hour, night or day, to bring it in order of battle to its alarm posts."

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(c) Battle Outposts.

See below under "Organization of Outposts and Frontages." Note also Townshend's orders for the retreat from Ctesiphon :—

. . . . . .

"(3) Service of protection of rest and security :—

Battle outposts. Each G.O.C. brigade responsible for his own front (the firing line taking the place of piquets, sentry groups thrown forward).

The cavalry to ensure the service of security by day.

(4) The troops to stand to arms one hour before daylight."

(d) Outpost Organizations and Frontages.

The organization of outposts, numbers allotted, etc., will depend entirely on the situation, country, etc. It is of interest, however, to note historically what has been done under various circumstances. Clery gives an interesting series of cases in his *Minor Tactics,* from which some examples have been taken.

(i) *Custozza,* 1866. Map F.

"Previous to the advance of the Italian army into Venetia in 1866, the Austrians watched the line of the Mincio between Peschiera and Mantua, on a front of about seventeen miles, with 2,800 infantry, 1,200 cavalry, and sixteen guns. This allowed about 250 men to a mile.

"On the eve of the battle of Custozza, after the Italians had crossed the Mincio, the Austrian outposts on the high ground from Castelnuovo to Sona, about five English miles, were composed of three battalions and one-and-a-half squadrons, about 3,200 men.

"This gave 640 to the mile.

"On the other hand, the open ground between Sona and Dossobuono, about five miles, was watched by squadrons, allowing about 150 men to the mile."

(ii) *Weissenburg, August 4th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

"On the eve of the Battle of Weissenburg, when the enemy were known to be still at some distance, Bothmer's division of the 2nd Bavarian corps formed the advanced guard of the 3rd Prussian Army, and occupied Bergzabern. Its outposts were formed of two battalions and two squadrons, which may be taken at about 2,200 men. They extended from Schweigen to Schaidt, a distance of about seven English miles. This would give about 300 men to a mile.

"On the night of the battle of Weissenburg, and while still in contact with the beaten foe, the outposts of the same corps were composed of five battalions and one squadron, and extended

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from beyond Weiler to Rott, and thence along the Seltzbach to the Hagenau road, a length of five miles. Taking the strength of this force at 5,000 men, this would give about 1,000 men to a mile."

Pierron also records some interesting cases :—

(iii) 1871.

"On January 5th, 1871, our regiment, the 19th Dragoons, a battery of artillery, and a company of landwehr, occupied Dreux. The outposts were worked as follows :—

"Each squadron in turn furnished the patrols and piquets. Patrols consisting of three men each were sent out in the direction of . . . (north-west, west and south-west), every three hours by day, and every two hours by night. They advanced to a distance of four leagues by day, and about half the distance at night. At the exits from the town were posted dismounted piquets, who patrolled the town and the *lisière*. A non-commissioned officer and six men on the top of the barracks searched with a telescope the distant country in the daytime."

(iv) *Investment of Paris*, 1870-71.

The outpost arrangements of the Germans at the investment of Paris were generally as follows :—

"A company of infantry furnished three or four piquets of thirty to forty men each, the remainder of the company formed the support. Another company similarly furnished the piquets and supports on the right or left. The two remaining companies of the battalion formed the reserve. A general reserve of the three arms, was, in addition, posted at points where roads met."

"According to the order given by the commandant of the 5th Corps d'Armée on September 18th, 1870, each of the two divisions had to occupy its sector of the investment line by a mixed brigade of all arms. The remainder of the Corps d'Armée, that is to say two mixed brigades and the corps artillery, formed a main reserve. On the highest points in each sector were established observatories, from which officers with powerful telescopes could observe the enemy's works and movements.

"Telegraphic communication was kept up between the headquarters of each division and the general headquarters at Versailles. Lines of communication were kept open between every post occupied by the outposts even up to the piquet line. These, as well as the connecting bye-paths, were marked by sign posts.

"Each piquet was commanded by an officer, and was of variable strength, amounting as a maximum to one officer, eight non-commissioned officers, and seventy-five men.

"Each squadron on outpost duty furnished sufficient orderlies to carry messages.

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"In one of the divisions, a battalion of rifles was used to occupy the most advanced posts and carry out the patrolling duties. In the other division which had no rifles, the want was supplied by detailing a patrolling section of about forty picked men from each battalion." (*Précis of Modern Tactics,* Pratt.)

It is of considerable interest to compare the Prussian scheme at the investment with that of the Japanese at the siege of Port Arthur; also with the method evolved in the static war period of the last war.

55.—ARTILLERY ESCORTS.

(*a*) *Sapignies,* 1871.

Two Prussian batteries were placed in a somewhat advanced position. Accordingly, the commander took the precaution of detailing a cavalry escort of some fifty men. During the engagement, these batteries were attacked by lines of French skirmishers, who succeeded in getting within 100 yards of the pieces, which were only saved by a charge by the cavalry in the flank of the attacking infantry.

(*b*) *South African War,* 1899-1902.

Note throughout this war, or any other of its type, the necessity of escorting artillery.

(i) *Graspan, November 25th,* 1899. Map C.

In this attack, the 18th and 75th batteries were the supporting artillery. "The four companies of the Loyal North Lancashire were detailed as an escort to this battery (18th), two of them lying down close to the guns, and the other two being in support, some distance in rear. The 75th battery lacked an escort at first, but later on a half battalion of the Northamptonshires was sent to it, and remained near the railway until the end of the day." *Official History,* Vol. I.

Later, when these guns were advanced into close range, the two companies of the Loyal North Lancashire went forward with them.

These escorts were of particular importance at this time, as the school of very close range artillery fire was in the ascendancy, and guns were often brought into action within rifle range of the enemy.

(ii) *Modder River, November,* 1899. Map C.

The 62nd battery had been left to guard the Orange River bridge, but was ordered on November 26th to march to join Methuen's division in action on the Modder. From 6 a.m. on the 28th, at which hour the battery started its forward move from Belmont, it had to be escorted by twenty-five of the Royal Munster Fusiliers Mounted Infantry.

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(iii) *Colenso, December 15th,* 1899. Map C.

This is a particularly interesting battle from the point of view of the artillery, in that it resulted in the loss of considerable portion of the guns available—*i.e.*, those of No. 1 brigade division under Long. It is also very interesting from the point of view of escorts, which consisted originally, for Long's guns, of two companies of the Royal Scots Fusiliers. This escort was increased later by four companies of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, when the guns found themselves in difficulties, as they had advanced into action within range of the enemy rifles. Later, two more battalions of the 2nd Infantry Brigade had to be deployed to attack in efforts to support these guns so as to withdraw them. Eventually, almost the main features of the action became attacks launched by infantry in this sector, acting really as escorts, to facilitate the withdrawal of the guns.

There is a very vivid description of the action in Vol. I of the *Official History.* The battle is certainly one of the most interesting in history as regards artillery escorts, handling and siting of artillery, misunderstanding of orders, and of inefficient staff work. It is of considerable interest to compare the situation of Long's guns in this battle with that of the guns of the 5th division at Le Cateau, where practically the same mistakes seem to have been made.

(iv) 1914.

Note the detailing of a platoon of the Gordons as an escort to the 6th Battery about Bois la Haut on August 23rd.

Sec. 56.—PROTECTION OF CONVOYS.

(*a*) It is of interest to note that up to the time of Napoleon, when the method of making an army live upon the country it occupied, wherever it was, was first really organized, the issue in war chiefly turned on the supply problem. A general was considered successful so long as his army was living at the expense of someone else, regardless of what his military objective might be. In addition, or as a result, war was largely made up of a series of struggles for fortresses, which could be used as centres from which could radiate forage and supply sorties, and the retention of which would facilitate the domination of the surrounding country. Hence, a considerable proportion of the field engagements was fought to cover or to prevent the introduction into a fortress of a convoy of men, food, and ammunition. "Invade with a large force, and you are destroyed by starvation," said Henry IV of France, with regard to campaigns in Spain in his time; "invade with a small one, and you are overwhelmed by a hostile population." Napoleon later found the same state of affairs in his campaigns in Spain.

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" General Skobeleff, when engaged upon his campaign against the Turkomans in 1880, was constantly in fear that the Russian Government would take alarm at the slowness of his progress, and would send reinforcements across the Caspian; weakness of force to him was, under the circumstances, a source of strength." Callwell, *Small Wars*.

(*Cf.* Handley Cross, *Jorrocks* loq. " Confound all presents wot eats ! ")

(*b*) *The move of Marlborough's convoy of siege stores from Brussels to Lille.* Map A.

This is perhaps the most interesting example in history of the precautions necessary for the protection of a convoy. After the successful action of Audenarde in July, 1708, the Allies eventually determined on the siege of Lille. For this purpose a large train of siege material and of supplies for the besieging force would be required. Marlborough prepared to collect this at Brussels. For those days the convoy was enormous. " The siege train alone was composed of eighty cannon with twenty horses apiece, twenty mortars with sixteen apiece, and 3,000 ammunition waggons with four horses apiece. It formed a column fifteen miles in length. It had seventy-five miles to travel from Brussels to Lille, and two rivers to cross, the Dendres and Scheldt. The route which it must take was exposed to attack from the army at Ghent upon the right flank, and from the army at Douai on the left, as well as from the garrisons of Mons, Tournai, and Lille. In these circumstances, the overwhelming balance of contemporary opinion, both civil and military, was adverse to the probability of its safe arrival. Marlborough and Eugene were well aware of the chances which they were offering. But they trusted to the moral paralysis of the enemy's forces and to the perfection of their own arrangements. Every detail of the operation had been carefully concerted. Cadogan and the Prince of Hesse-Cassel were to move the train from Brussels; Eugene was to meet and escort it; and Marlborough was to hold himself in readiness to act immediately as circumstances should dictate. Constant communications were to be maintained between the various commanders, and also with the governors of Audenarde and Ath. And the intelligence departments of both the allied armies were to leave nothing undone to procure the earliest information of the enemies' plans.

On August 3rd Marlborough despatched twenty-five squadrons and twenty-five battalions to reinforce the army of Eugene at Ath. On the morning of the 4th Eugene himself quitted Wervicq for the same destination. He was accompanied by Dopf, who possessed an invaluable acquaintance with the topography of the Spanish Netherlands. In the course of the day, Marlborough

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was apprised that a powerful detachment of the enemy had marched from Ghent upon the way to Ninove. He therefore ordered twelve squadrons more to proceed to Audenarde. On the evening of the 5th, Eugene learned from Cadogan that the convoy would quit Brussels on the 6th, and would take the road to Mons, which was by no means the direct route to Lille, but was the route least open to attack from the side of Ghent. On the 6th the Prince moved to Soignies with 40,000 men. The convoy, jealously guarded by Hesse-Cassel, arrived safely at that town on the 7th. On the same day, Marlborough, having heard that the French at Ghent had sent out a second detachment on the way to Ninove, ordered Wurtemberg with an additional thirty squadrons to Audenarde, and promised Eugene to send him as many more troops as he chose to demand.

The march of the convoy to Soignies puzzled the French. They had supposed that the siege of Ypres, Lille or Tournai was intended; but now, as it seemed, the selected fortress must be Mons. On this assumption, Berwick, who had advanced to Mortagne, threw seven battalions and three squadrons into the city, thereby weakening himself without endangering the convoy.

At this time Marlborough's information suggested that Burgundy and Vendome had some idea of flinging themselves on Brussels. He therefore warned the garrison, and reinforced it. He did as much for Antwerp. And he held himself in readiness to fall upon the rear of any force which might attempt to carry the capital.

On the 8th, at dawn, the convoy struck off from Soignies on the road to Ath. It was closely guarded by a special escort; its right flank was covered by Hesse-Cassel with thirty-five squadrons, its left by the army of Eugene, marching in two columns; and its rear was protected by a body of Hessians who threw out parties in the direction of Mons. But nothing happened. The convoy passed the Dendre at Ath on the 9th, and the Scheldt at Pottes on the 10th. On the 11th, Marlborough sent Wood with thirty squadrons to Petegem, while he ordered the Prince of Orange-Nassau with thirty-one battalions and thirty-four squadrons to observe the garrison of Lille. On the 12th he marched himself, with the rest of the army, to Helchin. On the same day, the convoy arrived safely at Menin. . . .

This achievement astonished Europe. "Posterity," wrote Feuquières, "will have a difficulty in believing it." *The Wars of Marlborough*. Frank Taylor. Vol. II.

(c) *Jena*, 1806.

A French convoy of 5,000 Prussian prisoners was being marched from Erfurth to Frankfurt after the Battle of Jena. It was surprised by a small detachment of 200 of the enemy's

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cavalry, who were themselves lost and actually cut off, the escort was sabred, and the whole of the prisoners released. When he heard of this, the Emperor said :—

"The first rule of prudence required that it should have been made certain that the route to be followed was free, and for this it should have been explored and opened up by a party of five or six hundred cavalry."

(*d*) *The Nile*, 1884, 1885.

This campaign affords many interesting examples of convoy work, as the whole campaign really turned on the supply question.

(*e*) *De Wet's Capture of the Convoy at Waterval Drift, February 15th*, 1900. Map C.

During Lord Roberts' move against Cronje for the relief of Kimberley, he had struck away from the railway, and, until he should arrive at Bloemfontein and open up the central railway, he depended on convoys of stores for the supply of the army.

In its general advance, the force had to cross the Modder River, and this was done without much difficulty by the cavalry, and by some of the infantry, but subsequently considerable delays took place owing to congestion at the drifts.

French, with the cavalry, had crossed on the 14th, other divisions were crossing immediately in rear of him, and the main convoy of stores was ready to cross at Waterval Drift, but was being delayed by the congestion there.

"The disappearance of the enemy after French's successful crossing induced the belief that no serious attack on the British right need be feared. This led to one of the most unfortunate incidents of the march. As the oxen of the convoy, exhausted by their long trek from Orange River bridge, and by the toil of the 14th, required a few hours to rest and graze, and therefore would not move directly in rear of the 9th division, some escort was needed for them. Under the impression that the Boers had been driven off, Headquarters decided that 200 infantry, and about the same number of mounted infantry, would be sufficient for the purposes. . . . The escort left with the convoy consisted of a company of Gordon Highlanders, a squadron of Kitchener's Horse, and some 200 details of the 8th Mounted Infantry. . . . At daybreak, all but ten of the waggons of the convoy were on the right bank of the Riet, with their oxen grazing to the eastward. The mounted part of the escort was still on the left bank, but the company of the Gordon Highlanders were bivouacked close to the main body of the convoy. The waggons had been formed into an irregular laager between the river and two kopjes, 1,800 and 2,200 yards respectively to the eastward. *No*

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officer had been detailed to command the convoy and its escort, but at 7 a.m., Lieut.-Colonel —— R.A.S.C., who had remained to superintend the crossing of the convoy, rode round the position and gave orders that the oxen grazing on the right bank should be collected, as he wished to move the waggons to a safer spot. But whilst the cattle were being brought together, shots were heard to the east, and some of the natives in charge of the oxen ran in."

The Gordon Highlanders took up a position to cover the convoy from the Boers, who were now seen to be advancing. " Attempts were still made to collect the oxen, but the enemy opened fire from the kopjes with shrapnel and with a pom-pom, and at once getting the range, swept down whole teams. A large number of animals strayed towards the enemy and were captured. A few were driven in and placed under cover of the banks of the stream, but the native drivers refused, after a time, to face the fire." *Official History,* Vol. II. Waterval was in telegraphic communication with headquarters, and reinforcements were at once sent off, and more and more troops became involved, until Lord Roberts decided that, though the loss of the convoy would be serious, " its abandonment would be a lesser evil than the dislocation of his plans by the entanglement of further troops in a fight at Waterval," especially as he was informed that there were actually sufficient rations without this convoy. The convoy finally had to be abandoned, without its being destroyed, and de Wet captured 176 waggons with 70,000 rations of preserved meat, 180,000 rations of breadstuff and groceries, eight waggon loads of medical comforts, and 500 slaughter-cattle.

There are innumerable actions fought over convoys in the South African War, fully described in the *Official History.* See also the general account of the convoy system as practised, in Chap. XXV. (*Official History.*)

57.—Protection of Railways.

See the incidents with armoured trains in the South African War, and the method of piqueting the railways for their protection. (*Official History.*)

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CHAPTER VII.

THE ATTACK.

60.—GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

(a) Co-operation.

See Sec. 7 (vi).

(b) Simultaneous Attacks.

(i) *Kolin, June 14th,* 1757. Map A (J 5).

The Austrian army which had been sent to relieve Prince Frederick Charles, blockaded in Prague, advanced along the Olmutz-Brünn-Prague road as far as Kolin; Frederick leaving a force before Prague, moved to meet Daun, advancing in his usual formation, covered by an advanced guard of fifty-five squadrons and seven battalions of infantry. The Austrians were drawn up on a semi-circular range of heights, their front line being posted half-way up the slope, and the second on the crest, while the front was covered by villages and difficult ground, and bristled with batteries which swept all the approaches.

Frederick decided to attack the Austrian right flank, which was nearer their line of retreat and he intended the attack in the usual oblique formation, with his right echeloned back. To carry out this attack, however, he had to move across the enemy's front, and by the time his own left was ready for the main attack, the troops of his right had been so worried by Austrian light skirmishers, that they became restive, and started a series of attacks on their own initiative. Thus Frederick's attack became frontal, a series of disconnected, piecemeal attacks, which he never succeeded in co-ordinating or synchronizing. The result was that he was severely beaten.

The same difficulties of making simultaneous attacks arose in his battle of Torgau, November 3rd, 1760.

(ii) *Roleia, August 17th,* 1808. Map G.

In August, Sir Arthur Wellesley had begun to land his troops, and with some 15,000 men advanced towards Lisbon. The French under Laborde took up a position on the heights of Roleia to

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check the allied advance and give the Frenchmen behind them time to concentrate. Laborde's strength was about 5,000.

"Being thus greatly superior in numbers, Wellesley advanced in three columns, directing one against the centre, and, with the two others, turning the French flanks—the Portuguese their left.

"After a cannonade and slight resistance, Laborde, seeing himself outflanked, fell back to a yet stronger position not far behind.

"Sir Arthur's attack against this position was made on the same principle as that against the first; but owing either to an incomplete understanding of what was intended, or possibly from being too eager to close with the French, the allied centre and left did not give the turning troops on the extreme left sufficient time to get well round the French right flank before committing themselves to a direct and difficult attack against that flank and against the centre, thus throwing away to a great extent the benefit of their superiority of force while the advantage of the ground was entirely with the enemy." (Robinson, *Wellington's Campaigns*.) As a result, the attacks of the columns were not simultaneous, and though Laborde was finally forced to withdraw, the allied losses were considerably heavier than necessary.

(iii) *Vittoria, June 21st,* 1813. Map G.

Wellington had been gradually pushing on to the Pyrenees, and had passed the Ebro. Joseph had collected his army to meet him along the little River Zadorra, covering the town of Vittoria.

The Allies numbered in all about 70,000 with ninety guns; the French between 60,000 and 70,000 with 150 guns. Wellington reconnoitred the enemy position, and decided to attack in four columns—right, right-centre, left-centre and left. The right under Hill, 20,000, was to move across the Zadorra by Puebla de Arganzon, endeavour to gain the heights of Puebla, and force the Puebla Pass; the right- and left-centre columns were under Wellington himself—the right to move to Nanclares, the left by Anda to Gueta de Ariba, and thence towards the Zadorra, connecting with the right-centre column; the left 20,000 under Graham, to move from Murguia by the Bilbao road to the bridges north of Vittoria, regulating its march by the left-centre column.

In spite of the complicated nature of these moves, Wellington's directions were so clear, and the co-operation so good that the attacks were almost simultaneous. Robinson in *Wellington's Campaigns* comments as follows in this respect:—

"Main points to be noticed in this battle are:—

"The precision and concert with which Wellington's joint columns, separated as they were by a close country, rendering communication difficult, kept touch with each other on the march from the Bayas to the Zadorra. It

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is no easy operation for a large army, divided into several columns, each consisting of more than one arm, and having various distances and rough country to traverse, to reach an ordered destination at exactly the right moment. When this is accomplished as nearly as in this case, it indicates that leaders, staff and regimental officers have all, from practice and experience, thoroughly learnt that art of moving in co-operation which must be acquired before a large force can put forth its full powers. So well timed was the allied advance, that, as Graham's guns were heard upon the left, Hill entered into action on the right, and it's a point of dispute whether the battle was first opened by Hill or by the right centre column near Villodas."

(iv) *The Seven Days—Gaines Mill, June,* 1862. Map B.

In the Confederate attack on Beaver Dam Creek, the work of Lee's headquarter staff was most inadequate. The attack was to be a simultaneous one by converging columns, of which Jackson commanded the outflanking column; but no arrangements whatever for intercommunication or reports of progress had been made. "Neglect of these precautions," says Henderson, "made it impracticable to arrange a simultaneous attack, and co-operation depended solely on the judgment of Hill and Jackson. In the action which ensued on Beaver Dam Creek there was no co-operation whatever. Hill attacked and was repulsed. Jackson had halted at Hundley's Corner, three miles from the battlefield. Had the latter come down on the Federal rear while Hill turned against their front an easy success would in all probability have been the result."

This fault, however, lay almost entirely in the inefficient work of the headquarter staff.

(v) *Gettysburg, July 1st, 2nd, and 3rd,* 1863. Map B.

The Confederates made the same mistakes in this battle. They never succeeded in making their attacks simultaneously. Ewell's corps and Hill's corps made several isolated attacks on the Federal 1st Corps, commanded by General Doubleday, who stated afterwards that "it would, of course, have been impossible to hold the line if Hill attacked on the west and Ewell assailed me *at the same time* from the north; but I occupied the central position, and *their converging columns did not strike together* until the grand final advance at the close of day, and therefore I was able to resist several of their isolated attacks before the last crash came."

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This dislocated action was to be a characteristic of the Confederates throughout the whole three days' battle. On the second day of the battle, this lack of co-ordination was even more evident, and the day was lost through the remarkable lack of combination in the attacks of Longstreet and Ewell.

(vi) *Russo-Japanese War. Liao-Yang, August 30th,* 1904.

The extremely involved Japanese attacks upon the Russian positions present an extraordinary picture of furious, piecemeal efforts on the part of lower formations, with little co-ordination from the top. Practically no two attacks on the whole front were made simultaneously, and the action undoubtedly would have offered great chances of a heavy counter-stroke to a general more imbued with the offensive spirit than Kuropatkin.

(vii) *Mesopotamia.*

The battles of General Townshend all afford interesting examples of atttempted simultaneous frontal and outflanking attacks, which were usually successful.

Ctesiphon.

"General Townshend's attack depended for success upon the accurate converging movements of widely separated columns which were to be brought to battle without a general reserve, the whole force being employed in the attack." (Evans.)

The timing of these attacks was considerably upset, and the result unsuccessful.

(viii) *East Prussia,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

During the initial Russian advance the German 8th Army decided to take the offensive against Rennenkampf's army, while Samsonoff's was delayed. An attack was therefore ordered to be made on Rennenkampf about Gumbinnen, and was a failure owing to the lack of co-ordination of attacks. Von Francois' corps, on the left was successful as he had ample time to reconnoitre and prepare the attack. The attacks of the other corps, especially that of Mackensen, arrived piecemeal at different times, and were unreconnoitred. As a result, Mackensen's corps was completely routed and the whole attack of the army failed.

(c) Offensive Action of Advanced Guards.

See Secs. 38-40.

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(d) Rapidity and Resolution of Action.

See Secs. 5 C (iii) and 7 (v) (g).

SEC. 61.—OBJECTIVES AND FRONTAGES.

(a) Objectives.

(i) *Mars-la-Tour, August 15th and 16th,* 1870.

After Bredow's cavalry charge, in the fierce fighting to prevent Bazaine's withdrawal, before Metz, Prussian troops were being thrown into the battle directly they arrived on the scene. The 38th brigade arrived and formed up at Mars-la-Tour, and there received orders to advance—" Direction: north-east on the corner of the Tronville Copses." Then, " while we were waiting," wrote an officer of the brigade, " the Roman Catholic chaplain (a German cavalry officer) galloped up to our colonel, and after a word or two with him, he rose in his stirrups and addressed us in the following words: ' Comrades, the 3rd corps is hard pressed, and to you is assigned the duty of relieving them. Attack, therefore, without fear of death, and may God be with you, Amen.' " No other objectives of any kind were given to the units, though their movement was intended to form part of a combined attack with the other battalion. " The enemy was completely hidden by the brow of the hill," goes on the eye-witness, " and even when we moved off we were still in complete darkness as to where we were going. Generals von Schwarzkoppen and von Wedell had decided between themselves, but they only gave the general direction to the regimental commanders and even the battalion commanders knew nothing whatever. My colonel, for instance, said sarcastically to me, ' This seems to be the chaplain's day; had it not been for him, we should not have known what was going on,' and this remark fairly expressed our feeling." (Maude, *The Evolution of Infantry Tactics.*)

The result was natural. The units wandered unco-ordinated, and without aim or objective, and were very severely handled, without achieving anything.

Similarly, in the same battle, close to Rezonville, the French 3rd Lancers attacked without objectives and lost heavily. They received the order to charge. Starting in two lines from the south of Rezonville, *without any reconnoitring of the ground,* they were thrown into such confusion by the hedges and other obstacles that abounded that they had to be recalled and rallied behind the village. Starting again on a better line, they crossed the crest; *but they had been given a vague order " to charge the Prussian batteries."* They no doubt saw the guns on the horizon at Rezonville; but when they reached a point further on, they

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found close in front of them a hurriedly-formed square of two Prussian battalions. They were aiming for it in fine style, when someone in the leading squadron cried "*A droite!*" and only part of the 2nd line went near the square. It was a blow in the air; three officers, thirty-four men, and forty-six horses were lost.

The guard Cuirassiers had been ordered to support the charge. An officer who rode with them says:—"Nobody had thought of pointing out an objective, or examining the ground, or supplying a reserve—we climbed to the plateau without seeing anything to attack." (*A History of Tactics*—Johnstone.)

(ii) *South African War. Paardeburg, February,* 1900.

Note the confusion and loss of life owing to the lack of co-ordination of attacks, and the complete lack of objectives for units.

(iii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

Kuropatkin was always extremely vague in his objectives. After the battle of Nan Shan, he seems to have had some idea of offensive action, and on June 9th, General Stakelberg received the following direction from him:—

"To you and your detachment is assigned the duty of moving towards Port Arthur and drawing on itself the greatest possible number of the enemy, thus weakening the attack on the Kwantung Peninsula. For this purpose your movement against the Japanese forces sent northwards must be swift and energetic, in order to keep in view the surprise of the advanced detachments. A battle, however, is not to be delivered against superior strength, and the reserve is only to be used when the situation is entirely cleared up. Your final aim will be the capture of the Chinchou position and the relief of Port Arthur."

How many contradictory and clashing objectives are included in this direction? The result, naturally, was that nothing was achieved.

(iv) *The Great War.*

Note that in very few cases on the Marne or the Aisne were correct objectives given to units or formations in the attacks carried out by British troops. Note how much more and more rigidly objectives were laid down as warfare became more and more entrenched. Note the vagueness of the objectives given by the Russian commanders in East Prussia in 1914.

(v) *Gallipoli.*

In the first battle of Krithia, on April 28th, the objective given was an arbitrary line on the map. Instead, the troops naturally

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made for the definite objective of the Turkish trenches, which altered the intended direction of attack. Much confusion resulted. (*Official History*, Vol I, page 289.)

(b) Depth of Objectives.

(i) Fatigue and Losses.

Note how objectives altered in the Great War. In the early offensives, Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, Loos—objectives to a considerable depth were given to units, but it was found that the losses incurred greatly limited the possible depth. As methods of offensive action became more and more those of material destruction, objectives became more and more limited, infantry really, in theory, occupying objectives rendered untenable to the enemy by artillery fire. Somme, Messines, 3rd Ypres.

The first battle of Cambrai (see Sec. 7 (iii) B (vi)) opened new methods, and in this attack the break through was effected with such few casualties, that the depth of the objective was only limited by the fatigue of the troops.

Note, too, in the March, 1918, offensive, Ludendorff considered that the depth of the objectives should only be limited by the fatigue of the troops. New formations were not to be put in until exhaustion was arresting the momentum of the attack of formations already involved.

(ii) Artillery Support.

Artillery support for deep objectives has always been a most difficult problem, and became more and more so, as the depth of defence increased. Its vital necessity and extreme difficulty first really appeared in the early battles of the Russo-Japanese War. In the battle of the Yalu, a great deal depended on the Japanese seizure of advanced positions for artillery to support their attack in its final stages, and on their concealment of their positions. This was achieved by the capture of the islands in the river.

In the Great War, as movement over roads and country destroyed by intense shell-fire became more and more difficult, so this artillery support became more difficult. It became necessary to put guns in very advanced positions, which remained silent and concealed until the later stages of the attack. See the use of German artillery in March, 1918.

Note, too, the very great difficulty in providing this support in Gallipoli.

At Cambrai, and in the final allied offensives, this lack of

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artillery support in the later stages was partly remedied by tank co-operation.

Note the influence on this, to-day, of mechanized artillery.

(iii) Enemy Reserves.

See Sec. 25 (m).

(*a*) *Battle of Ctesiphon, November*, 1915.

Note the complete misapprehension as to the strength and position of the Turkish reinforcements. Although it had been reported to General Nixon that large reinforcements were on the spot, this report was disbelieved; and objectives were given to General Townshend's division which were impossible to take and maintain against the certain counter-attack of the enemy's reserves.

(*b*) 1*st Battle of Cambrai, November*, 1917.

See also Sec. 7 (iii), B (vi).

There appears to have been complete misapprehension as to the strength and probable action of the enemy reserves. When the opening phase of the attack had been limited by the use of the German reserves immediately at hand, objectives were given to the British forces which made a more and more pronounced salient into the hostile lines, and which did not take into account the position and possible action of the enemy's reserves. To try to gain their objectives, the southern part of this salient was greatly weakened of troops; the Germans put in a heavy, surprise counter-attack on this face; and the success of the battle of Cambrai was nearly turned into disaster.

(*c*) *March*, 1918.

Note that Ludendorff struck at the junction of the allied armies, realizing that, in such a case, the allied reserves would be less likely to act in concert in a strong counter-attack.

(*d*) *Allied Offensives*, 1918.

In Foch's objectives, note how he never gave time to Ludendorff to collect reserves into a position to deliver a counter-attack. Directly a battle had stabilized sufficiently to allow of an organized counter-attack being made, he launched an attack elsewhere, thus continually dissipating the German reserves.

(c) Attack Organized in Depth.

This has always been the principle underlying attack formations. The production of the phalanx, Frederick's oblique attack,

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Napoleon's mass formations, the Prussian mass attacks, the attacks by successive waves with supports and reserves in depth, etc., have all been methods of achieving this in the face of the existing defensive weapons. In this respect, it is very interesting to read the "line" *versus* "column" controversy of the Peninsular and Napoleonic Wars, or the earlier "Phalanx" *versus* the "Legion." At Neuve Chapelle, Loos, Cambrai, attacks were not sufficiently organized in depth to maintain the momentum and deal with counter-attacks. At Neuve Chapelle there were insufficient reserves for the task; at Loos, reserves were too far away to maintain the momentum of the original attack (see Sec. 25 (m) (iv)); at Cambrai, reserves were too far away in the early stages of the attack, and, in the later stages there were insufficient reserves, especially of tanks, to maintain the momentum and to give the automatic defence in depth against possible counter-attack.

(d) Subsidiary Operations.

See "Economy of Force."

(i) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904-1905.

Note that on the Yalu, and before Liao Yang, Kuropatkin broke this principle. On the Yalu, and on the Langtzushan-Anping positions he had bodies for observation and delay. In both cases he maintained forces much bigger than were necesssary for this purpose, with the result that, instead of carrying out their correct rôle, they became involved in serious fighting.

(ii) *Palestine Campaign.* Map E.

Note the very skilful use of the detachment at Amman. By the maintenance of this detachment and the undertaking of minor enterprises, the Turks were led to believe that there was a serious threat from this eastern flank instead of the western; and, as a result, a large Turkish force was contained, inactive.

(e) Frontages of Attack in the Great War.

See Appendices A and B. Pages 168 and 169.

Note that these were for deliberate attacks in their most extreme form.

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APPENDIX A.

STRENGTH AND GROUPING OF FORCE USED FOR CERTAIN ATTACKS IN 1918.

The following table shows the strength of the force concentrated in line and close reserve for some of the attacks during the early portion of 1918. No account is taken of the portions of front which were not actually attacked, and, therefore, lightly held, nor of divisions which were some distance in rear and presumed to be in army or G.H.Q. reserve.

	Frontage of Attack.	Divisions in front line.	Frontage of attacking Divisions in yds.	Divisions in line and close reserve.	Force per mile of Front.
Somme, March, 1918. (German attack.)					
Cojeul to Bapaume-Cambrai road	12 miles	10	2,100	18	1·5 Divs.
La Vacquerie to La Fere	33 „	23	2,500	37	1·1 „
Total front of actual attack (*a*)	45 „	33	2,400	55	1·2 „
Lys, April, 1918. (German attack.)					
Ypres-Comines Canal to Frelinghien ...	6 „	4	2,600	6	1 „
Bois Grenier to La Bassée Canal	11 „	9	2,150	14	1·4 „
Total front of actual attack (*b*)	17 „	13	2,300	20	1·2 „
Aisne, June, 1918. (German attack.)					
Leuilly to Courcy	33 „	18	3,200	23	0·7 „
Montdidier-Noyon, June, 1918. (German attack.)					
Montdidier to Noyon	22 „	11	3,500	16	0·7 „
Somme, August, 1918. (British and French attack.)					
River Avre to Morlancourt	15 „	9	2,933	17	1·1 „

(*a*) The front of eight miles from the Bapaume-Cambrai road to La Vacquerie was lightly held by four divisions.
(*b*) The 6-mile front from Frelinghien to Bois Grenier was very lightly held by one division.

Note.—In the Somme battle each corps averaged 4½ divisions and attacked on a front of 3 miles on the northern portion, and of 4 miles on the southern portion.

In the Lys battle each corps averaged 3 1/3rd divisions and attacked on a front of about 3 miles.

In the Aisne and Montdidier-Noyon battles, each corps was composed of roughly 4 divisions and attacked on a front of 5½ miles.

For the four battles the German attacking corps have averaged 4 divisions and have attacked on a 4-mile front with 2⅔ divisions in reserve.

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APPENDIX B.

Summary of Frontages Employed in the Attack.

Place.	Date.	Number of Divs. in front line.	Frontage per Div. in yards.
Somme* (4)	1916	13	1,700
Arras* (4)	1917	16	1,800
Messines* (4)	1917	12	1,700
3rd Ypres* (4)	1917	15	1,600
Somme† (3)	March 1918	33	2,400
Lys† (3)	April 1918	13	2,300
Aisne† (3)	May 1918	18	3,200
Noyon-Montdidier† (3)	June 1918	11	3,500
Champagne East of Rheims† (3)	July 1918	15	3,050
Champagne West of Rheims† (3)	July 1918	17	3,000
Somme* (4) and (3)	August 1918	9	2,933

* = British Attack.
† = German Attack.
(4) = 4 Battalion Brigades.
(3) = 3 Battalion Brigades.

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THE GAINING OF CONTACT.

62. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

See advanced-guard actions.
Sec. 40.

THE ATTACK.

63. SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS.

(a) Importance of Time.

(i) 18th Century.

See Sec. 25 (h).

"How true it is," wrote Wellington, "that, in all military operations, time is everything."

Note the lack of judgment in this respect of the French marshals in the Peninsula.

At Talavera, Victor was so anxious to attack Wellington before the latter could have time to organize his defences that he attacked without reconnaissance.

At Salamanca, Marmont was so anxious to maintain the initiative and prevent Wellington's withdrawal that he attacked before he was concentrated, and in a piecemeal method, with the result that he was severely defeated. Sec. 97, 1 (*b*).

Note the delay of the Russians in attacking Plevna in 1878, which gave Osman time to organize a very formidable defence.

(ii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

The Japanese forces delayed for a very long time before Liao Yang, apparently in the hopes that Port Arthur might fall and Nogi's army be released to join them; but this delay enabled the Russians to prepare a very strong defensive position at Liao Yang.

(iii) 1914.

Rapidity of decision on the western front was all-important to the Germans.

(b) Rapidity of Decision and Simplicity of Plan.

Note how rapidly decisions were made by all great commanders and leaders in encounter attacks—Frederick and Seydlitz at Rossbach, Kellerman at Marengo, Wellington at Salamanca, "where 40,000 men were defeated in forty minutes," and in the series of encounter attacks at the beginning of the 1870 campaign.

(c) Necessity for Time for Reconnaissance.

See Secs. 30-33.

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(d) Envelopment and Penetration.

(i) Envelopment on Both Flanks.

(*a*) *Cannae, June,* 216 B.C. Map A (J 11).

Hannibal with the Carthaginians enveloped both wings of the Romans under Varro, and the Roman losses are put at from 40,000 to 70,000 out of an army of 87,000. (*Hannibal,* Dodge.)

(*b*) 1805.

Note Napoleon's envelopment of Mack at Ulm.

(*c*) 1870.

Note the complete envelopment of the French at Sedan, September.

(*d*) 1914.

The German plan, though originally designed as a manœuvre somewhat similar to that of Arbela, developed into an attempt to envelope both flanks, *via* Belgium and Verdun.

(*e*) 1914.

The Russian armies of the north-west front attempted an envelopment on both flanks, the first army under Rennenkampf moving round the north flank, north of the Masurian Lakes, and the second army under Samsonoff moving round the southern flank, south and west of the lakes.

(ii) Envelopment on One Flank.

American Civil War.

(*a*) ***Bull Run or 1st Manassas, July 21st,*** 1861. Maps B and J. The Federals in this attack attempted to envelop the left flank of Beauregard and Johnston by moving round his position *via* Sudley Spring, and the Warrenton Turnpike.

(*b*) ***2nd Manassas, August,*** 1862.

Pope's right flank was enveloped by Jackson's march round his flank. See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

(*c*) ***Chancellorsville, May 2-4th,*** 1863.

Jackson enveloped the right flank of the Federals by his night march, with an attack at dawn. Had not Jackson been killed, this enveloping attack would probably have practically destroyed the enemy army.

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(*d*) *Gravelotte-St. Privat, August 18th,* 1870. Map A, Sketch I.

In this attack which finally forced Bazaine into Metz, the Prussians attempted to envelope the French right. Owing to faulty reconnaissance (see Sec. 30 (v)), they thought the French flank rested at Amanvillers, and started their outflanking movement round this place. The position really extended as far as St. Privat, and the intended enveloping attack, which became a front attack, was crushed with great loss. Finally, another enveloping attack to outflank St. Privat was launched and was ultimately successful.

(*e*) *South African War,* 1899-1902. Map C.

Lord Roberts' offensive against Cronje in position south of Kimberley. Lord Roberts outflanked and enveloped Cronje's left flank, before the latter realized that the British advance had begun.

(*f*) *The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

Zassulich, on the Yalu, was enveloped by the Japanese 1st army. A feint was made on the Russian front, bridges for crossing the river being erected; three bridges were secretly thrown across on the Japanese right; and the left flank of the Russian position was enveloped.

(*g*) *The Great War.*

(i) *Western Front,* 1914.

Note the continual efforts of the Germans to envelope the outer flank of the British forces in all the fighting during the retreat from Mons.

(ii) *Tannenberg,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

The Prussian offensives of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes enveloped the left flanks of the second and first Russian armies respectively, which had advanced on both sides of the Masurian Lakes.

(iii) *Mesopotamia.*

All General Townshend's battles were examples of envelopment on one flank. He made a frontal attack to pin down his enemy, and then enveloped his position by a flanking attack.

His description of the idea of his own tactics in his *My Campaign in Mesopotamia* is very interesting.

(iv) *Palestine.*

In General Allenby's final break through against the Turks, note the excellent enveloping attack of the cavalry round the Turkish right flank.

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(e) Division of Forces to obtain Envelopment.

(i) Example of Danger of Separation of Forces.

See also " Concentration," Sec. 7 (i).

(a) *First Sikh War*, 1845.

After the defeat of Ferozeshah, on December 21st, the Sikhs had withdrawn before Gough, and had taken up a very strong position on the left bank of the Sutlej about Sobraon. Here they received large reinforcements, and therefore decided to separate their forces, sending 24,000 to cross the Sutlej near Ludhiana, invest the British garrison of 2,500 men, threaten Gough's communications with Ambala, and thus dislodge him from his position. During all this move, however, the main body of Sikhs remained inactive; and Gough, who also had been reinforced, was able to send Sir Harry Smith with about 9,000 men to deal with this detachment. Sir Harry completely defeated the detachment at Aliwal, and was able to join Gough again in time to crush the main body at Sobraon.

(ii) Successful Division of Forces.

See also " Marengo " under " Surprise," Sec. 7 (iii) A (iii).

Campaign of 2nd Manassas, August, 1862.
Map B and Map J.

(This campaign has been gone into in considerable detail, as there are illustrations of so many lessons of *F.S.R.* in it.)

McClellan, with some 90,000 men was in position on the peninsular south of Richmond, where he had been driven by Lee in a series of heavy engagements. Lee had at this time a total force of about 60,000 men. Meanwhile, Pope with 47,000, had advanced southward on the mainland on Richmond, and was coming into position about the Rapidan. It had become evident to Lee and Jackson that McClellan would withdraw from in front of Richmond, and Jackson was therefore given permission to try to defeat Pope in detail before McClellan could move round by sea to support him.

On August 3rd, McClellan was ordered to embark; on the 9th Jackson had moved to Cedar Run with 24,000 men; and on the 14th, Pope had arrived definitely in position on the Rapidan. On the 18th, the Confederates, who were now concentrated, tried to turn Pope's left *via* Pisgah Church; but, owing to *a mistake made in the orders to Stuart* and to *lack of understanding of their rôle by subordinate commanders*, there was considerable delay in the move. Further, *Lee's orders for the movement were captured by the Federals*, and Pope learned his danger in time to retreat. By the 19th, Lee's advanced guard had reached Brandy Station,

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and Pope was in position behind the Rappahannock from Kelly's Ford to Hazel Run. From this situation began the 2nd Manassas campaign.

The Federal position could not be turned from the south. Jackson therefore attempted to cross further north, by Sulphur Springs. He succeeded in getting a detachment across here, and maintained it there for two days; but it was very isolated, and he could not extend his hold on the other bank, so he ordered its withdrawal. This completely deceived Pope, who considered that this had been a decisive effort to turn his right, that it had failed, and that the idea would, therefore, be abandoned.

The next event was the amazing *Confederate Cavalry reconnaissance,* carried out by Stuart. On August 22nd, with 1,500 men he rode completely round Pope's right *via* Waterloo Bridge, entered Warrenton in a terrible storm, moved on Catlett's Station, where he destroyed the railway line and large quantities of Federal stores, and, most important of all, *captured Pope's despatch box, giving the whole details of Pope's dispositions, reinforcements available, and probable time of their arrival.*

In spite of this, Pope felt quite happy. He believed that this cavalry raid was in conjunction with Jackson's crossing at Sulphur Springs, and that the whole attempt had been repulsed and would be abandoned. He had concentrated his whole force on the road Sulphur Springs-Warrenton-Gainsville; portions of McClellan's army had already arrived at Acquia Creek; and forces were assembling at Washington. It appeared possible for him to assemble 150,000 men on the Rappahannock within a few days, while Lee could only be reinforced to 75,000 after a considerable lapse of time.

The Confederate plan of campaign evolved by Lee and Jackson, was to *divide the army;* Jackson was to move North across the Bull Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, and to strike the railway, on which Pope depended for his line of communications with Washington; Longstreet and Lee were to hold Pope on the Rappahannock, until Jackson had got astride Pope's line of communication, and then march to join him. Note that this scheme meant that 55,000 men were to attack 100,000 who could be reinforced to 150,000, and that the attacking force was about to be divided into two wings at a distance from one another of two days' march. Knowledge of Pope's mentality alone made Lee and Jackson adopt this bold, but apparently rash, plan.

On August 14th, Jackson began his preparations, and his troops on the Rappahannock were replaced by those of Longstreet. On August 25th, using every possible means of concealment, he moved off *via* Orleans, and halted at midnight at Salem. On the 26th he continued his march through Thoroughfare Gap; through Gainsville, where Stuart with his cavalry, who had remained on

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the Rappahannock to deceive Pope, joined him; and on to Bristoe, to prevent any move on Manassas by Pope. He broke down the bridges over Broad Run, and destroyed the railway, but two Federal trains managed to escape to Alexandria. Then, the same night he sent Stuart and Trimble to Manassas, which they captured, with the whole of Pope's accumulated stores.

Meanwhile Pope was completely in the dark. He sensed that something was happening, but could learn nothing, so decided on that fatal compromise—*a reconnaissance in force.* " Sigel and McDowell were ordered to force the passage of the Rappahannock at Waterloo Bridge and Sulphur Springs and obtain information of the enemy's movements. Reno was also to cross below the railway bridge and make for Culpeper. The manœuvres, however, were not carried out as contemplated. Only McDowell advanced, and as Lee had replaced Longstreet, who marched to Orleans the same afternoon, by Anderson, but little was discovered." (Henderson.)

By the morning of the 27th, Jackson was concentrated at Manassas, with Ewell's brigade at Bristoe. About 7 o'clock, an attack was made on Manassas by a brigade from Alexandria, but this was easily repulsed; but Stuart reported that heavy columns were moving from Warrenton to Gainsville, and from Warrenton Junction on Bristoe. The really important thing now was to unite the complete Confederate force. Longstreet was moving on Thoroughfare Gap, but the Federals were five miles nearer the Gap than Lee, there was a large garrison in Washington, and the railway was available for Pope's moves. Actually, at 7 o'clock, Pope had ordered Hooker to move on Bristoe, and at 8.30 ordered the whole force to concentrate at Gainsville. At 6.30 that evening, he ordered the army to move on Manassas. The situation was getting difficult for Jackson. To unite with Lee, he must retreat, and there was only one line still open to him—the line north and north-west. At midnight he accordingly burnt all the stores, and moved off, directing his march on Centreville to deceive his opponent, and then striking off to the vicinity of Groveton.

Up till 6 p.m. on the 27th, Pope's actions had been sound, but then he lost his head. After an action at Bristoe, Ewell had withdrawn in accordance with the orders of Jackson, to Manassas, and Pope had discovered what was the real Confederate strength. He imagined, then, that Ewell had been defeated and Jackson surprised, and that the latter could only retire to entrenchments at Manassas. Accordingly, he called up all the Federal forces to Manassas, which was found empty on the morning of the 28th. Meanwhile Jackson, in the vicinity of Groveton, was within twelve miles of Thoroughfare Gap, with an alternative line of retreat *via* Aldie Gap, was on his enemy's

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flank, and retained the power of striking and pinning Pope till Lee's arrival.

The movements of the 28th are difficult to follow, but are the most important of Jackson's campaign. His one idea was to destroy Pope before McClellan could reinforce him, and to do this he must hold the Federals until Lee could join him to take the decisive action.

On the 28th, at Manassas, Pope had received information that the Confederates were concentrated between Manassas and Centreville and the Federals were therefore directed towards the latter place, the left and centre being under McDowell. During this advance, *the Federals disappeared in the great woods south-west of Groveton*, and the situation was very obscure to the Confederate leader as well; but, during the afternoon, *McDowell's orders for the moves of his troops were captured*, and Jackson began to see light. Actually, King's division of 10,000 of McDowell's command had received orders to move *via* Groveton on Centreville along the turnpike, and they were moving up this road, *without any flank guard*, and with bands playing, thinking that the Confederates were far away at Manassas. Jackson was still uncertain of the exact situation, and imagined that this division was the flank guard of the whole force; but he decided that, as Longstreet's advanced guard was now already fighting in Thoroughfare Gap, he must attack King, even though he would probably be heavily reinforced, if he was to pin Pope to the ground. Ewell and Taliaferro were consequently ordered to made a flank attack on King's division. The resultant battle was very severe and indecisive, Ewell and Taliaferro both being killed, but the results were excellent from the point of view of the Confederate leader. He achieved his main object; the whole Federal force was drawn on him, and he knew that, at any rate, he had pinned his enemy to the ground. Pope, however, was again quite happy. He believed that, instead of conforming to Jackson's wishes, he had anticipated the Confederate retreat, and prepared to attack at dawn on the 29th. "McDowell," ran his orders, "had intercepted the retreat of the enemy, Sigel is immediately on his front, and I see no possibility of his escape." Henderson paints a remarkable picture of the *chaos at Pope's Headquarters, of the disastrous effects of dispersion of force, of lack of information, non-verification of information, incorrect positions of commanders, lack of co-operation, etc.* Pope "was badly informed. He did not know even the positions of his own troops. His divisions, scattered over a wide extent of country, harassed by Stuart's cavalry, and ignorant of the topography, had lost all touch with the Commander-in-Chief. Important dispatches had been captured. Messages and orders were slow in arriving, if they arrived at all. Even the *generals were at a*

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loss to find either the Commander-in-Chief or the right road. *McDowell had ridden from Gainsville to Manassas in order to consult with Pope, but Pope had gone to Centreville.* McDowell thereupon set out to rejoin his troops, but *lost his way* in the forest and went back to Manassas. From *Ricketts Pope received no information whatever.* (Ricketts' report should have been transmitted through McDowell, under whose command he was, and, as McDowell was not to be found, it naturally went astray.) He was not aware that after a long skirmish at Thoroughfare Gap, Longstreet had opened the pass by sending his brigades over the mountains on either hand, threatening both flanks of the Federals, and compelling them to retire. He was not aware that King's division, so far from intercepting Jackson's retreat, had abandoned the field of Groveton at 1 a.m., and, finding its position untenable in face of superior numbers, had fallen back on Manassas; or that Ricketts, who had by this time reached Gainsville, had in consequence continued his retreat in the same direction.

"Seldom have the baneful effects of dispersion been more strikingly illustrated, and the difficulty, under such circumstances, of keeping the troops in the hand of the Commander-in-Chief. On the morning of the 28th Pope had ordered his army to march in three columns on Manassas, one column starting from Warrenton Junction, one from Greenwich, and one from Buckland Mills, the roads which they were to follow being at their furthest point no more than seven miles apart. And yet at dawn on the 29th he was absolutely ignorant of the whereabouts of McDowell's army corps, he was but vaguely informed of what had happened during the day; and while part of his army was at Bald Hill, another part was at Centreville, seven miles north-east, and a third at Manassas and at Bristoe, from seven to twelve miles south-east." (Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson.*)

At dawn on the 29th, Pope at last discovered the situation as to King; Longstreet's advanced guard was through the Thoroughfare Gap; the main body of the Confederates had still twelve miles to go to join Jackson; and Jackson with 18,000 men, 2,500 cavalry, and 40 guns, was in position in face of Pope, whose force was about 70,000 strong, but still badly dispersed:— 20,000 at Bull Run, 20,000 Manassas, 18,000 Centreville, and 11,000 at Bristoe.

About 5 a.m., Pope attacked, and the battle is an interesting example of *a piece-meal, uncoordinated attack.* As each brigade or division arrived, it was thrown into the attack, and it was not until well into the day that Pope took control and tried, without much success, to co-ordinate the attacks. On the Confederate side the battle was conspicuous for the *success of a series of local counter-attacks.* While Pope was hurling division after

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division against Jackson, Lee and Longstreet, unknown to the Federals, were slowly concentrating on Jackson's right; and, had Longstreet carried out the orders issued by Lee, a heavy counter-attack on the Federal left might have been very successful. However, by the night of the 29th, Jackson, after terrific fighting and heavy losses, had finally achieved his object—he had pinned Pope to the ground *and had effected his junction with Lee in the very face of his enemy.*

It now remained to take advantage of this junction to destroy Pope. *The Confederate leaders made a careful reconnaissance of the new Federal position,* and, on the morning of the 30th, Lee decided to await events as he was not quite certain of the situation. Pope and McClellan had had another twenty-four hours in which to reinforce the troops in front of him; also, Lee was well placed to fight a defensive-offensive battle, and was fairly certain that Pope's sanguine and impatient temper would urge him on to attack. Meanwhile, *Pope was really supremely ignorant of the situation.* The last paragraphs of his orders stated :—" The news has just reached me from the front that the enemy is retreating towards the mountains." Henderson again gives a vivid account of Pope's ineptitude and and of his mistakes :—" If, in these days of long-range weapons, Napoleon's dictum still stands good, that the general who is ignorant of his enemy's strength and dispositions, is ignorant of his trade, then of all generals, Pope was surely the most incompetent. At ten o'clock on the morning of August 30th, and for many months afterwards, despite his statement that he had fought ' the combined forces of the enemy ' on the previous day, he was still under the impression—so skilfully were the Confederate troops concealed—that Longstreet had not yet joined Jackson, and that the latter was gradually falling back on Thoroughfare Gap. His patrols had reported that the enemy's cavalry had been withdrawn from the left bank of Bull Run. A small reconnaissance in force, sent to test Jackson's strength, had ascertained that the extreme left was not so far forward as it had been yesterday; while two of the Federal generals, reconnoitring beyond the turnpike, observed only a few skirmishers. On these negative reports Pope based his decision to seize the ridge which was held by Jackson. Yet the *wood along the railroad had not been examined,* and the information from other sources was of a different colour and more positive. Burford's cavalry had reported on the evening of the 29th that a large force had passed through Thoroughfare Gap. Porter declared that the enemy was in great strength on the Manassas road; Reynolds, who had been in close contact with Longstreet since the previous afternoon, reported that Stuart's Hill was strongly occupied. Ricketts, moreover, who had fought Longstreet for many hours at Thoroughfare Gap, was

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actually present on the field. But Pope, who had made up his mind that the enemy ought to retreat, and that therefore he must retreat, refused credence to any report whatever, which ran counter to these pre-conceived ideas. *Without making the slightest attempt to verify, by personal observation, the conclusions at which his subordinates had arrived,* at mid-day, to the dismay of his best officers, his army being now in position, he issued orders for his troops to be 'immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and to press him vigorously.' "

This final battle, which was the culminating point of the whole strategic conception of the campaign, opened about 12.30, and affords one of the best examples in history of the *effect of a strong counter-attack, launched exactly at the right moment.* About 4.15 p.m., when the battle had lulled slightly, owing to the exhaustion of the combatants, Lee launched Longstreet in a counter-attack on the enemy's left, and swept the Federals from the field. The pursuit of their broken forces was pushed with all the vigour possible, but bad weather seriously delayed the Confederate advance, and by September 2nd, Pope had succeeded in collecting the broken remains of his army under the protection of Alexandria.

(f) Penetration.

(i) *Arbela, October 1st,* 331 B.C. Map E.

One of the most interesting tactical manœuvres in history. Darius and the Persians probably outnumbered the Macedonians by about ten to one, and their line of battle far outflanked Alexander.

Originally the forces were drawn up parallel to one another, but, seeing how he was outflanked, Alexander slightly advanced his right and withdrew his left, thus almost producing an oblique order. He further put his right wing in depth to protect it, and had some troops in rear on the left for the same purpose—" flying columns of reserve, one behind each wing."

The battle opened by a chariot and cavalry attack on Alexander's right flank, which was checked by Alexander's right reserve. Then his refused left began to take effect. The Persians hurled a fierce attack on this, which meant swinging their right forward. This attack was barely being held back by Parmenio, when Alexander saw that, owing to this movement of the Persian right wing, a gap had occurred in their line at the pivoting point. Quickly he formed a wedge of " the Companions," and drove into the gap, penetrating right through the line, splitting it into two, and finally swinging round in rear of the Persian right.

The Persian losses in the battle and pursuit are variously put at from 40,000 to 90,000 men, while the Macedonians lost 500 killed.

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(ii) *Blenheim, August 13th,* 1704. Map A (G 6).

After his amazing march to the Danube, Marlborough and Eugene, with the British and Imperialist troops, had brought the French under Tallard, Marsion and the Elector of Bavaria to bay. The French numbered 60,000 and the Allies 52,000, and Tallard had taken up a position with his right flank resting on the village of Blenheim. As there was marshy ground, considered almost impassable, in front of the centre of the position, Tallard held that portion lightly, and massed his troops on the flanks. Marlborough and the British attacked Blenheim, and Eugene attacked and was counter-attacked by Marsion on the other flank. The fighting was very severe, and the issue seemed doubtful, when Marlborough saw the weakness of the French centre, at which he hurled the whole of his cavalry. Though the cavalry could only move at a trot, they succeeded in penetrating the French centre, and cut the French army in two.

The French lost 40,000 men, including 1,600 prisoners, among whom was Tallard, while the allied losses were about 11,000.

(iii) *Austerlitz, December 2nd,* 1805. Map A (K 6) and Sketch IV.

See Sec. 25 (e) (ii).

After Napoleon had inveigled the Russians and Austrians into over-extending their left, and enticed them into making an out-flanking attack, he hurled his main attack at the centre of the enemy's position, captured the dominating position of Pratzen, penetrated the enemy's line, cut the enemy's army into two, and then destroyed each portion in detail.

(iv) *The Great War.*

After war had become static, all attacks were really attempts at penetration, penetration aimed at some objective of importance, or of such depth that collapse of the rest of the line would result.

The most striking examples are:

(i) The German offensive in March, 1918—penetration to divide the allied armies and to cut the Amiens-Paris railway which was the main lateral communication.

(ii) The German offensive in April, 1918—penetration in an attempt to reach the channel ports, and to cut the Hazebrouck railway.

(iii) For example of the danger of flank counter-attacks against a penetrating attack, see the German counter-attack at the first battle of Cambrai, and Foch's counter-stroke against the German salients created by their penetrating attacks in 1918.

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(g) Greatest possible Fire Power to be made available in Main Attack.

See " Economy of Force," Sec. 7 (ii).

(i) *Talavera*, 1809.

Note that Victor was defeated, without even having used his reserve, though it was he who was on the offensive.

(ii) *Gravelotte*, 1870.

The full French reserves, particularly in artillery, were never employed.

(iii) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904-1905.

Kuropatkin, in his abortive offensives and counter-attacks never once employed all the strength at his disposal.

(iv) *Tannenberg*, 1914.

Note what a small force was left to contain Rennenkampf, so that the maximum force could be deployed against Samsonoff. See Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(v) *November*, 1914.

Note the effect on the campaign of Moltke weakening the decisive attack by withdrawing troops from the right wing. Secs. 7 (i) (g) and 7 (ii) (e).

(h) Enemy induced to disperse resources.

(i) *The Passage of the Hydaspes (i.e., Jhelum)*, 326 B.C.

In Alexander's invasion of India, he had made a treaty with Taxiles, a king in the Indus valley, and, in company with him, crossed the Indus, probably about the modern Attock. He marched on to the Hydaspes to attack Porus, the king of the region beyond the river. Porus, in considerable strength, held the line of the river, which was wide, swollen and rapid. Alexander went into camp, and then made constant trials at crossings by night and day in various places. Porus became anxious, and tried to meet these feints by keeping his troops under his orders, and dissipating his force and reserves along the river. When Alexander had completely exhausted all these troops, without actually attempting a crossing, Porus grew careless and paid less heed. Then Alexander chose a place some miles up stream. Leaving troops demonstrating at many of the points on the front, at which Porus' troops were dissipated, as usual, he crossed silently and secretly at this far point, and was finally completely victorious against Porus' host.

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(ii) *Napoleon.*

Note how Napoleon always seemed to be able to force his opponent to use up all his reserves, and was always left, himself, with the last reserve of troops in hand on the battlefield, with which to deal the final blow.

(iii) *The Great War.*

Note the influence of the man-power question in modern war.

It is interesting to compare in this respect the ideas on war of attrition of Marshal Saxe (see Sec. 7 (v) (a)) and Clausewitz with the modern Prussian idea of quick decision. Note how battles on the western front tended to become a question of who could last longest with regard to reserves—*e.g.*, the Somme or 3rd Ypres.

Note the different methods of Foch in 1918. He never gave the enemy time to concentrate or form reserves. Directly it was evident that reserves had arrived in one place, he struck at another. He forced the enemy to dissipate his reserves, and, towards the end, reserves were being thrown into the battle in odd battalions, or even companies, so great had been the German dissipation.

(j) Enemy to be held to his ground on the whole front.

See " Envelopment," Sec. 63 (d).

All successful enveloping attacks have included attacks all along the front.

(i) *American Civil War,* 1861-1865.

Sharpsburg, September, 1862. Map B.

The Federals put in a series of piecemeal attacks at different points in the line, but never on the whole line together. Thus Lee was able to move his small reserves from one threatened point to the next.

(ii) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

Battle of the Yalu, May, 1904 : Kuroki attacked all along the line to pin the enemy to the ground, while his flank attack was enveloping the enemy left.

(iii) *Great War.*

This became impossible on the vast entrenched fronts. Hence the battles of attrition such as the Somme, 3rd Ypres, March, 1918.

Note, though, how this principle was broken, considering the front of all the allies. Owing to the lack of one co-ordinating

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brain, attacks on the various fronts were never synchronised, so that the central powers were able to reinforce, by means of their railways, each threatened point in turn.

(iv) *Tannenberg*, 1914. Map A, Sketch I.

Note the Russian failure to obey this principle. In the advance of the 1st and 2nd Russian armies, they never attacked together. Rennenkampf fought at Gumbinnen, and then stood still, giving the German 8th army time to move their reserves to deal with Samsonoff. During the actual battle of Tannenberg, there was only one German cavalry division in front of the whole Russian 1st army.

(k) Employment of Reserves.

See Secs. 25 (m) and 63 (h).

(l) Co-operation.

See Sec. 7 (vi).

(m) Verbal Orders, etc.

See "Orders," Chap. XII.

Sec. 64.—GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE ATTACK.

The best examples for bringing out the points of this section can be obtained from the Battle of Gettysburg in the American Civil War; Worth, Spicheren, Colombey, Mars-la-Tour, in the opening phase of the 1870 campaign; the battles of Ethe, Virton or Neufchateau, between the French and Germans in the frontier battles about the Ardennes in 1914; those east of Gumbinnen, and at Orlau-Frankenau at the beginning of the Russian invasion of East Prussia in 1914; and the battles in the early part of the campaign in Mesopotamia.

(i) *The Encounter Battle of Ethe, August 22nd*, 1914.

See also Sec. 40 (e), Map A (E 5) and Sketch VI.

During the advance of the French and German armies towards the French frontier, many encounter attacks took place, of which that of Ethe was the most instructive. The general French plan was for the 4th army to take the offensive through the Ardennes, against the German centre, while the French 3rd army protected its right flank against any attack from the direction of Metz.

The French were almost entirely ignorant of the position of the Germans. Their reconnaissances were very faulty, and never succeeded in penetrating the German covering screen, while the wooded country of the Ardennes enabled the latter to conceal large bodies of troops from aerial observation.

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The battle of Ethe was fought by the 7th division of the French 4th corps against the 10th German division and 53rd brigade of the army of the Crown Prince, *i.e.*, the 5th.

This French division received orders on the 21st to advance on the 22nd on St. Leger. It was told that no engagement with the enemy was expected for at least some days, and it was advancing completely isolated from the other division of the corps, as the lines of advance of the two were along widely diverging roads, with impenetrable forest between them.

Actually the German 5th corps was in close proximity, hidden in the woods of Etalle. The German plan was for this corps to remain on the defensive, while the corps further in the south attacked; but, as the position of the 5th corps was not considered suitable for defence, it was ordered to advance to gain possession of the ground about Ethe, and there take up a defensive position. So, on the 22nd, both the French and the Germans were advancing on to the same ground, the latter with considerable knowledge of the movements and disposition of the enemy, and the former completely ignorant. Actually the 10th German division was ordered on Ethe and the 53rd brigade on to Bleid and Ruette.

The orders for the move of the 7th division on Ethe were not received till after midnight, and the divisional orders were issued at 03.00 hours. The advanced guard, consisting of two troops of Hussars, three battalions of the 14th brigade, one group of artillery and one company of engineers, was to pass Gomery at 00.30. The rest of the division was to follow, with its head 2,000 metres from the advanced guard.

There was a very thick fog on the morning of the 22nd, and nothing could be seen. No early reconnaissance was carried out, the cavalry moving just at the head of the van-guard, and everyone convinced that there were practically no troops in front of them.

While advancing from Gomery, it was found that no touch could be obtained with any formation on the right, and a battalion was accordingly detailed to move through Bleid to act as flank guard to the division; but no cavalry reconnaissance of any kind was made to this flank.

The van-guard moved without opposition to Ethe and then turned at right angles along the road to St. Leger. No reconnaissance was pushed out on to the high ground north of Ethe, and no orders were issued or precautions taken to protect the left flank of the force as it moved from Ethe to St. Leger; and yet, throughout this move the left flank would be open to the enemy, the country in this direction gave every facility for concealment of large hostile forces, and civilians had given information as to the location there of hostile forces.

The van-guard mounted troops pushed down the road towards

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St. Leger, until they were held up by one or two automatics about Hamave. The infantry supporting them were gradually deployed astride the road from Ethe to St. Leger to try to open a way for the cavalry, but the enemy were found to be in too great strength. By this time, too, enemy began to appear in small numbers on the high ground north of Ethe—the foremost troops of the German 10th division—and the value of this ground began to dawn on the French van-guard commander. A battalion was brought up from the main guard, and, in driblets, attempted to regain this ground, but it met with considerable opposition.

The fault of lack of reconnaissance on the part of the French was beginning to reap its reward. Gradually the strength of the German opposition began to make itself felt. The whole of the 7th division advanced guard was deployed in attempts to hold the ground north of Ethe and Belmont, but units and portions of units were thrown in as they came up, and all the attacks were piecemeal. The mist was still thick and co-operation almost impossible. The French guns came into position on the slope north of the Jeune Bois, and, when the mist did lift, were practically destroyed by the counter-battery fire of the heavy artillery which the Germans had brought up with their advanced troops. While these uncoordinated attacks were going on at Ethe, the advanced-guard troops at Hamave were pinned to the ground, and the 53rd German brigade advanced against the flank battalion at Bleid, overwhelmed it, and began a strong movement in the direction of Gomery, enveloping the right flank of the 14th brigade. The rest of the 7th division was practically inactive, as there was no one in command. General de Trentinian, the Divisional Commander, with his Chief of Staff, had gone forward to Ethe to try to sort out the situation and the mist had lifted almost immediately. As a result, movement out of Ethe became impossible. The G.O.C. and his Chief of Staff could not get away, they could get no orders through to the rest of the division, and they had left no one else in command.

About 08.30 a further danger to the French appeared. The enemy succeeded in breaking through between Ethe and Belmont, and a second enveloping movement was begun in the direction of Latour, this time on the French left flank.

For nearly eight hours the 14th brigade maintained the unequal struggle, while the envelopment became more and more pronounced, but about 16.00 hours General Trentinian managed at last to get out of Ethe, and hurried back to Gomery to bring the 13th brigade up at once to extricate the rest of the division. He arrived at Gomery to find that the 13th brigade was in full retreat. The hostile threat on Gomery and Latour had caused its immediate withdrawal, as there was no divisional commander to control it. As it was too late to recall it to extricate the 14th

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brigade, the 13th was ordered to take up a defensive position north of La Malmaison.

By 17.00 hours the envelopment of the 14th brigade was complete, but it still held its position south of Ethe. At nightfall, as the rôle of the Germans was merely defensive, and as they had achieved their object, they withdrew their troops to the high ground north of Ethe, leaving the 14th brigade to rejoin the rest of the 7th division.

The 7th division lost 124 officers, and 5,200 men, without having achieved any results, thanks to a plan which made co-operation impossible between the division and flank formations; to an entire lack of reconnaissance and of security precautions; to inefficiency in staff work; and to the Divisional Commander having completely lost control of his division for the greater part of the day.

(b) Importance of Information during the Battle.

(See also Sec. 29.)

(i) Note how particularly this is brought out in the battles in East Prussia in 1914. The Russians had practically no means whatever of communication, and commanders never kept those in rear or on the flanks informed of the situation.

At Tannenberg, the 6th corps withdrew, shattered by a German attack, thus completely exposing the right flank of the rest of Samsonoff's army, without the corps on its left ever being told.

(ii) Note the very great influence exerted by the lack of information during the Gallipoli landings.

Sec. 65.—INFANTRY IN THE ATTACK.

(See Secs. 71-74.)

(a) Infantry Formations.

(i) Formations have become less and less dense as defensive weapons have improved. Compare the phalanx with modern formations.

(ii) Note the "Line *versus* Column" controversy of the Napoleonic wars, and Napoleon's heavy losses when he employed his attacks in massed formations.

(iii) Note the enormous losses of the Germans in their attacks in dense formations in the first battle of Ypres, and the subsequent very gradual introduction of the policy of infiltration, exploiting areas of success rather than hammering at places where resistance had not been overcome.

As an example, compare the tactics of the battle of Neuve Chapelle with those of the German attack in March, 1918.

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'LEFIELD OF ETHE Sketch VI.



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(b) Maintenance of Direction.

In the first battle of Krithia, on Gallipoli, note how the attacking brigade lost direction in order to attack Turkish trenches which were holding them up.

Changes in plan and in the direction of attack were continually causing confusion in this campaign.

66.—ARTILLERY IN THE ATTACK.

A. General.

(i) *Artillery in the Battle of Worth, August 6th*, 1870.

"As early in the 1870 campaign as the battle of Worth, the workmanlike use of the German artillery was manifest. At the very outset, the advanced-guard batteries of the 5th and 6th corps were at work, firing from good positions opposite Worth and above Gunstett. The cannonade brings forward rapidly all the corps artillery of these corps, and the Germans ranged almost continuously along the heights from Gōrsdorf to Gunstett at an early stage of the fight. French batteries, though they are on the defensive, and have had plenty of time to plan their work, come into action in a desultory and piecemeal fashion. The commander of the 5th corps artillery of the Germans is able in a few minutes to ensure the concentration of all, or any desired portion of, his fire, now upon this corner of Froschwiller, now upon that edge of Elsasshausen, and again upon a fresh brigade of guns he sees arriving on the scene. The commander of the 11th artillery sees his infantry recoiling over the south-east corner of the Niederwald, and in a minute sixty guns are pouring shells into that corner. He sees French cavalry deploying rapidly for a desperate charge, and two or three batteries are on these before they are ready to move. He sees a mitrailleuse battery unlimber, bent on sweeping the slope crowned with German skirmishers. In a few minutes his shells have found the mitrailleuse ammunition waggon and blown it up, causing such havoc that the battery with difficulty withdraws from action." (*A History of Tactics*, Johnstone.)

(ii) *The Great War.*

Note the great influence of the lack of British Artillery and ammunition in the early stages of all the campaigns. As an example, the 26th Division in Mesopotamia attacked organised Turkish trenches on the 21st January, 1916, supported by three 18-pr. batteries, two 4-inch batteries, one 4.5 battery, one sec. 4-inch guns, 2 sections mountain guns, and one 15-pr. battery.

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(B) CONCENTRATIONS AND BARRAGES.

Massed artillery had often been attempted, but it was not skilfully applied. At Zorndorf, Map A (J 4), against Frederick, the Russians formed a battery of oversixty guns, but the *fire was dispersed;* at Austerlitz, Lichtenstein had a battery of forty guns, but for want of correct use, it had little effect on the advance of Lanne's corps.

The first really effective use of massed guns was the destruction of Augereau's corps at Eylau by the fire of seventy guns, where *fire was concentrated as well as the pieces.* Napoleon learnt the lesson and its principle was applied thereafter.

"In 1809, 100 French guns were formed into one battery against the Austrian centre at Wagram. In 1812 at the Battle of Borodino the attack of the Russian position was prepared by 120 guns turned into three batteries, and later in the day we find the artillery of Ney, Davoust and Murat, together with the reserve artillery of the guard, amounting to some 200 guns, formed in mass along the ravine of Semenoffskoi, and concentrating its fire with terrible effect on the Russian infantry between the latter village and the great redoubt. Similar instances occur at Lutzen and Leipzic; and finally at Waterloo, more than seventy guns were massed on the right of the Charleroi road to prepare the attack of D'Erlon's corps." (Clery.)

(C) BARRAGES. 1914-1918.

Note the gradual elaboration of the barrage as defences became more and more involved. Then tanks somewhat altered the methods. It is very interesting to compare the barrage maps of the third battle of Ypres and the first battle of Cambrai—the former the culminating point of the battles of material destruction, the latter the first battle based on the correct tactical use of the tank.

(D) COUNTER BATTERY.

Napoleon usually began by silencing the whole of the enemy's artillery by means of his massed artillery fire.

After the Napoleonic wars, the ideas current were that one third of available artillery should de devoted to counter battery, and the rest to dealing with hostile infantry.

In 1870, hostile artillery was the main target, until it had been silenced.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese often succeeded in making the Russians disclose their battery positions by a feint attack. Then they turned masses of artillery on to each position in turn.

Note the enormous growth of counter-battery work in the last war.

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(E) COMMUNICATIONS.

The great difficulty encountered in all the early battles of the Great War was communication between the attacking troops and the covering artillery which could enable the latter to attend the necessary support to the other arms. This was particularly the case in Gallipoli.

67. TANKS IN THE ATTACK.

It is of interest to see the gradual evolution of tank attack tactics in the Great War. First employed on the Somme in September, 1916, up till the battle of Cambrai, they were frittered away, employed in unsuitable ground, and did not gain surprise.

Cambrai was the beginning of the ascendancy of the tank, which achieved the greatest results on August 8th, 1918.

(See "Tanks in the Great War.")

SEC. 68.—CAVALRY IN THE ATTACK.

A. General.

Note the great change made in cavalry tactics by the improvement of fire-arms. When fire-arms were poor, cavalry was the dominating weapon for demoralization in the actual battle, which was often won by the demoralizing action of cavalry. See "Marston Moor" and "Naseby"; Marlborough's cavalry attack at Blenheim, Sec. 63 (f) (ii); the Austrian attacks at Kolin, June, 1757; Frederick's attempt to make Seydlitz charge the Russian guns at Zorndorff, August, 1758; Kellerman's decisive charge at Marengo, etc.

The best campaign in which to study the misuse of cavalry is that of East Prussia in 1914, when the Russians made every conceivable mistake.

(b) Protection of Flanks.

(See Flank Guards, Sec. 43.)

(c) To Assist in Envelopment.

(i) Note the action of Cromwell's cavalry against hostile flanks, especially at Marston Moor and Naseby, 1644 and 1645.

(ii) *Rossbach, November*, 1757.

Frederick the Great achieved his decisive success by the action of Seydlitz's cavalry on the hostile flank.

See Sec. 43 (a).

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(iii) *South African War,* 1899-1902.

In Lord Roberts' advance against Cronje in position before Kimberley, French with the cavalry division moved completely round the Boer left flank to assist in the envelopment.

(iv) *Campaign in East Prussia,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

Neither Rennenkampf nor Samsonoff made any real use of their cavalry. At Stolluponen and Gumbinnen, the Russian cavalry corps remained inactive, when there were excellent opportunities for enveloping the northern flank of the German army.

Compare this with the enveloping tactics of the Germans at Tannenberg and at the battles of the Masurian Lakes. The German commanders, especially von Francois, were very skilful in their enveloping tactics.

Note, however, that in the final stages of the battle of the Masurian Lakes, Ludendorff sent his enveloping cavalry divisions too far to the flank so that they were unable to co-operate with his attacking infantry.

(d) To Delay the Approach of Hostile Columns.

(i) *Eylau, February,* 1807. Map A (M 3).

After Augerau's corps had been almost completely destroyed by massed artillery fire, Napoleon used his cavalry, by means of shock action, to hold up the Austrian advance until he had his forces reorganized.

(ii) *Waterloo,* 1815.

When Blucher's troops first became visible, and Napoleon had realized that they were not Grouchy's, he despatched first the cavalry of Domont and Subervie to try to delay the approach of the columns.

(iii) *South African War, Paardeburg, February,* 1900.

Note the efforts made by mounted infantry to delay the approach of the counter-attack commandoes led by De Wet, which arrived at the critical phase of the battle.

(iv) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

Before the Yalu, there was a complete failure in this respect on the part of the Russians. Mischenko, with a cavalry brigade, was supposed to be delaying the approach of the 12th Japanese division, which was the first to land, but it achieved nothing.

(v) *Encounter Battle of Ethe,* 1914. See Sec. 64 (i).

Note how the advanced details of German cavalry held up the approach of the French 7th division until their own troops arrived in the neighbourhood of Bleid and on the high ground east of Ethe.

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(vi) *Tannenberg*, 1914.

When Ludendorff completed his concentration to strike Samsonoff about Tannenberg, he left only one cavalry division to delay the approach of the whole of Rennenkampf's army. Thanks to the latter's inaction and misuse of his own cavalry, the German cavalry division was quite successful in its rôle.

(e) Maintenance of Pressure and Pursuit.

See Sec. 76.

(f) Wasting Energy of Cavalry.

(i) To see how quickly cavalry can be wasted away see Chap. XI C (x).

(ii) *Western Front*, 1914.

Neither the Germans nor the French achieved good results. Multiplicity of rôles exhausted their cavalry without getting equivalent value. The misuse of Sordet's cavalry corps was the most striking example. He was continually being given different rôles, and was being continually transferred from one theatre to another, and one command to another. When he eventually arrived on the left flank of the British in the retreat from Mons, his corps was too exhausted to do anything.

(iii) *East Prussia*, 1914.

There was complete misuse of cavalry by the Russian Army Commanders though they were both cavalrymen themselves. As a result, when Rennenkampf had to withdraw before Ludendorff, prior to, during, and after the battle of the Masurian Lakes, the Russian cavalry corps was too exhausted to do anything, and had to be withdrawn, though it had done no work of any value. Compare these actions with those of the cavalry in the final break through at Palestine; or in the pursuits of Arbela, Jena, Tel-el-Kebir. See Sec. 76.

Sec. 70.—AIRCRAFT IN THE ATTACK.

See Sec. 15.

(A) In the Battle of Tannenberg, there was an interesting case of the value of aircraft in spotting possible counter attacks. After von Francois with the 1st corps had completely broken the Russian left at Tannenberg, he believed the enemy to be without further reserves at all, and began concentrating his corps in rear to move it north for the stroke against Rennenkampf. Jilinsky, the Russian Army Group Commander, had collected oddments up to about a division in strength, and placed them under the

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orders of Sirelius, with orders to counter attack Neidenburg, which von Francois was about to leave. A German aeroplane saw this force, and, by dropping a message on to the advanced German troops, just sufficient time was given to von Francois to enable him to deal decisively with this counter attack.

(B) Note the effective use of aircraft in the pursuit of the Turks after the final break through in Palestine.

FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ATTACK ON AN ORGANIZED TRENCH SYSTEM. 71—74.

The series of offensives on the Western Front give the full illustrations of the points emphasized in these sections. It is therefore proposed to note the main offensives, with just their most important features.

For frontages and troops attacking see in Sec. 68, Appendices A & B, Map A, Sketch II.

(*a*) 1*st Battle of Ypres*, 1914. *German Offensive.*

First example of the powers of modern defensive weapons.

German attacks in mass formation.

Rapidity and accuracy of British rifle fire the dominating feature.

The value of German medium artillery clearly demonstrated.

(*b*) *Neuve Chapelle*, 1915. *British Offensive.*

A surprise attack at dawn, with a short hurricane bombardment. Complete surprise and success at start.

Insufficient reserves or artillery ammunition to maintain momentum of attack.

Frontage of attack too small to achieve any decisive results.

(*c*) 2*nd Battle of Ypres*, 1915. *German Offensive.*

First use of gas in clouds—complete surprise and achieved considerable demoralizing effects.

Frontage of attack too small; use of gas inadequate.

Surprise effected by a new weapon, but this weapon inefficiently employed.

(*d*) *Festubert*, 1915. *British Offensive.*

An almost complete fiasco. No surprise achieved.

Insufficient artillery preparation or support.

Machine guns in defence becoming much more numerous.

(*e*) *Loos*, 1915. *British Offensive.*

The beginning of the period of long artillery preparation.

No secrecy; gas employed, but very inefficiently.

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Artillery preparation inadequate—wire often uncut, and hostile machine guns untouched.

Inadequate co-operation between artillery and infantry.

No arrangements made for consolidation of captured points of tactical value.

Reserves much too far back, and hence exhausted on arrival. See Sec. 25 (m) (iv).

Offensive continued long after break through could obviously not be achieved, by costly bombing attacks, *e.g.*, Hohenzollern Redout.

(*f*) *Verdun*, 1916. *German Offensive.*

The beginning of the battles of material destruction. Some surprise achieved, and considerable early success due to weight of artillery.

Then it settled down to a contest in material destruction.

(*g*) *The Somme, July*, 1916. *British Offensive.*

The offensive by material destruction. Days of preliminary bombardment. The whole countryside rendered impossible for movement. Infantry really advancing to take over objectives rendered untenable by the enemy by artillery fire.

The growth of the creeping and combing barrages.

(*h*) *Somme, September 15th*, 1916. *British Offensive.*

The first use of tanks in small numbers. A complete surprise, but had little effect. Ground impossible for manœuvre, and tanks advancing behind infantry.

Another case of surprise effected by a new weapon, but on too small a scale, and inefficiently employed. Cavalry were always held ready, as the idea that a break through would be achieved was held throughout.

(*i*) *Arras*, 1917. *British Offensive.*

Short hurricane bombardment, and considerable success achieved.

Attempt to push cavalry through almost a disastrous failure.

Owing to the complete failure of Nivelle's offensive in Champagne, with the consequent demoralization of the French army, the Arras offensive was maintained too long and became a struggle in material destruction.

Tanks employed in small packets, and of little use.

(*k*) *Messines*, 1917. *British Offensive.*

The sole complete success of these types of offensive.

All preparations very thorough.

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Objectives strictly limited and gained in the first success—hence the attack never developed into the " dog-fight " of the Somme, Arras, or 3rd Ypres.

A series of large mines under hostile position blown at zero hour was a main feature of the attack.

(*l*) *3rd Ypres*, 1917. *British Offensive.*

The culmination of the offensive by material destruction.

Long bombardments beforehand—the whole country turned into an impassable bog—little cover for artillery positions or dumps, with the result that both were being continually destroyed. Terrible weather. A battle of attrition.

Tanks again employed in small " packets," on impossible ground, and achieved little.

(*m*) *1st Cambrai, November*, 1917. *British Offensive.*
See also Sec. 7 (iii) B (vi).

First correct use of tanks—first glimmerings of the solution of the problem of the " break through." Complete secrecy of concentration—attacking divisions only moved up at the last moment—no increased activity on the front—new artillery on the front went into concealed positions by night, having been calibrated—no registration of new batteries permitted—attack at dawn with tanks in mass, preceding the infantry and covered by artillery fire and smoke.

Tanks to widen the gap, and cavalry to pass through. Limited success owing to all tanks being used in the original attack, and no reserves held; insufficiency of infantry reserves; infantry reserves too far back; destruction of main bridge over which the cavalry were to move; lack of co-operation between infantry and cavalry.

(*n*) *March*, 1918. *German Offensive.*

Complete surprise. Short hurricane bombardment—attacking divisions only brought up the night before—heavy gas concentrations employed on points of importance to the defence, such as the high ground at Flesquières and Havrincourt Woods, so as to neutralize them—attack pushed on wherever success obtained, and not delayed to take one point of resistance which still held out—great use of infiltration by small bodies of troops.

Decision made to push units up to limits of their exhaustion before being relieved.

Momentum of attack gradually waned—main difficulty one of administration—supply became very difficult—base of the salient made was too small, and communication within the salient inadequate for the supply of large number of formations.

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(*o*) *Allied Offensives of* 1918.

Based on Cambrai tactics. Secrecy of concentration. Short hurricane bombardment—use of massed tanks in front of the infantry and especially of "Whippets" to attack and disorganize German Headquarters of divisions and corps: *i.e.*, to attack the brain of the enemy. Attacks never allowed to stabilize—directly offensive in one place showed signs of stabilizing, owing to the concentration of hostile reserves, attacks were opened elsewhere, to force dissipation of the enemy's reserves. In these offensives, note the Belgian offensive in the north, and the American at St. Mihiel. Both were brought to a standstill by faulty administration in rear of the attacking formations.

ARTILLERY IN THE ATTACK ON AN ORGANIZED TRENCH SYSTEM.

There is little to be gained from a study of artillery in deliberate attack in campaigns previous to 1914, except possibly in the Russo-Japanese War, where many of the lessons learnt late in the last war might have been discovered. Skobeleff's order for the recapture of Loftcha, outside Plevna, however, is of interest:—

"In the first part of the action, the preponderating rôle belongs to the artillery. The order of attack will be communicated to the chiefs of batteries, who are recommended not to scatter their fire. When the infantry moves forward to the attack, the artillery will support it with all its efforts. Special vigilance is then necessary; the fire will be accelerated if the enemy should unmask any reserves, and pushed to the utmost limit if the attacking column meets any unforeseen obstacles. When the distance permits, shrapnel will be used against the enemy's trenches and troops. . . . This order to be read to every company."

It is also of interest to note that in 1870, the French used time shrapnel, *but these could only be burst at two ranges*—1,300 yards and 2,600 yards.

TANKS IN THE ATTACK ON AN ORGANIZED TRENCH SYSTEM.

See *Tanks in the Great War*, Colonel Fuller.

CAVALRY IN THE ATTACK ON AN ORGANIZED TRENCH SYSTEM.

See Secs. 71-74 for the offensives in which attempts were made to make use of cavalry.

In no offensive was any real chance given to the cavalry of getting through the hostile position, except, possibly, at Cambrai.

Note, especially, that in the retreat in March, 1918, the cavalry were dismounted and thrown in as infantry, thus being deprived of their primary value—mobility.

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ENGINEERS IN THE ATTACK ON AN ORGANISED TRENCH SYSTEM.

Communications.

Note the influence of engineers' work on communication, especially in the offensives by material destruction, such as the Somme and 3rd Ypres. It was an impossibility to maintain the roads, which were completely destroyed by shell-fire, weather, and the weight of transport they had to support. Then, in the final advance against the Germans, this advance largely depended on the rapidity with which the road and river bridges, destroyed by the enemy, could be repaired, and the whole system of communications for supplies maintained. When the armistice was signed the allied armies had reached the limits of the possible radius of supply at the time. Until communication, especially over the shattered belt of country, could have been restored, only small portions of the armies could have maintained the pursuit of the German forces.

Note, too, in the advance across the desert into Palestine, that the whole advance had to be stopped until a water pipe line had been built from the Sweet Water Canal across the desert for the supply of the army. See Sec. 23 (c) (ii).

SEC. 76.—THE PURSUIT.

(*a*) *Arbela,* 331 B.C. Map E.

After Alexander's victorious battle (see Sec. 63 (f)) he pursued Darius relentlessly, arriving at Arbela, seventy miles away, on the next day. He never gave the enemy time to reorganize his force or collect reserves, and, as a result, he at once captured Babylon, a city of immense strength, without a battle.

Cf. this with the action after Tel-el-Kebir—see 76 (f).

(*b*) *Dunbar, September,* 1650.

After Cromwell invaded Scotland, Leslie, the Scottish General, avoided action with him, and gradually succeeded in pinning him between superior forces and the sea about Dunbar. Cromwell had 14,000 men and Leslie about 27,000; and the latter was in a position commanding the Parliamentarians, who could not get away, and were at starvation point. Instead of remaining in his position, Leslie moved part of his force into the plain, and Cromwell, seizing his chance, completely defeated him. "Then the pursuit began, hot, relentless, irresistible. Three thousand Scots fell that day, and when night came, there were 16,000 prisoners, and if there was any remnant of the Scottish army, it had disappeared. The army had been destroyed. Cromwell was

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one of those master-spirits who never lose sight of the end in the means. He fought not to win battles and gain glory, but to destroy the forces of the enemy. He had learned by hard experience that 'he that fights and runs away, will live to fight another day,' and that a victory without an effective pursuit is a victory wasted. All great generals have known that effective pursuit is the necessary complement of a battle won; but few have pursued with the vigour and amazing results shown by Cromwell after Dunbar." (*From Cromwell to Wellington.*)

As a result, the Scottish army had ceased to exist, and Edinburgh fell to him almost at once.

A contemporary writer adds an interesting touch to this pursuit:—"The English had the pursuit for about eight miles or farther," he says; "to neere Muscleburgh; *the spoyle of the field, which was much, the seamen stole, whilst the soldiers pursued.*"—a new variant of combined operations!

(*c*) *Jena*, 1806. Map A (H 5).

This is the classical pursuit of military history. After the hard struggle of Jena and Auerstadt, Napoleon destroyed the Prussian army completely by his relentless pursuit. The Prussians at Auerstadt had been drawn off from in front of the heroic Davoust, "to fall back on Hohenlohe" (who had been fighting at Jena) "for support. But what a support Instead of an army it was a terrified mob flying before Murat's sabres, that met them halfway between Auerstadt and Weimar. Threatened also by Bernadotte's corps on their left flank, the two Prussian armies now melted away in one indistinguishable torrent, that was stemmed only by the sheltering walls of Erfurt, Madgeburg, and of fortresses much more remote. . . . The flood of invasion now roared down the Thuringian valleys, and deluged the plains of Saxony and Brandenburg. Rivers and ramparts were alike helpless to stay the all-devouring tide. On October 16th, 16,000 men surrendered at Erfurt to Murat; then, spurring eastward, 'le beau sabreur' rushed on the wreck of Hohenlohe's force, and with the aid of Lanne's untiring corps, compelled it to surrender at Prenzlau. Blucher meanwhile stubbornly retreated to the north; but, with Murat, Soult and Bernadotte dogging his steps, he finally threw himself into Lubeck, where, after a last desperate effort, he surrendered to overpowering numbers (November 7th)."

"Here the gloom of defeat was relieved by gleams of heroism; but before the walls of the Prussian strongholds disaster was blackened by disgrace. Held by timid old men or nerveless pedants, they scarcely waited for a vigorous attack. A few cannon shots, or even a demonstration of cavalry, generally brought out the white flag. In quick succession, Spandau, Stettin, Kustrin, Magdeburg, and Hameln opened their gates.

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. . . Amidst these shameful surrenders the capital fell into the hands of Davoust . . . and thirteen days after the great battle, Napoleon himself entered Berlin in triumph." (Holland Rose, *Life of Napoleon.*)

All the panic, and the surrendering of fortresses were due to the relentless pressure maintained by Napoleon. For the actual marches accomplished by his corps, see Chap. XI. C. (iv).

(*d*) *Waterloo,* 1815.

After the victory had been won, " the pursuit through the night was entrusted to Gneisenau, with the Prussians. It was so energetically conducted that probably no beaten army was ever more completely routed. Sometimes with horse and foot, sometimes with horse alone, always with drums and bugles, he (Gneisenau) kept close on the heels of the enemy, and the sound of the bugle and the beat of the drum alone sufficed to drive the French from nine bivouacs. When his infantry were exhausted, he mounted the drummers; and with these and a few squadrons, went clattering along the *pavé,* and drumming through the night. At dawn he halted—the French had disappeared. Thus were Ligny and Jena fully avenged." (General Robinson, *Wellington's Campaigns.*)

(*e*) 1870.

Note the constant failure on the part of the Prussians to accomplish any successful pursuit. Hoenig writes—" There never was such a chance as after Woerth, and from a tactical point of view it is and always will be the severest criticism on our cavalry leaders of the day that the French army was able to reach the Vosges passes. A pursuit, resulting in the utter rout of the enemy, would have been easier here than at Waterloo."

(*f*) *Tel-el-Kebir,* 1882. Map E.

Sir Garnet Wolseley had won the Battle of Tel-el-Kebir after a most amazing night march, with an attack at dawn. See Chap. IX (m).

Then, " by one of those flashes of intuition that mark the born leader of men, the British Commander perceived that the whole war might be ended if a force of cavalry pushed on to Cairo and demanded the surrender of its citadel at the moment when the disaster of Tel-El-Kebir unmanned its defenders. The conception must rank as one of the most daring recorded in the annals of war. In the ancient capital of Egypt there were more than 300,000 Moslems, lately aroused to dangerous heights of fanaticism by the proclamation of a ' holy war ' against infidels. Its great citadel, towering some 250 feet above the city, might seem to bid defiance to all the horsemen of the British army. Finally, Arabi

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had repaired thither in order to inspire vigour into a garrison numbering some 10,000 men. Nevertheless, Wolseley counted on the moral effect of his victory to seize the ramparts of the citadel, and to abase the mushroom growth of Arabi's pride.

" His surmise was more than justified by events. While his Indian contingent pushed on to occupy Zagazig, Sir Drury Lowe, with a force mustering fewer than 500 sabres pressed towards Cairo by a desert road in order to summon it on the morrow. After halting at Balbeis the troopers gave rein to their steeds; and a ride of nearly forty miles brought them to the city about sundown. Rumour magnified their numbers; while the fatalism that used to nerve the Moslem in his great days now predisposed him to bow the knee and mutter ' Kismet ' at the advent of the seemingly predestined masters of Egypt. To this small, wearied, but lordly band Cairo surrendered, and Arabi handed over his sword. On the following day the infantry came up and made good this precarious conquest." (Holland Rose, *The Development of European Nations.*)

(*g*) *South African War,* 1899-1902.

Note the decisive effect of getting French's cavalry in rear of Cronje and astride his line of retreat, when Lord Roberts was pursuing prior to the Battle of Paardeburg.

(*h*) *Le Cateau,* 1914.

Note the German failure to pursue decisively and rapidly. General Smith Dorrien with the 2nd corps successfully broke off the attack at his own time, and the German pursuit was very cautious.

(*i*) *Palestine,* 1918.

The final offensive in Palestine—the Battle of Megiddo—affords a wonderful illustration of relentless and vigorous pursuit, and of the decisive effect of getting cavalry round the flank of a retreating enemy, across his line of retreat. When the Turkish infantry had been broken, a gap was made in the coastal plain, the cavalry was pushed through round the hostile flank, and within thirty-six hours it had closed to the enemy all the main roads of escape.

The result was the destruction of the 7th and 8th Turkish armies.

Note, too, the wonderful targets provided for the Air Force in the demoralized, retreating Turks, targets of which full advantage was taken.

(*k*) *Italian Front.*

" On October 27th, 1918, in the final stage of the battle of Vittoria Veneto on the Italian front, pursuit by aircraft had an

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equally disastrous and demoralizing effect upon the Austrian Forces."

("British Strategy." Maurice.)

(*l*) *Mesopotamia.*

(i) Compare the action of the cavalry in Palestine with that of the Turkish cavalry after the battle of Ctesiphon. The latter succeeded in losing itself, operated behind its own main body, and reported the movements of that body as if they were those of the British forces. (See *Official History,* Vol. I.)

(ii) Note the difficulties in organizing the pursuit by General Maude beyond Bughhila, and the value of the naval flotilla.

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CHAPTER VIII.

THE DEFENCE.

77. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

A. Considerations affecting decisions.

(i) Defensive, for offensive purposes.

(*a*) FABIUS MAXIMUS, *circa* 217-216 B.C.

Note the defensive attitude adopted by Fabius against the Carthaginians. See Sec. 21 (c) (i).

(*b*) *Torres Vedras*, 1810. Map G.

The whole conception and use of the lines of Torres Vedras were based on this temporary defensive, inspired by offensive spirit. They provided Wellington with a bulwark which protected Lisbon, behind which he could withdraw in safety if attacked by very superior forces, and from which he could emerge suddenly to strike back at his enemy when the opportunity arrived. By laying waste all the country in front of these lines, he made it difficult for the French offensive force to live, and thus accelerated the approach of his own opportunity for offensive action.

B. Defensive in One Part to Swell Troops for Offensive Elsewhere.

(i) *Marengo*, 1800. Map F.

In this campaign, Napoleon allowed Massena to be shut up in Genoa, and finally to be captured there with his whole force, so that he might have the maximum striking force himself for his move across the Alps, and so that the enemy forces might be dissipated. See Sec. 7 (iii) A (iii).

(ii) *South African War*, 1899-1902. Map C.

While Lord Roberts was preparing his advance against Cronje in front of Kimberley, General Buller was trying, in a series of disastrous battles, to cross the Tugela to the relief of Ladysmith. Buller demanded immediate reinforcements to enable him to get

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across. "It is right that you should know that in my opinion," Buller wired, on February 9th, 1900, "the fate of Ladysmith is only a question of days, unless I am considerably reinforced." "On February 10th, Lord Roberts, after reviewing the previous communications which had passed between himself and General Buller, pointed out to him that 'to send you large reinforcements now would entail the abandonment of a plan of operations, the object of which was explained to you on January 26th, and in the prosecution of which, I am convinced, lies our best chance of success both in Natal and on the north of Cape Colony. Such a course would involve endless confusion and protracted delay, and, as Cape Colony is weakly held, might not improbably lead to a general rising of the disaffected Dutch population. I must, therefore, request that, while maintaining a bold front, you will act strictly on the defensive until I have time to see whether the operations I am undertaking will produce the effect I hope for." *Official History,* Vol. II.

(iii) *East Prussia,* 1914.

When Ludendorff took over the operations of the German 8th army, he decided to strike at the 2nd Russian army under Samsonoff. To enable him to collect sufficient troops to do this, he took up a defensive attitude on the front of the Russian 1st army, having only one cavalry division to hold up the whole of Rennenkampf's force. Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

C. Will to Defend Positions Necessary.

(i) *Gibraltar,* 1704 *and* 1779-83.

Compare the defence of Gibraltar under the Spaniards and the British.

In July, 1704, Sir George Rooke, with a combined British and Dutch fleet, captured the fortress after a resistance lasting only two days, during which the allies only lost some 280 killed and wounded.

Then, from 1779 to 1783, Gibraltar was defended by General Elliott against a combined French and Spanish force, provided with the most powerful floating batteries.

(See *The Army and Sea Power.* Ernest Benn Ltd.)

(ii) *Jena,* 1806.

Note how many powerful fortresses were surrendered without resistance by the demoralized Prussians to the pursuing French. See Secs. 76 (c) and Chap. XI. C. (iv).

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(iii) *The Siege of Metz,* 1870.

Bazaine inspired no ardour into the defenders. Though he had a large field force in the fortress, he made little attempt to co-operate with the field army under MacMahon, and eventually surrendered Metz at a very much earlier date than was necessary.

(iv) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

The series of positions taken up by the Russians at Nanshan, then at Telissu, Tashichiao, Liao-Yang, etc., were all very strong; but the commanders never had the will to defend them to the last. They adopted a passive defence on each successive line, and then withdrew.

(v) *East Prussia,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

Samsonoff's army had advanced to cut off the German 8th army from the Vistula, and a position had been occupied about Usdau, when Ludendorff launched his atack in this area. "The Russian position from Usdau through Meischlitz to Ruttkowitz is of great strength. The field of fire is excellent, and the slopes leading up to the main position absolutely without cover. There was ample room within the position for the concealment of artillery close up to the line, and there was excellent observation right up to Seeben and Grallau. Ample time had been available to strengthen the line. . . . On the 27th, the German artillery opened with a hurricane bombardment against the Mühlenburg, the key of the Russian position, just north of Usdau. The Russians began to leave their trenches, without waiting for an infantry attack, and the whole line gave way under the effect of the artillery fire. The movement soon became a rout, and by 10 a.m., the field was clear, the 1st corps having ceased to exist as an organized body. . . . The Battle of Usdau, if it can be so called, had been won by the German artillery. The unfed Russians had no stomach to withstand its effect." (*Tannenberg,* General Ironside.)

D. Position Selected must be Strategically Important.

(i) *Marengo,* 1800.

Note that in his plan of campaign, Napoleon paid little direct attention to the position of Melas with the Austrians, but moved completely round his flank, and thus forced him to conform to his movements. (See Sec. 7 (iii) A (iii).)

(ii) *Peninsula,* 1813. Map G.

The French Army, under the nominal command of Joseph, about 60,000 men, occupied a general line from Toledo and

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Madrid across behind the Tormes to beyond Salamanca, their centre maintaining the line of the Douro, along which defensive works had been raised, and their right behind the River Esla. Their main object was to defend to the last the line of the Douro, for it was expected that Wellington would move, as in the previous campaign, upon Salamanca, and thence attack the French position along the river.

This position was one of great strength, and Wellington saw no reason why he should attack it, if he could advance against the French communications by another route, which he had discovered, and had thoroughly reconnoitred. Consequently he secretly moved round their right flank, got on to their communications, and forced Joseph precipitately to conform to the allied movements.

Compare this with the position taken up by Wellington on the Mirabete after Talavera. This position was so situated on the flank of Soult's advance, that he would have had to attack it to ensure his communications. Sec. 43 (b).

(iii) *South African War*, 1899-1902. Map C.

Cronje had taken up the very strong position about Magersfontein, covering the direct line of advance on Kimberley, which was being besieged. Lord Roberts ignored this position, however, in his advance, and moved round Cronje's left flank, forcing him to conform to his movements and eventually rounding him up at Paardeburg. Sec. 7 (iii) A (iv).

(iv) *Antwerp*, 1914.

In the retreat in 1914, the Belgian Field Army withdrew and took up the defensive position of Antwerp. The Germans, however, did not attack this, as it was not of sufficient strategical importance at the moment. They merely masked it until they had come to the end of their project against France, and then turn their attention in force against the Antwerp position.

E. Economy of Man-Power in Defence.

Note how defensive measures, wire, provision of automatics, concrete pill boxes, etc., went on increasing in the last war, so as to get the greatest economy of man-power in the defence.

Sec. 78.—CHOICE OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

(See also Sec. 25 (e).)

A. General

(i) *Salamanca, July 22nd*, 1812.

(See also Secs. 7 (iv) (b) and 82 A (ii). Map G and Map H.
In this battle, there was the very interesting case of the hills of

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the Arapiles. Wellington had taken up a position covering Salamanca, not being certain upon which bank of the Tormes Marmont intended to operate. Between the French left and the British right were two solitary heights, rather steep and rugged, though of no great size, known as the Arapiles or the Hermanitos. Directly Marmont's intention of striking at the Ciudad Rodrigo road—the allied line of retreat through Portugal—was discovered, the inclusion of these hills in Wellington's defensive position became of supreme importance. The hills were the positions commanding movement towards the Ciudad Rodrigo road, and, if occupied by the enemy, would render Wellington's position very dangerous. As a result, the battle of Salamanca really opened with a race between the opposing armies for the Arapiles, one of which fell to each army.

(ii) *Fredericksburg, December 13th*, 1862. Map G.

On the right of the Confederate position, in the centre of Jackson's sector, there was a tongue of thickly-wooded copse, jutting out towards the enemy. Owing to the thickness of this wood, and to the marshy condition of the ground in its vicinity Jackson considered that it was unnecessary to hold it, or include it in his position. This error cost him a large number of lives. It gave a covered line of approach to the enemy, as neither the woods nor the marshes were found to be complete obstacles to movement, and it made a gap in the Confederate line.

(iii) *South African War*, 1899-1902. *The Tugela Position.* Sketch V.

There is a very interesting description of the formidable natural fortress of hills along the Tugela, barring Buller's road to Ladysmith. There was continual discussion between the Boer leaders as to whether the heights of Hlangwhane, on the eastern extremity of the line of hills, should be included or not. There seemed great danger of any garrison placed on it being cut off. There was constant vacillation, garrisons being placed in occupation, and then taken away again, but, finally, it was occupied, as Dirksen, the Commandant in that sector, wired direct to Kruger:—"If we give this kop over to the enemy, then will the battle expected at Colenso end in disaster."

(iv) *Ladysmith.* Map C.

In deciding on the positions to be taken up in the defence of Ladysmith, Sir G. White had a very difficult task. There were two rings of hills round the town, the outer one being at a distance of from 6,000 to 10,000 yards from the centre of the town, and then there was the inner ring, about 3,000 yards nearer the town, but there were insufficient British forces to occupy the

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outer ring, and the defence of the inner ring had to be taken up. "This was for the most part commanded in enfilade, it was open on one side, and, except from the north, it provided no good second line of resistance at any point. Especially detrimental was the proximity of Lombards Kop and Umbulwana (heights of the outer ring) on the eastern side. Certain to be occupied by the enemy, if not held by the British, these mountains not only looked on to the rear and flank of the town and every defence about it, but commanded the whole of the only grazing ground at the disposal of the garrison; commanding also the railway and other approaches from the southward . . . there could have been no complete artillery investment of the town and camps themselves, had it been possible to include these heights in the defensive circuit." (*Official History.*) Yet, Sir G. White had to abandon them to the enemy, as he had not sufficient troops to maintain a defence which would include them.

(v) *Russo-Japanese War, the Battle of the Yalu, May*, 1904. Map D.

There are two interesting points in the position taken up by the Russians at the Yalu. They abandoned all ground on the left bank. That is to say, they abandoned all attempts at finding out the movements and disposition of the enemy, and they allowed him to make all his preparations for attack at his leisure and in secrecy.

Secondly, they abandoned the islands in the river, the occupation of which by the Japanese greatly facilitated their bridging operations, and enabled them secretly to dig in guns on these islands to support the later stages of their attack.

(vi) *East Prussia*, 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

Rennenkampf's occupation of his defensive position at Gumbinnen is interesting, as the position had almost every possible defect.

There was no observation from it; it was much too extended for the troops at his disposal; and its left flank could be easily turned. In addition, he had no adequate information of the enemy and sent no mobile columns out to maintain touch. He adopted a purely linear formation, and he sited his reserves on his right flank, because of a false and unconfirmed rumour that the Germans were about to attack that flank from the direction of Konigsberg.

B. Battle to be Fought in Advance of Localities vital to a Defender.

(i) 1866.

Note the vital defensive battle that had to be fought by the

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Prussians in front of the defile of Nachod so as to hold this long enough to allow the 5th Prussian corps to pass through it and deploy against the Austrians. Sec. 38 (e).

(ii) *Suez Canal,* 1914. Map E.

In the beginning of the war, the defence of the canal was organized on the western bank. In February, 1915, the Turks carried out a very remarkable advance across the desert, and an attack on the canal line. This attack was repulsed, but it was realized at once that, as the canal was vital to the British, the defence of it must be organized in advance of it. Hence, the British movement eastward began.

On the western front, note the depth of the zones occupied in front of features which were vital to the defence, such as Kemmel Hill, the Aubers Ridge, the Vimy Ridge, etc.

(iii) *East Prussia,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

Before the Battle of the Masurian Lakes Rennenkampf was told that the area between the lines Insterborg-Angerburg and Wylkowyfski-Suwalki was vital. Instead of taking up a position in advance of it, however, he occupied the area itself.

C. Surprise in Defence.

See Secs. 7 (iii) and 30, and Chap. VI.

(i) *Liegnitz.* Map A (K 5).

Note particularly how Frederick surprised Daun by changing his defensive position at night at Liegnitz, August 15th, 1760. See Sec. 38 (a) (ii).

Also note the surprise of Federick at Hochkirch, Secs. 48-54 (ii).

(*b*) Note the surprise effected by Wellington by the secret construction of the lines of Torres Vedras.

(ii) *Fredricksburg, December 13th,* 1862.

Jackson completely surprised the Federal leader, Meade, by his skilful use of the woods to conceal all his troops and his artillery.

(iii) 1917.

Note the surprise effected by the Germans by their withdrawal in the Somme area to the line of the Hindenburg defences in the early part of 1917.

(iv) *July,* 1918.

Note the surprise effected by General Gouraud about Rheims in the German offensive in July, 1918. " The great attack to the east fell upon the army of General Gouraud, who adopted and

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improved upon the same defensive tactics as we had intended to use against the Germans in the March battles, but had been prevented by the fog from applying successfully with the single exception of the battle on the Arras front on March 28th. Gouraud, applying these tactics with better fortune and great skill, foiled the enemy's plans. He had the good luck to capture a party of Germans on the eve of the attack, and from these prisoners he ascertained the exact time at which the bombardment would open, and the enemy's infantry advance. He left in his front line trenches only a few troops to watch for, and break up, the German assault, and withdrew his main line of resistance behind the area swept by the full storm of the hostile bombardment, while his own guns, which had been reinforced, poured a tornado of shell upon the German infantry." The Germans were completely surprised by these methods and movement, and the attack broke down with very great loss.

(v) Surprise in defence has usually been effected by the means of counter attack. See Sec. 82.

D. Concealment.

(i) Note the skill with which Wellington always chose a position which would provide concealment and free movement for his reserves, as exemplified by his position at Talavera, and especially at Waterloo. The latter is very clearly shown by the complete model of the battlefield in the Museum of the R.U.S.I. in Whitehall.

(ii) *Fredricksburg, December 13th,* 1862. Map B.

See above, Sec. 78 (c) (ii).

The position taken up in this battle by the Confederates is very interesting, as it had so many disadvantages. It had little depth, little room for deployment of artillery, little room for movement of reserves, and no room for counter attack—at the same time it was very strong for purely passive defence.

For a complete discussion and analysis of interesting defensive positions, compare Henderson's remarks in *Stonewall Jackson* on the positions of 2nd Manassas, Sharpsburg, and Fredricksburg.

(iii) *Gallipoli.*

Note the moral and material effect of the concealment of the Turkish defensive troops at the time of the landing from the "River Clyde." (*Official History,* Vol. I, page 232.)

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E. Framework of the Defence Artillery and Machine Guns.

(i) *American Civil War, Sharpsburg, September,* 1862.

"The position, in many respects, was well adapted to Lee's purpose. The flanks were reasonably secure. The right rested on the Antietam. The left was more open; but the West Wood formed a strong *point d'appui,* and beyond the wood a low ridge, rising above Nicodemus Run, gave room for several batteries, while the Potomac was so close that the space available for attack on this flank was much restricted. The ground could thus be held by a comparatively small number of men, and a large reserve set free for the counter-stroke. The great drawback was that the ridge east of the Antietam, although commanded by the crest which the Confederates occupied, would permit McClellan to deploy the whole of his powerful artillery and in no place did the range exceed two thousand yards." (Henderson.)

(ii) *American Civil War, Fredricksburg,* 1862.

In this position, the artillery advantages lay with the Federals, the attackers. The Confederate line lay everywhere within range of excellent hostile artillery positions; there was insufficient room for the deployment of all the Confederate guns; the sole way of covering portions of the front was by placing batteries in the open in advanced and dangerous positions; and there was ample room for the deployment and movement of the whole of the Federal artillery.

(iii) *The Russo-Japanese War,* 1904.—*The Position on the Yalu, May.* 1904.

The position occupied by the Russians is a very interesting one from the point of view of artillery co-operation. "The Russian position extending along the western bank of the Ei-ho was, on the whole, a strong position. . . . The defender's field of fire was very good throughout to a distance of even more than 1,000 metres on the left wing, where the Ei-ho valley gradually narrows. The tactical value of these heights, however, was marred by the fact that the formation of the various knolls made it difficult to keep the infantry positions separate from those of the artillery. The fire trenches had to be constructed almost close in front of the gun emplacements, and these forts suffered alike with the Russian batteries from the fire which the enemy's artillery directed against these batteries. As, moreover, there were no lateral communications in the positions, nor any from front to rear, and as the slopes towards the west, too, were difficult of access, the uniform control of the fight in the position was rendered difficult, and the timely withdrawal of the artillery in case of retreat jeopardized." (*German Official*

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History.) In addition, as seen in 4 above, the Russians had handed over a big artillery advantage to the Japanese by their abandonment of the left bank of the Yalu and of the islands in the river.

(iv) *The Great War.*

(a) Note the faulty siting of the guns of the 5th Division at Le Cateau.

(b) The German positions known as the Hindenburg positions afford the best modern example of the siting of defensive positions. They provided perfect artillery and machine gun co-operation, and forced the British forces into the devastated region of the Somme area, where positions for any arm were difficult to find.

F. Frontage of Penetration.

See Appendices A and B in Sec. 61.

Note how valueless were the attempted penetrations on a small front at Neuve Chapelle, Festubert, Loos. Compare these with the penetration effected by Ludendorff in March, 1918. Even this, however, was not on a sufficiently wide front to have decisive results, owing to the great depth in which positions were organized on the flanks of his break through, and the tenacity with which these flanks were held to prevent him widening the gap.

Note the immediate effect of successful counter-attacks penetrating the flanks of a salient as illustrated by the German counter-attack in November, 1917, and in the offensives initiated by Foch in July and August, 1918.

81.—OCCUPATION OF A DEFENSIVE POSITION.

(*a*) *Peninsular War.*

When Wellington was withdrawing to the lines of Torres Vedras, he took up a covering position at Busaco with his whole force to delay the advance of the enemy, to raise the moral of his own troops by giving the enemy a decided check, and further to mystify the enemy as to the existence of the lines of Torres Vedras.

(*b*) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905. Map D.

In the Russo-Japanese War, the main defensive position was being constructed at Liao Yang. Unfortunately for the Russians Kuropatkin never really decided what his action was to be—whether the positions of the Yalu, Telissu, Tashichiao, etc., were to be delaying actions to cover the construction of the Liao Yang position, or whether a decisive battle was to be fought on these

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positions. As a result, the force was always too big for a protective force, yet was never allowed to fight a really decisive battle. The danger of this was clearly shown at the Yalu. Clear instructions were not given as to the rôle nor as to the method of withdrawal of Zassulich and the eastern detachment on the Yalu, and, as a result, the whole force became involved in a serious engagement against superior forces.

(c) *East Prussia*, 1914.

The best modern illustration of this is afforded by von Francois' scheme for the delay of Rennenkampf's army about Stallupönen. See *Tannenberg*, General Ironside.

82.—COUNTER-ATTACKS.

A. Immediate Counter-Attacks.

(i) *Austerlitz, December 2nd*, 1805. Sketch IV.

This was one of the few defensive battles fought by Napoleon. He deliberately enticed the enemy to attack him, enticed them to try to envelop him, weakening their centre by so doing, and then counter-attacked their centre, seizing the all-important heights of the Pratzen. By this he cut the enemy's lines in half, and destroyed each in detail. See Sec. 25 (e) (ii).

(ii) *Salamanca. July 22nd*, 1812.

See Sec. 7 (iv) (b). Map G and Map H.

The most dramatic counter-stroke of history. Wellington had taken up a position covering Salamanca, to wait till he could discover Marmont's intentions, facing roughly east. Directly he discovered that Marmont intended to move round his right flank to cut him off from the road to Ciudad Rodrigo, he completely changed his position to one facing almost due south, with his left upon the "English Arapiles," a small hill opposite a similar one in the French line, called the "French Arapiles." His line ran through the village of Arapiles, and his left nearly reached Aldea Tegada. On his right he concentrated Packenham's division with the cavalry, whom he concealed in woods.

"This position better secured Wellington's line of retreat by the Ciudad-Rodrigo road, and also made it more possible for him to head off Marmont toward Miranda if he attempted to interfere with his movements along it. He now began his retirement to Ciudad Rodrigo by passing his commissariat and baggage along the Ciudad-Rodrigo road; and up to this time had acted entirely on the defensive.

"Marmont, eager to prevent his escape, and observing the dust raised by his baggage column in the distance on the Ciudad-

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Rodrigo road, mistook his opponent's defensive attitude for a desire to avoid battle; he was also completely ignorant of Wellington's exact position, which the wooded and undulating country concealed from him. Therefore, having taken some time in giving instructions to his columns, he pressed forward to threaten the Ciudad-Rodrigo road with his leading troops, consisting of Thomière's division with the light cavalry, and flanked by fifty guns—this force constituting what may be termed the left wing of his army. He intended also, when Wellington moved to meet this advance, and when his own divisions, which were somewhat in rear, had closed up, to fall upon the Allies, by the village of Arapiles, which he now attacked, and partially, though not entirely, succeeded in occupying. But in this hastily pushing forward, *he left a gap of some distance between his left and the remainder of his force,* an error which Wellington, observing it from the hill of the English Arapiles 'fixed (writes Napier) with the stroke of a thunderbolt.'

" Issuing orders to Packenham to attack the head of Thomière's division, he directed General Pack to assault the French Arapiles, in order to engage the enemy in that quarter, and bore down himself with the bulk of the troops upon Thomière's right flank.

" Packenham carried out his orders with great quickness, and at about five o'clock, when Thomière, in confident security, was pressing forward on the march to cut off the Allies, he was himself enveloped in front and flank. Alison writes: 'So rapid were the movements, so instantaneous the onset, that it appeared as if the spirit of a mighty wizard had transferred itself into the whole host.'

" The French attempted gallantly to make face both to their front and right; but, taken by surprise, they were attacked at a complete disadvantage, and were quickly driven back. Clausel, coming up from the west, endeavoured to restore the fight; but when the French, some being in column, some in squares, some in line, were being torn by the volleys of the infantry and by the allied guns, Le Marchant's heavy horsemen, with Anson's light cavalry on their flank, came swiftly down upon them, and 'the next instant 1,200 French infantry, though formed in several lines, were trampled down with a terrible clamour and disturbance.' (Napier.) The French left wing was entirely broken, more than 2,000 prisoners were taken and Thomière's division ceased to exist as a military body." (*Wellington's Campaigns,* Major-General Robinson.)

" Forty thousand men," it was said, " were defeated in forty minutes."

(iii) *2nd Manassas, August 30th,* 1862. Map B and Map J.

For outline of the campaign see Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

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

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Jackson had been heavily assailed by the Federal forces, while he was waiting the arrival of Longstreet and of Lee, and Pope was still ignorant of the real situation. By the 30th, Longstreet and the whole of the Confederate force joined Jackson, and came up on his right flank, unknown to Pope, who was still hammering at Jackson, whom he now believed to be retreating. By about 4.15 p.m. Pope had discovered that Jackson was still maintaining his position and the two opposing armies had reached a state of exhaustion. This was the moment Lee was waiting for. Longstreet's troops were waiting hidden in the woods on the Confederate right, and they were now launched in an overwhelming counter-attack against the Federal open left flank. Gallant efforts were made by the left brigades of the enemy to gain time for the occupation of a new position, "but the counter stroke of Lee was not to be withstood by a few regiments of infantry. The field of Bull Run had seen many examples of the attack as executed by indifferent tacticians. *At the first battle isolated brigades had advanced at wide intervals of time. At the second battle, the Federals had assaulted by successive divisions, but of* 50,000 *infantry, no more than* 20,000 *had been simultaneously engaged,* and *when a partial success had been achieved there were no supports at hand to complete the victory.* When the Confederates came forward it was in other fashion; and those who had the wit to understand were now to learn the difference between mediocrity and genius, between the half measures of the one and the resolution of the other. Lee's order for the advance embraced his whole army. Every regiment, every battery and every squadron was employed. No reserves save the artillery were retained upon the ridge, but wave after wave of bayonets followed closely on the fighting line. To drive the attack forward by a quick succession of reinforcements, to push it home by weight of numbers, to pile blow on blow, to meet the defender occupied along his whole front, and to provide for retreat, should retreat be necessary, not by throwing in fresh troops, but by leaving the enemy so crippled that he would be powerless to pursue—such were the tactics of the Confederate leader." (Henderson.)

By this, one of the most classical of all counter-attacks in war, the enemy was completely broken, and did not really regain any organization until it arrived under the walls of Alexandria.

(iv) 1914.

See the counter-attack of the 5th Brigade through Polygon Wood, the charge of the Oxfords at Nonne Boschen, and the famous counter-attack of the Worcesters at Ghehwelt in the Ypres fighting in 1914.

See *Official History,* Vol. II.

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(v) *Givenchy, December,* 1914. Map A, Sketch II.

This was an excellent example of a small, immediate local counter-attack.

The Germans attacked Givenchy, over-ran the foremost trenches, and seized the highest ground, and the "keep," a specially fortified point, which was of great local tactical importance. Before the enemy had time to consolidate their gains, the keep was retaken by a counter-attack made by a hastily-gathered local reserve of the remains of the forward troops, cooks, runners, mess waiters and anyone that could be discovered. As a result of this rapid action, the enemy were completely disorganized and the whole ground regained.

(vi) *East Prussia,* 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

The rapidity and skill with which Ludendorff passed from the defensive to the offensive was very remarkable. Von Prittwitz, commanding the 8th German army, had decided to withdraw to the line of the Vistula, and take up a defensive attitude. Directly Ludendorff was placed in charge of affairs, he arranged for an immediate concentration against Samsonoff, and organized a counter offensive, which resulted in Tannenberg, and the destruction of the 2nd Russian army. Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(vii) *Ctesiphon. Mesopotamia.*

Note the effect of the counter attack launched by Nur ud Din on the British force on the 23rd. General Townshend became convinced that the Turks must have received considerable reinforcements.

B. Deliberate Counter-Attacks.

(i) *Cambrai, November,* 1917. Map A, Sketch II.

After the initial great success of the British attack at Cambrai, the Germans succeeded in bringing down sufficient reserves to stabilize the situation. Directly they had done this, they prepared a counter-attack against the base of the southern flank of the attacking formations. While the British forces went on hammering at the strongly-organized positions about Bourlon Wood, the enemy suddenly launched this counter-attack with the greatest success. There were no reserves ready to meet it, and had it not been for some hard fighting by the Guards Division, thrown in to hold up the German advance, the results might have been somewhat disastrous. As it was, a considerable portion of the ground gained in the previous days' successes had to be abandoned again to the enemy.

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(ii) 1918.

Foch carried out similar schemes to the above on a larger scale. When the German series of offensives by penetration occurred, he first secured the flanks of the break at such places as Soissons and Rheims, and gradually stabilized the fronts of attack. Then he launched in July and August a series of counter-attacks against the flanks of these penetrations, which ultimately broke down the whole German front.

C. Counter Offensive.

(i) Enemy Expended his Reserves.

(*a*) Note how successful Napoleon always was in making an enemy use up all his reserves, while he himself had enough in hand to deliver the final blow.

(*b*) 1918.

This was one of the factors in deciding Foch to pass from the defensive to the offensive. All German reserves had been employed in their offensive actions, and were becoming worn out, while Foch's were getting larger every day, owing to the arrival of the Americans.

(ii) Enemy Exposing a Portion of his Force without Hope of Support.

See "Concentration," Sec. 7 (i).

(*a*) *Dunbar, September 3rd*, 1650.

See Secs. 5 B (i) and 76 (b).

In this case, Cromwell was on the defensive, in the face of a very superior Scottish force under Leslie, who held an almost impregnable position completely shutting Cromwell in. Then the latter was given his chance. In an attempt to close his enemy in more rigidly, Leslie exposed a portion of his force without hope of support from the remainder. Cromwell saw this, turned on the isolated portion, and destroyed it. Rapidly following up this success, he completely demoralized the rest of the Scottish forces who ceased to exist as a military body.

(*b*) Note that the Austrians always committed the same fault in their series of offensives against Napoleon when he was in the Mantua area in 1797. See Sec. 7 (i) (c).

(*c*) *2nd Manassas, August*, 1862.

Note the wonderful chance Pope really had for destroying Jackson's exposed force. Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

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(*d*) 1914.

This was the mistake made by the Russians in East Prussia. Samsonoff's army was exposed to offensive action by the Germans, who could concentrate rapidly with their excellent system of strategic railways, and it was unsupported by Rennenkampff. Sec. 7 (iii) A (vi).

(*e*) *Joffre's Counter Stroke on the Marne*, 1914.
Map A, Sketch III.

Directly von Kluck began his oblique march so as to pass east of Paris, Joffre saw that, by so doing, the German right flank had become exposed to a counter offensive debouching from, and to the north of, Paris. Accordingly Gallieni was rushed through Paris, and the counter offensive, which turned the whole advance into a withdrawal, was launched against the German flank.

(iii) UNDULY EXTENDING THE FRONT.

(*a*) *Arbela*, 331 B.C.

See Sec. 63 (f) (i).

By echeloning his flank, Alexander succeeded in making Darius extend his front to a great extent, and then he drove at the weakened centre and cut the line in two.

(*b*) *Austerlitz*, 1805. See Sec. 25 (e) (ii).

Napoleon made the enemy extend their left further and further in their efforts to outflank his right. This extension weakened their centre, on the Pratzen, which he knew to be the decisive point, and he then delivered his counter-attack against the weakened centre.

(*c*) 1914.

This was the reason underlying the French offensive of the 4th army into the Ardennes. They considered that in order to make their sweep sufficiently wide and to have their striking wing sufficiently strong, the Germans must have over-extended their front, and dangerously weakened their centre. An offensive was therefore launched without success at this point. They had miscalculated the effective strength which the Germans could put into the field on mobilization.

(iv) EXPOSING HIS FLANKS.

(*a*) *Rossbach, November 5th*, 1757.

See Sec. 43 (a).

Note how Frederick changed from the defensive to the offensive directly Soubise attempted to outflank him, and, by so doing, exposed the French flank to a decisive counter-attack.

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(*b*) *2nd Manassas, August 30th*, 1862.

See Sec. 63 (e) (ii).

In the final battle, Pope was ignorant of the presence of Longstreet and Lee on the right of the Confederate position, and made continuous attacks on Jackson only. As a result, his reserves were wrongly placed, and he exposed his left flank to Longstreet. Directly Lee saw that his enemy was completely involved in the operations against Jackson, and that most of the Federal reserves had been used up, he launched his classic counter-attack against the Federal left. Sec. 82 A (iii).

(*c*) *East Prussia*, 1914. Map A, Sketch III.

During Rennenkampff's advance into East Prussia, von Francois with the German 1st corps, took up a defensive position about Gumbinnen, his line forming almost two sides of a square. He flung back his left very far, so as to make the Russians extend their front, and, in prolongation of this flank, he hid his corps cavalry. The Russians did as he expected, extending their front to cover the German left flank, and thereby completely exposing their right flank. Von Francois at once launched the cavalry in a counter-attack. They swung round the Russian right flank, attacked the rear organizations, and completely disorganised the offensive.

(*d*) 1914. Exposure of German flank before the Marne.

84. ARTILLERY IN DEFENCE.

See Secs. 12, 66, and 71-74.

87-95. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS IN PROTRACTED DEFENCE.

Lessons can only be learned by a study of the whole of the campaign on the Western Front, and will not be dealt with.

96. DISENGAGEMENT.

A. Outline of Various Types of Disengagement.

(i) *Sharpsburg, September*, 1862. Map B.

After the terribly severe fighting of the 17th and 18th, Lee came to the conclusion that he must evacuate the position, and retire across the Potomac. The withdrawal was not easy, as the position had not been chosen with a view to easy retirement, and the Potomac, which was 200 yards wide, could only be crossed by a few deep fords of which only one was practicable for wagons.

" Before evening (*i.e.*, 18th) Lee determined to evacuate his

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position, and during the night the army of Northern Virgina, with all its trains and artillery, recrossed the Potomac at Boteler's Ford.

"Such was the respect which the hard fighting of the Confederates had imposed upon the enemy, that although the rumbling of heavy vehicles, and the tramp of the long columns were so distinctly audible in the Federal lines, not the slightest attempt was made to interfere. It was not till the morning of the 19th that a Federal battalion, reconnoitring towards Sharpsburg, found the ridge and the town deserted; and although Jackson, who was one of the last, except the cavalry scouts, to cross the river, did not reach the Virginia shore till eight o'clock, not a shot was fired at him. . . . The retreat, despite many obstacles, was as successfully as skilfully executed. The night was very dark, and a fine rain, which had set in towards evening, soon turned the heavy soil into tenacious mud; the ford was wide and beset with boulders, and the only approach was a narrow lane. . . . Just before nightfall, under care of a heavy artillery fire, the Federals pushed a force of infantry across the ford, drove back the two brigades, which, with thirty pieces of artillery, formed the Confederate rear guard, and captured four guns. Emboldened by this success, McClellan ordered Porter to put three brigades of the Fifth Army Corps across the river the next morning, and reconnoitre towards Winchester.

"The news of the disaster to his rear guard was long in reaching Lee's headquarters. His army had not yet recovered from the confusion and fatigue of the retreat. The bivouacs of the divisions were several miles from the river, and were widely scattered. *The generals were ignorant of each other's dispositions. No arrangements had been made to support the rear guard in emergency. The greater part of the cavalry had been sent off to Williamsport, fifteen miles upstream, with instructions to cross the Potomac and delay the enemy's advance by demonstration. The brigadiers had no orders; many of the superior generals had not told their subordinates where they would be found; and the commander of the rear guard, General Pendleton, had not been informed of the strength of the infantry placed at his disposal.*

"On the part of the staff, worn out by the toils and anxieties of the past few days, there appears to have been a general failure; and had McClellan, calculating on the chances invariably offered by an enforced retreat, pushed resolutely forward in strong force, success might possibly have followed."

Lee at once sent orders off to Jackson to drive back the enemy, but the latter had already had a report and taken action on his own initiative. He ordered Hill and Early to move back, and himself went back to reconnoitre the enemy's movements.

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" He had at once grasped the situation. The Confederates were in no condition to resist an attack in force. The army was not concentrated. The cavalry was absent. *No reconnaissance had been made either of lines of march or of positions.* The roads were still blocked by the trains. The men were exhausted by their late exertions, and depressed by their retreat, and the straggling was terrible. The only chance of safety lay in driving back the enemy's advanced guard across the river before it could be reinforced; and the chance was seized without an instant's hesitation." (Henderson.)

Jackson's counter-attack was completely successful, and the Confederates were then able to retire unmolested.

(ii) *The Russian Retirement from the Yalu, May,* 1904. Map D.

This is a very interesting case of withdrawal in the face of superior forces, which was costly owing to the inefficiency of staff arrangements and of co-operation. No arrangements had been made beforehand for withdrawal, although Zassulich, in command of the Russians, knew that he was only meant to delay the enemy on the Yalu and not to get seriously involved. *No reconnaissances of roads, of positions for the various arms, or of places in which to block the enemy's advance were made.* There was no co-ordination of the various parts of the force. Zassulich made rapid reconnaissances at the moment, and placed organized parties in successive positions on to which the foremost troops could retire, and the actual retreat was skilfully effected. A general scheme, however, could not be improvised suddenly. The left sector of the Russian forces, under Colonel Gromow, did not receive the orders for the withdrawal, but acted independently. In danger of being out-flanked to the north by the Japanese, he began to withdraw, but did so only to safeguard his own troops. He entirely ignored the position or movements of the rest of the Russian force and, as a result, completely uncovered their northern flank.

Had it not been for the excellent way in which the Russians always fought when on the defensive, and for the lack of vigour of the Japanese pursuit, the Russian retreat might rapidly have been turned into a disorderly rout. There is a very interesting picture of this retreat given in the British and the German official histories.

(iii) *East Prussia.* 1914.

Note the terrible chaos of men, transport and guns in Samsonoff's unco-ordinated retreat before Ludendorff.

(iv) *German Withdrawal on the Somme,* 1917.

As a result of the heavy fighting in the autumn of 1916, the Germans had been left in a somewhat unpleasant position, and

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all the 1916-17 winter they had been employing vast numbers of civilians on the preparation of the immensely strong Hindenburg positions in rear. Directly these were completed, they decided to withdraw to them, especially as they knew that a British offensive was planned in this area. Gradually, secretly, and methodically they withdrew all stores and equipment, they blew up or destroyed all buildings, dug-outs, roads, railways—in fact they created a completely devastated waste between their old and the new Hindenburg lines. They left just a very few troops with machine guns to hold the original line and then finally withdrew them suddenly by night. In spite of the demolitions and signs of withdrawal, the actual movement came as a surprise, and the British pursuit was extremely difficult. All the roads were cratered, no communications had been left, delay-action mines were left in the ruins of the villages, or in dug-outs, and many types of " booby traps " installed to delay the advance. As a result, they seriously deranged the allies offensive plans and forced us to occupy this devastated waste, while they were in the deliberately-constructed miniature fortresses of the Hindenburg system.

(v) *March,* 1918.

In the British retreat in March, 1918, one saw the danger of not having previously prepared positions in rear, with formed bodies of men detailed to occupy them.

(vi) *Gallipoli, December,* 1915.

The withdrawal from Gallipoli is almost unique in history, and it teems with interesting lessons.

The scheme had to be so detailed and involved that it is impossible to give a brief outline of it; but practically every lesson of a deliberate retirement can be obtained from it.

B. Effect of Galloping Horses, etc.

(i) *Jena,* 1806.

When Prince Hohenlohe was retiring to Jena, " it had been decided to order a camp on the plateau north of Jena, and about noon the troops were filing through the narrow streets under the eyes of the Prince, when a sudden panic arose. It was alleged afterwards that as the head of the column cleared the town it was met by an excited Hussar with a blood-stained bandage round his head, who came galloping down the road *from* Weimar (*i.e.*, the direction of their own forces) shouting ' Get back ! Get back ! the French are upon us.' Be this as it may, the head of the column did check. Some guns were sharply reversed and galloped back upon the infantry in the crowded street, and in a few moments the panic spread throughout the whole town and up the valley as far as Lobeda. Some Saxon supply wagons coming from Neu-

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stadt actually turned round and were not stopped in their flight until they were arested by the real enemy in their efforts to escape from an imaginary one." (*Jena*, Maude.)

(ii) *East Prussia*, 1914.

" During the retreat (of the 6th Russian corps on Samsonoff's right) on the 27th, the troops became inextricably mixed, and on one occasion, the arrival of the corps commander's motor-car, escorted by its Sotnia of Cossacks, raised a cry of 'cavalry.' In the resulting panic there were considerable casualties, and the incident must have still further demoralized the corps commander when he saw the condition to which his troops had been reduced." (*Tannenberg*, Major-General Ironside.)

C. Traffic.

(i) Note the terrible difficulties with transport congestion on the roads met with by Samsonoff in his retirement at Tannenberg.

(ii) In the retreat from Mons, note the British difficulties owing to French troops being on the same roads as themselves, and to Sordet's cavalry corps crossing their line of withdrawal.

(iii) In the early stages of the German offensive on the Lys in April, 1918, movement behind the British lines became almost impossible owing to the congestion of civilian refugees.

D. Demolitions.

(i) *Peninsular War.*

Wellington destroyed the whole countryside in front of the lines of Torres Vedras to delay the enemy and to make it difficult for them to subsist in the area.

(ii) 1914.

Most of the continental bridges are constructed with chambers specially made for containing demolitions, so that they can be easily destroyed; but in the German advance in 1914, no demolitions were really carried out, either because it was expected that the bridges and railways would be required for an advance later, or because they were loth to destroy their own property. It is of considerable interest to speculate what would have been the effect on the German advance of a systematic plan of destruction of means of communication, ruthlessly carried out.

Considerable effect was created by the inundations in Belgium, but no pre-arranged scheme for this had been drawn up, and it was only after a long delay that anyone was discovered who knew what steps to take with the locks and sluices to create the required inundations.

(iii) *March and April*, 1918. See Sec. 46.

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CHAPTER IX.

NIGHT OPERATIONS.

This Chapter will not be illustrated section by section, but as a whole. The various phases visualized in *F.S.R.* have been, as a rule, so intermingled that one action often illustrates many of the principles involved. A few instances of marches, advances, attacks, etc., will therefore be given in chronological order.

(*a*) *Attack on the Heights of Epipolae before Syracuse in* 413 B.C., *in the Peloponnesian Wars.*

The Athenians, under Demosthenes, attacked these heights, which were really the key to the city. They expected severe resistance, and *orders were only issued for the period up to the moment of engagement. No one was told what to do afterwards.* In addition, *no distinctive badge or word was issued* to them, so that they could distinguish friend from foe. Actually, they did not meet with so much resistance as they expected at first, and their columns pushed on in the darkness, without objective, lost their bearings, and lost their cohesion. Their confusion was increased by the fact that some of the Greek allies of the Syracusens had the same war cry as themselves. As a result, they were driven back in confusion, and in such a crowded state that they could not use their weapons, and were defeated with terrible loss.

(*b*) *Rugen*, 1715. Map A (J 2).

In 1715, Charles XII of Sweden was besieged in Stralsund by the Danes and Prussians. "Opposite to Stralsund, in the Baltic Sea, is the Isle of Rugen, which serves as a bulwark to that place, and into which the garrison and citizens might have retired, had they had boats to have transported them thither. This island was of great consequence to Charles. He saw very clearly that if the enemy were once masters of it, he should find himself besieged both by sea and land; and perhaps be reduced to such great extremities, that he must either bury himself in the ruins of Stralsund, or become a prisoner to those very enemies he had so long despised, and upon whom he had imposed the most severe laws. But notwithstanding all this, the unhappy situation of his affairs did not permit him to place a sufficient garrison in

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Rugen, in which there were not more than 2,000 men." (Voltaire, *Charles XII.*)

On November 15th, the Prince of Anhalt succeeded in landing 12,000 men on the island, and at once heavily entrenched his position. Charles was in entrenchments with 2,000 men at a port on the island some three leagues from the point of landing of his enemy.

Charles determined to attack, *but made no reconnaissance of any kind before so doing.* He was unaware of the size of his opponent's force, and of the existence of the fosses, trenches, and *chevaux-de-frise* that Anhalt had constructed. Yet he decided on a night attack. He arrived in silence at two in the morning, only to find all these obstacles in his path. "Ah," he said, "is it possible? I did not expect this." However, he attempted to push on, and actually threw the enemy into momentary confusion by the impetuosity of his attack; but the result was a foregone conclusion, and he was severely defeated.

There is a very picturesque description of this given in Voltaire's *History of Charles XII, King of Sweden.*

(*c*) *Hochkirch, October 13th,* 1758. Map A (J 5).

See Sec. (48-54) (ii).

A Night Advance and an Attack just before Dawn.

As a result of pure obstinacy and of misconception of the powers of the enemy, Frederick had taken up a very weak position with his right on the village of Hochkirch. Daun, with a force more than twice his strength, was posted in front of him at a distance of about one-and-a-half miles. "The country, especially on the Prussian right, was very wooded. The two armies lay thus from the 10th to the 14th. The Austrians continually strengthened this position and made a great parade of doing so during the night of the 13th; but at 3 a.m. on the 14th, Daun took 30,000 men from his centre, and moving through the woods by *routes which had been carefully reconnoitred, prepared, and marked,* arrived within 200 yards of Frederick's right while it was still dark, and began a fierce attack. Frederick, who had taken no outpost precautions, was completely surprised, and severely defeated.

(*d*) *Leignitz, August 5th,* 1760. Map A (K 5).

A March to change a Position of Defence to Surprise an Enemy.

"At no moment of his long career, not even when he galloped from the field of Mollwitz nor when he gathered round him the wreckage after Kunersdorf, had the King's plight seemed so

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desperate as now. He had with him only some 30,000 men, and Kay, Kunersdorf, Maxen, Landshut, Dresden formed an unbroken series of disasters. Against him were some 90,000 Austrians. They barred Frederick's path both to Breslau and Schweidnitz, and brought his force to the verge of starvation." (Reddaway.) He was in position to the south-west of Liegnitz, when he heard from a drunken deserter that Daun was planning a surprise attack on him. He therefore determined to create a surprise for Daun by moving forward by night to a new position much nearer the enemy, to the north-east of Liegnitz, where there was an excellent defensive position. On the evening of August 14th, the Prussians stole away from their camp and occupied in complete silence this new position. " From about eight in the evening," says Carlyle in his life of Frederick, " Frederick's people got on march, in their several columns, and fared punctually on; one column through the streets of Liegnitz, others to left and right of that; to left mainly, as remote from the Austrians and their listening outposts beyond the Katzback River; where the camp-fires are burning extremely distinct to-night. The Prussian camp-fires, they, too, are all burning uncommonly vivid; country people employed to feed them, and a few Hussar sentries and drummers to make the customary sounds for Daun's instructions till a certain hour. . . . About one in the morning . . . all are safely across (the Schwartzwasser)."

This secret change of position completely surprised the Austrians, who, advancing without any advanced guard (see Sec. 36 (a) (ii) suddenly bumped into Frederick's whole force, and were severely defeated.

(*e*) *Quebec*, 1759.

The combined operation to take the Heights of Abraham afford one of the most interesting examples in history of night operations.

There is a very excellent account in *Montcalm and Wolfe* by Parkham.

(*f*) *Napoleon's Night Advance to Arcola, November*, 1796. Map F.

During the fighting for Mantua (see Sec. 7 (i)), the Archduke Charles, by October, 1796, had completely defeated Jourdan at Wurzburg, and thrown back both his army and that of Moreau on the Rhine. The Imperialists then decided to make another attempt to retake Lombardy. The French had only 40,000, of whom 8,000 were contained opposite Mantua, while Alvinzy disposed of 60,000. Alvinzy with 35,000 was to advance due west

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towards the Brenta, and Davidovich through Tyrol by the valley of the Adige to meet him at Verona. On November 12th, Massena was severely handled by Alvinzy at Caldiero, and forced into Verona with considerable loss. Napoleon was now in a difficult position. "It was necessary at all costs to drive Alvinzy from the heights of Caldiero before the Tyrolese columns should overpower Vaubois' detachment at Rivoli and debouch in the plains west of Verona. But, as Caldiero could not be taken by a front attack, it must be turned by a flanking movement. To any other general than Bonaparte, this would have appeared hopeless; but where others saw nothing but difficulties, his eye discerned a means of safety. South and south-east of those hills lies a large depression swamped by the flood waters of the Alpon and the Adige. Morasses stretch for some miles west of the village of Arcola, through which runs a road up the eastern bank of the Alpon, crossing that stream at the aforenamed village and leading to the banks of the Adige opposite the village of Ronco; another causeway, diverging from the former a little to the north of Ronco, leads in a north-westerly direction towards Porcil. By advancing from Ronco along these causeways, and by siezing Arcola, Bonaparte designed to outflank the Austrians and tempt them into an arena where the personal prowess of the French veterans would have ample scope, and where numbers would be of secondary importance. Only heads of columns could come into direct contact; and the formidable Austrian cavalry could not display its usual prowess. On these facts Bonaparte counted as a set-off to his slight inferiority in numbers.

"In the dead of night the divisions of Augereau and Massena retired through Verona. Officers and soldiers were alike deeply discouraged by this movement, which seemed to presage a retreat towards the Mincio and the abandonment of Lombardy. To their surprise, when outside the gate, they received the order to turn to the left down the western bank of the Adige. At Ronco the mystery was solved. A bridge of boats had there been thrown across the Adige; and crossing this without opposition, Augereau's troops rapidly advanced along the causeway leading to Arcola and menaced the Austrian rear, while Massena's column defiled north-west so as directly to threaten his flank at Caldiero." Rose.

Actually, the surprise was not complete, and the ensuing fight was of a desperate nature. "Victory again declared for the troops who could dare the longest, and whose general was never at a loss in face of any definite danger. Both armies suffered severely in these desperate conflicts; but, while the Austrians felt that the cup of victory had been snatched from their very lips, the French soldiery were dazzled by this transcendent exploit of their chief." (Holland Rose.)

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(*g*) *The Crossing of the St. Bernard Pass*, 1800. (See also Sec. 7 (iii) A (ii). Map F.

When the move across the Alps of Napoleon's army, destined to fight Marengo, appeared to be progressing satisfactorily, suddenly the whole scheme was placed in jeopardy. "The narrow valley of the Dora Baltea, by which alone they could advance, was well-nigh blocked by the Fort of Bard, which was firmly held by a small Austrian garrison (about 250 men), and defied all the efforts of Lannes and Berthier. . . . Meanwhile, some of his foot-soldiers had worked their way round this obstacle by a goat-track among the hills and had already reached Ivrea lower down the valley. Still the fort held out against the cannonade of the French. Its commanding position seemed to preclude all hope of getting the artillery past it; and without artillery the First Consul could not hope for success in the plains of Piedmont. Unable to capture the fort, he bethought him of hurrying by night the now remounted guns under cover of the houses of the village. For this purpose he caused the main street to be strewn with straw and dung, while the wheels of the cannon were covered over so as to make little noise. They were then dragged quietly through the village almost within pistol shot of the garrison; nevertheless, the defenders took alarm, and, firing with musketry and grenades, exploded some ammunition wagons and inflicted other losses; yet forty guns and 100 wagons were got past the fort."

(*h*) *Alexandria*, 1801.

The French under Menou made a night attack on the English troops under Abercromby and Moore.

The French attacked in three wings, composed respectively of about 15, 9, and 12 battalions about one-and-a-half hours before daybreak. At the same time a weak feint was made on the extreme left of the British position. *The attack was a very involved one, with insufficient co-ordination.* There was great confusion in the French columns; *direction was lost in the darkness; the left and centre columns became hopelessly intermingled; and there was no mutual support whatever.* The hand-to-hand fighting was very severe, but all attacks, which went well on into daylight, were finally repulsed with great loss to the enemy. Fortescue's *History of the British Army*, Vol. IV, Part 2.

(i) *American Civil War*, 1861-1865.

See Jackson's night march, in 2nd Manassas (Sec. 63 (e) (ii), and his night advance at Chancellorsville.

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(k) River Crossing by Night in Face of the Enemy.

The Passage of the Danube, June 27th, 1877. Russo-Turkish War. Map A.

"On the 26th (June), the detachment of General Dragomiroff, consisting of the 14th division and the troops attached to it, arrived at Zimnitza. At dark that evening the pontoons were launched in the creek which runs past the village of Zimnitza, and were then hauled out into the main river and down to the point of embarkation. There were 104 boats of the regular pontoon train, 100 boats and rafts which had been constructed in the neighbourhood, and four battalions of pontoniers to manœuvre them. The troops numbered in all about 15,000 men, and were divided into six detachments of 2,500 men each, the plan being to cross by detachments in a body; but after the first detachment had crossed, this was found to take too much time, and as soon as enough boats returned to take one company they were immediately loaded and sent back.

While the boats were being launched, five batteries (forty guns) of nine pounders, supported by regiment No. 35 (of the 9th division), were established on the northern bank of the main river, to cover the passage, and silence the enemy's batteries on the south bank, as well as the monitors, should they venture down from Nikopolis. The troops began embarking at midnight, and about one o'clock in the morning they put out from the shore and began rowing towards the Turkish bank, aiming to reach it at a point about three miles below Sistova, at the mouth of a small stream known as the Tekir-Dere. Just as they were approaching the shore they were discovered by the Turkish outposts, who opened fire upon them and gave the alarm; but the boats, although somewhat dispersed by the wind, reached the shore and landed their men in the vicinity of the point designated. The twelve companies composing the first detachment formed on the bank and climbed up the steep bluff, driving before them the line of Turkish skirmishers. By two o'clock they had gained possession of the banks of this little stream, and of a neighbouring hill, about three-quarters of a mile from the shore and east of Tekir-Dere. Soon after this, the day began to dawn, and the Turks were thoroughly roused by the noise. It was, however, too late. The Russians had gained too firm a hold of the Turkish bank to be driven off before their supports could be brought up, and the natural bulwark of Turkey against Russia had been lost. *The Russian Army and its Campaigns in Turkey, 1877-78.* Greene.

(l) *Lord Roberts' Night March to the Peiwar Kotal, December, 1878.*

This night march to outflank the Afghan position in the Peiwar

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Kotal affords an excellent example of a night operation in mountain warfare. Lord Roberts has given his own full description of it in his *Forty-One Years in India.*

(*m*) *Tel-el-Kebir*, 1882. Map E.

The night advance to attack the Egyptians at dawn at Tel-el-Kebir is almost the classic example of its kind. After the landing at Ismailia, the force had advanced to Kassassin, and it was from there that Sir Garnet Wolseley decided to attack the Egyptian entrenchments at Tel-el-Kebir. In considering the hour of attack, there were many points to be looked into. "In order that Tel-el-Kebir might become the gateway for the final success of our army, it was necessary:—

(1) That the Egyptian force within it should not be merely manœuvred out of the position they held, but that the force should be crushed, broken and dispersed by actual fighting.

(2) That this should take place at the earliest hour of the morning in order to give as much daylight as possible for the cavalry to advance upon Cairo and for the infantry to seize Zagazig.

In addition, the zone over which the force would have to advance was extremely open to fire; and the supply of water for troops moving in the heat of the day was very difficult."

A night march with an attack at dawn appeared to offer an escape from all the difficulties, and to offer the best chance of exploitation. Reconnaissances had shown that the railway and canal had neither of them been seriously injured beyond Kassassin. Therefore, the presence of these lines of movement greatly facilitated the arrangement for a desert night march. . . . . *A knowledge of the ground up to the enemy's position had been obtained more perfectly than can often happen in similar cases.* Not only had the reconnaissance of the Indian cavalry and Lieut.-Col. ——— 's earlier reports furnished a great deal of information, but, taking advantage of the enemy's flight on September 9th, Colonel Redvers Buller had ridden in a wide sweep somewhat round the extreme left of the enemy's lines at Tel-el-Kebir, and had observed the nature of the works and the general line of their trace." Further observations had been found possible from which the various distances to the works of the enemy could be carefully fixed. "From previous experience, it was calculated that, making all allowances for delays, etc., during the night march, the actual rate of progress to the front over the desert would be about one mile per hour, and the time of starting from Ninth Hill was therefore fixed at 1.30 a.m., to allow of the troops arriving just before dawn in front of the enemy's works. Sir Garnet's hope, if everything went well, was that the infantry would actually reach and assault the enemy's

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works just at the first gleam of dawn." Before dawn on September 12th, Sir Garnet Wolseley took his divisional commanders out and personally explained to them the nature of the intended movement.

To avoid the effects of possible confusion, the commander "determined to assign to each of his two divisional generals an entirely independent sphere of operations. Supposing that any confusion supervened in the course of the night, and that one division failed to deliver its blow at the right moment, then there was every hope that the other, wholly unaffected by this fact, would strike its independent blow, and would secure a success which would give time for the division, that had so failed, to recover itself and to serve as a support to the successful wing of the army.

"For this reason, then, the two infantry divisions were placed at a very considerable interval from one another, and between them was concentrated the whole mass of the artillery of the army corps."

The orders given to the infantry were to move forward up to the works themselves without firing a shot; and in order that there might be no confusion when starting, the *lines of direction were to be marked by posts,* which were ordered to be placed by the Royal Engineers after sunset. At the same time, great latitude was allowed to the divisional commanders in the actual details of the execution of the project. It is of interest to note, looking back at the classical occasion when the attack on the Capitol of Rome was given away by geese, that, in considering the hour of attack, the certainty of the brigade moving through the "wady" to the south of the canal putting up innumerable animals had to be considered. As the sole means of directing the force, once the directing posts had been quitted, was by reading the stars, a lieutenant R.N. was detailed to accompany Sir E. Hamley for the direction of the Highland Brigade. When the movement started, "the difficulty in finding the directing posts, which had been set up by the engineer officers as guides for the earlier part of the march, was very great. The night was more than usually dark, and it was some time before the troops could be placed in the positions assigned to them. By about one p.m. the troops were in all the places assigned to them. . . . . *A series of connecting files were, by Sir Garnet's orders, established between the leading brigades of each division and those behind them, to insure their not losing trace of one another in the dark. The strictest orders were given against smoking, striking lights, or loud giving of orders. Silence was strictly enforced.* The advance went satisfactorily, but there were many incidents, which are very instructive. The march of one division was considerably slower than that of the other, which would have

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made a co-ordinated attack very difficult. Then, with the Highland brigade, after a march of about an hour-and-three-quarters, they were halted for a time to give them a rest." As all orders were given only in a low tone, and passed on from company to company and battalion to battalion, the order to halt did not at once reach the outer flanks. The consequence was that as the flanks continued to step out, while touch was maintained with the centre, the flanks lost their direction, and circled round so that the brigade halted in a crescent formation. When the order to advance was again given, the flank battalions, supposing themselves to be moving still in the same direction, advanced directly to their front. The result was that the flank battalions almost met in front of the centre." (*Military History of the Campaign of* 1882 *in Egypt.*)

In spite of all these difficulties, however, the force arrived sufficiently correctly in position to deliver their attack at dawn, and the results were overwhelming. The whole advance was a classic of organization for a desert march by night.

(*n*) *Campaign of Adowa,* 1896. (See Sec. 23 (a) (vii.).

Note the lack of staff work during the night advance, which caused columns to cross one another's line.

(*o*) *Stormberg, December,* 1899. Map C and Sketch VIII.

This is probably the most interesting night operation in history, as it illustrates, in its failure, practically every principle of night work.

Early in November, President Steyn ordered an invasion of the north-eastern portion of Cape Colony; and the Boers, moving very slowly, seized Aliwal North on the 13th, Burghersdorp on the 15th, and on the 25th the important railway junction of Stormberg.

"Lieut.-General Sir William Gatacre, with the staff of the 3rd division, the two brigades of which had been sent to Natal, disembarked at East London on November 16th. The tasks assigned to that General were to prevent British subjects from being persuaded or compelled to take up arms against their sovereign, to encourage and protect the loyal, and, so far as possible, to stem the Boer invasion until the return of Lord Methuen's division from Kimberley enabled the country south of the Orange River to be swept clear of the enemy preparatory to the general advance through the Free State."

Here he was not in sufficient strength to move forward at once, but, when reinforcements arrived later, he seized Putterskraal, and occupied Sterkstrom as an advanced post. Meanwhile, the enemy was becoming bolder. The railway and telegraph to the

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west from Stormberg was destroyed, and Gatacre's troops at Putterskraal and French's at Naauwport were cut off from one another. As a result, General Buller began to get anxious, and on December 2nd suggested that Gatacre should close with the enemy.

On November 29th, Gatacre had made a raid on Molteno; a detachment of Cape police was left there; and a further detachment of 400 men pushed out to Penhoek. By December 6th, Gatacre had been reinforced, but his reinforcements were only just free from the confinement of the voyage from England, and were, therefore, not very fit. Nevertheless, the G.O.C. considered that, in the existing strategic situation, any further prolongation of the defensive attitude he had hitherto been obliged to maintain would be injurious. He determined, therefore, to take advantage of the free hand left to him by Sir Redvers Buller, and to follow the further suggestion that he should close with the enemy. On the evening of the 7th, he informed the commanding officers that he intended to make a night march on Stormberg and attack the Boer laager. It will be seen, from Sketch viii, that the building and sheds which mark the railway junction lie at the foot of a steep razor-back hill, called Rooi Kop, and on the eastern edge of a valley or vlei, about two miles in length from north to south, and one in breadth. This vlei, in which the enemy's main body was known to be, is shut in on the east by the Rooi Kop, which dominates all of the surrounding country. To the south and south-west, it is enclosed by a lower hill, named the Kissieberg, and on the north by a flat-topped kopje on which forts had been constructed by the British garrison when in occupation of the junction. Between this kopje and the northern point of the Kissieberg, there is a gap of a mile, through which pass out the spruit, which drains the vlei, and the branch line to Naauwport. The railway from East London to Bloemfontein and the main road from Molteno to Burghersdorp, *via* Stormberg, cross a Nek between the Kissieberg and Rooi Kop, subsequently skirting the latter hill very closely. This Nek, on which the intelligence scouts reported the Boer guns to be posted, and the Rooi Kop, Sir W. Gatacre planned to seize before dawn on the morning of the 9th by a night march on Molteno. He proposed to employ on the enterprise the whole of the mounted infantry, one field battery, the R.E. company, the Northumberland Fusiliers, the Royal Irish Rifles, and a detachment of Cape mounted police. The mounted troops from Penhoek were also to co-operate on the right flank. Arrangements were made with Sir H. Elliott for an advance of the headquarters of the Cape Mounted Rifles in the direction of Dordrecht. By concentrating at Molteno late on the day previous to that chosen for the attack, General Gatacre hoped to surprise the enemy. Owing, however,

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to some difficulties in obtaining rolling stock, the movement was postponed till the 9th. . . .

"Although the entraining of the troops began about 12 noon, it was not complete till after five p.m., *owing to the lack of sufficient sidings*. The movement to Molteno was covered by the armoured train, and was carried out without interruption. The detachments of Brabant's Horse and Cape Mounted Rifles ordered in from Molteno failed, however, to appear. A message to the officer commanding at Penhoek, conveying the order, had been handed in at the telegraph office at Putterskraal at midnight by the telegraph clerk. *The precaution of demanding an acknowledgment of the receipt of this important order, or of sending a duplicate, does not appear to have been taken by the divisional staff.*

"The troops had dined before leaving Putterskraal, and took with them one and a half days' rations, the half ration to be eaten in the train on the way to Molteno, and the remainder to be carried by the men on the march. *The preserved meat had been issued in 6-lb. tins. These were very inconvenient. Therefore many of them were thrown away.* On arriving at Molteno, Sir W. Gatacre assembled the commanding officers and issued personally to them his orders for the movement against Stormberg. His intelligence staff had ascertained that the actual strength of the Boers in laager at that moment was about 1,700 and that the southern face of the Kissieberg and the Nek between that hill and the Rooi Kop were entrenched. The General, on receipt of this information, determined to modify his original plan. *Although Stormberg had been occupied for more than a month by British troops, no systematic sketching of the surrounding country had been undertaken.* Except a plan made more than a year before of the ground in the immediate neighbourhood of the junction, and reproduced in one of the intelligence handbooks, *the only map at the disposal of the staff was the Cape Survey, the scale of which, 12½ miles to an inch, was too small for tactical purposes.*"

The local Cape police, the Berkshire mounted infantry, and others were very well acquainted with the country; and, after a personal examination of Sergeant Morgan, Cape Police, and several native policemen, who had previously been selected as guides, Sir W. Gatacre determined to move his force out from Molteno by the Steynsburg road, and to diverge from that road by a cross track, leading northwards from a point near D. Foster's farm to Van Zyl's farm, which was situated immediately in rear of the western face of the Kissieberg. Thus the position on the Nek would be turned. The distance to be covered during this flank march was said by his informants to be about nine miles. The actual distance was ten miles. Allowing for intermediate rests for the men, the General anticipated that he

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would be able so to order the time as to place his men in a position to rush the Kissieberg with the bayonet before dawn, and then, as soon as daylight appeared, to plant the guns on that kopje, thus commanding the whole of the Stormberg valley. Sir W. Gatacre informed commanding officers of these intentions, and arranged the order of movement of the troops.

"The column was to move off in three echelons, the first consisting of the divisional staff and the infantry, the second the artillery and mounted infantry, and the third the field hospital, machine guns, etc. . . . *Guides were allotted to each unit.* Complete reliance was placed on the efficiency of these guides, and the *precaution of causing the roads to be previously reconnoitred by a staff officer had not been taken. Both Sir W. Gatacre's intelligence officers, one of whom knew the ground intimately, had duties on the line of communication and were thus unable to accompany the column.* The General, with all the rest of his staff, took his place at the head of the leading battalion, which was *preceded by eight infantry scouts under a subaltern. The remainder of the infantry marched in fours.* The batteries were in column of route. The wheels of the 77th were covered with raw hide. The wheels of the 74th had not been so padded, as *that battery was only added to the column at the last moment.* The hide proved to be of little value for the purpose of deadening the sound, and only made the draught heavier.

"*The head of the column moved off about nine p.m., somewhat later than had been originally planned.* The artillery and the infantry following in due course along the Steynsburg road, but the *machine guns, field hospital, and R.E., owing to a lack of staff supervision, took the one direct on Stormberg,* and finding that there were no troops in front of them, halted where they were until daylight, having first ascertained from the officer left in command at Molteno that *he did not know the route by which the main column was advancing.* Meanwhile, the infantry of that column had pressed on with the keenness of soldiers eager for their first fight, and, at 1 a.m., crossed a railway line, soon afterwards approaching a homestead, which proved to be that of Mr. J. Roberts. The guides had, in fact, passed the branch road leading to Van Zyl's farm, but on being interrogated, the head guide, Sergeant Morgan, assured Sir W. Gatacre that he and his assistants knew the way perfectly, and that they were leading the column by a road which, though slightly longer than that originally selected, avoided wire and a bad piece of track which the guns would have found it difficult to cross at night. They added that they were within one-and-a-half miles of the spot, to which the General desired to be guided. The map and freehand sketch show that the guides now proposed to lead the column to

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the rear of the Kassieberg by the wagon-track which leaves the Steynsburg road at Roberts' homestead, and after crossing the Bamboosberg Spruit and the colliery branch line, strikes, near Van Zyl's house, the track by which General Gatacre had intended to approach the enemy's position. The distance still to be traversed was, as will also be noticed, not one-and-a-half, but about two-and-a-half miles. Moreover, after crossing the spruit and the railway, the track traverses the northern slopes of a stony irregular underfeature which guards the approaches to the Kissieberg from the south and west. Progress over this ground was unlikely to be rapid. Roberts' homestead is ten-and-a-half miles from Molteno. *The troops had, therefore, already marched further than was originally anticipated;* and, as they had halted for a short time every hour, their rate of marching had been fast for night-work over such country. *The men were somewhat weary owing to the march.* They were out of condition. *They had been engaged on heavy fatigue work on the morning of the 9th.* Whether, therefore, the guides had missed the true road in the dark, a supposition which is favoured by the fact that they had previously assured the General that the whole route was fit and easy for wheeled transport, or whether, not realizing the importance in military operations of obedience to orders, they had, on their own judgment, diverted the column to the longer route in the belief that it would be easier, the effect on the General's plan of attack was serious. Sir W. Gatacre, nevertheless, decided that he would give his men an hour's rest, and then push on.

"About 2 a.m. the march was resumed in the same order as before, except that the guns and mounted infantry had closed up to the infantry. But after crossing the railway the roughness of the ground added to the fatigue of the troops; moreover, doubt as to the manner in which the column was being guided had spread discouragement. The General, moving at the head of the leading battalion, constantly questioned the guide, but was as constantly assured by Sergeant Morgan that the right road was being followed, although the distance was greater than he had estimated. The column, therefore, trudged on until at length, as the first signs of dawn were beginning to appear, it reached the cross roads near Van Zyl's house, and thus was on the very ground whence General Gatacre intended to make his assault on the Kissieberg. *If the assault had been delivered at once, the ridge might have been carried* and command over the Stormberg valley have been thus secured.

"The Boers in and near Stormberg on the morning of December 10th were under the command of Olivier; they consisted of about 1,700 burghers . . . with two guns and a Maxim. A detachment . . . with one gun held the Nek between the Kissie-

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berg and Rooi Kop. A piquet of about fifty men were stationed on the western ridge of the former hill, and another piquet watched the north end of the vlei; the remainder of the burghers slept on the lower inner slopes of the two hills. The Boer accounts of the fight all agree in stating that Gatacre's night march was a complete surprise to them. . . . Sir W. Gatacre's information, therefore, as to the strength of the Boers in the Stormberg valley was accurate, their dispositions favoured the plan he had formed for a surprise, and the British assailants, notwithstanding the circuitous march, had now arrived in time, though only barely in time, at the spot for its execution. But either *the chief guide did not fully comprehend the General's intentions,* or he had lost his bearings, for he pointed to a kopje nearly two miles off, and said that that was the real place. The wearied men continued to trudge along the road, which, skirting the lower western slopes of the Kissieberg, lead to Stormberg junction. *Day was breaking but no change was made in the formation of the troops. The infantry remained in fours, with no flankers out, and still only eight men were in front as advanced guard.* The Boer piquet on the Kissieberg saw the grey thread as it wound its way slowly along the foot of the hill within effective range of the crest. A single shot echoed through the valley, and a corporal of the leading company of Irish Rifles fell dead. A rapid fire, although from but a few rifles, was then opened on the British troops at a range of about 400 yards. It was impossible to convey orders to a long column of route, thus taken at a disadvantage. *Each company officer had to act on his own initiative, and as few, if any of them, knew where they were, or where was the enemy they were required to attack, confusion inevitably arose.*"

The force gradually entered into a piece-meal, unco-ordinated attack, which was bound to end in failure. This failure was eventually accentuated by an unco-ordinated withdrawal, the orders for which never reached many of the troops.

The *Official History* sums up the action as follows:—"The plan though bold, was sound in its design, and would have succeeded had not exceptional ill-fortune attended its execution. Several of the causes of failure stand out conspicuously in the narrative: the mistake of the guides in taking the longer route, which unduly fatigued the men; the failure to realize that the Kissieberg was within striking distance when the cross-roads near Van Zyl's farm were reached; . . . Yet it cannot be held that chance alone was responsible for this miscarriage. A long night march, to be followed by a night attack, involves, under the most favourable circumstances, a considerable element of hazard, and it is therefore essential that every possible precaution should be taken to obviate mistakes and to ensure that the

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column should not, in its mission to surprise, be itself taken at a disadvantage. Careful reconnaissance by the staff of the route to be followed can, therefore, never be neglected with impunity. *If a staff officer had examined beforehand the Steynsburg road, at least as far as the branch track which it was intended to follow, and if he had been made responsible for the supervising of the guides, the mistakes as to the route would, in all probability, have been avoided.* This omission is all the more remarkable in that one of the Intelligence Staff, upon whom the duty of this reconnaissance would naturally have devolved, was well acquainted with the ground in the neighbourhood of Stormberg. It is, perhaps, doubtful whether in view of the fatigue shown by the troops on their arrival at Roberts' farm, it was wise to persist in the enterprise. In any case, it is clear *that the neglect to change the formation of the column, and to send out flank and advanced guards when dawn appeared, whilst the movement was being carried out along a road surrounded by hills, was a dangerous and unnecessary risk.* Finally, the abandonment of large detachments of infantry, when retreat was ordered, implies a serious lack of supervision both by the staff and by the officers then left in command of the battalions. Yet in weighing the responsibilty for these errors, it must be borne in mind that the units composing the force had only just come together for the first time, that General, staff, and troops were all new to one another, and that the men engaged were not in hard condition." *Official History of the War in South Africa,* Vol. I.

(*p*) *Magersfontein, December* 11*th,* 1899.

This action is another of the most interesting night operations in history. See *Official History.*

(*q*) *Russo-Japanese War,* 1904-1905.

There was some very interesting night fighting on the part of the Japanese at the Battle of Ta-Shih-Chiao, on the night of July 14th/15th, 1904.

See British or German official account of the Russo-Japanese War.

(*r*) *Mesopotamia: The Battle of Qurna, May* 31*st,* 1915.

Note in this very interesting " combined operation " battle the move by night of the turning attack, which had to start in its " bellums " from its rendezvous at 1 a.m., and before 5 a.m. had deployed at the pre-arranged point.

See *Official History of the War, Mesopotamia.*

See *My Campaign in Mesopotamia,* Townshend.

(*s*) *Aziziya, October,* 1915. Map E.

On the night of October 27/28th, General Townshend moved

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

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out of Aziziya with the greater part of his force to attack the Turkish detachments at Kutuniya. The enemy, whose strength was estimated at 1,000 Arab irregular horsemen, 400 cavalry, two guns, four machine guns, and an infantry battalion, was surprised in the early morning of the 28th, and retired rapidly in disorder. The British force suffered no casualties; and, after destroying the enemy's camp and fortified serai, returned to Aziziya.

(t) *Ctesiphon, November 22nd,* 1915. Map E.

For the attack on Ctesiphon, all the forces operating moved by night to take up their various positions from which they were to start the attack.

See Townshend's orders for the operation. Appendix, Part 3, *My Campaign in Mesopotamia.*

(u) *Mesopotamia: The Final Attempt to Relieve Kut, April 15th,* 1916. Map E.

" On the evening of April 14th, General Gorringe issued orders for the 3rd division to carry out the attack on the enemy's trenches about Twin Pimples at dawn next morning. The objective was 800 yards length of a trench which ran roughly southward from the vicinity of Twin Pimples and was a few hundred yards in advance of the main Bait Isa position. This trench, which was reported to be held by the enemy in some strength, was said to be about 400 yards from the line held by the 89th Punjabis, though enemy piquets were within seventy-five yards of those of the British. The troops were warned in the order, however, that the location of the enemy's line could not be considered accurate. The attack was to be made by the 7th and 9th brigades advancing side by side *under mutual arrangements by their brigadiers."* (The deployment of the infantry was covered by troops in position in face of the Turkish positions.) " Behind them, on an alignment some 1,500 yards from the trench to be captured, four battalions were to form up by 3 a.m., with fifty yards between brigades. The night was dark and cloudy, and just before 3 a.m. on April 15th, a violent thunderstorm broke with heavy rain, which made it difficult for the troops to gain their positions; and *this resulted in a greater interval being left between brigades than had been ordered.* Rain continued to fall till about 8 a.m., though it became less heavy after the first hour, but the darkness was intense.

" When the advance commenced at 4.45 a.m., on a compass-bearing of 280 degrees, the two battalions of the 9th brigade were ordered to incline to their right to correct the interval between them and the 7th brigade on their right. Each of the 9th brigade battalions had half a battalion in first and half a battalion in second line; while the 7th brigade had the whole of

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one battalion in their first line and the whole of another in their second. *Each brigade was under the independent command of its brigadier.* In the darkness, the leading half battalion on the left of the 9th brigade inclined too far to the right and got in front of the other half battalion of this brigade. Further, the lightning and the men's fixed bayonets so affected the compasses carried by the guides that the greater part of the battalions of the 9th brigade and one of the 7th lost their direction and found themselves among the 37th brigade, who were holding trenches in a salient towards the enemy. Fortunately, however, a party of about 260 men of the three battalions found their way to the enemy trench near Twin Pimples and captured the northern portion of it without much difficulty, and as it became lighter, other troops pushed forward and captured the southern portion, also without much difficulty. Then, in spite of heavy enemy fire and a weak counter-attack about 11 a.m., the position was consolidated. See *Official History of the War, Mesopotamia,* Vol. II.

(*v*) *Battle of the Somme,* 1916.

" In the early hours of July 14th, the attacking troops (some seven divisions) moved out over the open for a distance of from about 1,000 to 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness just below the crest and some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong patrols, and the correct deployment had been ensured by careful previous preparations. (Actually, white tapes had been laid out earlier in the night.) The whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The decision to attempt a night operation of this magnitude with an army, the bulk of which had been raised since the beginning of the war, was perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to the quality of our troops. It would not have been possible but for the careful preparations and forethought, as well as *thorough reconnaissance of the ground by divisional, brigade, and battalion commanders and their staffs before framing their detailed orders* for the advance.

" The actual assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m. on July 14th, when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short ranges, and along the whole front attacked our troops, preceded by a very effective barrage, swept over the enemy's first trenches and on into defences beyond."

Official Despatches, despatch dated December 23rd, 1916.

(*w*) *Palestine: The Crossing of the River Auja, December,* 1917. Map E and Sketch VII.

This small operation is an almost classic example of a night operation. The situation in Palestine was that Jerusalem had been captured by General Allenby, and he had held it against the

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Turkish counter-attacks. "The presence of the Turks on the high ground near the coast, north of the Auja, and at Bald Hill and Mulebbis south of it, and further east, rendered Jaffa insecure for shipping and threatened the one lateral road Jaffa-Ramleh-Latron-Jerusalem. The 21st corps were directed to drive the Turks north and to occupy the line Rantieh-El Jelil.

The River Auja was from forty to sixty yards wide, averaged ten feet deep, with few fords, it ran at about three miles per hour, and was subject to heavy floods in the winter rains. In winter the river was fordable only at the bar formed just where it enters the sea, and there the depth was about three feet six inches. The Turks had an entrenched post to cover this ford, and also kept it under frequent bursts of machine-gun fire at night. The Jaffa-Tulkeram road crossed the Auja at Hadrah by a stone bridge, which was also a mill dam; but the Turks had blown this in. East of Stone Bridge, the ground on the south and left bank was marshy. Generally, the banks of the river were low and muddy, but small groves and belts of trees between Stone Bridge and Jerisheh afforded some cover on both banks. The Nahr Burdieh joined the Auja just below Sheikh Muannis. A belt of sand-dunes ran up the coast and from Tel el Rekkit, low cliffs extended northwards.

"Inland, north of the Auja, the country consisted of a down-land of sandy hills, with a little cultivation west of Sheikh Muannis. South of the river, there were low grassy hills, thin scrub and some orange groves. Besides Mulebbis, on the left bank, the Turks had a strong position at Sheikh Muannis situated on a ridge, about half-a-mile north of the river and one-and-a-half miles inland.

"The forcing of a passage was entrusted to the 52nd Lowland Division. The river front was carefully examined. A particularly bold reconnaissance was made by two officers, who swam out to sea, landed on the Turkish side, came back through their lines undetected, and plumbed the ford as they came.

"General Hill (52nd division), proposed to effect the passage by night, and by surprise, without any particular artillery support until after the crossing had been secured. After that, his plan was to proceed covered by a barrage worked to a time-table. But, *in order to lull the enemy into a false security, he was to be put under a drill, as regards artillery fire, and to be given a regular dose of night bombardment each evening; so that, when the real attack came, there would be no abnormal artillery action to alarm him.*

"Broadly, the plan was to take across a small covering force, if possible undetected; then to pass the three brigades over at three points (the ford, below Muannis, and at Stone Bridge), and also to demonstrate further east in order to confuse the Turks.

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The navy were to cover the left flank and harass the Turks near the coast.

"The covering troops were to cross first, at point X, on rafts made up from 2,300 gallon canvas tanks. Each raft carried sixteen men. Then light bridges were to be put across on piers of similar rafts, to take infantry and pack-animals. Subsequently, pontoon and barrel-pier bridges were to be built, and the Stone Bridge repaired. Timber was obtained by pulling down houses and sheds. A pontoon bridge was sent up from the Suez Canal. The rafts were put together under the trees in the German Colony of Sarona. *The infantry practised embarking and disembarking in a large irrigation tank at night, and also rehearsed cutting through cactus hedges in the dark.*

"The operation was fixed to begin on the evening of December 20th, at 20.00 hours.

"The first troops to cross were to be the 1/7th H.L.I. battalion of the 157th brigade, and its task was to swing left and take the Turkish trenches guarding the ford at the river mouth. It was to be followed by one battalion 156th brigade, which was to move simultaneously on B (Slag Heap Farm), while a company was told off to bomb the stone wall at C. It was hoped that the enemy would be confused, and would wait to clear up the situation before launching a counter-attack, which would then be too late. Two other battalions of 156th brigade were to take Muannis and roll up the trenches at D, respectively. The rest of the 157th brigade were to cross at the ford and move on Tel el Rekkit. The 155th brigade were to demonstrate at G, and later in the night, cross at H and secure Hadrah and the Stone Bridge.

"The 19th and 20th of December were very wet days. The Auja rose alarmingly, the valley became water-logged, and the approaches to the crossing place (at X) were so soft that at the last moment 200 yards of corduroy road had to be laid to enable the rafts to be taken to the river. There was a young quarter moon, the night was uncomfortably light, very cold, and sounds travelled amazingly.

"The inter-communication was very complete, and cables from divisional headquarters to brigades and to the artillery were all duplicated.

"The operations commenced to time, and in six minutes four rafts were afloat at X; half-an-hour later, half the covering party was also undetected, and the leading raft was at the water's edge by 20.35 hours.

"By 22.00 hours, the light bridges were three-quarters completed, the second battalion was crossing, but the bridging parties were experiencing difficulty with the current and soft banks, and in getting the last bay into place. All times were now put back half-an-hour. By 22.30 hours, the first bridge was across and in

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use. By midnight the whole of the 156th brigade was across, and by dawn they had secured their objectives and were well dug in.

" The assault started at 00.25 hours on December 21st. The 7th Highland L.I. completely surprised the Turks and took the trenches for 1,000 yards north of the ford. The 1/4th Royal Scots took Slag Heap Farm. The 1/7th Royal Scots took Sheikh Muannis by 03.00 hours. The 8th Scottish Rifles cleared the ground at D, south of Muannis. The 1st Scottish Rifles (brigade reserve) put the long wall, C, into a state of defence and had formed a dump of 50,000 rounds of S.A.A.

" Meanwhile, at fifty minutes after midnight, the remainder of the 157th brigade began to ford the river—the 1/6th H.L.I. leading.

" The ford had not been marked by pickets, owing to the river's swollen state, but the commanding officer found it, and the battalion crossed, the men in fours linked, while the R.E. put up the pickets as they went. There were thirty casualties from shell fire. All went according to plan. By 02.00 hours the 157th brigade was across, and they had secured all objectives by 05.48 hours and were dug in.

" On the right, the 155th brigade began its demonstration about 23.15 hours, and its covering party at H got across unobserved by 23.25 hours. The ground was so boggy they could not launch their bridge piers, and so the troops had to ferry over in rafts, and so lost time; and at 02.35 hours, they were thirty minutes late in the programme. But by 03.40 hours two battalions were across, two hours later the 5th Royal Scots Fusiliers had taken Hadrah; and after stubborn fighting Stone Bridge was in our hands at 05.40.

" At 06.00 hours, two batteries were ordered to cross the ford, to support 157th brigade, and the navy were informed that all objectives had been taken. It seems that the Turks had expected an attack for some days, but when the artillery fire proved to be normal evening shelling, they regarded the attack as merely local demonstrations. They considered the only feasible crossing to be at Stone Bridge, and that elsewhere was impossible in the existing state of the river."

As a result of this extremely successful night operation, the rest of the force was enabled to move over in daylight next day, and the line of the 21st corps was advanced so as to give ten miles clear between Jaffa, and our lateral road, and the Turks.

An Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns, 1914 *to* 1918, Major-General Sir M. G. E. Bowman-Manifold.

(*x*) *Western Front.*

During the final offensive against the Germans from August,

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1918, onwards, there were a few interesting examples of night attacks. The most important were :—

(1) The attack by the 3rd and Australian corps on August 24th, in which Bray-sur-Somme and Becourdel-Becourt were captured; and

(2) the attack by the 13th corps on October 13th, which was a night march and a night attack.

Full description of these attacks are given in *The Story of the Fourth Army,* where also there is an interesting discussion, in the concluding chapter, on " Zero hour," and the pros and cons of night operations.

(*y*) *Attack on Villers Bretonneux, April,* 1918.

" At 10 p.m. on the night of April 23rd/24th, a counter-attack was launched by a brigade of the 18th division and the 13th and 15th brigades of the 4th and 5th Australian divisions, and met with remarkable success. A night operation of this character, undertaken at such short notice, was an enterprise of great daring. The instant decision to seize the opportunity offered, and the rapid and thorough working out of the general plan and details of the attack on the part of the corps commander and divisional and subordinate commanders concerned, are most worthy of commendation, while the unusual nature of the operation called for the highest qualities on the part of the troops employed. It was carried out in the most spirited and gallant manner by all ranks. The 13th Australian brigade, in particular, showed great skill and resolution in their attack, making their way through belts of wire running diagonally to the line of their advance, across very difficult country which they had had no opportunity to reconnoitre beforehand.

" At daybreak, Villers Bretonneux was practically surrounded by our troops. In this well-conceived and brilliantly-executed operation, nearly 1,000 prisoners were captured by our troops." *Official Despatch,* dated July 29th, 1918.

See also official account of Australian forces in the war.

See also *History of the 5th Australian Division.*

(*z*) *Mesopotamia.*

Note the interesting and complicated night concentration and advance on the Dujailah redoubt on March 7th/8th, which completely surprised the Turks; also the night march of the Cavalry Division to Basruyiyah on the 14th December.

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Sketch VII.

G OF THE NAHR AUJA
)ivision, 20/21, Dec., 1917.



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CHAPTER XI.

MOVEMENTS BY SEA, LAND, AND AIR.

SECS. 112-120.—MARCHES.

(A) MARCH DISCIPLINE.

(i) *Moore's retreat,* 1809. Map G.

"Cold, wet, and frequent night marches, the want of regular supplies, and the sense of the enforced retreat, now combined to shake the discipline of the army at times to a deplorable degree, and the retreat to Corunna was at first marked by great disorder; but the returns show that those regiments in which the disciplinary standard was recognized to be high, and in which the officers paid great attention to their men, although they were those most heavily engaged, suffered comparatively less than others. Where discipline was relaxed, the men broke out of the ranks, entering houses in search of food and drink, and numbers of these stragglers were killed by the enemy."—(Robinson, Vol. I.) See also Oman, Vol. I.

(ii) *Retreat from Burgos,* 1812. Map G.

"The marches were not excessive, but as the roads were heavy with mud, and the weather at times exceedingly bad, much fatigue was undergone by men and animals; the sick and wounded suffered extremely, and it was difficult to get the guns and baggage along. By want of staff and departmental arrangements more than anything else, there was at times an insufficiency of supplies and serious privation, but not with all corps.

"The casualties in battle were not heavy, though there was often sharp fighting, and no guns or baggage had to be abandoned. Still, discipline became much relaxed towards the close, and the soldiers fell into the disorders of an army weakened in spirit by toil and retreat; plunder—especially of spirits, wine and food—intoxication, and, as a result, insubordination, becoming prevalent crimes." Robinson, Vol. II. See also Oman, *Peninsular War.*

On November 16th, 1812, Wellington published a General Order from Aldehueda de la Boveda, in which occurred the following:—

(3) The number of soldiers straggling from their regiments, for no reason excepting to plunder, is a disgrace to the army,

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and affords a strong proof of the degree to which the discipline of the regiments is relaxed, and of the inattention of the commanding and other officers of regiments to their duty, and to the repeated orders of the army.

(4) The commander of the Forces considers the commanding officer of any regiment from which there are men absent on a march, to be responsible; and he now desires that the Hon. Lieut.-Colonel Cole will put in arrest the commanding officer of the —rd regiment, for having allowed soldiers to straggle from the ranks of the —rd regiment on the marches of yesterday and to-day."

In this retreat, the Allies lost about 7,000 men, of whom by far the greatest number consisted of stragglers from the ranks who perished from their own carelessness or disobedience. In a communication addressed to his general officers, after the retreat, Wellington said: "I am concerned to observe that the army under my command has fallen off in this respect (discipline) in the late campaign to a greater degree than any other army with which I have ever been, or of which I have ever read."

(iii) *Craufurd and the Light Division.*

Note the effect of Craufurd's march discipline on his Light Division. His standing orders for this division, in this particular, are still the basis of all modern instructions; and, by enforcing them, he made his division probably the finest marching formation, apart from one of the finest fighting formations, that any army has ever had. See Craufurd's "Orders for the Light Division."

(iv) *Jackson.*

Note the wonderful difference in Jackson's troops in the Valley after he had insisted on march discipline being maintained.

(v) 1914.

Note how quickly march discipline may be undermined by a retreat. In the retreat from Mons, in several cases, strong action had to be taken to maintain this discipline, which, at times, was showing signs of disappearing.

(B) Regulations to Prevent Traffic Blocks.

(i) *Retreat to Corunna,* 1809. Map G.

For his night march from Lugo, Sir John Moore took steps to mark the road and to prevent confusion of traffic blocks. Special guides were appointed to each column, and bundles of straw were placed at certain distances as land marks. A heavy storm of wind and rain came, however, and all the land marks were destroyed. Then the guides, in the darkness, lost their

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way, and there was serious confusion, and traffic blocks. Only one out of the three divisions got on to the right road, and though the march was begun at 10 o'clock at night, at daybreak the following morning the rearmost columns were only just clear of Lugo.

(ii) *The Campaign of Adowa*, 1896.

See Sec. 23 (a) (vii).

Note the lack of staff arrangements and the consequent crossing of units on the line of march early in the approach march.

(iii) 1914.

Note the confusion caused in the retreat from Mons when Sordet's French cavalry corps crossed the line of retreat of the B.E.F.

Note also the confusion and trouble caused during the retreat from Mons by French divisions clashing with the 1st corps allotment of roads. *Official History*, Vol. I, p. 113.

(iv) *Battle of Loos*, 1915.

Note the terrible confusion and trouble caused by lack of traffic control. (See Sec. 25 (m) (iv).)

(v) *April*, 1918.

It is of interest to note that on the first day of the German offensive against the Portuguese on the Lys, it was found necessary to send one battalion, out of the three of the only infantry brigade in support to the northern portion of the sector, to act as traffic control, as the congestion of the roads due to fleeing civilians, etc., was so great that it was quickly becoming impossible to carry on the battle.

(vi) *Belgian Offensive and American Offensive at St. Mihiel*, 1918.

The former offensive came to a quick and complete standstill owing to the entire congestion of all roads due to lack of traffic control, and General Weygand had to be sent there to reorganize the system.

The same occurred in the American offensive at St. Mihiel in 1918.

(c) Space and Distance.

A few examples of the most famous marches are given. For a full study of these and many others, there is a very interesting chapter in Furse's *The Art of Marching*.

(i) *March of the Lacedæmonians to Marathon, September*, 490 B.C. Map A (N 14).

Two thousand Lacedæmonians set out from Sparta to reinforce the Athenian army. They started very late, owing to waiting for

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religious omens, and arrived too late for the battle; but they covered 150 miles in three days in their efforts to be in time.

See also Hannibal's famous march from Spain to Italy in 218 B.C.

(ii) *Xenophon*, 401 B.C.

Note his amazing march as rearguard to the Ten Thousand from Cunasa to the Euxine in 401 B.C. In fourteen months, his army had marched upwards of 4,000 miles, fighting rearguard actions much of the time.

(iii) *Blenheim*, 1704. (Sec. 7 (v) (b).)

Marlborough's famous march across Europe from the Moselle to the Rhine and the Danube to join Eugene. He actually covered 240 miles in 25 days.

(iv) *Jena*, 1806. Map A (H 5).

Some of the marches in this campaign are rather remarkable. Horsetzky gives the following figures for marches in the pursuit after the battle:—Murat, with the main body of the cavalry reserve was

On October 14th on the battlefield at Jena.
,, 15th at Erfurt.
,, 16th at Langensalza.
,, 17th at Nordhausen.
,, 18th at Halberstadt.
,, 20th before Magdeburg.
} 125 miles in 6 days.

,, 22nd before Dessau.
,, 25th at Spandau.
,, 28th Prenzlau.
} 170 miles in 8 days, at the end of which Hohenlohe surrendered with 120,000 men.

,, 29th Stettin, which, with a garrison some 10,000 strong, surrendered.

,, 30th at Anklam
November 4th Schwerin.
,, 6th Lubeck.
,, 7th Ratkau.
} 200 miles in 10 days; and Blucher then surrendered with 15,000 men.

Bernadotte with the 1st Infantry Corps did 375 miles in twenty-three days, or an average of sixteen miles a day for twenty-three consecutive days.

Ney's corps marched from Roda to Weimar on October 14th, taking part in the battle of Jena on the way—twenty miles by road alone. The following day it went on from Weimar to Erfurt, thirteen miles; on the 16th to Grafen-Tonna, near Langensalza, fifteen miles; and on the 17th, marching day and night, from there to Nordhausen, a distance of thirty-seven miles.

It was the marching powers of his units that enabled Napoleon to carry out this classic pursuit of the Prussians.

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(v) *Peninsula*, 1809.

In his attempt to cut off Sir John Moore's force, Napoleon, moving from Madrid to Astorga, with 50,000 men, marched 200 miles in ten days, crossing mountain passes in snow, and losing one whole day at the river Esla.

(vi) *July*, 1809.

According to Napier, Craufurd, with his Light Division, marched sixty-two miles in twenty-six hours up to the battle of Talavera.

(vii) *Lord Roberts' March from Kabul to Kandahar*, 1880.

Three hundred and thirteen miles in twenty days.
See *Forty-One Years in India*.

(viii) *Serbo-Bulgarian War*, 1885.

In the Serbo-Bulgarian War of 1885, a Bulgarian regiment is said to have marched 136 kilometeres in thirty-six hours, and to have fought at the end of it for the defence of Slivnitza.

(ix) *Italian-Abyssianian Campaign*, 1895-6.

In this campaign, which more or less culminated in Adowa (see Sec. 28 (*h*)), Arimondi, with his mixed force, performed some amazing marches.

In his march from Macalle to Adagamus, he covered 115 miles in three days, ten-and-a-half hours, having fought two engagements in this period of time, having stopped to burn many villages, and being encumbered with many women and much baggage. During this march, he actually covered fifty-seven miles in twenty-nine-and-a-half hours' continuous marching.

(x) *The Relief of Kimberley*, 1900. *French's March with the Cavalry*. Map C.

This is particularly interesting, as it shows the severe effects of forced marches on troops, and the necessity for good horsemastership.

"In the evening of February 10th, 1900, General French, at the head of twelve cavalry regiments (thirty-six squadrons), two mounted infantry brigades, and ten batteries, quitted his camp at Enslin, and on the 15th, in the afternoon, entered Kimberley.

"His force had marched 150 miles in less than six days, doing on an average twenty-five miles a day.

"This march cost him dear, for, of the 5,000 horses which had started from Enslin, the column left 1,474 on the road foundered, exhausted or sick. The horses of this force were soon stumbling from exhaustion. On the second day's march the

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train had to be left behind. This loss of horses was due to the great heat, lack of water, and to bad horse-mastership." *Official History.*

(xi) *Palestine,* 1918.

Note the great distances covered by Allenby's cavalry in the final break through of the Turkish positions. It is interesting to compare this with French's march, detailed above, as in Palestine many of the horses were without water for sixty and some for ninety hours, and still carried on.

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CHAPTER XII.

EXAMPLES OF TYPES OF ORDERS, AND RESULTS OF BAD OR VAGUE ORDERS.

(*a*) One of the most famous orders ever issued was the extremely brief and not very explanatory one issued by Suvoroff :—

"God wills, the Czar commands, Suvoroff orders that the enemy shall be defeated."

(*b*) *Jena,* 1806. *Example of Confused Orders.*

During the concentration of the French forces, Napoleon was still at Paris. He, Berthier, and Murat were all issuing orders for the concentration, owing to a misunderstanding. Napoleon's own orders to Berthier were extremely vague and contradictory, wrong names of places even being used at times. It was one of Berthier's great achievements that he succeeded in unravelling these confused letters from Napoleon. There is a very good picture of the confusion caused by these letters in Maude's *The Campaign of Jena.*

(*c*) *A Case of a General refusing to depart from the letter of his Orders although the situation was obviously different to that visualised by the higher Command. Jena,* 1806.

"The night before the battle of Jena, Prince Hohenlohe, commanding the Prussian corps which was nearest the French, was ordered to remain in his position on the steep plateau above the town, and on no account whatever to leave it. During the night, Napoleon scaled the heights, and occupied the crest with his advanced guard. So daring a proceeding had never been contemplated by the Prussian staff; Prince Hohenlohe was fettered by his orders, and next morning, instead of attacking vigorously and driving his audacious enemy down the hill, he suffered the whole French army to deploy at leisure on the heights." Henderson, "The Framing of Orders," R.U.S.I. *Journal,* Vol. 40. Compare this attitude of Hohenlohe with that of von Alvensleben at Mars-la-Tour, see Chapter XIV (*l*).

It is also of great interest to note that the French disaster at Waterloo is ascribed to bad staff work and orders. "If the Prince of Wagram had been there, it is more than conceivable that the scales would have fallen other than they did; for it was the indifferent staff work of Soult and the bad drafting of orders

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which lost the French the campaign. Of this, Napoleon was so firmly convinced that he never could efface it from his memory; again and again he was heard saying, ' If Berthier had been here I should never have met this misfortune.' " (*Napoleon's Marshals*, Dunn-Pattison.)

(*d*) *Wellington.*

For specimens of his orders see his despatches.

Note also that the orders he issued for the marvellous counter-attack at Salamanca were written on two or three little scraps of torn paper.

See also Craufurd's " Standing orders for the Light Division."

(*e*) *Inkerman, Crimea,* 1854. *Misunderstanding of Wording of Orders.*

" In this attack, one of the Russian columns had been ordered to attack the right and centre of the position, and to ascend to the heights by the *left* bank of the Careenage ravine. It ascended, however, by the *right* bank of the ravine, which was *on its left.* In consequence of this blunder, two columns found themselves on a narrow plateau, unable to deploy, and were compelled to engage the English lines in close column."—Henderson, *The Framing of Orders.*

(*f*) *Balaclava, October 25th,* 1854. Map A. S 9.

The mistake which led to the famous charge of the Light Brigade was due to vagueness of orders.

The Russians, under Prince Mentschikoff, had driven the Turks from their redoubts at Kadikoi, and entered the valley of Balaclava, where they had been stopped by a charge of the Heavy Brigade. " All this had passed under the observation of Lord Raglan. He does not seem to have made any comment on the strange inaction of the Light Brigade, which was afterwards explained to be due to Lord Cardigan's impression that he was expected to confine himself strictly to the defensive. But Lord Raglan sent the following written order to Lord Lucan : ' Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by the infantry, which have been ordered to advance on two fronts.' The last sentence referred to the two English divisions on the march, and still at some distance. This order did not commend itself to Lord Lucan's mind so clearly as to cause him to act on it. He moved the Heavy Brigade on the other side of the ridge, where he proposed to await the promised support of infantry, and this, under the circumstances, was not an irrational decision. After a while a disposition seemed manifest on the Russian side to carry off

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the captured guns, which might very well seem to signify a general retreat of the forces. Therefore a second written order was sent to Lord Lucan, thus worded: 'Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of horse artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your left. Immediate.' This order was carried by the Quartermaster-General's aide-de-camp, author of a book on cavalry tactics, in which faith in the power of that arm was carried to an extreme.

Probably anyone viewing the matter without pre-possession will think that Lord Raglan's orders to Lord Lucan were not sufficiently precise. For instance, in the last order "to the front" is manifestly vague, the enemy being on several fronts. Lord Raglan, in a subsequent letter, explains his meaning thus: "It appearing that an attempt was making to remove the captured guns, the Earl of Lucan was desired to advance rapidly, *follow the enemy in their retreat,* and try to prevent them from effecting their objects." But the enemy were not removing the guns at that time, and not retreating, and the order, thus given by Lord Raglan under a mistake, did not apply.

Here was plenty of room for misinterpretation; and on receiving this order, Lord Lucan, by his own account, read it "with much consideration—perhaps consternation would be the better word—at once seeing its impracticability for any useful purpose whatever, and the consequent great unnecessary risk and loss to be incurred." He evidently interpreted "the front" to mean his own immediate front, and was presently given to understand that "the guns" were those which had retired along with the Russian cavalry. For when he uttered his objections, Nolan (the aide-de-camp to the Quartermaster-General) undertook to reply, though there is no evidence that he had any verbal instructions with which to explain the written order. "Lord Raglan's orders," he said, "are that the cavalry should attack immediately." "Attack, sir! attack what? What guns, sir?" asked Lord Lucan sharply. "There, my lord, is your enemy, there are your guns," replied the believer in the supreme potency of cavalry, pointing towards the valley, and uttering these words, Lord Lucan says, "in a most disrespectful but significant manner."

Very indignant under what he held to be a taunt, Lord Lucan thereupon rode to Lord Cardigan, and imparting to him the order as he understood it, conveyed to him the impression that he must charge right down the valley with his brigade, as it stood in two lines, while the Heavy Brigade would follow in support. And it certainly was impossible for Lord Cardigan to know what he could advance against except the cavalry that stood facing him; and though he shared and echoed Lord Lucan's misgivings,

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he at once gave the order, "The brigade will advance." With these words the famous ride began. *The War in the Crimea.* General Sir Edward Hamley.

It is not surprising that the French made the famous remark after the charge: "C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre."

(*g*) *American Civil War,* 1862.

"Stonewall Jackson's orders for battle were in every respect a model. They were very short, not to say abrupt; but they were exceedingly clear. They left no doubt whatever as to the intentions of the general in chief. They entered into no details, except when details were absolutely necessary. Commanders of divisions and brigades, of the advanced cavalry, of advanced flank and rear guards were given a perfectly free hand as to the disposition of their troops, and they were expected, in case of emergency, to act on their own initiative. The only unpardonable fault in Jackson's eyes was to do nothing, under plea of waiting for orders. To an energetic and active subordinate, even if he were sometimes led into errors of judgment, he forgave everything. His orders, moreover, whenever possible, were given to his lieutenants in a personal interview, where questions could be asked, explanations given, and all doubts removed; and to his systematic method of directing his troops his wonderful success is in no small measure to be ascribed." Henderson. "The Framing of Orders." *R.U.S.I.,* Vol. 40.

(*h*) *June 27th,* 1862. *Gaines Mill, before Richmond.*

Case of danger of unconfirmed verbal orders.

"Jackson sent by his aide-de-camp a verbal message to his reserve divisions, communicating his plan of attack. The messenger, however, misconceived the General's intentions, *and instructed the reserve divisions to await further orders before engaging the enemy.* The error was eventually rectified by the chief of the staff; but for two hours, the first line had been left without the support which Jackson had intended should be furnished, and was well nigh overwhelmed." Henderson, *Framing of Orders.*

(i) *Franco-Prussian War,* 1870.

Issue of "directions" instead of orders.

This campaign is a remarkable example of loyal support and co-operation between commanders of formations. For the most part, Prussian Royal Headquarters only issued instructions or directions, which were defined as:—

"Communications from a higher to an inferior officer, which are not so much put forth as definite orders for his immediate line of action, but rather as leading ideas. They thus serve as

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a guide in the otherwise independent formation of the resolutions."

It is interesting to see the different views of these taken by the various commanders. General Steinmetz, commanding the 1st army, at the beginning of the war conceived that "he had only received delaying or hampering orders from the Royal Headquarters. He therefore wished to have more comprehensive directions extending over a longer period, during which he could preserve the divided freedom of his own resolution."—*Official History.*

"Six days earlier," says Altham in his *The Principles of War,* "a 'direction' had been given to the 3rd army, notifying that 'His Majesty *deems* it *expedient* for the 3rd army to advance forthwith,' but the Crown Prince (in command of the army) *'regretted that he must refrain from carrying out this operation.'*"

(*k*) *The Battle of Worth, August 6th,* 1870. Sketch I.

This battle was brought on against the will of the higher command, but was really due to bad orders on the part of the latter. "On the morning of August 6th, the outposts of the Crown Prince and of Marshal MacMahon were in close contact. The Germans, however, were not fully concentrated, and the Commander-in-Chief had determined to postpone attack until his troops had closed up. In his orders the previous night this intention had been clearly expressed; the whole army was aware when the sun rose that battle would not be joined until next day. It happened, however, that the 2nd Bavarian army corps, standing opposite the French left, was divided from the remainder of the army by a steep and densely-wooded mountain; and to this corps special orders had been sent, to the effect that if they heard artillery fire they were to attack immediately, in order to prevent the French turning in full strength against the 5th army corps which held the German centre. *This order was not communicated to the remainder of the army.*" Henderson.

The result was obvious. The German 5th corps pushed forward a small reconnaissance of one battalion, which drew artillery fire, and the 2nd Bavarian Corps at once committed the whole army to an attack.

(*l*) *Correctly Departing from Orders. Mars-la-Tour, August 15th/16th,* 1870. Sketch I.

Note how von Alvensleben, with the 3rd corps, disregarded his orders to avoid engagement with the enemy, when he rapidly advanced and struck the French at Mars-la-Tour, thus ensuring the encirclement of Bazaine in Metz. See Sec. 7 (v) (g).

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(*m*) *The Italian-Abyssinian Campaign*, 1895-6.

This campaign is particularly full of disasters due to bad orders.

At the beginning of the 1895 campaign against Menelik " Arimondi was at Macalle. Toselli, with 2,150 men, had been advanced as far as Amba Alagi; but on November 24th, he moved still further south to Belego, his mission being restricted to collecting information and to preventing the natives from rising. He was not to make any attempt at serious resistance, but if attacked to retire on Amba Alagi, and thence to Macalle, in which strong position the Governor had ordered General Arimondi to establish his first line of defence—but definite orders had been given that in case of really serious attack, Arimondi and Toselli should withdraw to Adigrat, so that the whole of the colonial army might be concentrated against the invaders. Toselli had already acquired such knowledge of the enemy's movements that he considered matters very serious. On the 29th, therefore, he wrote to Arimondi, asking for orders; on November 30th, Arimondi replied by the following telegram:

" ' I leave you the choice of maintaining your position at Belego, *or of retiring to the foot of Amba Alagi, or, according to circumstances, still further.*'

" This was the telegram which, according to his narrative, he wrote at Adigrat, but the telegraph office there, and consequently Toselli, received a mutilated version that bore an entirely different signification, it ran as follows:

" ' I leave you the choice of maintaining your position at Belego, *or of retiring to the foot of Amba Alagi according to circumstances.*' "

" The alteration in meaning is obvious. General Arimondi believed that, having given Toselli full power to use his discretion according to the necessity of the moment, he need have no further anxiety about the matter. Toselli, on the other hand, believed that he was only authorized to retire as far as Amba Alagi, and no further; he considered himself bound when he reached that place, to turn and hold it at all costs." *The Campaign of Adowa and the Rise of Menelik.* Berkeley.

The result was that Toselli acted on what he thought to be his orders, and was practically annihilated by trying to maintain this position at the foot of Amba Alagi.

(ii) *The Battle of Adowa*, 1896. Sketch IX.

Note the mistake in Baratieri's orders as to the name Kidane Meret, and the disastrous results of this. See Sec. 23 (a) (vii). Later again in the same battle, Baratieri, still ignorant of the whereabouts of his various columns, and that Albertone had advanced far beyond the objective intended by him, caused further trouble by vague orders.

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"At 6.45 the Governor ordered Dabormida's brigade to advance—'to occupy the Spur of Belah and, *if possible, to support Albertone*'—another command that led to fatal misunderstandings! This is the order he tells us he gave, but nobody seems to have understood it as such—and it would have very little meaning, for how could Albertone be reached by a brigade that still occupied the Spur? What he probably intended was that, after occupying that height, Dabormida should continue to advance with some of his troops and join hands with Albertone, whom the Governor believed to be within a short distance. But the results were in every way disastrous, for Dabormida thought it his duty to advance without any further delay to the assistance of Albertone, and owing (probably) to the paths being flanked by high cliffs, he was eventually led away northwards, far from either Albertone or Arimondi." *Ibid.*

The whole battle was one of the greatest disasters met with by a European power at the hand of natives.

(*n*) *South African War*, 1899-1902.

(i) *Colenso, December*, 1899. *Vague Misleading Orders.*

Note the terrible confusion owing to the vague orders and the misuse of the words "iron bridge." See Sec. 30 (viii).

(ii) *Stormberg, December*, 1899. *Danger of not Obtaining an Acknowledgment of Orders.*

Note the results of not getting this acknowledgment from the mounted detachment that was at Penhoek. See Chapter IX (o).

(iii) *Paardeburg, February*, 1900. *Confused Orders due to Lack of Staff Organization.*

The unco-ordinated confused attacks on Cronje's laager at Paardeburg afford a very interesting example of the results of a lack of a trained staff, lack of an organization for writing, issuing and disseminating orders, and of the dangerous results of making any sudden alteration in the normal channel of command.

See the *Official History*, Vol. II.

(*o*) *Russo-Japanese War*, 1904-5. *Interference with Subordinates. Muddling Orders.*

Kuropatkin was a very good example of a general who interfered continually with subordinates, who over-centralized control, and who confused his subordinates by the frequency, length and vagueness of his orders.

"His orders were irritating, both in their frequency and their length. Yet *they either concealed with extraordinary care from his subordinates his real intentions and designs, or set them forth so obscurely that they were misinterpreted.* Thus at Ta-shih-chiao Zarubaiev failed to understand that he was not required to

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fight a serious battle, and in case of failure to fall back at once to An-shan-shan, but to delay the enemy by a series of rear-guard actions.

"At Liao-Yang, Kuropatkin's ultimate intention was:

"'To concentrate his troops in the second of his prepared lines of defence, and at some favourable opportunity, using the town of Liao-Yang as a bridgehead, to fall upon the Japanese with superior numbers.'

"Yet his orders to his subordinates contained no indication of this design for a counter-stroke; even those of the August 29th assign no other task to any commander than 'to defend' or 'to take up' such and such a position." Altham. *The Principles of War. Kuropatkin.*

It is interesting to compare this view with that expressed by Kuropatkin in the very candid and interesting book he wrote, *The Russian Army and the Japanese War*—a book which was at once supressed in Russia.

In a report to the Czar which he made just before the war, he said:—

"Generally speaking, the staff work cannot be characterized as entirely satisfactory. The principal reasons for this were the somewhat unhappy selection of the officers appointed to be chiefs, due to a limited personnel and to an insufficient supply of the means of intercommunication for both the troops and the staffs.

"The amount of writing done by the various staff officers was colossal. They worked the whole evening and all night; their effusions were lithographed or printed, and were sent off in all directions, but the *orders were rarely received by the troops in proper time.* At the manœuvres on the Warsaw Military District in 1899, cases came under my notice of *general officers commanding divisions receiving the order to move in the morning two hours after the time appointed for them to start.*"

"As regards fighting (in the Russo-Japanese War), it was laid down that in conducting military operations the *officer commanding an army should be guided by the instructions of the Commander-in-Chief, 'but should act independently.'*" It was this last direction that, in Kuropatkin's opinion, made all the difficulties as to orders. "Our army commanders were unnecessarily sensitive to interference with their powers, and in cases where orders would formerly have been issued to corps commanders it now became necessary to reckon with the personal opinions of army commanders, and to guard against offending their susceptibilities. How jealously they looked after their rights, and how strangely they interpreted their own powers, is illustrated by the following incident:—" (This was a discussion as to a possible change of plan.) 'But when my Chief of Staff asked the officer commanding the 2nd Army—who was to commence the

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operation—how he proposed to employ his cavalry, Kaulbars (the army commander) looking upon the question as an interference with his authority, became annoyed, and said much that was unnecessary and quite beside the point.'" *The Russian Army and the Japanese War.* Kuropatkin. Vol. II.

(*p*) 1914. *Objectives.*

1914. *Western Front.*

(i) During the German advance to the Marne, control by German H.Q. completely failed. Von Kluck acted throughout on his own initiative and did not conform to the instructions which underlay the vague orders from Von Moltke.

(ii) Note the danger of issuing verbal orders, unconfirmed in writing, as exemplified by the battle of Ethe-Virton. See Sec. 64 (i).

(*q*) *Length of Orders.*

Note how, in the trench warfare periods of the Great War, orders became longer and longer, and more and more detailed as the control of operations became more and more centralized.

(*r*) *Mesopotamia.*

Townshend's orders and instructions, especially in the early period, were rather remarkable, and General Nixon disapproved of the issue of some of them to lower formations. See *My Campaign in Mesopotamia,* by General Townshend.

(*s*) *Eastern Front,* 1914.

There is a very interesting discussion on the Russian instructions and orders which were issued in *Tannenberg,* by General Ironside.

(*t*) *Retreat from Mons.*

Note the bad British orders issued, which made no attempt to co-ordinate the movements of the 1st and 2nd Corps.

See Sec. (44 and 45) (d).

Note also the great difficulty encountered in communicating orders to units in the retreat from Mons. On several occasions, units were left without any orders at all.

(*u*) *Gallipoli.*

(i) Trouble often seems to have arisen owing to non-delivery of orders or confused orders.

In the attack on X Beach, General Hare's orders spoke only of the "redoubt on Hill 138." In reality there was a second and somewhat higher crest 400 yards to the south-east of Hill 138,

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and each of these mounds or hills was crowned with a redoubt." (*Official History,* Vol. I, p. 229.)

Cf. this with Adowa, or Colenso. Secs. 23 (a) (vii), 30 (viii).

(ii) For the operation subsequent to the landing of the 29th Division, the orders " entered into so much detail as to what was to be done if all went well that they left little margin for the unexpected."

(iii) The important message meant to be sent by General Birdwood to Sir Ian Hamilton, outlining the situation at Anzac on April 26th, was not addressed to anyone. " Only by mere chance did this all-important message, fraught with such vital issues, eventually reach its proper destination."

(iv) Lastly, it may be of interest to quote, as an example of a military message, that sent by the Turkish officer in Sedd al Bahr :—" My Captain, either you must send up reinforcements and drive the enemy into the sea or let us evacuate this place because it is absolutely certain that they will land more troops to-night. Send the doctors to carry off my wounded. Alas ! Alas my Captain, for God's sake send me reinforcements, because hundreds of soldiers are landing. Hurry up. What on earth will happen, my Captain? "

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